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Abstract
This thesis is a study of the role of policy leadership in German defence and security 
policy between 1990 and 2002, with particular reference to reform of the 
Bundeswehr. It situates this case study in the framework of a set of analytical 
perspectives about policy change derived from public policy theory, arguing that 
public policy theory has either underestimated policy leadership or failed to 
discriminate different leadership roles, styles and strategies. The author rejects the 
dominant contextualist and culturalist approach to leadership in studies of German 
defence and security policy in favour of an interactionist approach that stresses the 
dialectical interaction between policy skills and strategic context. The case study also 
shifts the focus in studies of policy leadership in Germany away from a preoccupation 
with the Chancellor to the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the 
core executive. The thesis illustrates the strongly self-referential nature of 
Bundeswehr reform, despite adaptational pressures from Europeanisation and 
‘NATO-isation’, and the domestic politics of base closures. It also shows how 
domestic macro-political arrangements predispose leadership roles in German defence 
and security policy towards brokerage and veto playing rather than towards 
entrepreneurship.
Wir fühlten aile, wie tiefund furchtbar die àusseren Màchîe in den Menschen 
hineingreifen konnen, bis in sein Innerstes, aber wir fühlten auch, dass es im 
Innersten etwas gab, was unangreifbar war und unverletzbar}
* Seghers, A (2002), Das Siebte Kreuz (Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin, 20* edition) p. 408.
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Chapter 1: The Theoretical Approach
1.1 Introduction
This thesis examines of the role of policy leadership in German defence and security 
policy using the case study of Bundeswehr reform (1990-2002) to explore five 
analytical perspectives about policy change originating from public policy theory, 
arguing that public policy theory has underestimated policy leadership and failed to 
discriminate different leadership roles, styles and strategies. The research also seeks 
to improve upon what is identified as a dominant constructivist approach to German 
defence and security policy by developing an interactionist approach, stressing the 
dialectical interaction between policy skills and strategic context.
Hence the thesis will attempt to make original conceptual and empirical contributions 
to several fields of study within political science - to theoretical work on German 
defence and security policy, public policy theory, leadership studies and 
Europeanisation. The empirical material presented in the thesis also fills an important 
gap in the literature on German defence and security policy, documenting the 
previously under-researched area of Bundeswehr reform during the Kohl 
Chancellorship in the post-Gold War period (in particular giving greater emphasis to 
the politics of base closures than previous accounts) and the Schroder government 
(1998-2002).^
The empirical content adds to an increasingly important field. The reform of the 
Bundeswehr must be placed into the context of the changed international environment 
of the post-Cold War period -  the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia, the 
Kosovo conflict, US hyper-power and the two Iraq Wars. These events and the
2
Longhurst, K. (2000) German Strategic Culture, A Key to Understanding the Maintenance of 
Conscription, University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies Discussion Papers. 
Longhurst K. (2003) Why Aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the 
Persistence of Conscription, German Politics, Vol. 12, No.2 pp. 147-165
11
changing international security environment mean that the ability of Europe to act as 
one in the area of defence and security policy is imperative. The Second Iraq War cast 
the spectre of future conflicts fought not on a multilateral basis but as ‘coalitions of 
the willing’, with each state deciding for itself how its national interest and security is 
served. Unless Europe is able to pool its resources and capabilities and act as one 
militarily, it is will be powerless in the face of US defence spending and military 
might.^ In short, the development of a functioning CESDP is critical to the 
international system and future of multilateralism, the rasion d’etre of the EU. Along 
with securing an equal application of justice and better distribution of welfare outside 
the boundaries of the EU this is one of the key future tasks of the EU.
Paradoxically, the EU will have a greater ability to stop conflict and act as a ‘civilian 
power’ if it has a stronger military capability. With an effective CESDP the EU would 
have more weight when promoting soft forms of security that in the long-term may 
well be more effective in fighting the causes of terror and conflict. The ‘war on terror’ 
can surely not be won by military might but by tackling the root causes of this threat: 
low living standards, poverty, inadequate education, and healthcare which lead to the 
weak state structures and civil societies in developing countries that hinder 
démocratisation and allow terror organisations to find root and support amongst 
populations.
The thesis explores the factors determining the extent to which the Bundeswehr has 
transformed from an armed force structured around the military doctrines of the Cold 
War -  Landes und BUndnisverteidigung (Territorial and Alliance Defence) - to being 
able to respond to the new security environment of the post-Cold War era 
characterised by low- intensity and ethnic conflicts, terrorism and the consequent 
challenge of being able to contribute to peace-making and peace-keeping operations.
The reform of the Bundeswehr, and its ability to engage in crisis reaction and 
prevention tasks with a European-wide pooling of military resources and capabilities
 ^Hill, C. (1994) The Capabilities-Expectations Gap or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, in 
Buhner, S and Scott, A. (1994) Economic and Political Integration in Europe, Internal Dynamics and 
Global Context* (Blackwell, Oxford), pp. 103-127
Hill, C. (1998), ‘Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds), A 
Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (Routledge, London), pp. 18-38
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is a key barometer of the German willingness to address the ‘capabilities-expectations 
gap’ that continues to beset the European Union. Thus the research makes a small but 
significant contribution to this question.
However, the thesis not only attempts to add to knowledge about the issue of 
Bundeswehr reform, but also seeks to make an important contribution to work on 
leadership in Germany, shifting the focus from the Chancellor to the ministerial level 
and the roles played by top officials and brings new empirical material to bear on 
Germany’s role in NATO and the EU and the influence of these institutions on 
German defence and security policy. ^  Finally, the thesis provides an original case 
study of the role of a Commission in policy making, analysing the role played by the 
Weizsacker Commission in Bundeswehr reform, contributing to work on the policy 
style of the Schroder government and the concept of the 'Raterepublik* (Schroder’s 
policy style of using Commissions to prepare for major reforms).^
The thesis also attempts to make a number of conceptual contributions to political 
science, seeking to apply public policy theory to explain how German defence and 
security policy has changed in the period 1990-2002, within the ‘policy subsystem’ of 
the Bundeswehr. It focuses on the roles, styles and strategies of leadership in policy 
change in the context of examining five analytical perspectives about policy change 
that are derived from public policy theory. Particular attention is paid to the three 
leadership roles of policy entrepreneur, policy broker and policy veto player with 
reference to the governments of Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schroder and the Federal 
Defence Ministers Volker Rühe (1992-98) and Rudolf Scharping (1998-2002), in 
contrast to the ‘contextualist’ consensus that dominates the literature on German 
defence and security policy. The thesis utilises an interactionist approach to policy 
leadership that draws out the complex relationship between leadership skills and 
strategic political context.
Bundeswehr reform throws up the vexed problem of the relationship between 
structure and agency. Existing work on German defence policy has focused on
* Paterson, W. ‘Helmut Kohl, ‘The Vision Thing’ and Escaping the Semi-Sovereignty Trap’, German 
Politics, 7,1 (1998)pp.l7-36.
 ^Heinze, R. Die Berliner Raterpublik: Viel Rat, wenig Tat? (Wiesbaden: Westdeutsche Verlag)
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applying international relations theory, with a dominance of the field by constructivist 
accounts that stress culture and offer a contextualist approach to leadership. Thus 
Berger stresses Germany’s ‘culture of antimilitarism’, rooted in Germany’s ‘struggle 
to draw lessons from its troubled past’; Longhurst identifies a specific German 
‘strategic culture’, analysing it into foundational elements that are highly resistant to 
change, ‘security policy standpoints’ that translate these core values into policy, and 
‘regulatory practices’ that make up specific policies and are more amenable to 
change.^ These accounts share two basic beliefs -  (1) that German policy is driven by 
core shared ideas rather than material factors, producing a ‘culturally-bounded’ 
pattern that persists over time; and (2) that German definitions of national interest and 
identity in relation to defence and security are constructed by these shared ideas.^ The 
result is a conception of a national security culture that: ‘predispose(s) societies in 
general and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies over 
others.’*
In short, previous accounts have sought to demonstrate the importance of structure, 
culture and the inheritance from past formative periods rather than agency and 
leadership skills in explaining change in German defence and security policy. 
Ideational structures emerge as deeply conservative, and strategic culture as self- 
reproducing. This thesis seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the relationship 
between structure and agency in the area of Bundeswehr reform by showing that -  to 
the extent that policy change is culturally conditioned - culture is an on-going 
accomplishment of agents whose role can be transformative and not simply a self- 
fulfilling prophecy.^ It does so by uniting the insights from public policy theories -  
notably multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theories -  and highlighting the 
role of individual leadership.
 ^Berger, T. (1998). Cultures o f Antimilitarism, National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore 
MD, John Hopkins University), p. 6
Longhurst, K. (2000) Strategic Culture, The Key to Understanding German Security Policy? 
(Birmingham University, PhD Thesis)
 ^Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
* Duffield, J. (1998) World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, Intemationallnstitutions, and German 
Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press), p.27 
 ^Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 186-189
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Policy theory is concerned with understanding the role played by ideas in policy 
change, the precise mechanisms through which some ideas are successful and others 
not, and crucially the role of agency in this process. Hence the thesis seeks to provide 
a clearer understanding of the relationship between structure and agency by 
examining the mechanisms through which policy change takes place. Public policy 
theory is well-adapted to this task because it has had a special concern with the 
transmission of ideas and argument, in short with the cognitive basis of policy. As 
Majone argued: ‘We miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in 
terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.’
In attempting to disentangle the relationship between structure and agency in policy 
making the thesis stresses the complementarities and overlaps within public policy 
theory and the potential cross-fertilization with institutionalist accounts. Given the 
interactionist approach developed here, the greatest potential for cross-fertilization is 
with historical institutionalism. Within historical institutionalism policy change is 
seen as ‘as the consequence... of strategic action.. ., filtered through perceptions of an 
institutional context that favours certain strategies, actors and perceptions over 
others’.T h e  institutional context of the configuration of rules matters in ways that 
public policy theory often fails to acknowledge adequately. It provides reasons for 
action through the normative expectations associated with its framework of roles, and 
it affects actors’ choices of strategies and venues.
However, institutions do not fully script in advance what agents must do, reducing 
them to ‘plastic’ men.^ "^  Deeper beliefs and intentions -  often of a moral character - 
are at work, including motives external to the particular institution. They mean that 
agents are capable of self-directed conduct. Also, institutional leaders operate in the
Stone (1989) ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Stories’, Political Science Quarterly,
No. 104, Vol.2, pp.281-300
Sure], Y. (2000) ‘The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy Making’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol.7, No.4 pp.495-512
“ Majone, G. (1989) Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven, Yale 
University Press), p.2
Hay, C and Wincott, D. (1998) Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism, Political Studies, 
Vol.46, pp.951-957.
Schlaeger, E. (1999) A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories and Models of Policy Processes, in 
Sabatier, P. (ed.) (1999) Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, Westview), pp.250-251 
Hollis, M. (1994) The Philosophy o f the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 
pp. 114 and 180-182
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more fluid and open-textured context of the interface with other institutions with 
which there are relationships of mutual dependence. This endows them with further 
potential for autonomous conduct. As this case study will seek to show, the leadership 
skills and strategic actions of players in key institutional positions also partially 
transform the institutions and therefore the strategies, actors and perceptions that an 
institutional context favours. Such an understanding of institutions is more amenable 
to public policy theory and allows for a more effective exploration of the relationship 
between agents and structures than rational choice and sociological institutionalism 
which privilege agency and structure respectively.
Thus five analytical perspectives about policy change are identified that derive from 
public policy theory:
Perspective 1. The context and opportunity for major policy change is provided by 
significant perturbations external to the policy subsystem, notably the effects of 
international crises, governmental changes, ‘public opinion* shocks for instance as 
manifested in Lander (state) elections, changes emanating from other policy 
subsystems including international institutions like NATO and the EU (NATO-isation 
and Europeanisation), and court rulings on Bundeswehr reform.
Perspective 1.1: Significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, 
but not sufficient, cause o f change in the policy core attributes
Perspective 2. Policy change requires a shift within the policy subsystem in the 
coalition in power so that new beliefs are brought to bear on policy.
Perspective 3. Policy change is a long-term process, requiring policy-oriented 
learning by means o f technical information and analysis o f the nature and magnitude 
of problems, their causes, and the probable impacts o f different policy solutions.
Perspective 4. Policy change requires skilful policy entrepreneurs, capable o f 
manipulating short-term 'windows o f opportunity' to bring new ideas to bear. These 
windows are opened by 'compellingproblems* or by events in the 'politics* stream.
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Perspective 5. Policy change requires a shift o f institutional venue, bringing in new 
actors and ideas and changing the decisional bias.
Building on this, the thesis develops an interactionist approach to policy leadership 
stressing the interaction between a policy leader’s policy skills, policy traits and 
strategic political context.
Leaders are shown to be critically important in policy change by manipulating the 
processes of policy-oriented learning, by using information to reframe issues and by 
selecting policy forums and new institutional venues. They play different types of 
policy leadership role. In some instances, they act as policy entrepreneurs, adopting 
and pushing through particular solutions, typically involving radical change to the 
policy paradigm. In other situations, they behave as policy brokers, seeking to 
negotiate consensus amongst competing policy ideas. Sometimes, their role is that of 
policy veto players, minimising the political costs of pressures for policy change 
emanating from within the policy subsystem.
Finally, in its focus on the role played by NATO and the EU in Bundeswehr reform 
(chapter 6) the thesis will seek to build upon previous work on the Europeanisation of 
German Defence and Security Policy and argues that greater attention must be paid to 
the role of agency in the process of Europeanisation than previous accounts posit.
Hence the thesis will attempt to break new empirical and conceptual ground, applying 
public policy theory to explain how German defence and security policy has changed 
in the period 1990-2002, within the ‘policy subsystem’ of the Bundeswehr. Before 
going into greater detail about the analytical perspectives of policy change and 
interactionist approach to policy leadership, the next section will outline the main 
debates within study of policy change and the concept of policy leadership.
Cowles, M. Caporaso, J and Risse, T. (2001) Transforming Europe, Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change (Ithaca, NY, Cornell) pp. 1-21
Knill, C. (1998) ‘European Politics, The Impact of National Administrative Traditions’, Journal of 
Public Policy, Vol. 18 (1) pp. 1-28
Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. ‘The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy. On the 
Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’ in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (eds) (2003) 
Germany, Europe and the Politics o f Constraint (Oxford, Oxford University Press) pp.325-345
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1.2 The Concept of Policy Leadership and the Study of Policy Change
Leadership is what Stephan Komer terms an inexact concept -  one that in contrast to 
key concepts of mathematics, cannot readily resolve the problem of borderline cases 
(when is ‘what a leader does’ not leadership?)/^ Its ambiguity stems from the 
difficulties both of gaining agreement about its boundaries and to what it refers and of 
measuring its presence and effects. As we shall see below, disagreements exist about 
such matters as its empirical referents, the bases and forms of leadership (e.g. whether 
it is coercive or ideational), and how it relates to companion concepts like power and 
management.
Many of these differences are ultimately not resolvable because they are linked to 
contrasting ontological starting points about the nature of reality and about the way 
that the world works. One source of contest is about whether it refers to a property of 
one or more agents (and the relationship between them) or to a relationship between 
one or more agents and a policy sub-system and a macro-political framework. To the 
extent that there it is agreed that leadership is a relationship between actors and a 
policy sub-system or macro-political framework, there are disagreements about how 
this relationship should be conceptualized (notably between the ‘contextualist’ and the 
‘interactionist’ approaches). There are also deep differences of view about what 
should be included and excluded (e.g. what types of effect, what types of role, which 
policy skills?) and what prioritised (e.g. personal traits or situational contingencies 
like institutional and political context).
For some leadership is a transformational activity, involving vision, charisma and 
symbolic pow ers.T he leader is ‘an individual who creates a story’ and someone to 
whom others attribute significant symbolic pow ers.From  this perspective leadership 
is bound up with a process of attribution in which others -  seeking to explain policy 
failure or success -  invoke poor or good leadership as the ‘real’ cause. Another 
perspective -  more skeptical of the ‘romance of leadership’ notion -  focuses on
Komer, S. (1959) Conceptual Thinking, A Logical Enquiry (New York, Dover) p.36 
Bryman, A. (1992) Charisma and Leadership in Organisations (London, Sage)
** Gardner, N. (1996) A Guide to UK and EU Competition Policy, 2“*. Edition (London, Macmillan) 
Hunt, J. (1991) Leadership, A New Synthesis (London, Sage) p.205
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situational contingencies, such as the institutional and policy environment/^ Their 
stress on constraints leads them to identify a wider range of roles. Alongside 
transformational leadership, they identify ‘transactional leadership*, in which policy 
brokers are involved in the negotiating difficult compromises, and laissez-faire 
leadership (similar to Mintzberg’s ‘quiet’, enabling leadership) that focuses just on 
broad strategic direction but is ‘hands-off in relation to policy management.^®
A second reason why leadership is an inexact concept is that it cannot to be 
numerically measured, at least not in a way that would avoid the accusation that the 
procedure and the results were arbitrary. Even if one can agree on its proper 
dimensions, it is by no means clear how it could be ranked, nevermind give them 
clear numerical expression. Its use involves an unavoidable exercise of informed 
judgment, not scientific precision. It is difficult for those who use it to avoid 
entrapment in the ‘romance of leadership* notion in which special powers are 
attributed to leaders when trying to explain policy success or failure when it is 
difficult to determine the ‘real* causes at work.^  ^This problem is made all the more 
difficult to handle because attribution by others is itself an important part of 
leadership. As we shall see below, it produces methodological difficulties in using 
interviews to identify aspects of leadership.
These two problematic aspects of the concept -  as with other concepts of everyday 
experience -  mean that it is destined to remain contested and its application fraught 
with difficulties. In this context the thesis settles for the modest, but nonetheless 
challenging task of seeking to describe the imprecise relationships that are associated 
with policy leadership in as precise a manner as possible. In doing so it can aim to be 
coherent in terms of the ontological and epistemological foundations of the thesis and 
to be useful in guiding empirical research on the questions posed (and is to be 
properly criticised on these grounds). However it cannot hope to avoid the ongoing 
disputes that derive from different ontological and epistemological positions.
Bass, B. and Stogdill, R. (1990) Bass and StogdilVs Handbook o f Leadership, Theory, Research and 
Management Applications (New York, The Free Press)
Fielder, F.E. (1967) A Theory o f Leadership Effectiveness (NY, McGraw-Hill) pp.261-265 
“  Bums, B. (1978) Leadership (London, New York, Harper Row) pp.257-357 
Mintzberg, H (1989) Mintzberg on Management, Inside our Strange World o f Organisations (New 
York, Free Press)
Hunt, J. (1991) Leadership, A New Synthesis (London, Sage) p.205
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A review of the main literature on leadership within political science and organization 
theory underlines the definitional problems. Given the endemic nature of these 
problems in discussing leadership both bodies of literature tend to offer complex 
analytical models rather than definitions.^^ In both literatures there has been a clear 
shift over time from an actor-centred emphasis on personal traits to one that gives 
more attention to contextual variables, from ‘leadership character’ to what might be 
termed ‘contextualisation of leadership’.B ey o n d  that both literatures are 
characterized by tensions and unresolved conflicts. Notably there are those who give 
primacy to context -  ‘contexts make leaders’ - and those who stress the interaction 
between personal leadership skills and context -  that leaders negotiate contexts and 
the resources, constraints and opportunities that they present. "^  ^Political science has 
great difficulties in disentangling leadership from the concept of power, and moving 
beyond the dualism of the cognitive and the strategic aspects of leadership. 
Organization theory has similar problems of differentiation from the concept of 
management, and has no settled position about the relationship between the task- 
oriented and the socio-emotional aspects of leadership. Both bodies of literature lack a 
settled position on contextualist versus interactionist approaches to leadership.
Within political science there is a widespread recognition that the concept of 
leadership overlaps with the concept of power. Thus, just as with the concept of 
power, definitions of leadership have proved contentious. As Jean Blondel noted, 
‘power is the key element of political leadership’, and went on to define leadership as 
the ‘ability to make others do what they would not otherwise do’.^  ^This emphasis on 
the ‘powering’ aspect of leadership can be criticized for underplaying the inspirational
In political science on the French Presidency see Cole, A. (1994) François Mitterand, A Study in 
Political Leadership, London, Routledge; on die German Chancellorship see
Korte, H.-R. ‘Solutions for the Decision Dilemma, Political Styles of Germany’s Chancellors’, German 
Politics, 9,1 (2000) pp. 1-22.
Paterson, W. ‘Helmut Kohl: ‘The Vision Thing and Escaping the Semi-Sovereignty Trap’, German 
Politics, 7,1 (1998) pp. 17-36.
^  In organisation theory see Adair, J. (1983), Effective Leadership (Gower, London) and Handy, CB 
(1985) Understanding Organisations, 3"*. Edition (Harmondsworth, Penguin)
In political science see Elgie, R.C. (1995) Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies (Basingstoke, 
Macmillan)
^  Elgie, R.C. (1995) Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies (Basingstoke, Macmillan)
Hargrove, E and Owens J. (eds) (2003) Leadership in Context (London, Rowman and Litdefield, 
Lanham and Buder)
^  Blondel, J. (1987) Political Leadership, Towards a General Analysis (London, Sage) p.3
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and cognitive aspects of persuasion, whether through a common vision or through 
initiating policy learning.
Therefore in discussing leadership it is useful to distinguish between ‘power over’ -  
which derives from strategic skills in using constitutional position, executive 
organization, and party, coalition and electoral management - from ‘power to’ -  
which rests on cognitive skills of imparting vision, of persuasion through convincing 
narrative and of policy learning and lesson drawing.^^ This distinction is mirrored in 
The Oxford English Dictionary which in defining leadership covers a wide spectrum 
from ‘directing the course of action to be followed’ through to ‘guiding action by 
argument and persuasion’ and to ‘directing by example’. In seeking to arrive at a 
definition of policy leadership it is helpful to focus on both cognitive and strategic 
skills in negotiating different structural contexts. However, consistent with ‘critical’ 
realism, they are to be seen not as independent aspects of leadership but as internally 
related or mutually constitutive aspects in a dialectical manner.
The literature on leadership in German politics has been preoccupied with the Federal 
Chancellor and has had much less to say about executive leadership by ministers or 
administrative leadership by top officials. Both federal ministers and State Secretaries 
have been neglected in studies of the German core executive. Hence this literature is 
really only of value to studies of public policy to the extent that a policy falls directly 
within the constitutional sphere of the Chancellor or is identified as a Kanzlersache 
because of its preeminent political importance for the governing party and coalition. 
This view of leadership is, however, too restrictive for understanding policy change. 
By looking at policy leadership at the policy sub-subsystem level this thesis hopes to 
make a contribution to core executive studies in Germany by delving more deeply to 
look at the determinants of policy change.
Studies of Chancellor leadership have mirrored wider features of the political science 
literature. Analytical modeling has focused on mapping the various political 
constraints and resources that shape and provide the context for German Chancellors
^  Stone (1989) ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Stories’, Political Science Quarterly, 
No. 104, Vol.2, pp.281-300
27 Giddens, A. (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory (London: Macmillan) p,69
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in trying to provide leadership, paying particular attention to constitutional, party, 
coalition, electoral and policy resources/^ Of importance for this thesis have been the 
findings about how Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schroder have defined and practiced 
leadership. Kohl developed the so-called ‘Kohl system’ which relied on a broad and 
deep cultivation of a network of contacts centred around the CDU. Thus party 
management was always critical to his Chancellor leadership.^^ Kohl also nested his 
political and policy management in a long-term value of the political necessity of the 
coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). This allowed him to use the 
argument of coalition logic to discipline would-be critics within the CDU/CSU. 
Finally, historical vision played an important role in his formula of leadership, 
especially in relation to European unification.^® In this respect Kohl displayed a 
capacity for ‘transformational’ leadership’, most notably over Economic and 
Monetary Union.^^ These three elements defined the scope for leadership in the 
defence and security policy subsystem during his governments.
During his first term (1998-2002) Schroder’s leadership style was characterized by 
two main features: the search for consensus across the boundaries of parties and 
groups (his so-called Raterepublik of commissions preparing major reforms); and his 
careful attention to media image and to opinion polls and recognition that jobs and 
employment were the central concerns of voters.^^ The guiding theme was no longer 
historical vision but economic policy competence and to desire to project a personal 
image of a ‘modem’ Chancellor directly to the German public. His Chancellorship 
rested on a combination of leadership as ‘modem opportunity management’ with the 
arts of symbolic politics.^^ There were clear implications for defence and security
^  Helms, J. (2002) Making Sense of Organisational Change (London, Routledge)
Korte, H.-R. ‘Solutions for the Decision Dilemma, Political Styles of Germany’s Chancellors’, German 
Politics, 9,1 (2000) pp. 1-22.
Smith, M (1991) Analysing Organisational Behaviour (Basingstoke, Macmillan)
Mois, M.. ‘Pohcy Making and Foreign PoUcy Advice’ in Eberwein, K-D. and Kaiser, K. (eds) (1998) 
Germany's New Foreign Policy: Decision-Malting in an Interdependent World'. (München, Oldenburg 
Verlag) p.285
^  Paterson, W. ‘Helmut Kohl, ‘The Vision Thing’ and Escaping the Semi-Sovereignty Trap’, German 
Politics, 1 ,1 (1998) pp. 17-36.
Banchoff, T. ‘German Policy towards the European Union: The Effects of 
Historical Memory’, German Politics, 6,1 (1997), pp.60-76.
Heinze, R. Die Berliner Raterpublik: Viel Rat, wenig Tat? (Wiesbaden: Westdeutsche Verlag)
Korte, H.-R. ‘Solutions for the Decision Dilemma, Political Styles of Germany’s Chancellors’, 
German Politics, 9,1 (2(XX)) pp. 1-22.
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policy. For Kohl, defence and security policy mattered to the extent that it was about 
Germany’s historical obligations: to repay the United States for its support over 
German unification and more broadly over the post-war period, and as part of the 
process of European political unification and the strengthening of the Franco-German 
motor in this process. For Schroder, defence and security policy was very much 
secondary to economic policy when it came to making issues a * Kanzlersache’. The 
result was a very different context for leadership in the defence and security policy 
subsystem under Schroder.
However, as with political science more generally, the challenge for the literature on 
the Chancellor leadership had been how to conceptualize the relationship between its 
cognitive and strategic aspects. Those of a constructivist inclination have been 
disposed to stress the ‘vision thing* or the role of discourse. '^* However, seen from the 
perspective of ‘critical’ realism, the challenge is to draw out the complex dialectical 
relationship between the cognitive and the strategic aspects of Chancellor leadership 
and how these relate to a changing structural context and the resources, constraints 
and opportunities that this context presents.
Since the 1980s leadership studies has been a major growth area in organizational and 
management theory. Traditionally, this literature had focused on leadership ‘traits’ 
and later, from the 1940s under the impact of behaviouralism, had gone on to examine 
leadership in the socio-psychological context of group dynamics.^^ From the 1960s 
the emphasis shifted towards an interactionist approach that, whilst still rooted in 
social psychology, paid more attention to task requirements as a variable conditioning 
leadership. The result was a ‘contingency’ perspective on leadership. The ‘take-off of 
leadership studies in the 1980s owed much to the popularity of the work of Peters and 
Waterman, which stressed ‘benchmarking’ successful corporate leaders and drawing 
practical lessons.^^ Leadership was identified as a more critical variable in corporate 
success as the business environment was becoming more competitive, fast-changing
^  Dealing with Kohl, see Paterson, W. ‘Helmut Kohl, ‘The Vision Thing’ and Escaping the Semi- 
Sovereignty Trap’, German Politics^ 7,1 (1998) pp. 17-36.
Dealing with Schroder, see Jeffrey, C. and Hyde-Price, A. ‘Germany in the EU’, Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, Vol.39, No.4, November 2001, pp.689-717 
Barnard, C. (1938) The Functions o f the Executive (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press) 
Peters, T. and Waterman, R (1982). In Search o f Excellence, Lessons from America’s Best-Run 
Companies (NY, Harper and Row)
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and uncertain. It was about coping with change and thus was to be distinguished from 
management, which was about coping with the complexity of large-scale 
organizations.
Reviewing the complex organizational and management theory literature on 
leadership, Charles Handy concluded that this concept ‘is a complex one, riddled with 
ambiguity, incompatibility and conflict.R ather than providing a definition, he 
contents himself with a ‘differentiated trait’ approach that identifies three dimensions 
of leadership. They can be adapted to public policy theory as follows:
1. The leader as mobiliser and activator of the policy subsystem, setting a clear and 
firm direction of change through both a vision and a skilful exploitation of 
windows of opportunity for change. This dimension is consistent with the 
transformational leadership role of the policy entrepreneur.
2. The leader as ambassador of the policy subsystem, acting as a ‘linking-pin’ or 
integrator, finding common ground amongst its different actors and effectively 
representing the values and interests of the subsystem externally so that it achieves 
a high level of autonomy of operation and finds it easier to acquire necessary 
resources. This dimension can be seen as a key attribute of the ‘transactional’ 
leader as policy broker.
3. The leader as model to the policy subsystem, incorporating a set of shared values, 
attitudes and forms of behaviour that are highly valued as points of reference for 
the conduct of others. This dimension is close to the concept of charisma. It can be 
seen as consistent with the laissez-faire leadership role.
Within Handy’s broad summary of a large literature on organizational leadership is a 
set of unresolved tensions and conflicts. Most prominently, is the appropriate 
relationship between the socio-emotional aspects of leadership and the task-oriented 
aspects. At the heart of the socio-emotional aspect is how leaders interact with others 
who are significant for performance. Some stress the importance of building 
supportive relations -  like the policy broker - by allowing others to influence policy 
and building up trust and respect so that there is commitment to policy. In this view.
Handy, CB (1985) Understanding Organisations, 3”*. Edition (Harmondsworth, Penguin), p,114
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leaders are important as ‘linking-pins’.^  ^Others emphasise the psychologically distant 
leader who seeks informal acceptance but -  like the transformational leader - is 
strongly task-centred. In this view leadership is about providing clear definitions of 
activity so that control can be enforceable.^^
One common problem that is thrown up by political science and organization theory 
is a tendency to identify leadership with a particular type of effect, namely change.
The implication seems to be that leadership must have an effect and that effect must 
be change; also, that change is good and that good leaders produce change. Hence it is 
to be ‘measured’ in terms of the degree of change that it produces. This implication 
underpins the emphasis on ‘transformational* and ‘transactional’ leadership -  or, in 
the language of public policy theory -  on policy entrepreneurs and policy brokers.
This viewpoint ignores, however, that the effect of leadership can be to maintain 
continuity in the face of growing pressures for ‘undesirable’ or ‘unnecessary’ policy 
change. In this case the leader influences policy change by preventing it, by acting as 
a policy veto player on behalf of maintaining a set of policy beliefs. Hence this thesis 
adds the role of policy veto player to the characterization of leadership. The definition 
of policy leadership offered here does not take up a position on whether and in what 
ways it is bound up with particular effects.
Consistent with ‘critical’ realism this brief overview of political science and 
organization theory suggests the following working definition of policy leadership:
Policy leadership refers to the dialectical relationship between the cognitive 
and strategic personal and policy skills o f those in positions o f authority as 
they negotiate specific contexts at the policy sub-system and macro-political 
levels. These skills are used both in adapting to or seeking to shape structural 
contexts - and the institutional and political resources and constraints that 
they provide - and in tailoring their roles - as policy entrepreneurs, brokers 
and veto players - to these variable contexts. Leadership takes place within 
contexts that favour certain narratives and strategies over others but at the 
same time has the potential to recast these contexts.
Likert (1961) New Patterns of Management (New York, Me Graw-Hill) p.62
Fielder, F.E. (1967) A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness (NY, McGraw-Hill) pp.261-265
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1.3 Public Policy Theory and Analytical Perspectives of Policy Change
The use of public policy theory brings its own problems. First, it is not a unified 
field.'*  ^It contains differing views on the relationship between structure and agency, 
the causal mechanisms involved in policy change, the time-scales of such change, and 
the nature of the dependent variable (agenda setting for the multiple streams and 
punctuated equilibrium frameworks; decisions for the advocacy coalition framework). 
In particular, public policy theory does not provide an agreed account of leadership. 
The advocacy coalition framework inclines towards a contextualist approach to 
leadership, the multiple streams framework towards a ‘skill-based’ approach. On the 
positive side, public policy theory offers an opportunity to use multiple approaches to 
test their comparative advantage in explaining
Bundeswehr reform is an invitation to think more precisely about causal mechanisms. 
It is also possible to explore complementarities between these theories and see how 
they might cross-fertilise and help remedy each other’s main weaknesses. Notably, 
certain key concepts are shared across public policy theories: crisis/perturbation, 
policy entrepreneurs/brokers, institutional venues, ‘venue shopping’ and policy or 
professional forums. Though they are wrapped up in different frameworks of 
variables, these concepts represent an important degree of commonality in public 
policy theory that will be explored in this thesis. Cross-fertilisation is potentially 
fruitful in examining the extent to which leadership skills can make a significant 
difference to policy change.
Secondly, it is by no means easy to distinguish major policy change from minor. 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish change to the policy core (major) from change 
to secondary aspects (minor) and both -  which are specific to the policy subsystem - 
from change to deep core beliefs about fundamental political values that transcend the 
policy subsystem and are deeply entrenched in actors’ cognitive frameworks.**  ^Policy
^  Sabatier, P. ‘The Need for Better Theories’ in Sabatier, P. (ed.) (1999) Theories o f the Policy 
Process, pp. 1-17 (Boulder, Westview)
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coahtion Framework, An Assessment’, in 
P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories o f the Policy Process (Boulder, Westview Press), pp. 117-66.
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core beliefs represent basic normative and empirical commitments about priorities, 
causal mechanisms and appropriate strategies within the subsystem. Secondary 
aspects refer not just to the domain of technical information about how policy should 
be implemented (Sabatier’s view) but also -  as this thesis argues - to whether good or 
bad reasons can be given for adhering to particular policy core beliefs. But in practice 
this distinction is difficult to sustain.
Bundeswehr reform has tended to combine partial change to aspects of policy core 
beliefs with change to secondary aspects. The belief systems of leading actors tend to 
be more complex, nested within each other, and subject to the pulls and pushes of 
politics, than the advocacy coalition framework suggests. Not least, it should be 
remembered that changes in policy cores are a matter of perspective.^^ What, from the 
perspective of NATO and especially the US Defence Department, was seen as 
‘minor’ change to a secondary aspect of the Bundeswehr was ‘major’ change to the 
policy core for those within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem. This shows that the 
secondary aspects of the NATO belief system can constitute the policy core aspects of 
the Bundeswehr belief system. The level of analysis problem and the nesting of policy 
sub-systems complicate judgements about the magnitude of change.
A third problem is less often admitted in public policy theory. As we shall see below, 
public policy theory attributes a high degree of significance to ‘external 
perturbations’, in short to events and crises and the role of contingency in explaining 
policy change. Public policy theory also gives (to greater and lesser degrees) 
importance to agency in processes of policy change. This raises awkward questions 
about intentions and motives of individual leaders, in particular about personal traits 
like ambition, ideological fervour, self-confidence, assertiveness and risk-taking and 
about personal policy skills such as expertise, bargaining, articulation and setting of 
clear objectives, and managing party and public opinion. The point is that contingency 
and agency (leadership traits and skills) introduce powerful elements of indeterminacy 
into policy change and complicate the tracing of causal mechanisms. What public 
policy theory lacks is an interactionist approach that seeks to explain leadership in 
terms of strategic political context and leaders’ personal traits and policy skills.
Schlaeger, E. (1999) A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories and Models of Policy Processes, in 
Sabatier, P. (ed.) (1999) Theories o f the Policy Process (Boulder, Westview Press) p.253
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The five analytical perspectives about policy change outlined below are derived from 
public policy approaches and draw out, in various ways, the roles of contingency, 
cognition and leadership in shaping Bundeswehr reform. Above all, they move 
analysis of policy change away from static models of decision-making, by stressing 
how the various elements of the policy process interact over time."^  ^At the same time 
public policy theory gravitates towards one of two types of explanation and neglects a 
third. The advocacy coalition and the punctuated equilibrium frameworks are useful 
in highlighting the extent to which agency is constrained and shaped by the 
characteristics of policy subsystems and the macro-political political conditions 
within which these subsystems interact. In short, they have a contextual understanding 
of leadership in the policy process. In contrast, the multiple streams firamework takes 
a more agency-centred view of policy change that has little to say about institutional 
context. Against these two dominant views within public policy theory, this thesis 
argues for an interactionist approach that explores the relationship between leadership 
skills and context. In particular, it stresses the role of individuals in shaping processes 
of policy change and defining the limits of change.
Perspective 1. The context and opportunity for major policy change is provided by 
significant perturbations external to the policy subsystem, notably the effects of 
international crises, governmental changes, * public opinion ' shocks for instance as 
manifested in Lander elections, changes emanating from other policy subsystems 
including international institutions like NATO and the EU (NATO-isation and 
Europeanisation), and court rulings on Bundeswehr reform.
This perspective is common to public policy theories and shared with historical 
institutionalism, which stresses critical junctures. Thus, for instance, the punctuated 
equilibrium framework stresses how macro-political forces intervene to push an issue 
out of a policy subsystem and onto the governmental agenda. However, theories differ 
in whether they see major policy change as a product of a single ‘watershed’ event or 
external shock (notably the multiple streams framework) or a series of events 
extending over a decade and more (the advocacy coalition framework).
43 John, P, (1998) Analysing Public Policy (London, Pinter), Chapter 8
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The thesis seeks to identify and examine ‘watershed’ events and turning points and 
how they affected policy. Such examples include the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, the 
Kosovo War of 1999 and the terrorist assault on the US on 11 September 2001; the 
election of the Schroder government in 1998 and associated generational change; the 
relevant rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court; and domestic budgetary crises, 
especially associated with the risk of breaching the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. 
Where public policy theories agree is in seeing no necessary connection between the 
size of an event and the degree or pace of policy change. One factor is the skill (or 
lack of it) of policy entrepreneurs in seizing the window of opportunity to effect 
change. This point is stressed strongly in the multiple streams framework and the 
punctuated equilibrium framework and recognized by the advocacy coalition 
framework. It highlights the roles of contingency and leadership in explaining policy 
change.
This perspective is also consistent with the 'second image reversed' literature in which 
domestic change is seen as embedded or nested within requirements and pressures 
emanating from the international arena."^ Domestic leaders can use NATO and EU 
requirements to strengthen their positions within domestic policy and change the 
terms of policy debate. Seen from this perspective, change in German defence policy 
is shaped by two mechanisms. The ‘top-down’ mechanism involves adaptational 
pressures from Atlanticisation and Europeanisation consequent on lack of 'goodness 
of fit' with German policy."^  ^The ‘bottom-up’ mechanism of Atlanticisation and 
Europeanisation takes the form of domestic actors using NATO and the EU to 
strengthen their power over policy.'^^
The perspective raises a number of problems. First, the independent variable is not 
specified very clearly. ‘Crisis’ is more an attention-directing device than a precise.
^  Gourevitch, P. (1978) ‘Explaining Policy Choices’ in Politics in Hard Times, Comparative 
Responses to Economic Crises pp.35-68 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press)
Putnam, R. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Two-Level Games’ International Organisation, 42, pp. 427-60 
Milner, H. (1988) Resisting Protectionism, Global Industries and the Protection o f International Trade 
(Princeton University Press, N.J.) pp.290-301 
Cowles, M. Caporaso, J and Risse, T. (2001) Transforming Europe, Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change (Ithaca, Cornell University Press), p.6
^  Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D, (2002) ‘The National Impact of European Union Regulatory Policy, 
Three Europeanisation Mechanisms’, European Journal o f Political Research, No.41, pp.255-280
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clearly specified explanatory concept. A crisis can be defined as an ‘epoch-making’ 
moment of decisive intervention, marking the historical transition between phases of 
political time.^  ^But, helpful as such a definition is, it does not make it easy to 
distinguish a crisis from an event that dislocates policy routines. When precisely is an 
event a crisis? How does one measure the independent variable and compare, say, a 
change of government with a budgetary crisis and both with Srebrenica or 11 
September? In the absence of clear answers to these questions, it remains impossible 
to predict what kind of event would produce a particular scope or level of policy 
change. Secondly, not all exogenous shocks translate into policy change. Thus the 
perspective needs modification, as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith later recognized:
Perspective 1.1: Significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, 
but not sufficient, cause o f change in the policy core attributes.'^^
This leads on to a third problem with the perspective. There is an important perceptual 
dimension to crisis. An event is a crisis or shock because it is perceived to be so and 
because a leader provides a narrative of systemic failure."^  ^Hence a crucial aspect of 
policy change is the role of leaders in identifying and defining a crisis (e.g. of Joschka 
Fischer defining Srebrenica as a crisis for German defence and security policy). The 
creation and manipulation of a crisis consciousness by leaders is a critical component 
of policy change. Therefore one is forced to consider what prompts leaders to define 
events as crises and to use them as instruments of change.
An additional problem is that policy change will not occur unless policy leaders in an 
active display of agency skilfully exploit the opportunity created by a crisis 
consciousness. This involves leadership skills in managing the strategic context of 
consensus building required by domestic constitutional arrangements. In the case of 
Germany the semi-sovereign character of its domestic institutional arrangements
Hay, C. (1999) 'Globalisation, Régionalisation and the Persistence of National Variation: The 
Contingent Convergence of Contemporary Capitalism’, ESRC ‘One Europe or Several’ Working 
Paper, University of Birmingham, p317 
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories o f the Policy Process (Boulder, Westview Press) pp. 117-66 
Hay, C. (1999) ‘Globalisation, Régionalisation and the Persistence o f National Variation: The 
Contingent Convergence of Contemporary Capitalism’, ESRC One Europe or Several’ Working 
Paper, University of Birmingham, p.324
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mean that consensus creation requires highly developed negotiating skills across party 
and intergovernmental boundaries. The result of this contextual factor is a leadership 
bias towards policy brokerage and policy veto playing rather than towards policy 
entrepreneurship. This has implications also for leadership styles and strategies, with 
a preference for ‘salami-slicing’ and opportunistic actions, for creating professional 
forums and for sidelining and excluding change agents (see below).
Similarly, there is an important perceptual dimension to ‘goodness of fit’ with 
international requirements. Domestic actors can help create or define away a lack of 
fit with NATO and EU requirements. Thus American actors may define a lack of 
German fit with NATO requirements pointing to the ‘hard’ dimension of military 
power and war-fighting capacity and German unwillingness to share in international 
crisis intervention in this manner. This translates into external pressure on the issue of 
‘burden sharing’.T h e  effects of such pressure on policy change in the Bundeswehr 
were demonstrated by the way in which German Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss 
justified lengthening the period of compulsory military service from 12 to 18 months 
in January 1962. It was a matter of fulfilling NATO obligations and matching the 
length of compulsory service in other member states. In contrast, German policy 
actors can respond by stressing other aspects of NATO commitments and Germany’s 
role in the stabilization of Europe, especially in the east. Thus in the 1990s Schroder 
and Scharping could point to the increasing ‘crisis prevention’ role of NATO, linked 
to the UN, and Germany’s disproportionately high contribution to the ‘soft’ 
dimension of defence and security, including nation- and state-building. Defined in 
this way, there is a goodness of fit and little adaptive pressure. ‘Fit’ is, in short, a 
definitional matter and a dimension of the process of leadership.
Perspective 2. Policy change requires a shift within the policy subsystem in the 
coalition in power so that new beliefs are brought to bear on policy.
This perspective derives from the advocacy coalition framework, which highlights the 
importance of core beliefs (‘deep core’, ‘policy core’ and ‘secondary aspects’ of 
beliefs) shared by actors from a variety of institutions at the level of the policy
^  Chalmers, M. ‘The Atlantic Burden-Sharing Debate -  Widening or Fragmenting?’ International 
Affairs, 77, 3, pp.569-585
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subsystem/^ These beliefs -  rather than the preferences or desires of rational choice 
and game theory -  are seen as the motor of action/^ Advocacy coalitions give an 
important degree of structure and stability to a policy subsystem over time and are 
characterized both by shared beliefs and by co-ordinated behaviour. Shared core 
beliefs are seen as highly resistant to change, in contrast to secondary aspects of 
beliefs that relate to policy objectives and how these are implemented and to the 
reasons given for holding particular beliefs. Hence the question arises of whether the 
Bundeswehr policy subsystem is characterized by one or more advocacy coalitions 
whose members not only share core beliefs but also co-ordinate their actions and 
contend for power over policy. If so, it will be necessary to examine how they have 
been able to resist or accelerate change (for instance by seeking out sympathetic 
institutional venues, engaging in policy-oriented learning and using exogenous 
crises).
Again, there has been a tendency to underplay the significance of individual policy 
leadership in the development of a belief system and in the formation of advocacy 
coalitions, not least in their transformation from nascent to mature coalitions.^^ This 
typically takes the form of leaders acting as policy entrepreneurs, both adopting a set 
of policy ideas and organizing co-ordinated action on their behalf.
Perspective 3. Policy change is a long-term process, requiring policy-oriented 
learning by means o f technical information and analysis o f the nature and magnitude 
of problems, their causes, and the probable impacts o f different policy solutions.
This perspective also derives from the advocacy coalition framework, which stresses 
the important role of new technical information and/or experience in producing 
relatively enduring alterations of thought and behaviour by ‘probing’ belief systems
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith (eds) (1988) ‘Special Issue, Policy Change and Policy Orientated 
Learning, Exploring the Advocacy Coalition Framework’, Policy Sciences 21, pp. 123-278 
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (eds) (1993) Policy Change and Learning, An Advocacy Coalition 
Approach (Boulder, Westview Press)
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment’ in 
Sabatier, P. and Jemkins-Smith, H. (1999) Theories o f the Policy-Making Process (Boulder: Westview) 
pp.132-135
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment’ in 
Sabatier, P. and Jemkins-Smith, H. (1999) Theories o f the Policy-Making Process (Boulder: Westview) 
pp. 117-169
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and the adequacy of the reasons for supporting given policy beliefs.^ "^  Policy-oriented 
learning involves greater knowledge of the parameters of problems and the factors 
affecting them, of the determinants of policy effectiveness and of the probable 
impacts of different policies/^ It leads to the reframing of policy arguments. 
According to the advocacy coalition framework, policy analysis and learning is 
essentially an instrumental process of improving the quality of the reasons for holding 
a particular policy belief.
This perspective requires an examination of whether and how policy learning occurs, 
including the role of think tanks (like the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the 
party foundations), academic experts and journalists, as well as the role of different 
levels of government (from EU and NATO down to the Lander). It is also important 
to investigate the roles of both policy brokers and of professional forums (notably the 
Weizsacker Commission on Bundeswehr reform during the Red/Green government). 
However, the advocacy coalition framework argues that changes in the policy core 
aspects require a perturbation or shock in non-cognitive factors external to the 
subsystem and that professional forums rest on fragile foundations.
Though the advocacy coalition framework focuses on policy-oriented learning as a 
social process, it implies a role for individual leadership in policy brokerage. 
Leadership can take the form of establishing a professional forum as a means of 
giving greater momentum to policy change. Professional forums are a mechanism for 
facilitating learning across coalitions by bringing together actors with contrasting 
beliefs. They are effective when a stalemate exists, each coalition regards a 
continuation of the status quo as unacceptable, deliberations are confidential and 
based on professional norms, and the forum is led by a policy broker who is respected 
by all parties as relatively neutral.^^ Policy change then represents a form of power 
sharing among coalitions. The advocacy coalition framework underplays the role of
Heclo, H. (1974) Social Policy in Britain and Sweden (New Haven, Yale University Press) p.306 
Schon, D and Rein, M (1994) Frame Reflection, Toward the Resolution o f Intractable Policy 
Controversies (New York, Basic Books)
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories of the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press), p. 123 
Schoen, D and Rein, M (1994) Frame Reflection, Toward the Resolution o f Intractable Policy 
Controversies (New York, Basic Books)
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories o f the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press) p. 148
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individual policy leadership in this process. Secondly, policy brokers can be 
independently important in policy-oriented learning. In the absence of learning across 
coalitions policy change can be accelerated when there is learning by a policy broker 
who has the authority to make short-term changes to policy.^*
Perspective 4. Policy change requires skilful policy entrepreneurs, capable o f 
manipulating short-term 'windows o f opportunity' to bring new ideas to bear. These 
windows are opened by 'compellingproblems’ or by events in the 'politics’ stream.
This perspective derives from the multiple streams framework, which stresses the 
critical role of individuals in conditions of ambiguity: of unclear preferences, vague 
and shifting problem definitions, fluid participation, and bureaucratic politics (the so- 
called ‘garbage can’ model of choice). Individual policy leadership takes the form of 
coupling the three separate streams that comprise the policy process, each with its 
own dynamics and rules. In consequence, and in contrast to both the advocacy 
coalition framework and the punctuated equilibrium framework, the policy process 
displays considerable randomness rather than a disposition to settle into equilibrium.
The policy process consists of the problem stream in which various definitions of 
problems are offered and data about problems presented; the policy stream in which a 
wide variety of ideas float around in the ‘policy primeval soup’ and are generated and 
pursued by various policy specialists; and the politics stream which consists of 
elections, swings in public opinion, political and administrative turnover, and pressure 
group campaigns, each influencing how opinion formers define problems and 
evaluate solutions.^^ Coupling of the streams takes place in conditions of flux in the 
interactions amongst the three streams, giving rise to discontinuity. In such 
circumstances policy leadership -  rather than coalitions or institutional arrangements - 
is seen as playing the major role. Hence it is important to identify policy 
entrepreneurs, how they effect change, and under what conditions they are able to
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories of the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press) p. 145 
Kingdon, J. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy, 2'“^ . Edition (Boston, Little, Brown) 
Zahariadis, N. (1999). ‘Ambiguity, Time, and Multiple Streams’, in P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories o f the 
Policy Process (Boulder, Westview) pp.73-93.
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connect particular Bundeswehr reform proposals to a changing configuration of 
problems and politics.
This perspective is useful in offsetting the contextualist bias in the advocacy coalition 
framework and in the punctuated equilibrium framework by directing attention to the 
role of the ‘internal calculation processes’ of policy entrepreneurs in policy change. It 
has two weaknesses however. Firstly, in specifying the strategic context it 
underestimates the importance of the institutional characteristics of the decision 
setting and the use of these characteristics by entrepreneurs to shape the direction of 
choices. Secondly, it focuses on only one leadership role -  policy entrepreneurship -  
and ignores two other leadership roles that significantly affect policy change -  policy 
brokerage and policy veto.
Perspective 5. Policy change requires a shift o f institutional venue, bringing in new 
actors and ideas and changing the decisional bias.
This perspective derives from the punctuated equilibrium framework, which posits 
that policy monopolies are responsible for stasis in a policy subsystem by controlling 
the venue that oversees the policy. The resultant equilibrium is punctuated by bursts 
of policy change.^^ Policy monopolies dominate the important institutions of a 
particular policy subsystem with a supportive ‘policy image’ so that decision-making 
remains for long periods in a condition of equilibrium. This policy image is reinforced 
by its own success in a ‘negative feedback process’ (success dampening pressure for 
policy change). Policy change occurs when the policy monopoly is challenged by 
competing images. This happens when a compelling external perturbation or policy 
failure (‘positive feedback’) excites public and media interest and propels new issues 
onto the macro-political agenda of Federal Chancellor and Bundestag. Opportunities 
for change depend on a policy system experiencing positive feedback, leading to a 
gathering momentum behind new ideas that ‘punctuates’ the equilibrium, a shift of 
issues to the macro-political level and a burst of policy change.
^  Zahariadis, N, (1999). ‘Ambiguity, Time, and Multiple Streams’, in P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories of the 
Policy Process (Boulder, Westview) pp.73-93.
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Again, as with the advocacy coalition framework, individual policy leaders intrude 
back into the model. A critical strategy for changing policy is for leaders to seek to 
change the institutional venue or to have actors from other venues become involved. 
This change of venue within which policy is considered -  in the characteristics of the 
decision making setting -  is critical because it frames the problems that actors 
confront. It alters the policy monopoly and policy image and leads to change to the 
policy core. In this ‘politics of punctuation’, as in the ‘multiple-streams’ framework, 
policy leadership is critical, and policy change can be rapid and radical. However, in 
contrast, to the multiple streams framework, policy change is less dependent on the 
internal calculation processes of the policy entrepreneur than on characteristics of the 
decision setting. Hence the punctuated equilibrium framework offers an opportunity 
to link Bundeswehr reform to the way in which institutions shape policy change by 
offering a more dynamic view of the role of policy leadership in this process. This 
examination includes the effects of institutional structures within NATO and within 
the EU as well as of institutional structures within the German core executive, the 
legislature and the political parties. Because of its focus on the characteristics of the 
decision setting, the punctuated equilibrium framework has a greater affinity than the 
multiple streams framework with historical institutionalism.
These analytical perspectives suggest that public policy theory allows a more nuanced 
understanding of how policy change occurs and the context and conditions for that 
change than the rather one-dimensional approach posited by constructivist ascendancy 
in German defence and security studies. These five analytical perspectives allow for a 
more sophisticated analysis that seeks to tease out the role played by external 
perturbations and the role of policy leadership in shaping the policy process, for 
instance through creating and sustaining a crisis consciousness, reframing issues, 
acting as a catalyst for new advocacy coalitions, changing institutional venues, and 
creating professional forums to promote policy-oriented learning.
The punctuated equilibrium framework has three key contributions to make to 
understanding the role of policy leadership. Firstly, it shows that leaders can 
manipulate actors’ frames of reference by the use of information to change the 
characteristics of the situation to which they have to respond. In the words of Jones: 
‘Information is viewed as inherently ambiguous, so that there is a very important role
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for leadership and policy entrepreneurship in the framing of issues... The 
manipulation of information plays a key role in forcing governmental attention to 
problems.’^  ^Policy entrepreneurs seek out opportunities to reframe issues and to 
guide processes of policy learning in particular directions. Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith’s concept of policy broker represents a concession in this direction but one 
limited by the constraint of co-ordinated action built into the advocacy coalition 
framework.^^
Secondly, the punctuated equilibrium framework stresses the importance of control 
over institutional venues for shaping the pace and direction of policy change.^^ 
Institutional venues are seen as creating decisional biases, changing these venues or 
those who participate in them as instigating cognitive change. Hence in the 
punctuated equilibrium framework institutional settings are seen as pivotal both in 
shaping the context of policy leadership (notably semi-sovereignty, veto players and 
potential for blockade) and in the means by which leaders affect policy change.
Finally, the punctuated equilibrium framework scores against the advocacy coalition 
and multiple streams frameworks by paying more attention to the institutional setting 
of policy change. The advocacy coalition framework underplays the link between 
policy beliefs and institutional settings; the multiple streams framework has too little 
to say about how these settings shape the ‘coupling’ possibilities of policy 
entrepreneurs. Crucial significance is attached to the structures of the political system 
in setting the context for policy change.^ This perspective fits well within Peter 
Katzenstein’s interpretation of Germany as a ‘semi-sovereign’ state in which power is 
shared across the federal system, political parties and parapublic institutions and 
jurisdictions are overlapping.^^ The result is a policy bias to incremental change. This 
insight was further developed in Holtmann and Voelzkow’s view of Germany as a
Baumgartner, F. and Jones, B. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. (Chicago, 
Chicago University Press) p.23 
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories of the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press), p. 145 
Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, D. (1991) ‘Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems’ Journal of 
Politics, Vol.53, No.4, p. 1047
^  True, J. Jones, B. and Baumgartner, F. (1999) ‘Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory’, in P. Sabatier (ed.). 
Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, Westview Press) pp. 97-115.
Katzenstein, P. Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth o f a Semi-Sovereign State 
(Philadelphia, Temple)
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mix of competitive majoritarian democracy and ‘negotiation’ democracy. The 
institutional nodes of ‘negotiation’ democracy are federalism (including the ‘dual’ 
majorities in Bundestag and Bundesrat), coalition government and neo-corporatism.
In short, German policy making is, at the macro-level, bound up with an institutional 
structure of interlocking politics {Politikverflechtung).^^
The result is that policy leaders have to negotiate a range of institutional veto points, 
creating a potential for inertia and Reformstau (reform blockage). From the 
perspective of those favouring radical reform of the Bundeswehr, semi-sovereignty 
becomes a liability rather than an asset. Not least, constitutional structure is crucial 
not just in specifying the fundamental values of German defence and security policy 
but also in shaping the degree of consensus required for major change. Thus there are 
high potential political costs of Bundeswehr reform that shape the kinds of policy 
leadership role that are likely to emerge in Germany. They act against the policy 
entrepreneurship role of the multiple streams literature and favour the policy 
brokerage and policy veto roles.
At the same time, as this thesis argues, policy leadership remains more important in 
policy change than either constructivist accounts or public policy theories (on the 
whole) have been prepared to concede. As Donald Coleman states when writing about 
the importance of business entrepreneurs and their neglect by neo-classical economic 
theory: the policy leader ‘having been exorcised by abstractions, has reappeared 
through the back door. He insists upon intruding back into the model.’^^
1.4 The Interactionist Approach to Policy Leadership
This emphasis on the role of policy leadership is not linked to the development of a 
new theory of public policy or to a new perspective about policy change. Instead, the 
critical analysis of the above five analytical perspectives about policy change is bound 
together by the development of a model of the role of leadership in the policy process
^  Holtmann, E. and Voelzkow, H. (eds) (2000) Zwischen Wettbewerbdemokratie und 
verhandlungsdemokratie. Analysen zum Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. (Opladen, 
Westdeutscher Verlag)
Sbenz, A, Scharpf, F. and Zintl, R. (1992) Horizontale Politikveiflechtung: Zur Theorie um 
Verhandlungssystem (Frankfurt, Capmus)
^  Coleman, D. (1980) Courtaulds (Oxford University Press, Oxford) p.34
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that follows an interactionist approach. In this approach leadership is conceptualised 
as a complexity of interactions between leaders’ skills and context, focusing on three 
sets of variables; personal leadership traits, policy leadership skills and strategic 
political context.^^ Given that Bundeswehr reform is clearly located within the 
defence and security policy subsystem, the leadership issue clearly relates to the role 
of the Federal Defence Minister
Personal Leadership Traits include:
Policy and political ambition 
Ideological fervour 
Self-confidence 
Judgement
Affiliation or follower satisfaction 
Risk-taking
Pacific versus coercive persuasive styles
Accommodativeness
Decisional initiative and assertiveness
Activism.
Policy Leadership Skills include:
Articulation and setting of clear policy priorities
On personal leadership traits see: Greenstein, F. (1998) Leadership in the Modem Presidency 
(Harvard, Harvard University Press)
Paige, G. (1977) The Scientific Study o f Political Leadership (Free Press, New York)
Winter, R. (1987) Action Research and the Nature o f Social Enquiry, Professional Innovation and 
Educational Work (Aldershot, Avebury)
On policy leadership skills see:
Bader, John (1996) Taking the Initiative, Leadership Agendas in Congress and the Contract with 
America (Georgetown University Press, Washington)
Hargrove, EC. (1998) The President as Leader, Appealing to the Better Angels o f Our Nature 
(Lawrence, University Press of Kansas)
Hargrove, E and Owens J. (eds) (2003) Leadership in Context (London, Rowman and Littlefield, 
Lanham and Butler)
Ripley, R (1969) Majority Party Leadership in Congress (Little Brown, Boston)
Rockman, B. (1984) The Leadership Question, The Presidency and the US System (Praeger, New 
York) pp. 187-214
Strachan, R. (1990) New Ways and Means, Reform and Change in a Congressional Committee (Chapel 
Hill, University of North Carolina Press)
On strategic political context see:
Palazzolo, D. (1992) The Speaker and the Budget, Leadership in the Post-Reform House o f 
Representatives (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh) pp.32-25
Peters, R, (1990) The American Speakership, The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press) pp.316-322
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Discernment of favourable and unfavourable opportunities for leadership
Expertise and experience
Timing
Mobilizing and conciliatory skills with respect to the Bundestag coalition 
parliamentary parties and the public 
Bargaining and conciliation with affected groups.
Strategic Political Context includes:
Constitutional scope for action, especially as defined by the Federal Constitutional 
Court.
Electoral context
Salience of the issue
Size of the majority in the Bundestag
Relations between the parties in the coalition government
Whether the federal government also has a majority in the Bundesrat
Extent to which the Federal Defence Minister enjoys the support of the Bundestag and
the Bundesrat and a majority of her/his political party
Institutional context of the Bundeswehr, of the federal government and of the
legislative process
Reputation of the Defence Minister within the ministry and within the federal 
government and whether he/she has the confidence of the Federal Chancellor 
Poll ratings of the Defence Minister
Public reputation and political skills of the Chancellor on this issue
Analysis of these complex interactions enables us to identify three distinct policy 
leadership roles -  entrepreneurship, brokerage and veto playing -  and to relate the 
type of role adopted to the conditions, especially of institutional context, in which 
specific skills are useful. Policy entrepreneurship involves adopting and pushing a 
particular policy solution, typically requiring radical policy change. Policy brokerage 
is about seeking consensus amongst contending ideas. Policy veto playing seeks to 
minimise the political costs of policy change emanating from within the policy 
subsystem. Broadly, as indicated above, the semi-sovereign macro-political 
arrangements of Germany create a disposition to opt for policy brokerage or for 
policy veto playing roles over policy entrepreneurship. It can be argued, consistent
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with the advocacy coalition framework, that Germany’s high consensus building 
requirements reinforce the general disposition of policy leaders to weigh losses more 
heavily than gains, to remember defeats more than victories and to exaggerate the 
power of opponents/^
These policy leadership roles are linked to different policy leadership styles and 
strategies. In the case of policy entrepreneurship, leadership takes on a heroic style of 
bold policy initiative in which the leader acts as animateur of change. The 
characteristic leadership policy strategy involves creating and sustaining a crisis 
consciousness and reframing policy issues in a manner that provides an historical 
legitimation for bold change. The policy leader develops a new policy narrative that 
attributes proposals with political coherence and historical meaning and significance. 
The appropriate skills involve the arts of discourse and persuasion aimed at getting 
agreement on a particular policy model.
However, one of the weaknesses of the multiple streams literature is that its analysis 
of policy entrepreneurship is confined to agenda setting. Effective policy 
entrepreneurship requires strategic skills not just in agenda setting but also in 
translating ideas into policy decisions. A characteristic strategy when faced with 
powerful opposition is ‘salami-slicing’, in which the policy leader pursues policy 
change as a ‘nibbling’ or iterative process by a series of opportunistic actions 
designed to circumvent opposition. This may involve creating faits accomplis. Volker 
Rühe provided an example between 1992 and 1994. In a more favourable political 
context the policy entrepreneur is more likely to mobilize co-ordinated action around 
the proposed policy model, seeking to create a powerful advocacy coalition on its 
behalf. This second type of strategy was less visible within Bundeswehr reform. It 
made a fleeting appearance with Klaus Kinkel and Joschka Fischer during the Kohl 
period, but was ineffective in both agenda setting and decision making about 
Bundeswehr reform.
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
Sabatier, P. (ed,). Theories o f the Policy Process, (Boulder, Westview Press) pp. 117-66 
Quattrone and Tversky ‘Constraining Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice’, 
American Political Science Review, September 1998, pp.719-736
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In contrast, policy brokerage is associated with a ‘humdrum’ leadership style of 
pursuing incremental change/^ Its characteristic leadership policy strategy involves 
the facilitation of policy-oriented learning and the ‘binding in’ of opposition, 
particularly by the creation of a professional forum. This means gaining the 
agreement of key actors that a continuation of the status quo is unacceptable, that 
there are important empirical questions to be addressed, that key interests are 
represented and that professional norms of policy analysis will be respected.^^ It is 
close to a mode of power sharing amongst competing policy beliefs. This type of 
leadership policy role, style and strategy was characteristic of the Scharping period 
(1998-2002).
Policy veto playing is associated with an immobiliste leadership style of preventing 
forces for change from shaping policy. The immobiliste style of policy veto players is 
reflected in a policy strategy of sidelining or excluding change agents in a form of 
Denkverbot (ban on thinking), of blocking new policy ideas from emerging. It was 
apparent under Rühe between 1994 and 1998 when much greater weight was attached 
to the potential losses than to the gains from Bundeswehr reform.
The analytical perspectives of policy change outlined above can be mapped onto this 
analytical framework of leadership roles, styles and strategies. Thus the policy 
entrepreneur role fits into the multiple streams framework with its stress on how 
leaders create and exploit the windows of opportunity opened by developments in the 
problems, politics, and policy streams (perspective 4). The policy broker role is 
addressed by the advocacy coalition framework, notably with its stress on policy- 
oriented learning (analytical perspectives 2 and 3). The policy veto player role is most 
closely linked to the punctuated equilibrium framework (perspective 5). These 
linkages suggest the ways in which policy leadership skills are related to the different 
contexts outlined in the major public policy theories: a context of ambiguity in the 
case of policy entrepreneurship, of a policy process structured by contested beliefs in
On heroic and humdrum leadership styles, see Hayward, J. (1982) ‘Mobilising Private Interests in the 
Service of Public Ambitions’ in Richardson, J, (ed.) Policy Styles in Western Europe (Allen and 
Unwin, London) p. 111
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coahtion Framework: An Assessment’, in 
P. Sabatier (ed.). Theories o f the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press) p. 150
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the case of policy brokerage, and of macro-political conditions that impose high 
political costs on policy change in the case of policy veto playing.
1.5 Ontology and Epistemology
Consistent with ‘critical’ realism the thesis accepts the ‘foundationalist’ argument that 
there is an ‘observable’ world of public policy that exists independently of our 
knowledge of it and that provides essential data as the basis for establishing how 
policy processes work and the role of leadership within these processes. Thus research 
is concerned with mapping this structural context -  which includes policy beliefs - 
and establishing causal mechanisms of policy change (see the five analytical 
perspectives examined in this thesis). The implication for epistemology is an interest 
in programmatic positions and public statements and what they show about how 
structural contexts are ‘strategically selective’, that is are more open to some kinds of 
leadership roles, styles and skills than others.^^
However, in order to penetrate into the complex world of leadership skills, and how 
leaders adapt to and seek to shape different and changing contexts, it is necessary to 
go beyond ‘foundationalist’ theory and its positivist epistemology to look at 
phenomena such ‘strategic learning’. As Neumann states: ‘...the immediately 
perceived characteristics of objects, events, or social relations rarely reveal 
e v e ry th in g .‘Critical’ realism argues for attention to the extent to which public 
policy is discursively constructed and the product of social interaction and to which 
leadership is constituted in and through narrative. Thus the epistemological position 
draws heavily on the ‘hermeneutic’ or ‘interpretative’ tradition that seeks to 
understand the policy world ‘from within’ by delving into the reasons behind actions, 
opaque as they may be, and the beliefs of actors. According to the ‘double’ 
hermeneutic it involves understanding policy actors and their perceptions of their role 
in the policy process. The result is a close attention to qualitative methods designed to 
reveal those parts of the policy process that are unobservable.
Jessop, B. (1990) State Theory, Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (Oxford, Blackwell) pp.260- 
271
Neumann, W.L. (2000) Social Research Methods, Qualitative and Quantitaive Approaches, 4*. 
Edition (Boston, Allyn and Bacon), p.77
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‘Critical’ realism also informs the interactionist approach to the question of how 
policy leadership works that is adopted in this thesis. This approach builds on and 
develops Giddens* argument for avoiding an unnecessary dualism of agency and 
structure, which are seen in a dialectical relationship with each other and as mutually 
constitutive, to seeing them as in practice completely interwoven.^^ The stress is on 
how policy actors interact with their contexts and on the element of temporal fluidity 
as actors and contexts constantly alter. It is important to focus on complex and 
changing structured contexts, on how actors perceive and act on these contexts -  
notably how they construct their interests - and on the unintended consequences of 
their actions as they are mediated through and in part change these structures.
Therefore, consistent with ‘critical’ realism, contingency and variability are seen as 
crucial aspects of the policy leadership process.^^ This is reflected in the stress in 
perspective 1 on external perturbations and policy change. Also, according to 
‘critical’ realism, as policy actors gain greater knowledge of the structured context, 
‘strategic learning’ takes place. This is reflected in the perspective dealing with 
policy-oriented learning and policy change. Policy leaders are under pressure to 
examine the quality of their reasons for holding onto particular policy beliefs. The 
complex and changing contexts and how actors perceive and act on them are dealt 
with in the analytical perspectives relating to advocacy coalitions and to institutional 
venues. In short, the analytical perspectives about policy change cover the broad 
fabric of concerns of ‘critical’ realism and its attempt not just to overcome the 
dualism of structure and agency but also to bridge positivist and ‘interpretivist’ 
epistemological positions.
1.6 Research Methodology
The role of policy leadership in German defence and security policy can be usefully 
examined by a strong reliance not just on qualitative methods but also on the case 
study method. These methods are especially well adapted to examining the complex
Hay, C. ‘Structure and Agency’ in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G, (eds) (1995) Theory and Methods in 
Political Science (Basingstoke, MacMillan), p.200
Giddens, A. (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory (London: Macmillan) p.69 
Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis (Basingstoke, Palgrove) pp.251-260 
^  Hay, C, ‘Structure and Agency’ in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds) (1995) Theory and Methods in 
Political Science (Basingstoke, MacMillan), p. 199-202
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leadership roles, styles and strategies that shape policy change, the complexity of 
interactions between leaders and contexts, as well as the difficult questions of 
causation that arise. It must be stressed that after decades of research experimental 
psychology has reached no clear conclusions about the conditions in which specific 
leadership skills are useful, how, why and when. Hence this thesis does not set itself 
the bold objective of offering such conclusions with reference to the role of leadership 
in German defence and security policy. It seeks to examine the extent to which the 
leadership roles, styles and strategies of key actors made a significant difference to 
policy outcomes under changing contextual conditions between 1990 and 2002.
1.6.1 Qualitative Method and the Case Study Method
As argued above, the appropriate epistemology to explore research questions about 
policy leadership is an interpretative approach that goes beyond the observable face of 
policy to examine both particular skills and their appropriateness to different and 
changing contexts and complex processes of cognitive change. There was, of course, 
an observable public domain to be uncovered. Thus party and government policy 
papers were used to demonstrate specific policy changes; press, television and radio 
reporting provided insights into the presentation of policy by leaders, especially how 
they were legitimated. Also, secondary data could be gathered on trends in defence 
spending, public opinion, on the spatial distribution of base closures and on 
privatisation/procurement. However, they were used in the context of knowledge 
acquired from archival research and semi-structured interviews, which were the 
central methods employed in the thesis.
The working analytical perspectives about policy change set out in the chapter on 
theoretical approach are tested using Bundeswehr reform as a single case study. 
According to Yin: ‘The case study method... is an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, addresses a situation in 
which the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and 
uses multiple sources of evidence.’ *^ By opting for a single, in-depth case study the 
thesis seeks to provide ‘a thorough analysis of an individual case’ and situates itself in
78 Yin (1993) The Applications o f Case Study Research (London, Sage) p.59
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the literature on contextualisation in cross-national comparative research/^ However, 
the context is not an object of study in its own right, as with proponents of culturalist 
explanations. Instead, public policy theory is used to identify general factors that 
influence policy change and to test them with reference to the specific context of 
German defence and security policy.
A single case study provides an opportunity to delve more deeply into the 
complexities of policy change by testing a variety of analytical perspectives. In this 
respect it has an advantage over a set of case studies where it is usually only possible 
to test one or two analytical perspectives. The advantages that the single case study 
offers would be lost by focusing on just a single perspective.
Consistent with the nature of the research questions, the thesis opts for explanatory 
and interpretative case study rather than exploratory or descriptive case study as the 
most suitable method for empirical investigation.^® The case study of the Bundeswehr 
is used both to interrogate public policy theory (Lijphart’s ‘theory-infirming* case 
study) and as a means to assess what light public policy theory can throw on German 
defence and security policy. This type of case study aims to produce an analytical 
narrative framed around leadership as a variable rather than just ‘thick’ description. 
Because this individual case study uses and assesses the utility of concepts developed 
within public policy theory and tests analytical perspectives about policy change 
derived from this body of theory, it can lay claim to be comparative.^^
Explanatory and interpretative case study offers several advantages, notably:
Hantrais, L. (1999) ‘Contextualisation in Cross-National Research’ International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology, Vol.2, No.2, pp.93-108
Kumar, R (1999) Research Methodology, A Step by Step Guide for Beginners (London, Thousand 
Oaks, New Delhi, Sage) p.99 
Grix, J. (2001) Demystifying Postgraduate research. From MA to PhD (Birmingham, University of 
Birmingham) pp.66-68
Lijphart, A. (1974), ‘Consociational Democracy’ in K. McRae (ed.), Consociational Democracy, 
Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart), pp. 70-89.
** Eckstein, H. ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’ in Greenstein, F and Polsby, N. (eds) 
(1975) Handbook o f Political Science, Vol.7, Strategies o f Political Enquiry (Reading, Mass, Addison- 
Wesley) pp.79-137
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•The emphasis placed on policy context, especially the way in which Bundeswehr 
policy is embedded in the changing nature of the post-Cold War security 
environment and of the domestic institutional and political environment 
•The ability to chart processes of change over time, thereby enabling the 
comparison of policy leadership skills in different contexts 
•The opportunity to examine processes as well as outcomes, especially important 
when investigating policy leadership 
•The analysis of causal mechanisms as identified in various analytical perspectives 
about policy change
•The assembly of evidence from various sources and the possibility of using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods 
•The possibility of generalizing results to the body of public policy theory from 
which the original analytical perspectives about policy change were derived, 
following the logic of replication (rather than of statistical sampling).
Within the framework of maintaining a logic of interconnectedness between ontology, 
epistemology, methodology, sources and methods, the research developed in an 
iterative and pragmatic manner. Fieldwork was initially informed by a set of 
preliminary working analytical perspectives about policy change derived from the 
literature but then fed back -  via the refinement of the research questions - into the 
further development of a remodeled theoretical account.^^ This remodeled account 
centred on leadership as a variable in the policy process, how it was exercised and 
with what effects. It aimed to do more justice to the complexity of policy change 
uncovered in the empirical investigations whilst also trying to meet criteria of clarity 
and parsimony.
Grix, J. (2001) Demystifying Postgraduate research, From MA to PhD. (Birmingham, University of 
Birmingham) pp.73-95
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1.6.2 Sources of Evidence
The research for this study was conducted over a three-year period from October 2000 
to December 2003. During the first year, in preparation for the fieldwork, the focus 
was on re-analysing the key academic texts on public policy theory and on German 
defence and security policy, including its historical background and the main 
ontological and epistemological positions adopted. This work was undertaken with 
the aim of identifying and refining the initial working analytical perspectives about 
policy change, which provided the guiding theme or angle. The theme or angle was 
then further refined to the role of policy leadership, leading to a survey on leadership 
in both political science and organization theory. In addition, a start was made with 
the collection of official documentation (see below), including key policy positions 
and Bundestag debates, and with the collection of newspaper and journal articles and 
interviews. Some of this material could be obtained by post or over by on-line 
computer search, but the main work had to be conducted using archival research 
during the period of fieldwork.
The fieldwork stage began in October 2001. It was conducted according to the 
principle of triangulation, which states that an outcome finds confirmation when at 
least three different sources of evidence coincide.This involves correlating and 
cross-checking the secondary literature (including newspaper reports) with the 
materials yielded by archival work and the content of the interviews. Three main 
sources of evidence were used.
1. The continuing collection and analysis of official documentation, notably relevant 
key Bundestag debates, legislative texts and regulations, court rulings, interviews 
given to newspapers, and policy statements by the federal government (especially 
the Federal Defence Ministry), by NATO and by the EU. As the principal focus of 
empirical research was on the SPD/Green government from 1998-2002, the main 
source was the Archiv of the SPD’s federal executive {Bundesvorstand). This 
provides a detailed overview of policy positions on defence and security, press
Peters, G. Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods (Basingstoke, MacMillan) p,97 
Grix, J. (2001) Demystifying Postgraduate Research, From MA to PhD. (Birmingham, University of 
Birmingham) pp.84-85
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releases and media reactions, not least with reference to key policy leaders. Also 
useful as sources of secondary materials were the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fUr Auswdrtige Politik.
2. Interviews with key actors principally within the defence and security policy 
subsystem and key related policy subsystems, including from NATO, the EU, the 
Federal Defence Ministry, the Bundeswehr, the Federal Chancellor’s Office, the 
Foreign Ministry, the Federal Finance Ministry, members of the Weizsacker 
Commission, as well as officials in the main political parties, notably their federal 
executives, and in the Bundestag’s main committees and working groups.
3. Canvassing of expert opinion through interviews and many informal 
conversations with foreign embassy staff, policy analysts (e.g. in the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and Deutsche Gesellschaft fUr Auswdrtige Politik 
(DGAP)), journalists and academics and through the collection of articles, reports 
and other official publications.
The collection of documentation and interviews were at the heart of the empirical 
research and represented the main use of time in fieldwork. In particular, interviews 
were essential in order both to look behind the official discourse of policy statements 
and legislation to deeper, often unarticulated aspects of Bundeswehr policy (like the 
political targeting of base closures) and also to more precisely and fully reconstruct 
the sequence of events. At the same time, consistent with the principle of 
‘triangulation’, they had to be checked not just against other interviews (e.g. with 
policy experts and academics) but also against the other sources of evidence to 
identify willful or unconscious misinformation and subjective accounts that rewrote 
the narrative to personal advantage. Interviews were on occasion misleading about 
developments over time and from a broader perspective, because interviewees lacked 
the appropriate experience or were too close to the policy process and engaged in 
assertion. In particular, as noted above, the interview method was affected by the 
‘romance of leadership’ notion. Interviewees were prone on occasion to attribute 
important symbolic importance to individual leaders in offering opinions about the 
reasons for policy success or failure. Hence care had to be taken in interpreting 
interview evidence and in careful triangulation with other sources.
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47 interviews were conducted during the fieldwork, principally in Berlin but also in 
Brussels, following best practice as prescribed in the relevant literature.^"  ^Interviews 
were in almost every case conducted in German. They were arranged by letter, email 
and telephone, with particular attention paid to anonymity and confidentiality so that 
interviewees could feel more relaxed and free to comment. It was agreed that 
interviewees would not be cited directly. It was important to establish confidence in 
this way because defence and security policy is surrounded by a mystique of secrecy 
that adds difficulties to the interview process.
The interviews varied in length from one hour to over three hours. In the early 
exploratory stage interviewing technique took the form of open-ended interviews; as 
the research design matured and the interests narrowed to more specific topics more 
use was made of semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured questionnaire is 
detailed below, along with an appendix listing the interviewees. This format gave the 
interviewees some freedom in responding to questions and enabled the interviewer to 
identify what was important to them and explore these aspects.
Initially, interviewees were identified by seeing which names most frequently 
recurred in press coverage and could be identified from institutional charts. This was 
complemented by the ‘snowball’ method of asking interviewees to identify the key 
‘influentials’ who should be interviewed. The actors mainly worked with the relevant 
Federal Ministers of Defence, with the Weizsacker Commission, with the relevant 
party and Bundestag committees and working groups, and with NATO and EU 
relations. The opinions of academics, journalists, policy researchers and foreign 
embassies about who to interview were also sought.
^  Cassell, C. and Syman, G. (eds) (1994) Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research, A Practical 
Guide (London, Sage)
McCracken, G. (1998) The Long Interview (Newbury Park, Sage)
Mishler, E. (1996) Researching Interviewing, Context and Narrative (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press)
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Chapter 2: The Domestic Context of Bimdeswehr Reform
This chapter focuses on the domestic parameters of policy leadership in Bundeswehr 
reform, focusing on the characteristics of the policy subsystem and its interactions 
with related policy subsystems and the wider macro political system. In short, it seeks 
to give more specificity to explanations of policy leadership by disaggregating the 
German state and moving the level of analysis from the macro to the meso level. The 
focus is on how the institutional organization of the armed forces, defence and 
security policy, foreign policy and budgetary policy, and not least the relationship to 
NATO and to the European Union, determines the scope for, and nature of, policy 
leadership in Bundeswehr reform.
This approach situates the chapter within the scholarship of historical institutionalism 
with its stress on how the behaviour of leaders is structured by institutions.^ In this 
perspective institutional context is seen as shaping not just the opportunities for, and 
constraints on, policy leadership but also the preferences and hence calculative 
activity of policy leaders. However, the chapter departs from the more radical 
structuralist bias in the variant of historical institutionalism that emphasises the 
concepts of path dependency and sunk costs.^ These concepts are seen as lacking in 
specificity and adding little to the older concept of ‘habit*.^ Above all, they predict too 
much stability and limit policy change to the impact of exogenous shocks. They have 
little to say about mechanisms or processes of endogenous policy change and the 
dynamic and contingent nature of historical change.^ This chapter argues for a form of 
historical institutionalism that is useful in opening up the black box of policy 
leadership (the micro level) by relating actor strategies and styles to the meso level of 
institutional context.
* Steinmo, S, Thelen, K, Longstreth, F, (1992) Structuring Politics, Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
 ^Longhurst K. (2C)03) Why Aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the 
Persistence of Conscription, German Politics, Vol. 12, No.2 pp.147-165
 ^Blyth, M. and Varghese, R. (1999) ‘The State of the Discipline in American Pohtical Science, Be 
Careful What You Wish For? British Journal o f Politics and International Relations, Vol.l, No.3 p.356 
 ^Blyth, M. and Varghese, R, (1999) ‘The State of the Discipline in American Pohtical Science, Be 
Careful What You Wish For? British Journal o f Politics and International Relations, Vol.l, No.3 p.259 
Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996). ‘Political Science and the Three New InstitutionaUsms’, Political 
Studies, 44, pp. 936-57.
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2.1 The Bundeswehr Policy Subsystem
The Bundeswehr can be characterized as a subsystem that is both separate from and 
nested within the larger subsystem of German defence and security policy. Though its 
boundaries are pervious, it represents a set of actors and organizations that interact 
regularly to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given policy 
domain.^ This policy domain embraces, in addition to the armed forces, the federal 
defence administration, the armaments sector, military pastoral work, and the 
administration of military justice. The Bundeswehr is, moreover, a ‘mature’ 
subsystem in that it has existed for a decade and more as a common reference point 
for action.^ As will become clear, its properties -  notably its ethos of professional 
consensus and reflective practice - are different from those of the defence and security 
subsystem in which it is nested.
At the same time it must be emphasized that the Bundeswehr policy subsystem and 
the wider defence and security policy subsystem are nested within a macro-political 
framework of constitutional law. This constitutional framework is crucial in shaping 
the identity of the policy subsystem and reflects the enduring imprint of the historical 
catastrophe of the Nazi period in setting the terms of debate about the Bundeswehr.
Of particular note are articles 26 and 115a-l of the Basic Law. Article 26 bans 
preparations for a war of aggression. It is a criminal offence to undertake acts ‘with 
intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war 
of aggression’.
In this spirit article 115a-l regulates the definition and declaration of ‘a state of 
defence’ (rather than a ‘state of war’) and its implications for the functioning of 
political institutions. It is a matter of determining ‘that the federal territory is under 
attack by armed force or imminently threatened by such an attack’. Article 115a is 
also crucial in reinforcing the Parliamentary control and oversight of a definition and
 ^Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
Sabatier, P. (ed.). Theories o f the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press) p. 135 
 ^Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
Sabatier, P. (ed.). Theories o f the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press) p. 135
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declaration of a state of defence. It requires a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in 
the Bundestag (including at least a majority of members) and the consent of the 
Bundesrat. These constitutional provisions are to be understood in terms of ‘the 
determination to promote world peace’ outlined in the Preamble to the Basic Law. 
Taken together, they promote a particular, historically rooted conception of the 
identity of the Bundeswehr and of the kind of expertise that it requires. This 
conception stresses an orientation to territorial defence (article 115a) and to peace and 
humanitarian missions (the preamble and article 26).^
Figure 2.1 The Structure of the Defence Ministry
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The Bundeswehr has the six key attributes of a policy subsystem.®
The relevant actors regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community that shares a 
domain of expertise and a particular policy identity. Key actors include the Federal 
Minister of Defence, the Ministry’s planning staff, the General Inspector of the 
Bundeswehr (and his deputy and the inspectors of the individual armed forces), the 
Defence Commissioner of the Bundestag, members of the Bundestag Defence 
Committee, and the two Bundeswehr universities in Hamburg and Munich where 
officer training takes place. According to Article 65a of the Basic Law the Defence 
Minister is the commander of the armed forces during peacetime and thus the highest 
military superior over all soldiers.
Its shared identity as a policy subsystem has three roots. First, as stressed above, it 
derives from the key constitutional provisions regulating national defence. Secondly, 
shared identity within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem is influenced by the way in 
which it is nested exclusively within the NATO command structure. Given the 
dominant position of the United States within NATO, this involves a connection to 
the thinking within the US Department of Defence. In consequence, it is exposed to a 
US and NATO preoccupation with threat assessment, deterrence and war-fighting 
capacity. This simultaneous nesting within domestic constitutional thinking and 
NATO/US doctrines creates an ambiguity within Bundeswehr identity that is less 
noticeable within the Foreign Ministry. It contrasts with the EU- and UN-orientations 
of the Foreign Ministry and its emphasis on a civilian power view of German security 
policy. This civilian power view rests on a symmetry or fit of security policy 
conceptions between the EU and UN, on the one hand, and German constitutional 
thinking, on the other. Over issues like modernization of short-range nuclear weapons 
in 1988-89 and NATO enlargement to the east in the 1990s, the Defence Ministry 
proved willing to mobilize support in Washington against the Foreign Ministry.
Thirdly, the shared identity comes from the notions of the Bundeswehr as ‘citizens in 
uniform’ and inner FUhrung (‘inner leadership’), both closely bound up with
* Taken, albeit with the addition of shared identity and of corporate interests, from Sabatier, P. and 
Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in Sabatier, P. (ed.). 
Theories o f the Policy Process (Boulder, Westview Press), p. 136
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conscription. The strength of embeddedness of these notions in the policy subsystem 
owed much to the fact that their two main proponents since 1951 -  General Count 
Wolf von Baudissin and General Ulrich de Maiziere -  served as Inspector Generals of 
the Bundeswehr. It is also reinforced by the work of the Defence Commissioner in 
safeguarding the basic rights of soldiers and dealing with their complaints.
The notions of ‘citizens in uniform’ and of innere FUhrung are given statutory form in 
the Federal Law Governing the Legal Status of Soldiers (Soldatengesetz) of March 
1956 (amended 1975) and the Military Appeal (Complaints) Act of December 1956. 
Of particular note are the provisions relating to a soldier’s rights, commitment to the 
free democratic basic order, obedience, comradeship, the duties of a superior officer, 
the right of complaint and the right to continuing general and professional training. In 
addition, a Ministry of Defence regulation of 1972 clarified the principles and practice 
of innere FUhrung. The shared value system of the Bundeswehr is also regulated by 
the directive on the problem of traditions in the armed forces, issued by the Ministry 
of Defence in September 1982. Taken together they manifest a self-conscious concern 
with a Bundeswehr that, in the words, of the 1982 directive, manifests ‘orientation not 
only towards success and the successful, but also towards the suffering of the 
persecuted and the humiliated’, ‘political participation and common responsibility, 
awareness of democratic values, judgement without prejudice, tolerance, readiness 
and ability to discuss the ethical aspects of military service, the will for peace’, ‘the 
active contribution to the shaping of democracy through the role of the soldier as a 
citizen’, ‘an open-minded attitude to social change and the readiness for contact with 
the civilian citizen.’^
These sources of shared identity are important in influencing the dominant ideas about 
how the Bundeswehr should operate. These ideas stress the primacy of the experience 
of members of the Bundeswehr as the source of valid knowledge rather than the 
primacy of externally generated research findings. This affects the Bundeswehr policy 
subsystem in two ways. First, the notions of ‘citizens in uniform’ and of innere 
FUhrung encourage constant self-criticism by soldiers of their own practice in an
’ See Bestandsaufnahme, Die Bundeswehr an der Schwelle zum ll.Jahrhundert, Bundesministerium 
der Verteidigung, May 1999, pp.17-18. See also The Bundeswehr in 2002, Current Situation and 
Perspectives, Federal Defence Ministry, April 2002, p.53.
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open, collegiate manner, supported by the regular reviews of the Defence 
Commissioner on behalf of the Bundestag. This takes the form of ‘reflective practice’ 
in the Bundeswehr.^® Secondly, the Bundeswehr is strongly oriented around the 
generation of professional consensus. This involves bringing together the key 
professionals to agree common positions, for instance in Bundeswehr conferences, 
again based on personal experience. These two models of reflective practice and of 
professional consensus support a high degree of autonomy and resilience of the 
Bundeswehr as a professional policy subsystem.
The relevant actors have sought to influence Bundeswehr policy over a long period of 
time and thus engage in policy-oriented learning. From the time of Adenauer’s 
Memorandum to the Allied High Commission on the Security of the Federal Republic 
of August 1950 -  when he proposed a German military contingent -  the Bundeswehr 
policy subsystem was in the making on a cross-party, consensual basis. By 1957 its 
essential features were in place. Though conflicts have taken place over the 
Bundeswehr -  for instance during the Bundestag Committees of Investigation in 1980 
and 1997 -  successive federal governments have adhered to this norm of cross-party 
consensual policy making on the Bundeswehr. The result has been strong cohesion 
within the policy subsystem. This political tradition of maintaining consensus about 
the Bundeswehr has been important in sustaining the models of reflective practice and 
professional consensus in the operation of the policy subsystem.
Policy-oriented learning within the subsystem is also strongly conditioned by the 
operational experience of the Bundeswehr. This learning process was stimulated by 
political decisions during the 1990s to commit more and more troops to ‘out-of-area’ 
operations of a peace-making and humanitarian nature. The result was an internal 
dynamics of learning, leading to pressures for policy change from within the policy 
subsystem relating to the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. Under Rühe and 
Scharping political leadership found itself caught up in responding to this bottom-up 
process. In particular, two operational issues suggested the need for new types of
On medical care see Harrison, S. Moran, M. and Wood, B. (2002) ‘Policy Emergence and Policy 
Convergence, The Case of ‘Scientific Bureaucratic Medicine’ in the United States and the United 
Kingdom’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, No.4, Vol.l, pp. 1-24 
"  Harrison, S. Moran, M. and Wood, B. (2002) ‘Policy Emergence and Policy Convergence, The Case 
of ‘Scientific Bureaucratic Medicine’ in the United States and the United Kingdom’, The British 
Journal o f Politics and International Relations, No.4, Vol.l, pp.4-5
56
expertise: the problems of protecting civilian populations in a context of aggressors 
and victims; and the requirements of involvement in civil-military co-operation 
projects aimed at reconstruction, for instance the rebuilding of schools, kindergartens, 
health centres, police stations and the provision of field hospitals. New operational 
experiences of this nature have generated new forms of policy narrative about the 
Bundeswehr.
Within the Federal Defence Ministry, the Federal Chancellor’s Office and the 
Bundestag Defence Conunittee there are specialized units dealing with the 
Bundeswehr. On occasion the Bundestag Defence Conunittee constitutes itself as a 
special Committee of Investigation to probe into possible policy failures. Thus, it 
investigated the violent demonstrations in Bremen in 1980 against the twenty-fifth 
anniversary celebrations of the Bundeswehr’s integration into NATO. In 1997 it 
investigated media claims of extreme-right-wing infiltration of the Bundeswehr. 
However, the investigative activities of the Bundestag have had more to do with 
auditing the reflective practices and professional consensus within the Bundeswehr to 
ensure that guidelines are effective than with developing and applying new, externally 
generated policy ideas to the Bundeswehr.
Within the Lander governments too key actors are drawn into Bundeswehr policy.
The Lander governments take an interest because Bundeswehr policy affects their 
territorial and economic interests, especially through base closures. These bases 
involve close ties between the military and locals and become an important focus of 
community relations, sustaining often many thousands of local jobs, for instance in 
hotels, restaurants, leisure facilities, and construction companies. Hence the local 
political interests of Lander politicians -  as well as of Bundestag members - are at 
stake. As we shall see in chapters 4-5, the politics of base closures has proved 
especially problematic for Bundeswehr reformers. It has strongly engaged the 
interests of Lander Economics Ministries and of State Chancelleries in the issue.
In addition, the development of German participation in peacekeeping missions has 
drawn Lander Interior Ministries -  and the Federal Border Police - into closer 
association with the Bundeswehr. This reflects the increasing involvement of civilian 
police contingents in peacekeeping. Germany seconded police officers to missions in
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Cambodia, Namibia and Western Sahara. More important was the increasing scale of 
such contributions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan. 
This was part of the process in which the Bundeswehr was drawn into civil-military 
co-operation projects through peacekeeping.
There exist interest groups, and specialized subunits within interest groups, that 
regard the Bundeswehr as an important issue. The Bundeswehr has its own 
professional association to represent its collective interests. Also, the churches, youth 
organizations and the trade unions take an interest in Bundeswehr policy. The 
development of peacekeeping operations has increased the involvement of civil 
society with the Bundeswehr, especially as the Foreign Ministry -  supported by the 
Bundestag - has led German attempts to strengthen the civilian component. Relief 
organizations like the Malteser Hilfsdienst and the Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe have 
played a role in providing medical care services and supporting civil-military projects 
in developing health services.
A range of social groups -  including the Lander -  have an interest in the practice by 
which conscientious objectors are allowed to do Ersatzdienst by working in hospitals 
and care homes for the elderly and the disabled. This community service represents a 
large pool of cheap labour that helps underpin German social services. Hence 
Bundeswehr reform has financial as well as community-wide implications and links 
to the social policy subsystem and the concerns of the Federal Ministry for Family. 
These implications were not lost on the SPD and on the social wing of the CDU for 
which there was an important social dimension to Bundeswehr policy. Key SPD 
policy makers feared that a professional volunteer army could lead not just to higher 
defence spending but also to higher social policy spending. This threatened major 
electoral consequences and set constraints on the capacity of SPD leaders to act as 
policy entrepreneurs on behalf of a volunteer professional army.
A number of research institutes (such as institutes for peace and conflict research in 
Frankfurt and Hamburg) and specialized units within institutes (such as the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik) deal with Bundeswehr issues. Potentially at least, they are a 
source of new policy ideas and long-term influence over the context in which 
Bundeswehr policy is debated. However, compared to the United States, there are
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relatively few research institutions working in this policy subsystem, and ‘think tanks’ 
have had a minor role in Bundeswehr reform and indeed on wider defence and 
security policy issues. The notion that valid knowledge about Bundeswehr issues is to 
be derived mainly from external research findings rather than from personal 
professional experience has found little acceptance.Bundeswehr reform was not 
based on guidelines developed out of scientific research by academic experts.
Not least, a powerful structure of business interests depends on Bundeswehr policy 
and its implications for armaments’ procurement. The role and the structure of the 
Bundeswehr has direct bearing on their commercial interests, and Lander in which 
these companies are heavily represented -  notably Bavaria and Lower Saxony -  have 
an interest in promoting their interests for the sake of local investment, employment 
and tax revenues. The defence industry was not a catalyst for policy change towards a 
more mobile, flexible Bundeswehr and hesitant in its support for joint European arms 
procurement. In these areas policy change came from the Federal Defence Ministry. 
The defence industry was essentially dependent and conservative, more a brake on 
change.
Hence the Bundeswehr policy subsystem embraces a wide range of economic and 
social as well as political interests that must be negotiated by policy leaders. In the 
German case -  compared to the US -  a key feature is the absence of a pivotal role for 
research institutes in developing new thinking and providing new ‘winning’ policy 
narratives or ‘causal stories’ that can be taken up and used by policy leaders to make 
sense of ill-defined, problematic situations. To the extent that new policy narratives 
have emerged, they have done so from the ground upwards through the operational 
experience of the Bundeswehr in new peace-keeping operations, notably in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan.
On medical care see Harrison, S. Moran, M. and Wood, B. (2002) ‘Policy Emergence and Policy 
Convergence, The Case of ‘Scientific Bureaucratic Medicine’ in the United States and the United 
Kingdom’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, No.4, Vol.l, pp. 1-24 
Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin 6* August 2002, Interviews, British Embassy, Belrin, 9*** 
September 2002
Roe, E. (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis, Theory and Practice, (Durham, Duke University Press)
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2.2 Interlocking and Nested Policy Sub-Systems: Defence, Foreign, Security and 
Budgetary Policy
The opportunities for, and constraints on, policy leadership over Bundeswehr reform 
are conditioned by the complex interactions between this policy subsystem and 
related subsystems. These interactions take two forms. First, the Bundeswehr is part 
of the larger defence and security policy subsystem, which (as we shall see) in turn 
overlaps with the foreign and security policy subsystem. Secondly, both the 
Bundeswehr and the defence and security policy subsystems are nested within NATO 
and increasingly the EU. The Bundeswehr is appropriately seen as a distinct 
subsystem from NATO and the EU in that innere FUhrung is seen as a specifically 
German policy innovation and conscription as part of a German concept of the 
‘citizen in uniform*. In short, Bundeswehr policy is an expression of a sense of a 
specific national identity and of national sovereignty. In addition, only a very small 
proportion of those involved with Bundeswehr policy are actively involved in NATO 
policy.
With German unification and the end of the Cold War Landesverteidigung (territorial 
defence) and conscription were the dominant concepts in the policy subsystem of the 
Bundeswehr. They found their legitimation in the post-war bloc system, in which the 
Federal Republic, as a result of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s diplomacy, was firmly 
locked in the pro-West camp.^^ Moreover, it was a distinctively exposed part of the 
Western bloc because of both its extensive land borders with the pro-Soviet Eastern 
bloc and the uniquely exposed position of West Berlin as an island in that bloc. The 
weight of Eastern bloc military capability in Europe was poised on the borders of the 
Federal Republic. Hence the Federal Republic was structurally vulnerable and highly 
dependent on collective NATO commitment to its territorial defence. In this context 
of the bloc system territorial defence was bound up with the notion of an ideological 
commitment to defend a way of life based on freedom against socialism. In short, 
territorial defence and post-war political identity were closely interwoven. More
Adenauer, K (1965) Erinnerungen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt) p.245
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practically, German leaders prided themselves on having the largest European army in 
NATO, some 500,000 men, of which about 220,000 were conscripts.
The policy subsystem of the Bundeswehr was in turn nested within the wider policy 
subsystem of defence and security. This wider subsystem was characterized by a 
number of key features. In particular, as chapter three details, it contained contending 
advocacy coalitions rather than the professional consensus that characterized the 
Bundeswehr policy subsystem.
• The constitutionally enshrined rules within which it operates, notably the Basic 
Law’s Preamble and article 26.. Not least, German defence and security policies 
are committed to: ‘... to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe...’. The Basic Law establishes three basic principles: (1) the exclusive 
power of the federation to establish the federal armed forces and to subject them 
to rigorous political control; (2) the exclusively defensive aim of German defence 
and security policies; and (3) the principle both of compulsory military service, if 
need be, and of the right of conscientious objection, the latter linked to the 
obligation to serve Germany in a ‘civilian alternative service’ (Ziviler 
Ersatzdienst)}^
• The pivotal position of the Federal Defence Ministry and its institutional interest 
in its autonomy in the conduct of its affairs, supported by article 65 of the Basic 
Law. Because of its origins in the debate about rearmament in the context of 
NATO entry, the Defence Ministry had a traditionally strong NATO orientation 
and a deep commitment to deterrence doctrine.Interestingly, as late as 2001 it 
was the only federal ministry still lacking a European policy unit, whether in the 
form of a division (as in the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry) or even a 
section (Referat). This underlines the lack of a strong European specialization in 
the Defence Ministry. Over time Europeanisation pressures have grown, notably 
via the Franco-German Defence Council (established in 1988), the Eurocorps, the 
integration of the WEU into the EU’s structures, the development of the ESDP’s 
institutional machinery in Brussels and its rapid reaction force, and joint defence 
procurement projects.
16Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (German Bundestag, Berlin, 2(X)1)
Gutjahr, L. (1994) German Foreign and defence Policy after Unification (London, Pinter), p.l09
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Its possession of all the attributes of a mature policy subsystem listed above, 
including not least a policy-oriented learning process after German unification that 
led to a gradual redefinition of identity. Earlier policy identity had been founded 
on territorial defence and the capacity to mobilize very large numbers of ground 
troops for this purpose. During the 1990s this notion began to give way to the idea 
of a crisis reaction, mission-oriented Bundeswehr, capable of taking on larger 
international responsibilities. This meant a much more mobile, highly trained 
Bundeswehr taking on new tasks of crisis management and humanitarian action, 
in which policing the safety of civilian populations became a key priority.
The relatively low incentive for senior politicians to interest themselves in, let 
alone specialize in defence policy, given the low prestige of military values in 
German public life and the minor position given to defence in the priorities of the 
public. Far more attractive in career terms was specialization in economic, 
employment and social policy issues, given the greater importance that electors 
assigned to them.
In consequence, only a very small number of politicians seeking or gaining senior 
office had experience and expertise in defence and security policy. Amongst 
Chancellors only Helmut Schmidt had been Federal Defence Minister and took an 
active interest. During the 1950s the bitter debates about German rearmament and 
the formation of the Bundeswehr generated a group of politicians with a defence 
expertise: notably, Fritz Erler, Carlo Schmid and Schmidt in the SPD; Erich 
Mende in the FDP; and Konrad Adenauer and Franz Josef Strauss within the 
CDU/CSU. However, Willy Brandt, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schroder did not 
show much enthusiasm for this policy sector. On the whole. Federal Chancellors 
and party leaders were reluctant to become identified with military issues, for 
electoral as well as historical reasons. In this respect they differed significantly 
from US Presidents, French Presidents and British Prime Ministers. There was no 
electoral incentive for a German Chancellor or Chancellor candidate to present 
her/himself as leader of a ‘warrior’ nation.
The high degree of sensitivity of the national mood to rearmament and 
deployment issues, especially on the left of the political spectrum, underpinned a 
general ‘culture of restraint’ within the defence and security policy subsystem. 
This sensitivity has been manifested many times. Examples include the early
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1950s’ issue of the European Defence Community and NATO; the debate in 
1959-60 about whether the Bundeswehr should be equipped with tactical nuclear 
weapons; the early 1980s debate over deployment of American Pershing and 
Cruise missiles on German soil; the 1985 debate about the US’s proposed 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI); the issue of modernization of short-range 
tactical nuclear weapons in 1988-89; the Gulf War of 1991; the Kosovo War of 
1999; the Afghan War of 2001 ; and the Iraq crisis.
Over the period since 1983 on average some 70-80 per cent of Germans wish to 
remain within NATO.** But this support was distinguished from a much more 
critical attitude towards war-fighting strategies and missile and troop deployments 
that might be seen as offensive rather than defensive. This attitude was strongly 
represented amongst German intellectuals and amongst the young, especially 
students, who were prepared to take to the streets in huge mass demonstrations. 
The Pershing and Cruise deployments were implemented against prevailing public 
opinion but legitimated in terms of NATO loyalty. Despite NATO loyalty, ‘war’ 
was a deeply emotional issue for a people still living in the trauma of the Second 
World War, the carpet-bombing of its own cities and the acute sufferings of its 
wartime and post-war refugee population. Notions of associating the Bundeswehr 
with a strategy of pre-emptive military action of the kind outlined by the Bush 
Administration in 2002 were anathema and threatened high domestic political 
costs.
Within the policy subsystem three distinct policy narratives arose, based on 
contending definitions of the principal source of security threat (discussed in 
chapter three). For the ‘freedom’ coalition the threat came from the enemies of 
Western values (the Soviet empire and then ‘rogue’ states); for the ‘peace’ 
coalition the threat derived from the ‘spiral of violence’ associated with the 
military-industrial complex; and for the ‘pacifist’ coalition the threat was 
aggressive and overwhelming US power. The presence of these advocacy 
coalitions distinguished this policy subsystem from the professional character of 
the Bundeswehr policy subsystem.
The work of research institutes like the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft ftir Auswartige Politik fed into these advocacy coalitions.
Figures provided by interview partner in Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2“*. September 2002
63
However, it was more important in sustaining and adapting their shared beliefs 
than in generating new policy ideas. In the United States, by contrast, a range of 
think tanks played an active pace-setting role in defence and security policy ideas 
and agenda change. The Brookings Institution was very much at the heart of the 
‘liberal’ coalition’ with its beliefs in interdependency, ‘soft’ power and 
multilateralism. The Heritage Foundation was at the heart of the traditional 
conservative coalition with its beliefs in American exceptionalism but tied to an 
essentially pessimistic view of the world. The Hudson Institute, the Centre for 
Security Policy and the Project for New American Century spearheaded the neo­
conservative coalition which tied belief in American exceptionalism to an 
optimism about the US’s ability to transfrom the world in its image. There were 
no German equivalents. Also, there is not the same circulation of people and ideas 
between Defence Ministry and think tanks as in the US -  seen for instance in the 
influence of actors like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz on behalf of the neo­
conservative agenda. Nor does the German defence industry play an important 
role in funding think tanks. More important in the German case is the role of the 
party foundations like the SPD’s Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the CDU’s Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung in organizing debates around defence and security policy 
topics. However, they provide a platform for the exchange of ideas rather than an 
independent research and think tank capacity that seeks to shape the political 
imagination.
Because it was so nested within defence and security policy the Bundeswehr was 
affected by three key aspects of the interaction of the larger policy subsystem with 
other subsystems. Firstly, defence and security was nested within the budget policy 
subsystem. From the very origins of the post-war Bundeswehr the Finance Ministry 
had presented obstacles to planning and frustrated German ability to meet its NATO 
commitments.^^ The traditional policy prerogatives of the Federal Finance Ministry in 
this domain were reinforced by two factors: the greater political weight of Finance 
Ministers than of Defence Ministers in coalition and party politics (eg. Theo Waigel 
and Volker Rühe, Hans Eichel and Rudolf Scharping); and the impact of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) on the relative power of the Finance Minister in
Schwarz, H.-P. (1997) Konrad Adenauer, II, 1952-1967 (Oxford, Berghahn) p. 217
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imposing fiscal discipline. Budget constraints remained a key part of the politics of 
the Bundeswehr reform and were accentuated further by the implications of German 
unification.
The Federal Finance Ministry was an important source of pressure for change, 
especially in pressing the agenda of NATO and EU pooling of military capabilities 
and the agenda of privatisation so that significant long-term expenditure savings could 
be made. Pooling avoided a duplication of efforts by different states and, by 
economies of scale and overhead, enhanced military capability. Privatisation was seen 
as the route to efficiency gains. Both the Defence Ministry and the German armament 
industry were more disposed to identify and stress the potential costs of such changes. 
The savings from pooling seemed greatest in aircraft procurement -  especially 
fighters and military transport - because of their high purchase and maintenance costs 
when states were buying the same type.
Secondly, defence and security overlapped with the foreign and security policy 
subsystem. The Federal Chancellor’s Office acted as policy broker between the two, 
but had a policy bias towards the foreign and security policy subsystem. This policy 
bias reflected the weight of the Foreign Policy Division within the Federal 
Chancellor’s Office and the greater political weight of the Foreign Ministry in 
coalition politics.^® The Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry shared an overall 
commitment to the Harmel doctrine of deterrence with détente adopted by NATO in 
1967 as the basis for a durable and just ‘peace order’ in Europe as a whole. However, 
within this broad commitment -  and the framework of constitutional constraints 
outlined above - the Foreign Ministry was disposed to stress the reduction of tensions 
through diplomatic and political means, the Defence Ministry to emphasise the 
requirements of deterrence and the value of coercive diplomacy.
There was also a difference in the weight that they attached to different multilateral 
forums for security policy. The EU and the United Nations figured prominently in the 
thinking of the Foreign Minister. In particular, the UN was very much a key arena for 
the Foreign Ministry. This gave the Foreign Ministry a key voice in the development
^  On Hans-Dietrich Genscher against Scholz and then Stoltenberg over short-range nuclear missile 
modernization in 1988-89 see Genscher, H-D. (1995) Erinnerungen (Berlin, Siedler) pp.581-621
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of German participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Under the Kohl 
Chancellorship Klaus Kinkel sought to claim credit for this development. As a Green 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer attached particular importance to strengthening this 
new security role for the UN.^  ^The Defence Ministry had a traditional attachment to 
the primacy of NATO. As chapters four and five show, the Foreign Ministry under 
Klaus Kinkel and Fischer was to prove more open to new ideas about Bundeswehr 
reform than the Defence Ministry.
Thirdly, as chapter 6 shows in more detail, Bundeswehr reform and defence and 
security policy were subject to a dynamic of change associated with European 
Security and Defence Policy (BSD?). By means of its key co-ordinating role in 
European policy through chairing the Committee of ‘European’ State Secretaries and 
through the Permanent Representative in Brussels, the Foreign Ministry saw in 
sponsorship of ESDP a means to gain more influence over defence and security 
policy. The Defence Ministry could not distance itself from ESDP as an emerging key 
element in Germany’s priority to European political union, post-Maastricht and 
especially post-Kosovo. Considerations of bureaucratic politics led it to concentrate 
on ensuring that institutional mechanisms were in place with the new European 
security committee in Brussels to minimize the opportunities of the Foreign Ministry 
to interfere. This relative autonomy was justified by reference to the distinctive nature 
of defence and security policy; it depended on a high degree of confidentiality and 
secretiveness in order to protect the lives of soldiers and to prevent potential enemies 
gaining an advantage.
ESDP was associated with Europeanisation pressures on the Bundeswehr. These took 
two forms. ‘Top-down’ Europeanisation involved pressures to adapt the role, 
structures and ways of doing things in the Bundeswehr to meet the stated 
requirements of ESDP, notably the Helsinki Headline Goals. ‘Bottom-up’ 
Europeanisation involved the use by German actors of Europe as a means to push 
through and legitimate Bundeswehr reforms. As suggested above, however, ESDP -  
like NATO -  is best seen as a distinct policy subsystem that interacts with the German
See Joschka Fischer’s speech to the 35* Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 06.02.1999, 
Proceedings of the 35*. Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, Febuary, 1999
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defence and security policy subsystem and with the Bundeswehr policy subsystem 
rather than as in a hierarchical relationship to these subsystems. It has been above all 
important in opening up domestic political opportunities for policy change, as the 
Weizsacker Commission shows (see chapter 5).
As we shall see in chapters 3 and 6, potentially far more important for German 
defence and security policy was the implications of the Bush Administration’s 
unilateral commitment to a new military strategy of pre-emptive war, of its use of 
NATO as a military toolkit for the Afghan invasion, and of the threat of unilateral 
military action against Iraq in 2002-3. These developments created a new flux and 
uncertainty about the respective values of the United Nations, NATO and the EU as 
contexts for effective multilateral action on security. They gave a renewed emphasis 
to developing the UN and EU peace-keeping and humanitarian roles of the 
Bundeswehr, for instance in Macedonia and Afghanistan, a development that was 
consistent with longer-term SPD and Green policy thinking about international 
security. On these matters there was relatively little difference of view between 
Schroder, Fischer and Scharping (and later Peter Struck).
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2.3 Conclusion
Bundeswehr policy is at one level a highly specialist subsystem, involving a small 
elite of actors who are tied together in an intimate world of highly confidential 
information and a mystique of secretiveness. In the German case, in contrast to the 
United States or Britain, this mystique does not derive from the high social and 
political status and respect accorded to military professionalism. The role of the 
military in the downfall of the Weimar Republic and in the Third Reich made such 
claims politically unsustainable. It is rooted in the more practical concern -  shared 
across states - not to jeopardise the lives of German soldiers or the general public by 
advantaging those who threaten the use of armed force against Germany.
In addition, the Bundeswehr policy subsystem is held together by a strong sense of 
shared professional identity that has evolved over nearly fifty years and that is 
supported by a carefully cultivated cross-party consensus within the Bundestag. It is 
dominated by the models of reflective practice and professional consensus, which 
value the personal experience of soldiers as a source of valid knowledge. Conversely, 
the organization of the Bundeswehr policy subsystem shows little support for the idea 
of new policy ideas generated by external scientific ‘think tanks*. Such ‘think tanks’ 
would open up the Bundeswehr to a more critical external scrutiny. This dimension 
has been lacking in Bundeswehr reform because it has not been built into the 
organization of the policy subsystem. In addition, policy leaders have shown little 
interest in reforming its organization in order to encourage radical new thinking.
This shared identity provides Federal Defence Ministers with a formidable political 
resource in negotiating policy change, not least at NATO and EU levels. The 
Bundeswehr is a core element in German post-war political and social reconstruction 
and -  crucially -  symbolic of a ‘new* Germany in which Germans are proud.
This degree of autonomy is offset by the extent to which Bundeswehr policy is 
embedded in a much more complex institutional context and one, moreover, that 
generates a great deal of bureaucratic politics around the interacting interests of the 
Federal Defence, Foreign and Finance ministries as well as of the Lander and of the 
EU and NATO. The result is a formidable set of constraints that policy leaders must
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negotiate. An analysis of the complex set of policy subsystems with which 
Bundeswehr policy interacts and in which it is nested suggests that the EU and NATO 
are important but by no means central to defining the scope and nature of policy 
leadership.
The institutional context does, however, select for certain kinds of policy leadership 
roles, strategies and styles over others. In particular, it favours brokerage and veto 
playing roles over entrepreneurship. There is little scope or incentive to embrace a 
heroic leadership style and to pursue a strategy of creating and sustaining a crisis 
consciousness. Far better adapted to such an institutional context are strategies of 
promoting policy-oriented learning and 'binding in' opposition by means of 
professional forums (see Rühe and Scharping in later chapters) or of sidelining or 
excluding change agents (see the chapter on Rühe). But, equally, policy leaders do 
have choices about roles, strategies and styles and on occasion policy 
entrepreneurship has made an appearance. This issue is taken up in the empirical case 
studies.
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Chapter 3: The Post-Cold War Context of Bundeswehr Reform: Exogenous 
‘Shock’ or Policy-Oriented Learning?
The end of the Cold War represented an exogenous ‘shock’ that, according to one 
major variant of historical institutionalism, raised fundamental questions about the 
nature, role and structure of German defence and security policy, upsetting the logic 
of path dependency in policy change. This interpretation raises, however, the issue of 
whether the processes of policy change respond so swiftly and directly to exogenous 
‘shock’. This chapter argues that the missing factor was policy leaders prepared to 
mobilise perceptions of crisis and construct a narrative of crisis about the Bundeswehr 
to legitimate decisive intervention by the macro-political level in the policy 
subsystem.^ Exogenous shock was important in another way. It led to a 
reconfiguration of domestic advocacy coalitions, providing new opportunities for the 
‘peace’ coalition to identify itself with a policy narrative that privileged the 
peacekeeping and humanitarian roles of the Bundeswehr.
The reasons for this lack of crisis mobilization and narration lie partly in the domestic 
institutional context of Bundeswehr policy and the strong sense of shared identity 
within the policy subsystem (see chapter 2). They also relate to the perception of a 
relatively smooth process of adaptation between domestic policy on the role and 
structure of the Bundeswehr and the emerging requirements of the international, and 
above all European, security environment (no radical ‘misfit’). These requirements 
were not defined by German policy leaders in terms of a crisis narrative that stressed 
fundamental stmctural transformation of the Bundeswehr. The emphasis was on 
tinkering with the pre-existing and largely unmodified basic structures of the 
Bundeswehr. In essence, the process of Bundeswehr reform was defined more in 
terms of the perspective of long-term policy-oriented learning than in terms of 
‘exogenous’ shock and crisis narrative leading to the displacement of dominant policy 
ideas. Emerging new information about international security challenges and the
 ^Hay, C, (1999) ‘Globalisation, Régionalisation and the Persistence o f National Variation: The 
Contingent Convergence o f Contemporary Capitalism’, ESRC ‘One Europe or Several’ Working 
Paper, University of Birmingham
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accumulating experience of Bundeswehr policy makers with new ‘out-of-area’ 
operations created an independent dynamic of endogenous policy change.
When, in 2002-3, a crisis narrative emerged, it took the form of identifying the crisis 
as in German-US relations rather than in German defence and security policy and in 
the Bundeswehr. The narrative was of failure in US policy towards the Middle East 
and terrorism -  especially the new doctrine of pre-emptive strike -  rather than of 
failure in the Bundeswehr. In this changed context the Schroder government sought 
allies -  notably the French -  that would support its opposition to this new strategic 
doctrine. The form in which this crisis narrative emerged testified to the autonomy 
and resilience of the Bundeswehr and the defence and security policy subsystems.
This chapter focuses on the nature of the new, unfolding strategic context of the post- 
Cold War world as a basis for analysing German policy leadership roles in chapters 4- 
6. The previous chapter shows how leadership roles were ‘selected for’ by domestic 
institutional context.^ Here the emphasis is on how the international strategic context 
also ‘selected for’ leadership roles. Together, they suggest that policy 
entrepreneurship by ‘salami tactics’ was the most radical form of Bundeswehr change 
to which German policy leaders could aspire.
3.1 The Bundeswehr in the Cold War Period: A Policy Monopoly in a 
Framework of Adversarial Politics
During the Cold War period up to 1989-90 the defence and security policy subsystem 
came to possess a basic structure formed around three advocacy coalitions. Their 
boundaries were by no means firm, and individual actors could cross them and 
sometimes combine them in complex and changing ways. Nevertheless, these 
coalitions gave a long-term stability to Bundeswehr policy based on different policy 
core beliefs that glued them together. Above all, they offered different policy 
narratives about the nature and role of defence and security policy, framing how the 
problems were defined, where their causes are located, what solutions are proposed.
 ^Hay, C. (1999) ‘Globalisation, Régionalisation and the Persistence o f National Variation: The 
Contingent Convergence o f Contemporary Capitalism’, ESRC ‘One Europe or Several’ Working 
Paper, University of Birmingham
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and who are identified as heroes and villains. Domestically, the Cold War period was 
characterized by competition between the ’freedom’ and the ‘peace’ coalitions, with 
the ‘pacifist’ coalition as the outsider to the policy process and the ‘freedom’ coalition 
as ascendant.
The ‘freedom’ coalition was united by a shared core policy belief in defence of the 
Western way of life by an Atlanticist approach rooted in deterrence of a clearly 
defined enemy -  the Soviet empire. It was represented most strongly by the Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and on the right of the SPD. 
The political ascendancy of this coalition derived from the successful way in which 
Adenauer had used the Korean War crisis of 1950 -  and later the brutal Soviet 
repression of the East Berlin revolt of 1953 and the Hungarian uprising of 1956 - to 
push the agenda of a ‘policy of strength’ in confronting the enemies of liberal 
democracy.^ This was tied to a policy narrative that located defence and security 
policy in the historical story of the ‘long journey to the West’. ^
The ‘peace’ coalition was united in a shared core belief about internationally 
negotiated disarmament and arms control measures and bonded by a deep emotional 
bonding to peace and confidence-building measures. The ‘spiralling arms race’ was 
seen as transforming both sides into potential victims, making the enemy the military- 
industrial complex. Membership of this coalition stretched from the ‘realist’ wing of 
the Green Party into the centre-left of the SPD and was strongly represented in the 
churches, especially the Lutheran Church, youth organizations, the trade unions and 
peace research institutions. Protagonists of this policy narrative looked to Austria, 
Finland and Sweden rather than NATO and its constituent states as models. Its 
influence extended into the SPD where leading politicians -  like Anna-Marie 
Weiczoreck-Zeul, European spokesman in the 1990s -  preferred imitation of these 
three states to France as a model for building a European defence and security policy.
Each advocacy coalition offered a different policy narrative based on drawing 
different lessons from history. For the ‘peace’ coalition history taught that Germany 
had a special responsibility to work to avoid war, notably through a détente policy
 ^Schwarz, H.-P. (1997) Konrad Adenauer, II, 1952-1967 (Oxford, Berghahn) pp.81-86 
* Winkler, HA (2000) Der Lange Weg nach Westen (München, Beck Verlag)
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that guaranteed a durable and just comprehensive peace order throughout Europe 
based on collective security.^ Its preferred institutional arenas for policy development 
were the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the 
United Nations. For the ‘freedom’ coalition history taught that Germany must never 
again isolate itself by seeking to pursue a ‘special path’ (Sonderweg).^ Its peace and 
security depended on the closest possible integration into the Atlantic Alliance and the 
EU as a reliable, loyal ally. Its preferred institutional arena was NATO and 
development of a European pillar within NATO, preferably linked to the EU. The 
particular political skill of Hans-Dietrich Genscher as Foreign Minister (1974-92) was 
to act as policy broker between these two coalitions.^
A third ‘pacifist’ advocacy coalition comprised those opposing the policy image of 
Landesverteidigung and conscription and was to be found on the fringes of the 
political system. These figures and organisations were united by deep core policy 
beliefs stemming from a fundamentalist opposition to war and advocacy of unilateral 
disarmament and neutrality. The epicentre of this coalition was provided by the 
‘fundamentalist’ wing of the Green Party and the wider peace movement. Pacifism 
had deep roots in the country’s catastrophic experience of war in the twentieth century 
and was influential within university towns and cities, notably amongst critical peace 
researchers. However, it was an ‘outsider’ rather than a ‘insider’ coalition. Its means 
of influence were petitions (like the Krefeld Appeal of November 1980 against the 
NATO ‘dual-track’ decision) and mass demonstrations, using strident public protest 
to catch media attention and force the peace issue up the public agenda. In the context 
of huge mass demonstrations, as in Bonn in October 1983 over the deployment of 
Pershing and Cruise missiles, the boundaries between the ‘peace’ coalition and the 
‘pacifist’ coalition could become blurred. However for Brandt they remained clear in 
the commitment to ‘negotiated’ multilateral disarmament and to support of the role of 
the Bundeswehr in territorial defence.®
 ^Fischer, J. (1994) Risiko Deutschland, Krise und Zukunft derDeutschen Politik (Koln, Kiepenteuer 
and Witsch) pp. 185-233
 ^Gillessen, G. Germany’s Position at the Centre of Europe in Baring, A, (ed.) (1994). Germany's New 
Position in Europe, Problems and Perspectives (Oxford, Berg) pp.30-31 
 ^Genscher, H-D. (1995) Erinnerungen (Berlin, Siedler)
® Schollgen, G. (2001), Willy Brandt, Die Biographie (Berlin, Propylan) p.248
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Of particular importance was that the main split between the ‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ 
coalitions cut right through the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and was opened wide 
by Chancellor’s Schmidt’s initiative of 1977 in calling for a co-ordinated Alliance 
response to the challenge of Soviet medium-range missile deployments in central 
Europe. For those associated with Willy Brandt, the SPD’s chair, the party’s mission 
was to promote international peace and reconciliation; for the fewer around Schmidt 
the priority was defence of the Western way of life based on freedom and fulfilment 
of Alliance commitments. In the aftermath of the highly divisive deployment of 
Cruise and Pershing missiles in 1983, the ‘peace’ coalition gained power within the 
SPD. Under Brandt’s chairmanship the SPD advocated arms control, disarmament 
and a ‘nuclear-free’ zone in central Europe to reinforce détente, distancing itself from 
deterrence. The ‘peace’ coalition gained power in part because Brandt found himself 
cast into the difficult political position as party chair of having to act as policy broker 
between the presence of the ‘pacifist’ coalition with the SPD’s ranks and the 
‘freedom’ coalition.
However, crucially, the SPD’s advocacy of Egon Bahr’s ideas of a ‘second Ostpolitik' 
and of ‘common security’ -  endorsed at the Nuremberg party conference of 1986 - did 
not challenge the conception of the Bundeswehr as purely defensive, to be used only 
to defend the territory of Germany or that of another NATO member. The key 
questions and debates were about how that defensive role was to be organized, 
notably what role - if any - nuclear weapons should play in war-fighting. Thus a broad 
consensus existed amongst all the major parties (FDP, SPD and CDU/CSU) 
academics, journalists and defence institutions about the basic role of the 
Bundeswehr. Critically, this consensus was reinforced by the constitution (see chapter 
two).
Despite this overall adversarial contest about defence and security policy, the 
Bundeswehr policy subsystem during this period can be understood in terms of 
punctuated equilibrium theory. It was dominated by a policy monopoly with a 
supportive and deeply entrenched policy image of Landes- and BUndnisverteidigung, 
of conscription and of ‘citizens in uniform’. They formed the key elements within a 
policy narrative that resonated with past historical military failures. The reach of the 
policy monopoly was spread widely across the Federal Defence Ministry, the
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Chancellor’s Office, the Foreign Ministry, the two main ‘catch-all’ parties 
(Volksparteien) of the CDU/CSU the SPD, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Lander 
governments and a range of social institutions like the churches and the trade unions. 
It was also supported by the international institutions in which Germany was 
embedded. Even at the height of the polarization on defence policy between SPD and 
the CDU/CSU in the early and mid 1950s this policy image was not contested.^ The 
debate was about the political and institutional context of a future Bundeswehr and 
whether this context should be NATO or the SPD-sponsored idea of a system of 
collective security for a unified Germany.
Notwithstanding this polarization, Adenauer proceeded -  on the basis of advice from 
his key military advisers -  to base the foundation of the Bundeswehr on careful cross­
party agreement about basic principles. In this process there were very careful 
consultations with the Bundestag’s new security committee, involving many meetings 
between key SPD politicians like Brier and military officers. Hence from the outset, 
Adenauer adopted a leadership role of policy brokerage rather than policy 
entrepreneurship. This approach prevented the formation of advocacy coalitions 
within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem.
In consequence, the Bundeswehr policy monopoly was supported by the macro 
political system as well as the policy subsystem itself. It was reinforced by Germany’s 
semi-sovereignty: externally, as a ‘penetrated’ state constrained by the international 
treaty system under which Germany was rearmed in the 1950s.^  ^Internally, the policy 
monopoly was buttressed by the Federal Constitutional Court’s role in interpreting the 
constitution, by the Lander (state) interest in maintaining military bases, by the 
Federal Finance Ministry’s interest in budgetary control, and the interest of a range of 
social groups in Ersatzdienst and the dependence of the social policy subsystem on 
this supply of carers. In particular, the Basic Law prescribed a limited role for the 
German armed forces, allowing their use only in the context of attack upon German 
territory or that of another NATO member. At the same time the Bundeswehr policy 
monopoly owed a great deal to Adenauer’s choice of leadership role.
® Lowke, V.F. (1976) Die SPD und die Wehrfrage 1949-1955 (Bonn, Bad Godesberg) 
Hanrieder, W.F. (1971) Die stabile Krise (Düsseldorf, Bertelsmann)
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The two elements within the policy narrative of ‘territorial defence’ doctrine and 
conscription gained legitimacy not just from the geo-strategic position of West 
Germany during the Cold War but also from her historical experience. Her position as 
a ‘front line’ state of the West necessitated a large number of ground troops ready for 
mobilisation in the event of any ‘first strike’ by the Soviet Union. Conscription was 
justified by the fear that a professional army would never be able to attract enough 
troops to provide effective territorial defence, deter a potential Soviet aggressor and 
meet NATO commitments.
More fundamentally, conscription was bound up closely with the refashioned political 
identity of the post-war state. The system of conscription was seen as crucial in the 
context of Germany’s past civil-military relations. In one sense it was a useful way of 
connecting to German tradition and establishing appropriate and much needed role 
models after the disaster of complicity with the Third Reich. The idea of a ‘citizens 
army’ could be linked to Prussian military reformers like Gerhard von Schamhorst, 
August Count Gneisenau, and Karl von Clausewitz.
However, above all, the ‘citizens army’ was a way of transforming the new 
Bundeswehr into a different type of institution from the old Wehrmacht. One key 
aspect was a change in leadership style, a new code of conduct and tough 
parliamentary control. This theme was pressed by the SPD.^  ^The emphasis was to be 
on personal responsibility and a culture of discussion and persuasion rather than 
unthinking obedience. Here the crucial innovator was Count von Baudissin and his 
concept of innere Ftihrung. This concept of ‘inner leadership’ emphasised the 
importance of political education, teamwork and, above all, personal responsibility as 
the essential components of an army of ‘citizens in uniform’. Démocratisation of the 
Bundeswehr was underpinned by the specification of the aims and objectives of the 
Bundeswehr in the Basic Law (especially in the Preamble and in article 26 (1)); the 
unwillingness to recreate a General Staff on the Wehrmacht model; the new Defence 
Conunissioner accountable to the Bundestag; the subservience of members of the 
Bundeswehr to the civil courts; and explicit regulation of military tradition, including 
the symbolic aspects of the Bundeswehr.
"  See Fritz Erler in Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1975, pp.161-165
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A second aspect was conscription as a way of ending the military’s isolation from 
society, a theme was pressed by the CDU/CSU. The role of the military during the 
Weimar Republic was seen as a central example of how the first republic had been 
doomed. The lesson was to put in place arrangements that would ensure the 
Bundeswehr’s political loyalty by closely integrating it into society. Conscription was 
justified as a means of ensuring that there could be no recurrence of a ‘state within a 
state’.T h rough  a citizens army conscription would firmly embed the notion of the 
military’s subordination to democratically elected government in German political 
culture. It was essential to bind it to society by direct contact with the population at 
large.
The policy monopoly was sustained by a clearly recognisable ‘negative feedback 
process’. Its success was demonstrated by the way in which Germany was brought 
back into the international community as a respected partner and by the way in which 
Germany built a civic society with strong civil-military relations. Most important of 
all, the policy monopoly was deeply bound up with post-war German political 
identity. In this respect it can be argued that conscription went beyond a policy core 
belief to partake of the characteristics of a ‘deep core belief in conscription as ‘a 
pillar of our democratic state’ through its contribution to a sense of citizenship.^^ In 
consequence, it was a deeply entrenched belief as an integral part of actors’ value 
systems and highly resistant to change
Conscription was also valued at the Land and local level as a means of reinforcing 
loyalties. Conscripts tended to serve very near home in local bases, meaning that they 
retained close contacts to their families and localities and that the notion of territorial 
defence was given a pronounced regional expression. These loyalties would be lost 
with a professional army that served overseas. In the make-up of the Bundeswehr 
values of local patriotism played an important role, and regional and local bases took 
on an important symbolic value that made reform a politically sensitive matter.
See Theodor Blank, the first Defence Minister, in Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1975,153-8; 
also Theodor Heuss, the first Federal President, speaking in 1949, and quoted in Briihl and Rautenberg, 
1987, p.35
Genscher, H-D. (1995) Erinnerungen (BerUn, Siedler), p. 1022
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Landesverteidigung and conscription remained the dominant policy image right up to 
the end of the Cold War. Its dominance was intimately related to the bipolar character 
of the international security environment, Germany’s vulnerable front-line status, and 
the depth of German embeddedness in NATO. Not least, conscription was a key part 
of post-war national political identity, linked to painful historical memories of elite 
behaviour during the Weimar Republic. It was deeply entrenched and resistant to 
change as a deep core belief. Both concepts were further held in place by the 
institutional constraints of internal semi-sovereignty represented by the Federal 
Constitutional Court, Lander interest in avoiding closures of bases on their territory, 
and the Federal and Land Finance Ministries’ interest in defraying costs by retaining 
the use of young men in civilian alternative service as the counterpart to conscription. 
In this strategic context the prospects for leadership in support of an alternative policy 
image were very limited.
3.2 Military Intervention and Crisis Management: The Reconfiguration of 
Advocacy Coalitions and a Changing Policy Narrative
During the 1990s the new issue of the Bundeswehr’s role in military intervention and 
crisis management displaced the traditional centrality of its role in collective defence. 
This issue was focused on the participation of Germany in UN-led and NATO- 
supported peacekeeping missions and the question of NATO ‘out-of-area’ operations. 
The development of a military intervention and crisis management role and capability 
challenged the traditional policy narrative of Landesverteidigung and a conscript 
army. It also opened up a new political opportunity for the reconfiguration of 
domestic advocacy coalitions within the defence and security policy subsystem.
In essence, the development of a military intervention and crisis management role 
responded to the emerging realities of the post-Cold War world, notably the growing 
instability associated with state failure, for instance in Yugoslavia, Somalia and 
Rwanda. Two critical aspects of these realities were the responses of the UN and of 
the US. The UN was crucially important in providing the moral authority for German 
participation through the ‘Agenda for Peace’ strategy of its Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali in June 1992. In particular, this initiative expanded the traditional
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concept of peacekeeping operations, as set out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, to 
include preventive deployments. It also began a debate -  into which German policy 
makers were inevitably drawn - about the right and indeed duty of the international 
community to intervene in the traditionally sovereign internal affairs of states and 
about the links between conflict prevention and democracy and good governance.
The second important factor was the way in which successive US Administrations 
redefined US security policy on military intervention. Most problematic for Germany 
was the tying of this policy development to a progressive toughening of the notion of 
coercive diplomacy in the United States and the emerging political consensus between 
Democrats and Republicans around the idea of a role for the US as a global sheriff, 
forging coalitions or posses of states. The events of September 11 2001 -  a major 
terrorist attack on the territory of the US - were critical in this respect.
Broadly, two phases in the development of a military intervention and crisis 
management role can be detected. The first phase involved the elaboration of a new 
security strategy of intervention during the Presidency of Bill Clinton (1992-2000) 
under the auspices of both the UN and NATO. This strategy began with the Gulf War, 
and stretched through Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti, to Kosovo. For the US -  and 
especially the Democratic Party -  it involved the exorcising of the ghosts of the 
Vietnam War of the 1960s and a new optimism about the use of American military 
power. Its reception in Germany was influenced by the fact that this new tough- 
minded military interventionism emerged under the Democratic Presidency of Bill 
Clinton. Clinton was a multilateralist by conviction, and humanitarian ends of 
protecting civilian populations and opposing ethnic cleansing seemed to play an 
important role in his attitude to crisis intervention. There was room for tension with 
the domestic German ‘peace’ coalition -  which feared being drawn into an escalating 
spiral of violence in crisis regions -  and continuing implacable opposition from within 
the ‘pacifist’ coalition where the collusion of exploitative US corporate interests with 
US military intervention remained the chief suspect.
Mclnnes, C. and Wheeler, N. (eds) (2002) Dimensions o f Western Military Intervention (London, 
Portland, Frank Cass) pp. 1-28
Sylvan, D. and Keren, M. (2002), International Intervention, Sovereignty vs. Responsibility (London, 
Frank Cass)
De Benoist, A. Die Welt nach 9/11: Der Globale Terrorismus als Herausforderung des Westens 
(Tubingen: Hohenrain)
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However, and crucially, the notion of a role in protecting civilian populations from 
ethnic cleansing created a new strategic opportunity for domestic policy leadership 
from within the ‘peace’ coalition. Joschka Fischer was able to relate this new 
interventionism to long-standing, constitutionally-mandated German goals of 
promoting world peace and situate it in a policy narrative that emphasised Germany’s 
special historical responsibility (‘never again Auschwitz’). Notably, this 
transformation within defence and security policy was not linked to a crisis narrative 
about the Bundeswehr. There was no attempt to define a radical ‘misfit’ between 
these international security developments and domestic conceptions of defence and 
security and of the role of the Bundeswehr. The focus was on the Bundeswehr having 
a new opportunity to meet the purpose for which it was designed.
The second phase in the development of a US interventionist role was more complex, 
problematic and dramatic. It was linked to a perception of a radical misfit, both in 
Washington and Berlin: with the Bush Administration arguing that Germany’s 
absence of an appropriate Bundeswehr marginalized it; and the Schroder government 
rejecting the role that the US sought from it. This new US interventionist role was 
driven by the response of the Bush Presidency to the watershed events of September 
11 2001 and the subsequent Afghan War and the Iraq crisis. Its response was 
informed by the enhanced influence of the traditional conservative and the neo­
conservative advocacy coalitions within the Bush Administration. In particular, 
September 11 and the ease of US victory in Afghanistan empowered the neo­
conservatives.
These events engendered an increased optimism about US military power and its 
capacity to serve as a force for good by transforming the world in the US image and 
making the world safer for Americans. This new emphasis on US primacy went along 
not just with an accentuation of the coercive element in US diplomacy but also with 
the development of a new American political programme to rewrite the post-war 
world order. In this new US narrative American interests no longer lay principally in 
Europe, and the test for Europeans was which were prepared to enter into coalitions of 
the willing with the US as it pursued its world interests in the Middle East and
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elsewhere. A multilateralism of conviction gave way to a multilateralism of 
convenience.
This evolving phase drew out a crisis narrative in Germany but one whose referents 
changed as events unfolded. In the immediate aftermath of 11 September Schroder 
and the SPD situated themselves firmly in the narrative of the ‘freedom* coalition. He 
declared ‘unlimited* solidarity with the US. Envisioning a global ‘ expansion of the 
area of the deployment* {Entgrenzung des Einsatzraums) of the Bundeswehr,
Schroder forced German military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom 
through the Bundestag by tying it to a vote of confidence in his government over the 
deployment of 3,900 troops for combat. Against this dramatic background, observers 
such as Heins concluded that the historic frame of reference of German defence and 
security policy had been abandoned, notably the ‘culture of restraint* rooted in the 
traumas of the Third Reich. This transformation seemed to be signalled by the 
militant Atlanticism of the editorials of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and their 
identification of the crisis as residing in the lack of combat-readiness of the 
Bundeswehr for taking an active part in the anti-terror alliance fighting for Western 
civilization.^^
The turning point came in 2002 with the Bush Administration* s unilateral definition 
of a new world order based on the right to pre-emptive military strike against potential 
enemies. The National Security Strategy reserved to the US the right to decide who 
might be its enemies and how they were to be dealt with. Both the process involved 
(which bypassed NATO) and the content (the assumption of US primacy and 
aggressive war-fighting) deeply offended elite and public opinion in Germany (and in 
much of the rest of Europe). This new security doctrine was a ‘watershed* event in 
that it represented both a challenge to the core beliefs of the ‘peace* coalition (which 
was strongly represented within the SPD/Green coalition) and a radical ‘misfit* with 
the role and structures of the Bundeswehr. One effect was to mobilize the ‘pacifist* 
advocacy coalition around opposition to the United States as the cause of a potentially
Heins, V. (2002) Germany’s New War: 11 September and Its Aftermath in German Quality 
Newspapers, German Politics, Vol.ll, No.2, pp. 128-146 
Heins, V. (2002) Germany’s New War: 11 September and Its Aftermath in German Quality 
Newspapers, German Politics, Vol.ll, No.2, p. 134
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uncontrollable escalation of violence, by its ‘failed’ Middle East policy and 
aggressive conduct stimulating the growth of terrorism.
Above all, however, the behaviour of the Bush Administration offered a mobilizing 
and unifying issue for a politically beleaguered coalition government that faced the 
imminent prospect of defeat in the federal elections of September 2002. From a 
mixture of principle and opportunism Schroder crafted a political position for the 
federal elections that simultaneously met two requirements. He took a stand on widely 
accepted principles of defence and security policy in Germany (no commitment of 
German troops to a war based on pre-emptive strike) and unified both party and 
public opinion on this issue to his electoral advantage. His position -  outlined in the 
Bundestag debate of 13 February 2003 -  was that: ‘No Realpolitik and no security 
doctrine should lead to the fact that, surreptitiously, we should come to regard war as 
a normal instrument of politics.’ This position opened up a profound political gap 
between the Bush Administration and the Red-Green coalition.
Strikingly, this turn of events put the ‘freedom’ coalition on the defensive and was 
widely judged to have contributed to their narrow defeat of the CDU/CSU in 2002. Its 
strongest advocates were still to be found within the CDU/CSU, especially the CDU 
party chair Angela Merkel. They focused on the historic debt to the US for defeating 
Hitler, for confronting the Soviet threat and for backing German unification, and the 
consequent obligation to show loyalty in a time of acute danger. They also stressed 
the historical lessons about the dangers of German isolation and about the need to 
sustain pressure on dangerous dictators. But they faced two problems. German public 
opinion was overwhelmingly anxious about the new US security doctrine of pre­
emptive strike. Also, the Bundeswehr was not structured or equipped for such a role. 
There was, in short, a closer fit between the ‘peace’ coalition’s conception of defence 
and security and the changing role of the Bundeswehr than between the ‘freedom’ 
coalition’s conception and the Bundeswehr’s capability. In public debate two 
definitions of crisis competed: a crisis in German-American relations, ascribed to 
US’s unilateralism; and a crisis of isolation of the Schroder government. But neither
‘Schroder halt Kurs gegen die USA: Kanzler wirft Union Kriegsbereitschaft vor -  Merkel schliesst 
gewaltsame Losung nicht aus’ Handelsblatt, 14,02,2003
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crisis narrative identified the Bundeswehr as the source of the problems and sought to 
address the problems by its structural transformation.
These external developments towards a new crisis interventionist role illustrated the 
resilience of the domestic ‘peace’ coalition and the way in which events had 
empowered it. Schroder could proudly point to the transformation in defence and 
security policy and the Bundeswehr. Germany was by 2002 the second biggest 
contributor to international peacekeeping after the US, with an annual budget of euros 
2 billion, compared with euros 22 million in 1998.^  ^The missions in Macedonia and 
Afghanistan were seen as models of a new kind of defence and security policy that 
cast the Bundeswehr in a major role in economic and social reconstruction and 
protecting civilian populations through confidence building. In short, the Red/Green 
government was no longer appealing to a ‘culture of restraint’ grounded in the 
historical traumas of the Third Reich, as Kohl had over rejecting military participation 
in the Gulf War. Its policy narrative stressed German defence and security policy and 
the Bundeswehr as positive role models about which post-war Germans could be 
proud.
3.3 The Post-Cold War World
The end of the Cold War brought three fundamental changes that gave it the quality of 
a critical juncture for German defence and security policy. At the same time its main 
effects were longer-term and took the form of a process of policy-oriented learning 
over a decade and more.
3.3.1 German Unification
The most direct and immediate effect of the end of the Cold War for Germany was a 
new united Germany that was unleashed from the remaining constraints of Four- 
Power Allied control. Consequently, new questions emerged about whether and in 
what ways Germany might pursue a more interest-based and assertive security
19 Figures provided by interview partner in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28*. August 2002
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policy?^ Observers detected a new discourse of ‘normalization’, citing in particular 
Gerhard Schroder’s more neo-realist views/^ But, in the case of the Bundeswehr, it 
became clear that ‘normalization’ did not mean a structural transformation into a 
professional, war-fighting army on the British, US and (after 1995) French models. It 
meant a stronger assertion of a specifically German interest in retaining conscription 
and developing a new international crisis prevention and peacekeeping role.
The change in German defence and security policy did not involve a new effort to 
project power at the international and European levels but rather a complex adaptation 
to changing domestic and international conditions.^^ These conditions included: the 
enormous budgetary problems that Germany faced consequent on unification and 
subsequent long-term fiscal transfers from west to east; the relative decline in German 
economic performance, notably in growth and employment; and the more assertive 
behaviour of Lander governments that were keen to protect their economic interests in 
this more restrictive context. The problem for political leadership was how to 
reconcile these mounting domestic constraints with growing international pressure -  
especially from the US -  on Germany to radically upgrade its defence contribution.
The difficulties that such pressure could cause for Germany were apparent in the 
embarrassed reaction of Kohl to President Bush’s early offer of a ‘partnership in 
leadership’ with the US. This offer reflected US estimation of the pivotal role of 
Germany in the development and provision of European security stretching across the 
continent. But it also contained the implication of a partnership at the global level.
The offer reflected thinking in the US State Department under James Baker. It was 
not taken up in Bonn because it threatened to create both internal political difficulties 
-  over the idea of a global security role for Germany -  and external difficulties, 
especially within the Franco-German relationship and for the process of European 
integration. These two related arenas were too central to German definition of security 
interests to be jeopardized by this American policy offering.
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German unification had more immediate, major implications for the Bundeswehr. 
Upon unification the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) of the GDR numbered some 
520,000 troops. However, the first democratic government of the GDR sacked all 
senior personnel over the age of 55. Additionally, 60,000 soldiers deserted. Hence by 
the summer of 1990, the (NVA) amounted to some 100,000 troops. The 2+4 Treaty 
set a ceiling for the upper limit of permitted troop numbers at 370,000. Hence the goal 
was by the year 2000 to have 38,000 officers, 122,000 NCO’s, 40,000 other non­
commissioned personnel, 135,000 conscripts and 3,000 reserve officers and 137,000 
civilians.^^
The result was a radical reorganization that involved downsizing and problems of 
cultural change as elements of the much more traditionally organized, hierarchical 
NVA were absorbed into the Bundeswehr’s concepts of ‘citizens in uniform’ guided 
by innere Fiihrung. In consequence, irrespective of other changes that came with the 
post-Cold war order, German unification imposed an immediate major reform that 
meant politically sensitive base closures.^"  ^There was little time and energy to reflect 
on other major reforms till this period was over. Hence the process of policy-oriented 
learning about the new security environment was impeded in the short-term by the 
exigencies of German unification.
German defence and security policy was also influenced by the changing domestic 
political context with unification. Public opinion in the Eastern Bundeslander was less 
enthusiastic in its endorsement of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance.^^ The policy 
narrative that Berlin was in danger of serving as a satellite of Washington gained 
resonance from the way in which the GDR regime had served as a satellite of the 
Soviet Union. This was accompanied by a lack of the kind of economic benefits 
associated with US bases located in western Lander like Bavaria and Rhineland- 
Palatinate. In addition, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) aligned itself closely 
with the ‘pacifist’ coalition, with leading members showing a willingness to assign 
blame to the US even in the immediate aftermath of 11 September. As the East had a
‘Ein Staat-ein Armee: Streitkrafte im vereinten Deutschland’ ’ lAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik (1 
August 1990)
^  Interview, Bemd Weber, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th 
August 2002
^  Gutjahr, L. (1994) German Foreign and Security Policy after Unification (London, Pinter), p.l66- 
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much higher percentage of floating voters than the West, the political parties came to 
view the East as a critical battleground in federal elections. Hence a political strategy 
that neutralized the appeal of the PDS to anxious Eastern voters had an obvious 
appeal to the SPD, especially when it was under great pressure on economic and 
employment issues. German unification provided, in other words, a political incentive 
to adopt a less Atlanticist defence and security policy. At the same time this incentive 
had to be balanced against the dangers of losing Western voters who were more likely 
to fear isolation from the US.
3.3.2 US Hyper Power and NATO Crisis
The second fundamental change was that Germany no longer found itself caught up in
the bloc rivalry between two super-powers, the US and the Soviet Union. This rivalry
-  with its ideological basis and its clearly defined external threat -  had imparted a
powerful sense of a shared transatlantic security identity, symbolized by NATO. The
shared transatlantic security identity was further reinforced by memories of the
critical importance of US resources and will for victory in the two world wars. But the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact left NATO and, above
all, the US militarily ascendant and acted as triggers for a long-term process of
redefining both NATO and how individual states like Germany related to the US
through NATO. Crucially, it was no longer so clear that Germany and the US were
united in NATO against a common enemy. In this new context, US and European
actors had slowly to come to terms with the realization that they had overlapping but
frequently different interests and perspectives and that these divergences were 
26growing.
In the early stages of this process of redefining NATO Germany played an important 
role, especially in shaping NATO’s ^London Declaration’ of July 1990 and the far- 
reaching ‘Strategic Review’ and subsequent ‘New Strategic Concept’ adopted at the 
November 1991 Rome summit. The trigger was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
central and eastern Europe and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact. This process of 
engagement in NATO reform involved close co-ordination between Genscher’s
^  Carpenter, T (ed.) (2(X)1) NATO Enters the 21**, Century (London, Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass) 
ppl-6
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Foreign Ministry and Stoltenberg’s Defence Ministry, with a strong role for the 
Federal Chancellor’s Office under Joachim Bitterlich. Genscher also worked very 
closely with US Secretary of State James Baker to achieve German-US co-ordination 
in developing political dialogue with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe through the 
new ‘North Atlantic Co-operation Council’. More importantly, from a miUtary 
perspective the ‘New Strategic Concept’ involved a shift from forward defence and a 
reliance on nuclear response to a new stress on reinforcements in the event of war, 
and smaller, more mobile forces configured in multinational corps. The German 
government welcomed the consequent development of a NATO Rapid Reaction 
Corps.
But of more immediate importance for German defence and security debate was the 
shift in NATO’s strategic concept away from an emphasis on nuclear escalation. This 
emphasis had been a key trigger for the formation of the ‘peace’ coalition and for 
support for withdrawal from NATO. The ‘London Declaration’ defined nuclear 
weapons as ‘weapons of last resort’ and called for the negotiated elimination of all 
short-range, ground-launched nuclear weapons. Crucially, NATO’s nuclear strategy 
was no longer the key divisive issue in German defence and security policy. This 
development reduced the incentives for the ‘peace’ and the ‘pacifist’ coalitions to 
mobilize.
But another development - the US’s emergence as the military ‘hyper-power’ and its 
implications for NATO - provided a new catalyst for the ‘peace’ and ‘pacifist’ 
coalitions and sharpened domestic debate about defence and security. A poll in FT 
Deutschland in February 2002 showed that 74 per cent of German respondents 
believed that the US had too much power.^^ This change in public opinion suggested 
that Germans no longer felt so confident that what was happening within NATO, and 
to NATO, reflected German policy preferences and ways of doing things.
The first change was an accelerating imbalance of military capacity within NATO. 
The US’s undisputed military superiority as a war-fighting machine was practically 
demonstrated in the Gulf War; in the former Yugoslavia, notably the Kosovo War in
27 FT Deutschland, 2,02.2002
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1999; and in Afghanistan in 2001-2. Illustrative of the imbalance was that the planned 
defence budget of the Bush Administration in 2002 exceeded the combined military 
budgets of the next 14 biggest spenders -  including western Europe, Russia, Japan, 
and China.^^ New military technologies -  as well as new external security challenges 
-  forced a reassessment of US military strategy, based on the recognition that the US 
had a ‘war-fighting’ capability way beyond other states. This transformational leap in 
military capabilities found expression in the Bush Administration’s adoption of a 
‘preventive’ strategy in its National Security Strategy of September 2002. It also 
underpinned the belief that US military dominance would alter the strategic incentives 
of its enemies towards the use of more flexible biological and chemical weapons, 
made available by ‘rogue’ states like Iraq and North Korea.
This new US strategy raised very serious and sensitive political problems for a 
German defence and security policy subsystem that was constitutionally forbidden 
from anything other than defensive policies.^^ As we saw above, it contributed to an 
increasing difficulty of communication and understanding between the Red/Green 
government and the Bush Administration. This difficulty was accentuated when the 
Bush Administration demonstrated a new willingness to isolate the Schroder 
government, its Defence Minister Ronald Rumsfeld wrote Germany off as part of 
‘old’ Europe and threats of closure and relocation of US bases outside Germany were 
made.^° This behaviour of the Bush Administration provided the context for the 
Schroder government to re-examine its traditional caution about working with the 
French government in pushing a European defence and security policy. It also offered 
a political opportunity for President Jacques Chirac to woo the support of Schroder 
for his policy ambitions in this sector -  central to which was a more independent 
European role.^  ^Hence defence and security emerged as a key pillar of strengthened 
Franco-German co-operation in Schroder’s second term.
^  See www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2002 
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The second, linked change was in the US’s attitudes to NATO, signalled above all in 
its behaviour in the wake of NATO invoking Article 5 in the immediate aftermath of 
11 September. This article states that an attack on one ally is an attack on the whole 
alliance, obliging other states to assist the victim. But, influenced by the lessons of the 
Kosovo War, the US did not wish to be impeded by the requirements of multilateral 
action within NATO. Instead, for the war in Afghanistan the Bush Administration 
opted to use NATO as little more than a forum for building coalitions of convenience 
and picking and choosing what it wanted from its allies on the principle that the 
mission determines the coalition. In addition, given the US’s very low estimation of 
the military capabilities of its European allies, it wanted very little from them. In 
consequence, there was a loss of confidence amongst German policy makers in the 
capability of NATO to influence the use of US power. The result was a crisis 
narrative about NATO that focused on US policy and behaviour as the cause.^^
More positively for German policy makers, discussions about reform of the role and 
structures of NATO pointed to its transformation into a strengthened role in out-of- 
area operations based on a structure that encouraged niche capabilities and force 
specializations amongst its expanding membership. In this context Germany -  like 
other NATO members -  had the potential to develop its own special relationship to 
the US based around its particular, limited military capacities, especially in peace 
keeping and humanitarian role. This emerging NATO doctrine offered a domestic 
opportunity to stress that Bundeswehr reform should focus on a clearly specified and 
specialized range of tasks that were suited to Germany, namely in crisis prevention 
and management. However, this role specialization could not overcome the political 
problem that Germany and other NATO members were seen as being treated like 
dependents and used as convenience dictated.
These changes in the US role and NATO meant that the parameters of German 
defence and security policy had changed. No longer was it defined by the ideological 
clarity of a bipolar system and by contending advocacy coalitions over nuclear 
weapons policy. It was characterized by a new uncertainty about how far to go
‘Neue Aufgaben, neuer Kurs’ Der Spiegel, 42/2003
Hoffmann, S. (2000) World Disorders, Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, 
(London, Rowman and Littlefield)
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along with the consequences of a radical change in both structural and relative power 
that left Germany as a marginal player. Many key players in the German defence and 
security policy subsystem were not prepared -  and did not feel that Germany was 
capable -  of participating in new US-style war-fighting strategies. For them 
Bundeswehr reform did not go beyond a crisis prevention role. In this respect the 
parameters of Bundeswehr reform were set more by domestic than NATO factors. In 
so far as Germany was to be subject to ‘top-down’ pressures, these were more likely 
to come from the development of an EU defence and security policy whose 
development Germany could shape more readily than it could shape NATO.
A key result of post-Cold War developments was an increasing sense that German 
defence and security interests were more effectively promoted in an EU context than a 
NATO context because German policy actors were better able to ‘upload’ German 
ideas within the EU. This shift of view threatened the autonomy of the defence and 
security policy subsystem because EU pohcy co-ordination was traditionally the 
preserve of the Foreign Ministry. The challenge for the Defence Ministry was to work 
with fellow EU ministries to develop arrangements in Council decision-making that 
would insulate EU defence and security policy from both the foreign ministers and 
from the German Permanent Representative in Bmssels. Chapter 6 will examine 
Bundeswehr Reform in the context of the development of the European Security and 
Defence Policy in greater detail.
3.3.3 New Security Challenges
A third source of transformation came from new forms of conflict within the 
international security environment -  from the 1991 Gulf War, via heightened ‘ethnic 
conflicts’ with the Balkan wars of succession, to the terrorist challenge represented by 
the events of 11 September 2001.^^ The consequent uncertainties about the nature of 
security challenges, about the international institutions best suited to the new security 
environment, and about whether US policy should be followed threw the defence and
^  Wheeler, N. ‘Introduction: The Political and Moral Limits of Western Military Intervention to 
Protect Civilians in Danger’ in Mclnnes, C and Wheeler, N, (2002) ‘Dimensions o f Western Military 
Intervention’ (Frank Cass, London) pp. 1-28
Gartner, H. ‘Introduction’ in Gartner, Heinz, Hyde-Price, A. and Rienner, L. (2001) Europe’s New 
Security Challenges (Boulder, London) pp. 1-23
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security policy subsystem into flux. In the words of Volker Riihe, the newly united 
and sovereign Germany had to ‘redefine its foreign and security policy under changed 
conditions’.^  ^In 1992 it was not clear just how far those conditions were changing. 
Hence the process of redefinition extended over the period of a decade and more in a 
process of policy-oriented learning involving new information about sources of threat. 
This learning process generated two main policy narratives.
The two central questions that challenged the traditional policy image were the nature 
of the source of threat and the appropriate response. The first question was whether 
the traditional inter-state model of security challenge, with its priority to territorial 
defence and war-fighting capability, was becoming an anachronism.^^ For some, 
especially neo-conservatives and ‘realist’ unilateralists within the US Bush 
Administration, the key threat was now from ‘rogue’ states and hence there was a 
continuing need for a war-fighting capability to topple their regimes. Seen from this 
perspective, the problem was the rapidly increasing military capability gap between 
the US and Europe. The crisis was defined as the lack of combat preparedness of 
Germany, and the appropriate response was fundamental structural transformation of 
the Bundeswehr.
More influential within Germany was an alternative model that stressed the 
importance of multilateral action in areas of ‘soft’ power in an age in which the 
information revolution, technological change and globalisation elevated the 
importance of trans-national issues.^^ In this perspective the key threat came form 
new types of privately-organized warfare against civilians (the ‘privatisation’ of war), 
spilling across borders in the form of refugees, asylum seekers, organized crime, 
identity-based networks and terrorism.^* According to this model, the priority shifts to
Riihe, V. (1994) Deuschland’s Verantwortung, PerspektivenfUr das neue Europa (Frankfurt am 
Main, Ullstein Verlag), p.467
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a more piecemeal restructuring of the Bundeswehr around international law 
enforcement in defence of civilian populations.
These two policy narratives about new security challenges had important implications 
for the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. In one narrative -  embraced by the 
conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - the appropriate response was the 
classic security approach of raising defence expenditure, especially on increased 
military capability in precision weapons, transport and intelligence. This narrative 
accorded with the position of those who sought to liberate German policy thinking 
from the constraints of the Nazi period around a reconstructed post-war identity. In 
the other narrative -  represented by the left-wing Tageszeitung - the pressing need 
was for new more flexible forms of humanitarian intervention and policing beyond 
borders to protect civilian populations and support nation-building. This second 
narrative had greater resonance in a German defence and security policy subsystem in 
which the ‘peace’ coalition had a stronger impact than in the US and in which the 
‘pacifist’ coalition was a more influential contextual constraint.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed policy change within the German defence and security 
policy subsystem from the perspective of the advocacy coalition framework. It has 
shown how individual coalitions have been empowered or disempowered by 
developments within the international system, with effects on policy narratives. It has 
also shown that exogenous shocks have not led to radical structural transformation of 
the Bundeswehr because they have not been translated into a persuasive crisis 
narrative that have identified the problem of failure as residing in the Bundeswehr. To 
the extent that an influential crisis narrative has arisen its referent has been elsewhere. 
More influential with respect to the Bundeswehr has been a long-term policy-oriented 
learning process deriving from its accumulating operational experience in 
international crisis management. This process has been linked both to policy change 
(which is analysed in chapters 4-6) and to the emergence of a policy narrative which 
reflects an increasing sense of confidence in the Bundeswehr as a model.
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However, useful as it is in identifying the main lines of policy thinking, the advocacy 
coalition framework needs to be handled with caution. It has three main limitations. 
The first stems from its essentially heuristic nature and the danger of reifying 
coalitions as if they were actors. In practice it is not easy to clearly shoehorn 
individual actors and institutions into coalition membership. This is true, for instance, 
with respect to the SPD (whose members cross the ‘freedom’ and ‘peace’ coalitions) 
and the Greens (where members of both the ‘peace’ and the ‘pacifist’ coalitions are to 
be found). Hence the Red-Green government is crosscut by, and bestrides these 
contending coalitions, and it is not surprising that a wide variety of narratives inform 
German defence and security policy.
Within the SPD opposition during the 1990s the dominant feature in defence and 
security policy was a strengthening belief in the EU as the core security framework, in 
concert with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), but 
with ambiguity about the role of NATO. But ‘western Europeanists’ (like Oskar 
Lafontaine) and ‘pan European institutionalists’ (such as Karsten Voigt, Heidmarie 
Wieczorek-Zeul, and Gunther Verheugen) had different views about the relative 
usefulness of these three institutional settings. The SPD was also characterised by 
other factions such as the Civil Democrats.^^ The governing CDU/CSU and FDP were 
also subject to internal debates about German defence and security policy. Their 
thinking was much more clearly dominated by the ‘Atlanticism’ of the ‘freedom’ 
coalition and by the importance of NATO to German security policy and the need for 
an emerging European defence and security identity to be within this framework. But 
it was by no means clear what this set of core policy beliefs implied, as the next 
chapter shows.
The second limitation of the advocacy coalition framework stems from the fact that, 
even if it can be shown that they share core policy beliefs, there is not always clear 
evidence of significant -  or even minimal -  co-ordinated action across institutional 
boundaries. This is a more serious limitation. Thus the FDP and then the Greens came 
to agree on the need for a professional rather than conscript Bundeswehr. But they did 
so independently and without sharing much in the way of deep policy beliefs. It can
39 Gutjahr, L. (1994) German Foreign and Defence Policy After Unification (London, Pinter) pp. 143- 
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be argued that the Green Party and the FDP came to adopt this position despite their 
ideological distance. Each party took up the idea of a professional Bundeswehr 
because of its own particular ideological outlook, in short for internal reasons related 
to its own clientele. But there was no co-ordinated action to promote this idea.
Finally, it is important to remember that individual policy actors -  rather than 
advocacy coalitions -  seek out leadership roles in defence and security policy, 
whether by promoting a particular idea and policy narrative or acting as a broker. 
Their strategies are important: whether creating a crisis narrative or pursuing ‘salami 
tactics’ to push through new ideas; promoting policy-oriented learning and ‘binding 
in’ opposition’; or sidelining or excluding change agents. These leadership roles and 
strategies are explored in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4: Policy Leadership on Bundeswehr Reform during the Kohl
Chancellorship
During the first Cold War phase of the Kohl Chancellorship (1982-90) Bundeswehr 
reform had been very much a case of what Peter Hall terms third-order change/ It 
focused on the adaptation of existing policy instruments (for instance, the length of 
conscription) rather than the creation of new instruments or the change of policy 
objectives. The post-Cold War phase (1990-98) was characterised by the elevation of 
the Bundeswehr to an issue of second-order change (like the replacement of 
conscription by a volunteer army) and even first-order change to its basic role (from 
purely Landes- und BUndnisverteidigung to crisis management). As the last chapter 
showed, this shift in the level of policy change was attributable to a series of 
interrelated changes in the international security environment -  notably German 
unification, new security challenges, transformation in the roles of the US and of 
NATO towards crisis intervention, and an emerging European security and defence 
identity.
This and the next chapter seek to open up the ‘black box’ of the policy process of 
managing Bundeswehr change, testing the analytical perspectives of policy change 
(outlined in chapter one). Particular attention is paid to policy entrepreneurs, shifts of 
institutional venue, and policy-oriented learning as variables in explaining change. 
The next two chapters also seek to assess the nature and impact of policy leadership 
by analysing policy change by reference to different leadership roles, strategies and 
styles. This perspective reveals how policy leaders negotiated the complex domestic 
institutional context (outlined in chapter two) and the evolving international security 
environment (outlined in chapter three). A key theme is the attempt to manage the 
policy process, for instance by organizing processes of policy-oriented learning and 
using institutional venues. This is apparent in Volker Riihe’s use of ‘salami tactics’ to 
secure policy change in the role of the Bundeswehr (1992-94) and then his attempt to 
impose a Denkverbot on new policy ideas about the structure of the Bundeswehr 
(1994-98). Paradoxically, Riihe emerges as more willing to embrace first-order policy 
change to the Bundeswehr’s role than second-order change to its structure. The
* Hall, P. (1993) ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State, The Case of Economic Policy 
Making in Britain’ Comparative Politics, No,25, Vol.3, pp.275-296
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political factors that explain this paradox are analysed in this chapter, with particular 
reference to the politics of base closures.
This chapter seeks to show how the analytical perspectives about policy change that 
were presented in chapter one complement each other. It suggests the value of ‘cross­
fertilisation’ of approaches in gaining an adequate understanding of the complexities 
of the policy process. Thus, for instance, the perspective about policy 
entrepreneurship is shown as more relevant to agenda setting about both the role and 
the structure of the Bundeswehr than to explaining policy making. Above all, 
however, the focus is on the role of policy leadership and the interactions between 
actors and institutional and strategic contexts in this process. Existing analytical 
perspectives of policy change either underestimate this dimension or -  like multiple 
streams literature -  take too narrow a view of policy leadership and of the forms that 
it takes.
The context of policy change was provided by an established consensus that had been 
reaffirmed in the wake of Germany’s membership of the UN in 1973. UN 
membership brought the issue of deploying German soldiers for UN peacekeeping 
missions onto the agenda.^ From the outset, however, the Foreign Ministry took the 
view that Article 87a of the Basic Law ruled out Bundeswehr participation in 
missions mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapters VI and VII of the UN 
Charter. This view was reinforced by the Federal Security Council 
(Bundessicherheitsrat) in early 1982 and then by the new CDU/CSU/FDP coalition 
government in November 1982. From 1990 onwards the Kohl government sought to 
redefine a new consensus about the role of the Bundeswehr.
4.1 From the Gulf War to Sarajevo: Helmut Kohl as a Policy Leader
The Gulf crisis of 1990-91 was a watershed event in that, for the first time, it raised 
the policy problem of Bundeswehr deployment outside the territory of the Federal 
Republic in an acute manner. It involved highly sensitive issues of Germany’s 
historical and political responsibilities in defence of a NATO state (Turkey) and in
 ^Hoffman, A. (1998) Germany and the Role of the Bundeswehr, A New Consensus? Discussion Papers 
in German Studies IGS98/9 (Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham)
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support of a US-led ‘out-of-area’ intervention against an aggressor (Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait and Iraqi threat to Israel). At one level, it was a test of Germany’s loyalty as 
an ally and of historic debts and responsibilities to the United States and Israel. In the 
Foreign Ministry view, these considerations were balanced by potentially difficult 
issues in relation to the Soviet Union. At another level, the Kohl government faced 
serious domestic constitutional and political problems about a German role in military 
intervention, especially outside NATO.^
Kohl crafted a complex policy leadership role in response to Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the UN Security Council’s immediate resolution 
condemning Saddam Hussein as aggressor and demanding Iraqi withdrawal. On the 
one hand, he determined not to take the political risk of stepping outside established 
policy consensus. Externally, Kohl stressed the constitutional prohibition on German 
troop deployment to the Gulf, combined with German willingness to make a generous 
financial contribution to support UN-sanctioned military intervention.'* Internally, he 
pursued a policy brokerage role that was designed to keep the SPD leadership on 
board. On the other hand, as made clear by Defence Minister Stoltenberg at a WEU 
meeting in August 1990, Kohl made clear that he aimed to change the Basic Law to 
enable Bundeswehr deployment. The policy entrepreneurship role was announced but 
deferred.
Kohl and the key ministers involved -  Genscher and Stoltenberg -  hesitated to 
identify this event as a crisis for German defence and security policy or for the 
Bundeswehr, requiring a comprehensive transformation of its role and structure.
There were critical outside voices that created a crisis narrative. Some within the 
freedom coalition - led by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - stressed that Germany 
must assume a new role of international responsibility and solidarity alongside US, 
British, French and other troops against Iraq. For them there was a crisis of 
Bundeswehr capability that had to be addressed. This position was strongly supported
 ^Kielinger, T. (1991) ‘The Gulf War and the Consequences from a German Point of View’, 
Aussenpolitik, Vol.42, No.3, pp.241-250
Asmus, R.D, (1992) Germany after the Gulf War (Santa Monica, California, RAND)
* Lutz, D. (1990) ‘Die Golfkrise -  das Grundgesetz -  die gemeinsame Sicherheit zur iibertragbarkeit 
Europaischer Sicherheitsvorstellungen auf den Vorderen Orient und zur zulaassigkeit von 
Bundeswehreinsaetzen am Golf, Vierteljahresschrift fur Sicherheit und Frieden 8, pp.233-237
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by external actors, not least in and close to the US Administration.^ The Kohl 
government hesitated to adopt this position not just because of constitutional 
problems but also because it feared adverse political consequences in the imminent 
federal elections of December 1990 from frightening the German public. Leadership 
style was shaped by a preference for avoiding open public debate about the 
Bundeswehr’s role and structure.
More numerous were the voices from within the ‘peace’ and ‘pacifist’ coalitions 
which stressed that Germany must avoid any association with war and devote its 
energies exclusively to finding a political and diplomatic solution. For them the crisis 
was either about minimizing the loss of lives or about American power (see 
Tageszeitung). The huge anti-war demonstrations, notably involving over 200,000 in 
Bonn, were testament to the capacity of these coalitions to mobilize against 
government policy. Nevertheless, the Kohl government distanced itself from Willy 
Brandt’s high-profile personal mission to Saddam Hussein in November 1990 because 
it feared a further loss of international, and especially US respect consequent on not 
sending German troops to the Gulf. Given this strategic context -  and the accident of 
political timing that connected the Gulf crisis to the German federal elections - the 
Kohl government chose a low-profile leadership role and style.
By its nature as an issue of war and peace, the Gulf crisis was a Kanzlersache (matter 
for the Chancellor). It was a matter for the macro-political system rather than for the 
policy subsystem and hence was associated with change of institutional venue. This 
was all the more true because President George Bush and US Secretary of State James 
Baker dealt directly with him on German policy, expressing their disappointment and 
frustration with German responses as early as September 1990.^ Hence the Chancellor 
was under considerable external pressure, including the calling in of political debts for 
US support of German unification and threats from the Bush Administration that 
Congressional hostility to Germany could escalate and become politically dangerous 
for US-German relations. Kohl’s deep core beliefs set him firmly within the freedom 
coalition; his language was consistently about primacy to deterrence of dangerous
 ^Asmus (1992) Germany after the Gulf War (Santa Monica, California, RAND)
® Baker, J. (1995) The Politics of Diplomacy, Revolutions, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York, 
Putnam’s Sons) p.282
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dictators and to loyalty to the United States. Germany’s $2 billion financial assistance 
to back Operation Desert Storm was designed to placate US Congressional hostility 
towards German lack of gratitude for the US’s role on behalf of Germany.
However, during the Gulf crisis he pursued consistently a leadership role of policy 
brokerage, seeking to bind in potential opposition and draw the opposition into 
responsibility. Stoltenberg was very careful to keep the Bundestag Defence 
Committee informed, whilst Kohl met with SPD leaders to ensure that they were 
bound in to what the government was doing. His leadership style was not heroic as 
over German unification or over the Maastricht Treaty and European economic and 
monetary union in 1989-90. It was essentially low key and humdrum, carefully 
focused on avoiding a war and peace issue in the December 1990 federal elections 
that could frighten voters. Voter reaction was all the more uncertain given the fact this 
was the first all-German election, and the behaviour of the new East German 
electorate was potentially very volatile. This increased the political caution of Kohl.
Stoltenberg was under even more external pressure from US Defence Secretary Dick 
Cheney and would have liked the Bundeswehr to do more, especially over Turkey, to 
demonstrate its credentials as a loyal NATO ally. But he was in no position to play 
the role of policy entrepreneur because the strategic context offered no real window of 
opportunity to take bold initiatives. Kohl was immeasurably more politically powerful 
within the coalition government than Stoltenberg, especially after the December 1990 
elections. The constitutional constraints on committing German troops ‘out of area’ 
were by general consent too tight to offer room for manoeuvre.
Also, Stoltenberg faced the influence on Kohl from Genscher and the Chancellery’s 
foreign policy division. Both were agreed that the Gulf crisis must be managed in the 
framework of German unification. This meant acceding to US pressure to repay it for 
its decisive political support on this issue in 1989-90. Equally, Kohl was impressed by 
the foreign policy argument that a new German military role in the Gulf would 
empower hard-line domestic critics of Mikhail Gorbachev and could threaten 
ratification of the Two Plus Four treaty in the USSR.^ The Foreign Ministry argument
’ Genscher, H-D. (1995) Erinnerungen (Berlin, Siedler), p.907
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was that completion of the process of putting in place a stable, enduring framework 
for German unification -  without threatening the reform process in the USSR -  had to 
have precedence over any policy proposals for a new role for the Bundeswehr.
In the language of the multiple streams framework, developments in the politics and 
policy streams did not provide potential policy entrepreneurs within the federal 
government with a window of opportunity to couple proposals for policy change to 
the Bundeswehr with a new pressing policy problem. The advocacy coalition 
framework better captures Kohl’s policy leadership role, strategy and style. He opted 
for the leadership role of policy broker, seeking out a position that enabled the three 
advocacy coalitions in defence and security policy to share power. This meant 
satisfying three conditions:
• enabling Germany to continue to hold back from the use of force (satisfying the 
‘peace’ coalition)
• doing something to fulfil its role as a fully sovereign and loyal member of the 
NATO alliance and the UN (satisfying the ‘freedom’ coalition)
• making it possible for the SPD leadership to unify the representatives of the 
‘peace’ and the ‘pacifist’ coalitions in their ranks behind his policy.
For this purpose Kohl embedded German action -  especially ‘cheque-book’ 
diplomacy - in the traditional policy narrative of the historical and constitutional 
restraints on German defence and security policy consequent on the Nazi period.® His 
policy brokerage role is more consistent with the stress on seeking out consensus 
between contending advocacy coalitions than with the leadership behaviour predicted 
by the multiple streams framework. He situated it in the context of heavy external 
pressure from the US Administration of George Bush, which made issue linkage 
(German unification/Gulf War participation) and called in high political debts.
® Kaiser, K, and Becher, K. (1992) Deutschland und der Irak-Konflikt, Internationale 
Sicherheitsverantwortung Deutschland’s undEuropa’s nach der deutschen Vereinigung (Bonn, 
Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik) pp.96-97 
Mayer, H, ‘Early at the Beach and Claiming Territory? The Evolution of Ideas on a New European 
Order’ International Affairs, 73,4, pp.722-724
100
The multiple streams framework also underestimates just how important the domestic 
institutional context of interacting and nested policy subsystems was in shaping (and 
narrowing) the strategic choices that Kohl faced. The punctuated equilibrium 
framework, which gives more stress to institutional context, suggests that the Gulf 
War was likely to be important in producing a ‘politics of punctuation’, consequent on 
the policy process shifting from the subsystem level to the macropolitical level of the 
Chancellor and the Bundestag. This elevation of the issue into a Kanzlersache 
reflected the high political stakes and the problem of matching the traditional policy 
narrative of Landesverteidigung to the new security challenge posed by Iraq. But, 
contrary to this framework’s prediction, the change of institutional venue amounted to 
no more than a minimalist punctuation of the policy stasis and left the established 
policy image intact. Hence this perspective is not corroborated.
In negotiating the Gulf crisis Kohl laid greatest stress on reassuring the US that he 
was doing all that he could within the framework of the Basic Law. He also 
emphasised the need to pursue constitutional amendment so that Germany could 
participate not just in ‘blue helmet’ missions under Article VI of the UN Charter 
(pacific settlement of disputes) but also in military operations under Article VII. In 
March 1991 Kohl responded to US and UN pressures by sending 2,700 troops to take 
part in minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf (a request that had been rejected 
in 1986 after the Iran-Iraq war). This deployment represented the first deployment of 
German troops outside of Europe since the end of the Second World War and the first 
use of ‘salami tactics’ to change the role of the Bundeswehr. It was followed by air 
support for UNSCOM in Iraq and the UN mission in eastern Turkey and western Iraq, 
with nearly 2,000 troops providing humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees.
Kohl’s leadership role, style and strategy drew lessons from the way in which the 
Gulf conflict tested the limits of German consensus on military intervention. This was 
most clear in the widespread opposition, both from the opposition SPD and public 
opinion, when Kohl sent 18 jet fighters to Turkey to deter Saddam Hussein. Here he 
invoked the collective defence of a NATO member as legitimation. Kohl sought to 
appeal to the public mood by emphasising the importance of such an effort for the 
credibility of NATO and of Germany’s role in NATO.
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Even more sensitive was the issue of German assistance for Israel to deter Scud 
missile attacks from Iraq. To justify making Patriot anti-Scud missiles available to 
Israel Kohl used an historic policy narrative that drew on Germany’s responsibilities 
towards the state of Israel after the Holocaust. However, here he faced a much more 
difficult problem when the Israeli government reminded him that German companies 
were responsible for having sold gas and biological weapons to Iraq that were now 
being used against Israel. This pressure was extremely embarrassing for the Kohl 
government and limited the capacity of the opposition to object.
This testing of the limits of the domestic consensus deterred Kohl from acting as 
policy entrepreneur on a constitutional amendment. It threatened to raise such serious 
political disagreements with the SPD and between the coalition parties as to make the 
necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority very difficult to achieve. At the same 
time it was soon clear that the issue of military intervention and a crisis management 
role for the Bundeswehr was not simply a one-off event confined to the Gulf War and 
its aftermath. Against this background Kohl opted for a humdrum leadership style that 
avoided open debate about the Bundeswehr’s role and pursued a salami tactics that 
justified each new German participation in crisis interventions as for humanitarian 
purposes. In this way he was able to retain SPD support for Bundeswehr deployment 
as part of the UNTAC mission to Cambodia in May 1992, when - for the first time - 
German troops were doing more than just provide logistical support.^
The political sensitivity of this issue, even in the context of a humdrum leadership 
style, was displayed in April-May 1992 over the deteriorating situation in the Balkans, 
especially the crisis surrounding the siege of Sarajevo. This crisis raised the issue of 
whether German troops should be involved in ‘out-of-area’ humanitarian operations 
to protect civilians in nearby and familiar countries like Bosnia and Croatia against 
Serbian aggression. German interests were directly affected: the Balkan crisis 
threatened to erupt into a flood of refugees and potentially domestically destabilising 
use of this crisis by right-wing German populists; whilst insecurity threatened to spill 
over into eastern Europe and promote wider destabilization. The Foreign Ministry in 
particular feared a humanitarian nightmare across Europe, associated with feeble EU
’ Mayall, J, (1996) The New Interventionism 1991-1994, The United Nations Experience in Cambodia, 
Former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press), Chapter 2
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and NATO responses. At the same time it was reticent about taking on a policy 
leadership role, especially given French reluctance to intervene.
Once again the dynamic factor was US policy which -  still influenced by memories of 
the nightmare of failed military intervention in Vietnam - was focused on getting the 
EU to assume responsibility in the Balkans. The Bush Administration sought to 
encourage the British and the German governments to play a lead role in developing a 
united EU position that would, at a minimum, impose tough sanctions and isolate the 
Serbian political leadership and, at a maximum, involve military intervention under 
the auspices of the UN.*  ^By May 1992 US pressure on Germany to play a more 
active agenda-setting role was mounting, and the Sarajevo crisis was a source of 
mounting embarrassment to the German government. Its outcome was the decision of 
18 July 1992 to commit German destroyers as part of a NATO force monitoring the 
UN’s embargo against Serbia. This deployment was not supported by the SPD 
parliamentary party, which argued that it went beyond Alliance treaty obligations. US 
pressure had encouraged the federal government to push its salami tactics too far to 
retain SPD support.
In the rapidly changing context of crisis escalation in the Balkans, Cambodia and 
Somalia, Kohl’s leadership was no longer simply about agenda setting but about 
defining German policy on military intervention. One issue was what form 
Bundeswehr intervention should take: whether just peacekeeping and humanitarian 
aid missions or extending to peace enforcement and Gulf-style combat missions 
against aggressors. Another issue was under what conditions and within which 
institutional frameworks such interventions should take place. These issues were 
tackled by policy brokerage, with Kohl using individual crisis situations as the 
occasion for a salami tactics. These salami tactics and his policy brokerage were at the 
same time cover for policy preferences that were firmly embedded in the ‘freedom’ 
coalition. Kohl’s core policy belief was that Germany must assume the full range of 
international responsibilities, including the entire spectrum of military interventions. 
Precisely because the policy brokerage was an ongoing process, there was an 
unwillingness to spell out clear policy positions on the forms, conditions and
Baker, J. (1995) The Politics o f Diplomacy, Revolutions, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York, 
Putnam’s Sons), p.650
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frameworks of military intervention. These positions evolved in practice within the 
framework of the consensus policy style of the Bundestag Defence Committee. By 
1992 it was possible to infer the German policy position as requiring that Bundeswehr 
interventions should be limited to humanitarian missions on the basis of the moral 
authority of the UN, overseeing the implementation of its resolutions.
More importantly, interventions in Bosnia and Cambodia - and later Rwanda and 
Somalia -  had unleashed a policy-oriented learning process. This learning process 
involved aspects of reflective practice and the generation of professional consensus 
within the Bundeswehr about viable forms of intervention and about how they should 
be managed. Experience threw up lessons about the appropriate structures and skills 
required within the Bundeswehr; about the risks and problems involved in German 
troops protecting civilian victims from aggressors in peace enforcement operations 
(here later US experience in Somalia was important); and about developing new 
capabilities to assist in economic and social reconstruction through civil-military 
projects.
A mounting caseload of interventions and increased uncertainties about policy placed 
new demands on policy leadership. They also created a greater incentive for the 
federal government to attempt to shape the policy debate within the key international 
institutions - UN, NATO, the WEU, the EU and the OSCE - about the terms under 
which crisis interventions should took place. The retirement of Genscher in May 1992 
after 18 years as Foreign Minister also offered a new political opportunity for Kohl to 
strengthen his grip on foreign and security policy. The new Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel lacked Genscher’s political authority with respect both to his FDP and to the 
electorate. Hence developments in the three streams of problems, policies and politics 
conspired to offer a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurship about the role 
of the Bundeswehr. A new phase opened that appears to approximate more closely to 
the conditions for policy change outlined in the multiple streams framework.
By April 1992 Kohl was keen to seize the opportunities for policy leadership that had 
been opened by German unification and the emerging problems of the post-Cold War
"  Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6*.August 2002
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era. His strategic response involved combining a positive response to mounting US 
pressure from the Bush Administration, especially James Baker, for Germany to play 
a lead role with nesting this role within the top political priority that he gave to 
European political unification and giving a defence dimension to this process. This 
balancing act was by no means easy given the different conceptions of the US and 
France -  the two key pivotal players within NATO and the EU respectively -  about a 
European defence and security identity. Kohl’s main political advantage lay in his 
accumulated credit as a loyal ally and partner in both these contexts. Also, 
domestically, he enjoyed a high degree of policy autonomy in these two domains, not 
least related to his length of office and experience. To the extent that defence and 
security policy touched on relations to the top of the US Administration and the 
French Presidency Kohl had a substantial measure of autonomy of action.
However, Kohl faced three constraints. First and foremost, the domestic institutional 
context of the Bundeswehr and the defence and security policy subsystems offered 
only very limited opportunities for policy change to roles and structures. To a 
considerable extent he was hostage to this institutional context, with its strong bias 
towards reflective practice and professional consensus (policy-oriented learning) and 
to political consensus building around the Bundestag Defence Conunittee (see chapter 
2). Secondly, Kohl lacked confidence in the ability of Kinkel to make much impact on 
policy development within the UN, the EU and other international forums. He needed 
a new policy leader who could develop the Bundeswehr’s role in military intervention 
and crisis management.
The Federal Defence Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, was a safe pair of hands, a very 
competent departmental manager, but essentially a conservative, cautious figure. He 
lacked significant independent political authority. His early success as Federal 
Finance Minister (1982-89) had ended in what was widely seen as relegation to the 
Defence Ministry, following a politically costly tax reform and political scandal in his 
home state of Schleswig-Holstein. Also, he lacked the kind of background and 
expertise in defence and security policy matters that could give him authority over 
Bundeswehr policy. His original political task -  as defined by Kohl in 1989 -  had 
been to ensure order and discipline in the Federal Defence Ministry, which had a
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reputation for causing political embarrassments/^ But his personal qualities did not 
equip him to play the role of policy entrepreneur in transforming the role of the 
Bundeswehr. To the extent that German unification imposed requirements of 
‘downsizing’ on the Bundeswehr and integration of two armed forces, Stoltenberg 
could be expected to do it efficiently. But he was less interested in new policy ideas 
and their promotion. Above all, he was not, in Kohl’s view, the man to shape the 
institutional context to accelerate change to the role of the Bundeswehr. He was more 
hostage than shaper of this context.
Under Stoltenberg the key agent of policy change was General Klaus Naumann, 
Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. Naumann was critical in seeking to move the 
Bundeswehr away from a pure Landesverteidigung role to a crisis intervention role. 
As early as 1990 he used the London Declaration of NATO as an opportunity to 
promote a shift away from forward defence within the Defence Ministry. Naumann 
had a major influence on the key policy statement under Stoltenberg:
Militdrpolitische und Militarstrategische Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle 
Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr (Reform of the Bundeswehr; 
Military Policy and Strategy and its Conceptual Framework). This paper acted as an 
initial means of ‘softening up’ the national mood for a redefinition of the role and 
structures of the Bundeswehr. Equally, the critical reaction to it demonstrated the high 
hurdles to policy change in the Bundeswehr. By 1992 it was clear to Kohl that a 
bolder leadership role was needed in Bundeswehr reform to empower change agents 
like Naumann, and he looked to Volker Rühe to provide it.
4.2 Volker Riihe as Policy Entrepreneur and Broker, 1992-1994: Developing the 
Crisis Intervention Role of the Bundeswehr
In appointing Riihe as Federal Defence Minister in April 1992, Kohl sought out a
Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6* August 2002
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Politik, March 1996, see also ‘Wenn der ‘erste Soldat’ die Kamaradschaft vermisst: Das Verhaltniss 
zwischen Verteidigungsminister Riihe und Generalinspekteur Naumann ist stark abgekiihlt’. Die Welt, 
17/05/1995
Militarpolitische und Militdrstrategische Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der 
Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr (Reform of the Bundeswehr, Military Policy and Strategy and its 
Conceptual Framework), Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 1990
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much more pro-active German role in influencing the redefinition of defence and 
security policy in the wake of the Gulf War and emerging crisis intervention issues. In 
doing so, he wanted a CDU politician who was prepared to challenge conventional 
thinking and not allow the Foreign Ministry under the FDP to gain the initiative on 
defence and security policy issues. Kohl was aware that the UN was emerging as a 
key institutional venue on peacekeeping issues and that the Foreign Ministry had a 
lead role as gatekeeper to the UN. Hence it was in a strong position to stake out a 
central role in shaping Bundeswehr policy. He wanted a more confident Defence 
Minister who could work closely with the Foreign Minister but stake out a stronger 
role in policy development. Kohl appointed the man whom he regarded as the top 
foreign policy specialist in the CDU.^^
Above all, he wanted a Defence Minister who could seek to actively influence policy 
decisions in international institutions about the terms on which future crisis 
interventions were to be made and operated. This was a matter of ‘uploading’ German 
policy preferences to the key institutional venues, especially both NATO and the 
WEU as a link between NATO and the EU, venues in which the Defence Ministry 
had a lead role. It was about a new agenda setting role for Germany in defence and 
security policy and the political profiling of the CDU’s impact in this role.^^
Importantly, Rühe’s appointment coincided with a boom in UN peacekeeping 
operations between 1992 and 1994. Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Somalia 
provided Riihe with external events that he could use to effect change to the 
Bundeswehr’s role (see table 4.1). His appointment followed on the heels of a cabinet 
split on 2 April on deployment of the Bundeswehr in AW ACS flights over Bosnia. 
The deployment went ahead against FDP opposition, which argued that it was a new 
type of combat mission that went beyond the Basic Law and required constitutional 
amendment. The CDU remained keen to avoid such an amendment process because 
of the high political hurdles, whilst Riihe was also keen to keep the SPD onboard by 
fully exploiting the room for manoeuvre within the Basic Law.
Interview, Bemd Weber, CDU/CSU Bimdestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th. 
August 2002; See also ‘Mehrzweckwaffe Volker Riihe wechselt auf die Hardthohe’, Stuttgarter 
Zeitung, 1/04/1992 
‘Kohl’s Mann fiir den Notfall’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 02.04.1992
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Table 4.1 
1990-98
Principal German Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations,
Peacekeeping Operation Location Amount in $US
UNPROFOR 1992-95 former Yugoslavia 448, 508,789
IFOR 1996
SFOR 1997-98
UNOSOM 1992-95 Somalia 147,640,135
UNTAC 1992-93 Cambodia 136,836,241
UNAMIR 1993-96 Rwanda 43,977,383
UNTAES 1996-97 Croatia 42,928,145
UNMIBH 1995- Bosnia/Herzegovina 32,482,949
MINURSO 1991- Western Sahara 26,263,201
UNIKOM 1991- Kuwait/Iraq 22,774,791
ONUSAL 1991-95 El Salvador 10,855,779
Riihe brought with him a self-confidence that derived from a long period spent on 
foreign policy. From 1982 to 1989 he had served as deputy chair of the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary party responsible for foreign and security policy. In addition, before 
becoming general secretary of the CDU in September 1989, he had been chair of the 
CDU’s federal expert committee on foreign policy. His ambitions were, in short, as a 
foreign policy specialist who had sought to carve out a distinctive CDU foreign policy 
from the PDF’s ‘Genscherism’. Riihe had wanted the position of foreign minister and 
had carefully cultivated contacts in W ashington.His strong background in foreign 
policy meant that he started with a reputation of being prepared to ‘step on Kinkel’s 
toes’. H i s  background gave him the confidence and standing within the CDU/CSU 
to frame his ideas about the Bundeswehr and defence and security policy in a wider 
context of foreign policy.
‘Mehrzweckwaffe Volker Riihe wechselt auf die Hardthohe’, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1/04/1992 
Kohl’s Mann fur den Notfall’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 02,04.1992
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At the same time he had a clear political sense for the importance that Kohl attached 
to the FDP as a coalition partner and recognized that his own political career would 
not be helped by being seen as a divisive force. Hence he was careful to try to work 
closely with Klaus Kinkel as Foreign Minister, though relations were often very tense 
-  for instance in 1993 over the date for withdrawal from Somalia and over the 
retention of German personnel in AW ACS flights over Bosnia. By framing his 
thinking about Bundeswehr reform -  notably the strengthening of its crisis 
management capabilities - as part of a stronger EU Riihe succeeded both in giving a 
new political direction to defence and security policy and in establishing common 
ground with Kinkel. He also made his position more attractive to SPD leaders, in 
relation to whom he carefully pursued a strategy of embrace {Umarmungsstrategie). 
This also enhanced his career options in the case of a future Grand Coalition with the 
SPD; he would then be a likely CDU Foreign Minister.
Rühe’s self-confidence in policy leadership was reinforced by strong and explicit 
support from Kohl in three important areas: the strengthening of a European defence 
and security identity, dealing with the changed security environment in central and 
eastern Europe, and responding to the task of justifying the size of the German armed 
forces with the ending of the Cold War.^  ^He was especially active in promoting the 
importance of a crisis reaction capability for Germany as part of the EU, one of his 
stated aims upon taking office. This made the WEU a particularly important 
institutional venue for him to pursue policy change. As chapter 6 shows, Rühe was 
closely linked to the revival of the WEU as an instrument for a stronger European 
security and defence identity.
For this reason Rühe -  backed by Kohl - used the German presidency of the WEU to 
push hard for the adoption of the Petersburg Declaration at its Bonn meeting on 19 
June 1992. This initiative was designed to strengthen the WEU’s operational role by 
identifying peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian and rescue roles as 
central to a redefined defence and security policy. Rühe argued that this role 
definition was consistent with the German constitutional mandate to ‘promote world 
peace’ and the prohibition on aggressive acts by Germany. It would help promote a
Kohl’s Mann fur den Notfall’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 02.04,1992
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more secure and predictable environment within which the Bundeswehr could adapt 
smoothly to a new crisis intervention role, whilst bypassing difficult constitutional 
issues. Even so, leading SPD figures argued that the Petersburg Declaration 
represented a change to the Paris Agreement and Brussels Treaty and hence needed 
parliamentary approval.^^ The Petersburg Declaration also created adaptive pressures 
for the Bundeswehr to enhance its capabilities.
This was swiftly followed by strong German support for two other developments. In 
July 1992 at its Helsinki meeting the CSCE decided to launch peacekeeping and other 
humanitarian operations. In December 1992 NATO agreed to participate in UN 
operations on a case-by-case basis, ending the formal ban on ‘out-of-area’ activities. 
Riihe was helping to create a ‘top-down’ Europeanisation/NATO-isation bandwagon 
effect that was bound to have strong domestic resonance and reframe the terms of 
domestic debate about military intervention. The effects were demonstrated in 
growing policy consensus that accompanied German participation in IFOR 
(Implementation Force) and then in SFOR (Stabilization Force) from late 1995 
onwards.^^
Kohl also sought to embed the Bundeswehr more strongly in his policy on Franco- 
German reconciliation and European political unification, and Riihe was seen as an 
enthusiastic European (see chapter six).^  ^A Franco-German initiative of 1993 -  
previously submitted to the WEU for its approval - led to the formation of the 
Eurocorps, which was seen as a substantial contribution to realization of a European 
defence and security identity.^^ Kohl sought -  with the active co-operation of Riihe -  
to embed the Bundeswehr in a process of Europeanisation of its functions and identity 
and to give a practical expression to the work of the Franco-German Defence Council. 
This Council had been set up on initiative of the Federal Chancellor’s Office to 
coincide with the 25^ anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in 1988.
^  SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Press Release, ‘Das Glas 1st Voll -  die ersten hundert Tage von 
Verteidigungsminister Volker Riihe’, 13“'. June, 1992 
Riihe, W. (1996), ‘Growing Responsibility’, German Comments, Vol. 42, April, pp.32-7 
“  ‘Neue Chancen aus der Wiedergeburt der Europaische Mitte’, Welt am Sonntag, 12.06.94 
^  ‘Pladoyer fur eine neue Bundeswehr: Hochste Zeit fur eine Grundlegende Reform’, Das Parlament, 
36/37, September 1995
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Under Riihe, the WEU and the Franco-German relationship were instrumentalised for 
the purpose of strengthening the political pillar of European integration and giving 
clear political direction to the reformulation of defence policy in a changed context?"^ 
This political direction was informed by the perceived imperatives after German 
unification of giving a defence and security dimension to an accelerated European 
political union and of repaying the US for its support at a critical juncture in 1989-90. 
Kohl was preoccupied with moving beyond the very limited endorsement to the idea 
of a European security and defence identity in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (notably 
the declaration on strengthening the role of the WEU as both the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance and the defence component of the EU).
Riihe was very skilful in combining agenda setting by pursuing a policy 
entrepreneurship role in relation to specific crises with a broker role on defining 
intervention policy. His skill rested in carefully managing domestic strategic 
opportunities and constraints, especially the constraints of the institutional context.^^ 
The result was innovation in policy narrative with a new type of tactics for promoting 
policy change. The new policy narrative justified a crisis intervention role for the 
Bundeswehr in historical and political terms, in particular by nesting it within the 
framework of European political unification (see chapter six).^  ^This was 
accompanied by an opportunistic leadership strategy of ‘salami-slicing’ that involved 
the creation of a series of faits accomplis, designed to wrong foot opposition in the 
SPD and within the CDU/CSU.^^ This approach to policy change did not directly 
challenge and seek to disempower the traditional policy monopoly and pursue radical 
policy change by dislodging the policy image of Landesverteidigung and of 
conscription.^^ Riihe was an experienced CDU and Bundestag politician and fully 
aware of the institutional constraints represented by the Basic Law and the Federal
^  Riihe, V. ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Die Rolle der Bundeswehr’, Internationale Politik, 4/1995, 
pp.26-29
See ‘Der Mann mit dem Bulldozer-Image verfugt iiber ein enggekniipftes Netz von Kontakten in die 
Bonner Parteien und in die Bundesdeutsche Gesellschaft.’, in ‘Volker Riihe, Der Bulldozer wird 
Minister’, Berliner Morgenpost, 01.04,1992
^  ‘Nur ein geeintes und geschlosen hanlungsfahiges Europa ist fur die USA ein gleichrangiger 
Partner’, in Riihe, V. ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Die Rolle der Bundeswehr’, Internationale Politik, 
4/1995, p.27 
‘Salamitaktik’, Die 2kit, 17.01.1997 
^  ‘Dienst und Raki’, Die Zeit, 16.08.1996
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Constitutional Court, by the Lander and by the Federal Finance Ministry/^ This 
awareness shaped the complex leadership roles that he used to pursue a bolder change 
than under his predecessor.
Under Riihe policy change to the Bundeswehr was not just confined to secondary 
aspects of policy beliefs. It went beyond a long-term endogenous policy-oriented 
learning process in which policy professionals debated the technical aspects of 
security challenges and how best to respond. More important was the political 
element of policy leadership under Riihe. He situated external events and crises in a 
new policy narrative that sought to give a greater urgency and direction to policy 
change. His policy leadership in Bundeswehr reform mixed limited change to core 
policy beliefs with change to secondary aspects by relying on ‘salami’ tactics rather 
than confrontation and by a policy narrative that sought to change the boundaries of 
what was deemed to be both desirable and necessary. Despite the limited changes to 
core policy beliefs consequent on domestic institutional constraints, Rühe’s ‘salami 
tactics’ represented a series of daring policy proposals about the role of the 
Bundeswehr. Their highly sensitive nature was evident in the difficulty that policy 
leadership faced in managing societal debate surrounding each extension of the 
Bundeswehr’s role and alteration of its structure, notably over Bosnia.^^
Both Kohl and Rühe were determined to expand the role of the Bundeswehr beyond 
Landes- und Biindnisverteidigung. The Gulf War had set a small, but important 
precedent. Though his actions during the Gulf War had reflected a cautious leadership 
role of brokerage. Kohl’s underlying thinking derived from the core beliefs of the 
‘freedom’ coalition and was bolder.^^ In particular, he sought to align the federal 
coalition government and the CDU behind a reinvigorated conception of German 
defence and security policy. This conception sought to firmly embed a reunited 
Germany within NATO and the UN, whilst simultaneously anchoring Germany
Interview, Herr Rudiger Huth, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 
26th. August 2002
^  Maull, H. (1995) ‘Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis’, Survival, Vol.37, No.4, Winter 1995-1996, 
pp.99-130
Kaiser, K, and Becher, K. (1992) Deutschland und der Irak-Konflikt, Internationale 
Sicherheitsverantwortung Deutschland's und Europa’s nach der deutschen Vereinigung (Bonn, 
Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik) pp.96-97
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within the developing security framework of the EU (the so-called ‘not only/but also’ 
approach). Kohl and Riihe argued that this reinvigoration of German defence and 
security policy could only be achieved through changes to the core policy beliefs 
about the Bundeswehr. In the manner of policy entrepreneurs, they successfully 
exploited the policy problems presented by Cambodia and Somalia in 1992-93 to 
widen the scope of the Bundeswehr’s role, aided by the precedent set by the Gulf 
War.^^ This new leadership role involved Kohl and Riihe in creating a ‘crisis 
consciousness’. Emerging policy problems were used as a referent for identifying a 
crisis about reunited Germany’s position and role in the international community and 
its willingness to assume its new responsibilities.^^
However, the German political system provides a number of veto points, notably the 
ability to challenge the constitutionality of government policy. Kohl and Rühe’s 
‘salami’ tactics were challenged by the SPD and FDP, which asked the Federal 
Constitutional Court to rule whether the use of Germans in the NATO airborne early- 
warning aircraft (AWACS) in daily monitoring of the UN-mandated ‘no-fly’ zone 
over Bosnia-Herzegovina over the former Yugoslavia contradicted the Basic Law. 
The Federal Constitutional Court’s landmark ruling of 12 July 1994 legitimated 
Rühe’s strategy. It confirmed the constitutionality of Bundeswehr deployments in 
peacemaking or peacekeeping operations as long as they were within WEU and 
NATO missions under the authority of a direct UN mandate or Security Council 
resolution and had the approval of two thirds of the Bundestag. This ruling created a 
clear opportunity for the restructuring of the Bundeswehr in the light of its new 
constitutionally approved roles.
Rühe’s early willingness to act as policy entrepreneur on reform of the Bundeswehr’s 
structures to facilitate an extension of its roles was exhibited in key policy statements 
of 1992 and 1994. During this initial period, up to the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
ruling, he had prepared the Defence Ministry to take advantage of any window of 
opportunity that might emerge consequent on political or policy developments. This
‘Politiker mit Overdrive’, Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt, 03/06/1992 
‘The requirements of political and military security mean that no state in Europe is alone, Europe 
must be developed into a true economic and military union that embodies a common foreign and 
security policy’, in Riihe, V, ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Die Rolle der Bundeswehr’, Internationale 
Politik, 4/1995, p.26
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willingness to be entrepreneurial was supported by General Klaus Naumann, the 
Generalinspekteur (General Inspector) of the Bundeswehr, who had also served under 
Stoltenberg and was a long-standing master of the bureaucratic politics of the 
Bundeswehr.
Both Naumann and Riihe sought to manage the post-Cold War ‘flux’ and ambiguity 
by embedding a reinvigorated German defence policy within NATO and the 
The institutional venues of NATO and the WEU provided a means with which to 
‘manage’ the domestic policy process by changing the range of actors involved and 
redefining the role of the Bundeswehr in terms of positive symbols of Germany’s 
post-war rehabilitation. The use of institutional venues played an important role in 
Rühe’s policy entrepreneurship. Naumann was a pivotal player in this process. 
Already, under Stoltenberg, the requirements of these institutional venues had been 
used to develop and legitimate new thinking about the Bundeswehr. This thinking had 
first been spelt out in Stoltenberg’s Militarpolitische und Militarstrategische 
Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr 
(Reform of the Bundeswehr: Military Policy and Strategy and its Conceptual 
Framework).
The Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (Defence Policy Directives, VPR) of 
November 1992 emerged as a key policy statement. Like Stoltenberg’s paper, the 
VPR stressed the need for the Bundeswehr to participate in, and orientate its 
structures and expertise, to the prevention, containment and resolution of crises and 
low-intensity conflicts. The VPR, taking into account the critical reaction to the 
Stoltenberg paper, presented similar proposals, but in a more ‘palatable way’.^  ^Above 
all, its proposals were framed within the terms of the roles specified in the Petersburg 
Declaration. This was followed in 1994 by the White Paper on the Security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr. This 
spoke boldly of the transformation of parts of the Bundeswehr into highly mobile
The Trans-Atlantic Alliance and European integration remain Europe’s decisive anchors of stability, 
‘Soldat in hewegter Zeit, General Naumann pragte die Bundeswehr im umbruch’, IFDT, 1/1996 p. 14 
Militarpolitische und Militarstrategische Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der 
Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr (Reform of the Bundeswehr, Military Policy and Strategy and its 
Conceptual Framework), Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 1990 
Longhurst, K  (2000) Strategic Culture, The Key to Understanding German Security Policy? 
Birmingham University, PhD. Thesis, p. 157
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crisis reaction forces (Krisenreaktionskrafte) which could cover ‘the entire spectrum 
of possible missions’, from peacekeeping and humanitarian aid to peace enforcement 
against guerrilla fighters to combat missions. Here the thinking of Naumann was most 
visible.^^ Such missions were to take place within UN, NATO, WEU and CSCE 
frameworks, without precisely spelling out the conditions.
Riihe continually linked the importance of changes to the role and structure of the 
Bundeswehr as the only means to overcome German ‘difference’ on issues of security 
policy and to move towards European cooperation in the area of foreign and security 
policy as set out in the Maastricht treaty.^* German embeddedness in international 
institutions provided Riihe with the external discipline to control the range of 
competing ideas about the roles and structure of the Bundeswehr. To be legitimate 
they had to be compatible with this evolving framework; and Riihe was newly active 
in promoting the evolution of this international framework.
Analysis of Riihe’s policy leadership highlights -  in a way that the ‘multiple streams’ 
framework does not -  the importance of its macro-level and meso-level institutional 
context. At the same time the way in which he acted out this leadership reflects a 
more complex relationship between actors and institutions than is allowed for either in 
sociological institutionalism or in the ‘path dependency’ varient of historical 
institutionalism.^^ Rational action is more than just socially constituted. Institutions 
provide cognitive filters through which information and events are perceived and 
consequently shape how responses are formulated. However, as Riihe shows, policy 
leaders have a measure of autonomy and are not necessarily hostage to their 
institutional context. They are able to changes characteristics of the decision setting in 
order to enable access by other actors to the policy area -  managing institutional 
venues. In this way leadership has direct effects on the institutional contexts in which 
action takes place, changing the environment and altering the tempo of action. 
Secondly, leadership can involve organizing and being affected by processes of 
policy-oriented learning. This learning is not just a process of discovering the
Naumann, K. ‘Bundeswehr vor neuen Herausvorderungen’, Soldat und Technik, 1/1995 p. 12 
‘Ein Pladoyer fiir Europa, Minister Riihe legt neues Buch vor -  ‘Natioanlstaat Obsolet” , Die Welt, 
23/06/1994
Longhurst K. (2003) Why Aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the 
Persistence of Conscription, German Politics, Vol. 12, No.2 pp. 147-165
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strategic opportunities and constraints of the institutional context but also about the 
characteristics of problems and the cogency of policies.
Against the background of the new flux and ambiguity of the post-Cold War period, 
the Federal Defence Ministry provided an institutional context that both constrained 
and facilitated policy leadership. Rühe’s ‘salami’ tactics can be understood in terms of 
his use of a series of key events to open up opportunities for strategic action. This 
action took the form of increasing the roles of, and consequent adaptational 
requirements on, the Bundeswehr within the institutional constraints of a Defence 
Ministry that was dominated by the concept of Landesverteidigung and by the 
provisions of the Basic Law. However the Defence Ministry also presented 
opportunities for policy leadership by Rühe and Naumann as it was firmly embedded 
in NATO and Atlanticist in orientation. The ability of Rühe to use the institutional 
venue of NATO was crucially important. Rühe was able to legitimate his appeal for 
Bundeswehr reform by reference to the credibility of NATO in the context of the 
challenges of a new security environment."^ This in turn triggered and guided a 
process of policy-oriented learning amongst defence specialists that prepared the 
ground for further policy change.
Rühe’s policy leadership was enabled by a changing strategic context that created the 
ambiguity necessary for major policy change. However, strategic context alone was 
not enough to force change. Rühe also displayed the leadership traits and skills 
needed by successful policy entrepreneurs, notably a high degree of self-confidence, 
political ambition, calculated risk taking, an activist leadership style and good sense 
of political timing. He was renowned for a coercive, autocratic and arrogant 
leadership style, earning him the nickname ‘Volker Rüpel’ (yob), ‘bulldozer’ and 
‘Rambo’.^  ^At the same time, like Kohl, Rühe was capable of striking an appropriate 
heroic pose of framing his policy leadership within a discourse of historical 
legitimation, citing the necessity to embed Germany within the international 
structures of NATO and the BU during a period of flux."^ ^
^  ‘Hochste Zeit fur eine grundlegende Reform’, Das Parlament, 36/37, September, 1995 
Borner, K.H. (1996) The Future of German Operations Outside NATO, Parameters^ Spring 1996 
‘Volker Riihe, Der Bulldozer wird Minister’, Berliner Morgenpost, 1/04/1992 
Riihe, V. ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Die Rolle der Bundeswehr’, Internationale Politik, 4/1995
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Despite his reputation, Riihe was also careful to build support within the Defence 
Ministry and within the Bundestag for his policy proposals. He was careful to tailor 
his leadership style to a political system that was replete with potential veto points (in 
particular the German constitution). Riihe did this by engineering/aiYj accomplis and 
then by the skilful binding in of opposition by taking opponents into his confidence. 
Entrepreneurship in agenda-setting on a Bundeswehr role in military intervention was 
accompanied by policy brokerage in translating this role into policy making and 
implementation.
Rühe’s framing of his strategic action in support of a new military interventionism 
within the ideational context of international institutions involved an appeal to macro­
political common deep core beliefs (notably Atlanticism and Europeanism) to justify 
changes to the policy core beliefs within the policy subsystem about the roles and 
structures of the Bundeswehr."^  ^This framing activity was particularly important for 
Rühe in ‘softening up’ key members of the Bundestag Defence Committee, managing 
the debate about policy options by stressing the necessity of embedding Germany 
within the institutional context of NATO and the EU. Rühe would later find resonance 
within the SPD membership of the Defence Conunittee by arguing that German action 
in Yugoslavia was crucial to the development of European Conunon Foreign and 
Security Policy. He was thus able to manage political developments to increase the 
prospects for acceptance of his preferred Bundeswehr policies when -  according to 
the multiple streams framework - developments in the ‘problem’ stream made a 
coupling of politics and policies possible. This ‘softening up’ approach was decisive 
to Rühe’s management of the process of change and involved a combination of 
‘salami tactics’ with a persuasive policy narrative that resonated widely in the 
Bundestag Defence Conunittee and beyond."^ It also helped in refashioning the 
traditional cross-party political consensus about the Bundeswehr that went back to 
Adenauer.
Riihe, V. ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Die Rolle der Bundeswehr’, Internationale Politik, 4/1995 
^  Interviews, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 16th and 26th. 
August 2002, see also ‘Der Edel-Reservist’, Die Woche 29/11/1997, and ‘das Amt hat ihn verandert’, 
Berliner Zeitung, 3/09/1997, see also ,Riihe has indirectly worked his way into the Foreign and 
Security decision-making processes of the SPD and Biindnis90/Griinen, certainly as a bogeymann, but 
also as a middlemann whose intentions are everything but militaristic’, in Die Erfolgsgeschichte eines 
Querdenkers’, General-Anzeiger, 26/06/1998
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This refashioning of the consensus was exhibited in the three critical decisions on 
German deployments to Bosnia by the Bundestag in 1995-6. In the first vote in June 
1995 participation was supported by 386 to 258 (11 abstentions); in the second vote in 
December 1995 on IFOR participation support rose to 543, with 107 against (6 
abstentions); in the third vote in December 1996 499 voted for participation in SFOR, 
93 against (with 21 abstentions). With so many SPD and Green members of the 
Bundestag voting for deployment, Riihe felt able to write about a new consensus 
about the role of the Bundeswehr."^  ^The SPD defence spokesperson, Walter Kolbow, 
praised Rühe’s role in this process.'^
In this ‘softening up’ approach Rühe was aided by NATO force structure proposals 
that increasingly recognised the need for a crisis prevention capability. These 
proposals surfaced in the new Strategic Concept of November 1991, which looked to 
smaller, more flexible and mobile forces for crisis management as well as collective 
defence (endorsed at the Rome summit of the North Atlantic Council). This was 
followed by the proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to facilitate NATO 
contingency operations, first endorsed at the Brussels summit of January 1994 and 
completed by the Berlin sununit of June 1996. Similarly, changes within the force 
structures of Germany’s closest and most important security partners in Europe, 
Britain and France, also helped him to manage the agenda of Bundeswehr reform.^^ 
Not least, Rühe’s ‘softening up’ approach was assisted by intense media coverage of 
the carnage in Bosnia and Croatia, and the prevailing public sentiment that something 
had to be done to bring this to a halt and that German interests were directly 
engaged."^* Public opinion was a resource that Rühe could use to his advantage, 
especially in the Bundestag Defence Committee.
Rühe’s leadership style was clear in the particularly active role that he played in the 
Bosnian crisis. He prompted a visit of Green members of the Bundestag to Bosnia in
Rühe, V. (1996), ‘Growing Responsibility’, German Comments, Vol. 42, April, pp.32-7 
^  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17.12.96, also interview. Axel Schneider, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 
Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, September 2002 
Vemet, D. (1995a) ‘La France et L’Allemagne’ Politique Etrangère,Vo\. 80, pp. 879-90 
Vemet, D (1995b) ‘Yougoslavie, Le Test Rate de la Sécurité Européenne’, L'Année, Européenne, 
pp.52-55
Maull, H. (1995) ‘Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis’, Survival, Vol.37, No.4, Winter 1995-1996, 
pp.99-130
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order to ‘soften up’ members of the opposition."^  ^Riihe was also in close contact with 
key opposition members of the Bundestag, attempting to convince them of the need 
for German support for UN peacekeepers in Bosnia. This involved calling upon 
political favours that he done in the past and attending endless Bundestag conunittee
50sessions.
Thus whilst Rühe’s toughness and abrasiveness was displayed in his agenda setting on 
behalf of a new role for the Bundeswehr, his leadership style in policy making 
implementation can best be described as ‘consensual’, persuasive and 
accommodative. Whilst he used assertiveness to promote this new interventionist role, 
he recognized the importance of caution when seeking to gain domestic support for 
policy in the face of various veto players. Thus Rühe was careful to try to solve any 
problems within the coalition or between the coalition and the opposition before they 
came to public prominence by meeting with working groups of the coalition and 
influential figures of the opposition.^^
Rühe’s ability to ‘bind in’, bargain with, and accommodate opposition to his policy 
ideas on the Bundeswehr’s role was highlighted by Peter Glotz: ‘One has to hand it to 
Rühe, he is not just capable of shaming his political opponents, he can also listen to 
them and over the months give the feeling that he is taking their arguments seriously 
and championing them, as far as his role allows him.’^^  Rühe was, in short, a cunning 
political player, who modelled himself upon Kohl: ‘I have drawn my instincts from 
Helmut Kohl.’^^ . Thus Rühe combined the key leadership traits and skills of a policy 
entrepreneur in agenda setting with those of a broker in policy making and 
implementation.
A final factor affecting Rühe’s leadership role and style was his own political 
ambitions. He was seen by many within the CDU/CSU as the ‘crown prince’
‘Die Erfolgsgeschichte eines Querdenkers’, General-Anzeiger, 26/06/1998 
^  ‘Die Erfolgsgeschichte eines Querdenkers’, General-Anzeiger, 26/06/1998 
‘Politiker mit Overdrive’, Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 03/06/92, see also ‘Auf dem Weg 
zum Gipfel’, Die Woche, 14/08/1998, see also ‘In talks with the working groups and with influential 
memebers of the opposition the miniter has attempted to solve every problem before it became a 
problem’ in ‘Stehvermoegen fur die schnelle Gangart’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 24/09/1992.
‘Auf dem Weg zum Gipfel’, Die Woche, 14/08/1998
Die Erfolgsgeschichte eines Querdenkers’, General-Anzeiger, 26/06/1998
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successor to Helmut Kohl. The Defence Ministry had developed a reputation as a 
dangerous political post, as the demise of Manfred Womer and Stoltenberg illustrated. 
Therefore, it was necessary for the CDU/CSU that Riihe avoided becoming another 
‘victim’ of the Defence Ministry. Whilst it was important for Riihe to maintain an 
image of a forward-thinking future leader of the CDU, he had to be careful not to 
alienate sections of the party. Hence he had to work very closely with Wolfgang 
Schaiible, chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party -  and the most important rival 
‘crown prince’. This aspect of political ambition adds another dimension to his 
consensual politics: he was keen to move away from the ‘Riipel’ image that he had 
developed during his time as CDU General Secretary between 1989 and 1992.^^
Kohl’s and Rühe’s behaviour as policy leaders over the period 1992-94 seems to 
accord well with the multiple streams framework in drawing out the way in which 
they sought to couple developments in the problems, politics and policies streams. 
They were focused on windows of opportunity to effect policy change through agenda 
setting. However, this theoretical account focuses on agenda setting rather than policy 
making and implementation. In the process it misses the importance of the domestic 
institutional context of their policy leadership and of the structuring of the policy 
process by the ‘freedom’, ‘peace’ and ‘pacifist’ advocacy coalitions.
What emerges as crucial for their policy leadership in agenda setting was their use of 
institutional venues like NATO and the WEU -  and the moral legitimacy bestowed by 
UN peacekeeping operations -  to effect domestic policy change. This created an 
opportunity to identify an objective basis for Bundeswehr reform in the need to adapt 
the Bundeswehr for a new role. It also created the basis for developing a policy 
narrative to justify change that was anchored in the reflexive multilateralism that 
characterized German policy. At the same time their leadership in policy making and 
implementation was designed to avoid enflaming political sensitivities about the use 
of the Bundeswehr and to negotiate the constraints of a semi-sovereign polity and its 
many potential veto players, including the Federal Constitutional Court. This meant 
that, in addition, to use of institutional venues, Rühe gave primacy to ‘salami’ tactics 
and to preparing policy change by encouraging a longer-term policy-orientated
54 ‘Im Profil: Volker Riihe’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 25/06/1998
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learning process within the Defence Ministry under the guidance of Naumann. The 
institutional context conditioned the scope of policy change (no direct radical 
challenges to core policy beliefs), the mechanism of change (‘salami’ tactics), the 
process (‘softening up’ opposition and instigating policy-oriented learning) and the 
pace of change (incremental and slow). It did not, however, prevent Riihe from acting 
as policy entrepreneur in agenda setting on the role of the Bundeswehr or as policy 
broker in domestic policy making and implementation.
4.3 Volker Riihe as Policy Broker and Veto Player, 1994-1998: The Structure of 
the Bundeswehr and the Politics of Base Closures
The Federal Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 acted to remove the constitutional 
constraint that had impeded change to the core policy beliefs about the role of the 
Bundeswehr.^^ In its wake Rühe continued to press ahead in developing its crisis 
intervention role. Thus in 1995 he sanctioned further Bundeswehr deployments, with 
14 jet fighters sent to northern Italy to ‘protect and assist’ in the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers. This was followed by strong Bundestag support for the 
IFOR and SFOR deployments. The extent to which policy learning had taken place 
amongst the SPD about the need for German involvement in such an operation was 
tied up with the horror of the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.^  ^In addition, the 
development of this role was twinned with the political consensus on the need for the 
development of a European defence and security identity.
However, and seemingly paradoxically, the period after the Constitutional Court’s 
landmark ruling heralded a new era of policy stasis on the structure of the 
Bundeswehr. This stasis was due to a combination of external factors that constrained 
Rühe from acting as a policy entrepreneur on the structural reform of the Bundeswehr 
and, correspondingly, led him to re-emphasise defence of the traditional role of 
Landes- and Biindnisverteidigung.^^ The result was a situation in which the FDP
Dorff, R.H. ‘Germany and Peace Support Operations, Policy After the Karlsruhe Declaration, 
Parameters, Spring 1996, pp.73-90
^  Interview, Dr. Wolfgang Biermann, Head of International Policy, SPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, 3rd. 
September 2002.
‘Die Landesverteidigung bleibt Kemauftrag’, Lausitzer Rundschau, 22/03/1996, see also ‘Dienst und 
Raki’ Die Zeit, 16/08/1996, see also ‘Herr der Truppe, ohne Truppen’, Die Zeit, 18/10/1996, see also, 
‘Mit mir gibt es kein Riitteln an der Wehrpflicht’, Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 27/11/1997
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sought to position themselves as the radicals on Bundeswehr structural reform and 
Riihe -  abetted by Kohl -  emerged as policy veto player.^^ Both Kohl and Riihe 
identified high political risks in implementing structural reforms and pursuing the 
logic for structures of the shift to a crisis management role/^ They also feared high 
political costs from using the Constitutional Court ruling to open up public debate 
about the Bundeswehr’s role.
The paradox was that the role shift towards crisis deployment continued -  although 
with greater caution -  whilst structural reforms were subject to veto. The greater 
caution about crisis deployments was seen over Albania in April 1997; Riihe, 
supported by Kohl, rejected Bundeswehr deployment after Kinkel had initially backed 
it. It was seen again in January-February 1998 over weapons monitoring in Iraq when 
Riihe again rejected deployment to the Gulf despite strong US pressure. These 
deployments would involve the Bundeswehr in peace enforcement and potential 
combat missions.
The crucial change was that Kohl’s political advisers identified electoral dangers in 
structural reforms to the Bundeswehr. They became much more cautious in 1993 and 
early 1994 when the prospects for the Kohl government in the forthcoming federal 
elections became bleak. Hence any notion of swift follow-up action on the Court 
ruling was ruled out as too politically dangerous. The narrowness of the 
CDU/CSU/FDP victory in the federal elections of September 1994 did nothing to 
change the judgement that reform of the Bundeswehr posed dangerous political risks. 
After past political embarrassments associated with Womer (1982-88) and Rupert 
Scholz (1988-89), Kohl wanted above all stability in the Federal Defence Ministry. In 
a Bundestag context of a small majority Kohl wished to avoid political ‘bad news’
The necessary five ‘Landerverbande’ (State Party Groups) of the FDP called for a vote amongst the 
FDP membership on conscription. The young liberals stood against conscription, with Rainer Briiderle 
and Jurgen Mollemann, However many high-rankng FDP politicians were in favour of conscription 
such as Klaus Kinkel, Wolfgang Gerhardt, Guido Westerwelle and Gunther Nolting; see ‘Riihe wamt 
FDP vor Irrweg bei der Wehrpflicht’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 8* August 1997; see also ‘Die FDP legt 
sich ein Kuckucksei ins Nest’, Handelsblatt, 01/08/1997. The end result was in favour of the 
continuation of the party’s positive stance on Wehrpflicht with 41.84% for a Freiwilligenarmee and 
56.98% for Wehrpflicht However, only 19% of the party membership voted on the issue, short of the 
necessary 33% for the vote to carry weight. (‘FDP-Befragung: Fiir Wehrpflicht -  aber nicht genugend 
Beteiligung’. (DPA 171333, November 1997)
‘Kohl: Es bleibt bei der Wehrpflicht’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 09/08/1997, on the potential costs of an 
end to Wehrpflicht and Zivildienst see ‘Helden an der Kostenfront: Ohne Wehrpflicht keine Zivis’, 
Was würde ohne sie aus dem Sozialsystem?’, Das Sonntagsblatt, 26/09/1997
122
with Bundeswehr reform, and Rühe’s career prospects were bound up with meeting 
this political requirement.^ Such political ‘bad news’ could have a negative impact on 
three critical Lander elections in March 1996 (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland- 
Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein) on which the capacity of the federal government 
to steer its legislative programme through the Bundesrat depended. In this changed 
political context Kohl feared that the Defence Ministry could generate too many ‘bad 
news’ stories, especially if its proposals involved large-scale base closures that could 
damage local economies and the careers of many CDU/CSU politicians and 
undermine the parties' electoral-strategic interests.^^
The crucial factor restraining structural change to the Bundeswehr was the strong 
incentive for political manipulation of reform. Above all, Bundeswehr reform 
involved a high number of base closures across Germany that would be staunchly 
opposed by Lander governments and that would affect the electoral interests of a 
significant number of members of the Bundestag (MdBs).^^ Bundeswehr reform also 
threatened the system of Zivildienst that was an important pillar of the German social 
system.^^ Already, the reductions in the Bundeswehr that were consequent on German 
unification had led to the closure of many bases, necessitating large compensation 
payments to the Lander affected, and causing political conflicts with the Lander 
governments. These payments brought Bundeswehr reform firmly into the orbit of a 
Federal Finance Ministry that was already having to deal with the mammoth 
implications of German unification for budget deficit and debt levels.
The Finance Ministry had two particular concerns about base closures. Firstly, Theo 
Waigel was chair of the CSU as well as Finance Minister and enjoyed a particularly 
close personal and political relationship with Kohl. Unlike Rühe, Waigel was a
^  Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6“* August,, 2002 
Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6“*. August 2002
Interviews, CDU Bündesgeschaftstelle, Berlin, 21,st November 2001,6th. August 2002 and 
CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th. August 2002.
see ‘To abolish conscription and instead create a general service for all young men and women is 
frnacially risky and politically bound to fail...would one really employ 700,000 yound men and women 
per year with a total cost of 21 Billlion DM? Hence a professional armed force is without question 
more expensive than a conscript based armed force.’ in ‘Die Zivis sind untauglich fur die Wehrpflicht- 
Debatte’, Welt am Sonntag, 07.07.1996 see also Die Kostendampfer: Der Streit um die Wehrpflicht 
beunruhigt die Wohlfahrtsverbande. Ohne Zvildienstleistende, furchten sie, brache die Alten und 
Krankenpflege zusanunen’. Die Woche, 19.06.1996; Also interview in Finance Mininstry, Bonn, 28th 
August 2002
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pivotal coalition player, and not least helpful to Kohl in managing a difficult 
relationship to the Bavarian prime minister, Edmund Stoiber. Waigel was above all 
concerned to prevent federal measures that would have negative economic and 
political impacts on the CSU in Bavaria. As CSU chair he had to be preoccupied with 
issues that affected the potential electoral performance of the CSU in both the Land 
and federal elections. This protected his political flank against Stoiber and was vital to 
the continuing political influence of the CSU and Waigel within the federal coalition 
government.^ Base closures were very unpopular in Bavaria, and their threat 
generated considerable local media attention and political mobilization. He could not 
afford politically to be associated with such unpopular measures when Stoiber was 
pursuing the more politically popular course of opposing them. Hence, for reasons of 
electoral-strategic interest, Riihe could not expect support from the Finance Minister 
for base closures. This narrowed Rühe’s political room for manoeuvre over 
Bundeswehr reform.
Secondly, and crucially, from the perspective of the Finance Ministry Bundeswehr 
reform was very much secondary to its own major policy project -  ensuring that 
Germany’s commitment in the Maastricht Treaty to complete Economic and 
Monetary Union by 1999 at the latest was honoured.^^ The overriding problem was 
that this commitment had to be honoured against the background of a swelling public 
debt consequent on the huge fiscal transfers after German unification and of slow­
down in German growth and higher structural unemployment. The net effect was 
higher budget deficits. EMU strengthened the political pressure for fiscal 
consolidation because German negotiators, led by the Finance Ministry, insisted on 
the strictest possible application of the 3% budget deficit limit contained in the 
Maastricht Treaty as a prime condition to be met for the final transition to stage three. 
Again under pressure from his home state of Bavaria, where the CSU feared populist 
exploitation of the issue of losing the D-Mark, Waigel insisted on ‘3.0’ as a guarantee 
that the new euro would be ‘at least as stable as the D-Mark’.
^  Interviews, CDU Bündesgeschaftstelle, Berlin 21st. November 2001, 6th. August 2002 and 
CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin 26th. August 2002.
‘Um den Büffel wird es einsam: Warum Theo Waigel immer Gewinner bleibt und Maastricht 
wichtiger ist als die Bundeswehr’, Focus, 08/06/1996, see also ‘Ganz Einfach, Volker Rühe kampfr um 
seinen Etat. Damit erregte er das Missfallen des Kanzlers’, Der Speigel, 08/06/1996, also interview. 
Finance Ministry, Berlin, 18th August 2002
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Reassuring German public opinion on the stability of the new currency played a 
critical role in Waigel’s definition of his political self-interests. Such reassurance 
depended first and foremost on Germany itself remaining within the 3.0 budget deficit 
limit. This view was backed unequivocally by Kohl who viewed EMU as the central 
project of his government and the test and measure of his reputation as the 
‘Chancellor for Europe’. Hence Kohl and Waigel presented a firm and fixed axis on 
budget consolidation. Waigel’s prime task was to deliver a 3.0% budget deficit 
maximum for Germany in 1998. From this vantage point the end of the Cold War was 
seen as an opportunity to earn a large peace dividend. This dividend was earned in the 
form of huge cuts in the German defence budget over the 1990s. Rühe loyally 
delivered these cuts.^^ Hence Bundeswehr reform was nested in a budgetary policy 
subsystem that gave top priority to EMU and to the peace dividend as a key 
contribution to budget consolidation.
“ See Table 4.2
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Table 4.2 German Defence Spending 1991-2002 (In DM Bn.)
Ausgabenbereich 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Personalausgaben 13.7 12.5 13.5 12.9 12.9 12.8 12.5 12.2 12.4 12.4 12.3 12.5
Materialerhaltung 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.4
Sonstige
Betriebsausgaben 3.9 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.5
Summe
Betriebsausgaben 20.0 20.5 19.7 19.0 19.0 18.8 18.6 18.3 18.6 18.4 18.3 18.3
(Anteil am Epl. 14) 73,1 76,1 77,7 78,9 78,3 77,7 78,4 76,3 75,7 75,7 75,5 77,9
Forschung,
Entwicklung,
Erprobung 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9
Militârische
Beschaffungen
4.7 3.9 3.4 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.7 2.8 3.5
Militarische Anlagen 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7
Sonstige Investitionen 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Summe
verteidigungsinvestive
Ausgaben
7.4 6.4 5.6 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.1 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.2
(Anteil am Epl. 14)
26,9 23,9 22,3 21,1 21,7 22,3 21,6 23,7 24,3 24,3 24,5 22,1
Einzelplan 14 27.4 27.0 25.3 24.1 24.3 24.1 23.6 24.0 24.6 24.3 24.3 23.6
(Source: Interview Partner from Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28^ August 2002)
The implications of Germany’s fiscal difficulties and EMU obligations for 
Bundeswehr reform were clear, not least for a Defence Minister who needed the 
political support of Kohl and Waigel for his career ambitions and who projected
126
himself within the CDU as a key foreign policy thinker. A major structural reform of 
the Bundeswehr modelled around crisis reaction capabilities would necessitate an 
initial injection of financial resources to compensate for the closure of a large number 
of barracks. The Finance Ministry was not prepared to make available the scale of 
resources required for such a compensation scheme. By 1996 it was becoming 
increasingly clear -  and a source of political alarm in the Federal Chancellor’s Office 
-  that Germany had not only failed to meet the Maastricht criteria at the first 
scheduled review of whether to proceed to stage three. More seriously, it risked 
failing to meet the conditions in time to qualify for the final date fixed for January 
1999. The risk of acute political embarrassment was heightened because Waigel was 
taking the initiative in proposing a new tough Stability Pact -  enshrining the 3% 
deficit limit in stage three with tough sanctions. Tough action to enforce fiscal 
discipline was crucial both for German reputation and for ability to meet its 
overriding political commitment to qualify for stage three by 1999. EMU was a key 
project for Kohl and meant that any increase in the defence budget was out of the 
question.^^ A costly reform of the Bundeswehr would have been a political ‘hot 
potato’ and the kind of ‘bad news’ that Kohl wished to avoid.
As the last section showed, Rühe had been able to push through changes to the policy 
core of German defence and security policy. These changes were given structural 
expression in the VPR of 1992, with the creation of a crisis reaction force of 50,000 
troops. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 legitimised the CDU’s 
policy of extending the role of the Bundeswehr and represented a victory for Rühe’s 
policy entrepreneurship. It provided the opportunity to make further changes to the 
Bundeswehr, but this opportunity was not taken.
The Conceptual Guidelines for the Further Development of the Bundeswehr 
(Konzeptionelle Leitlinien zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr) of 1994 did little 
to develop the existing crisis reaction capability. It outlined a Bundeswehr of 340,000, 
containing 140,000 conscripts and 53,600 crisis reaction troops deployable at short
Um den Büffel wird es einsam; Warum Theo Waigel immer Gewinner bleibt und Maastricht 
wichtiger ist als die Bundeswehr’, Focus, 08/06/1996, also interview. Finance Ministry, Berlin, 14th 
August 2002
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notice, with a military service of 10 months.^* These changes were justified in relation 
to recent NATO and WEU decisions (outlined above). There were also changes to the 
Bundeswehr’s conunand structure, with the General Inspector’s role strengthened, 
thereby further empowering the reform agenda of Naumann. However, this policy 
statement suggested a very cautious approach to policy change.
The strategic context had changed in ways that led Rühe to modify his leadership role, 
strategy and style. Above all, given his political ambitions as a future CDU 
chair/Foreign Minister/Chancellor, he did not wish to be linked in any way with 
electoral costs to the CDU/CSU, either in 1994 or in 1996. Rühe could not afford to 
incur the wrath of powerful regional political leaders like Erwin Teufel in Stuttgart. 
Also, he had to pay particularly close attention to Bavaria because of the pivotal role 
of the CSU in the federal coalition and the CSU’s importance for his career ambitions 
as Federal Chancellor. Moreover, Bundeswehr reform had become bound up with 
wider issues about the health of the German economy and political survival of the 
CDU/CSU.
The scale of the difficulties that this changed strategic context made for Rühe’s policy 
leadership were made clear to him by the reaction in the Bundestag and from the 
Lander to the programme of base closures contained in the ‘Ressortkonzept zur 
Anpassung der Streitkraftestrukturen, der Territorialen Wehrverwaltung und der 
Stationierung* of 14 March 1995.^  ^It detailed the precise structure of the armed 
forces and details of base closures. The aim of the base closures was to release DM 
1.5bn to increase the investment part of the defence budget from 21 per cent to 25 per 
cent by 1998. It involved reducing the Bundeswehr from 370,000 to 340,(X)0 men. 
This ‘Ministry Concept’ led to widespread protest. The number of bases to be closed 
was reduced from 19 to 16 after Lander opposition, with large reductions (of around 
5(X) soldiers) in a further 32 barracks (out of a total of 734 bases).^° The final concept
Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr, Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, Bonn, 12 July 1994
‘Ressortkonzept zur Anpassung der Streitkraftestrukturen, der Territorialen Wehrverwaltung und der 
Stationierung’ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 15 March 1995 
‘Rühe macht 19 Standorte Dicht’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 15/03/1995; ‘Bundeswehr lost weniger 
Standorte als bisher vorgesehen’ 30/05/1995, DPA 311355. The concept was altered after heavy 
protests from the Lander, paticularly from Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen, where a number of 
barracks were saved.
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was agreed in early June 1995. Evidence for the political targeting of base closures is 
provided by the way in which Baden-Württemberg, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower 
Saxony and Bavaria were notably successful in reducing the numbers of troops lost in 
their regions.
A number of patterns in the political targeting of base closures were discernible. First, 
there was a clear correlation between the pattern of complaints and the targeting of 
closures. By 28 April the Defence Ministry had received over 500 petitions from local 
authorities, politicians, trade unions such as the OTV (Transport and General Workers 
Union) and soldiers, in particular from Bavaria (112), Schelswig-Holstein (91) and 
Lower Saxony (77).^* These complaints detailed the negative economic consequences 
for their regions. By 30 May the Defence Ministry had received over 700 statements 
of protest from the Lander This mobilisation was supported by active opposition of 
the Lander prime ministers -  notably Edmund Stoiber in Bavaria, Heidi Simonis in 
Schleswig-Holstein, and Gerhard Schroder in Lower Saxony, as well as uproar in the 
local media.
Secondly, the timing and pattern of base closures were affected by both the national 
electoral cycle and the Lander electoral cycle, in other words by electoral-strategic 
interests. In Lander where there were forthcoming elections, Schleswig-Holstein and 
Rheinland Palatinate, a number of bases were saved, with other bases subject to 
smaller reductions than previously planned. Other Lander also benefited from 
revisions to the closure progranune, including Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden- 
Württemberg. In contrast, Bremen, Hamburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and 
the Saar saw no changes to their levels of troop reductions, Hesse one more closure 
and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern saved one base.^  ^The Kohl government’s weak 
popularity and electoral threat in the Lander provided an increased incentive for 
political manipulation of base closures.
Thirdly, the pattern of base closures suggested that key beneficiaries were ‘flagship* 
Lander -  ones that are seen as models of CDU/CSU policy success and that contribute
‘Um die Soldaten kampfen’, Das Sonntagsblatt 24/03/95
‘Bundeswehr lost weniger Standorte als bisher vorgesehen’ 30/05/1995, DPA 311355. 
‘Bundeswehr lost weniger Standorte als bisher vorgesehen’ 30/05/1995, DPA 311355.
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disproportionately to CDU/CSU national electoral success. There seemed to be 
special Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg factors within the coalition, translating into a 
particular political weight for Edmund Stoiber and Erwin Teufel in Bonn.
The controversy surrounding Rühe’s base concept was to be expected. Nevertheless, 
it was an event that Rühe did not want to repeat, as it was a process that could make a 
number of political enemies, a factor that weighed heavily in his political calculations 
as potential successor to Kohl.^ "^
There appears to have been a clear political manipulation of base closures. Rühe paid 
close attention to balancing the political costs and benefits of base closures. The result 
was a skilful combination of careful spatial targeting of reductions in proposed 
closures with a use of a ‘scattergun’ approach that spread the costs widely. Electoral 
threat and career calculations were central to these calculations of targeting and show 
just how important politics was in shaping Bundeswehr reform. In particular, in a 
federal system like that in Germany -  where control in the Bundesrat is so important - 
there are particular incentives for targeting because of the implications of Lander 
election results for the federal government.
This experience shows that for reasons of political ambition and electoral and party 
strategy Rühe was not prepared to pursue the logic of his policy entrepreneurship on 
the crisis intervention role of the Bundeswehr into structural reforms. He was not 
willing to take unnecessary political risks beyond pursuing 'salami’ tactics in 
developing this role by proposing the kind of domestic policy reforms to the 
Bundeswehr’s structure that were necessary to ensure an appropriate crisis reaction 
capability. This position of misfit between developing role and missing structural 
reforms left German defence and security pohcy and the Bundeswehr vulnerable to 
external criticism of a lack of logic.
Rühe adopted a complex policy leadership in this period. He was a policy broker in 
dealing with base closures, seeking to bind in a wide range of actors across party 
boundaries to support the reform. But on other issues of structural reform he shifted to
Interviews, CDU Bündesgeschâftstelle, Berlin, 21 st. November 2001 and 6th. August 2002 and 
CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th, August 2002.
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a policy veto role. In particular, he had to deal with the unanticipated effects of his 
‘salami’ tactics in extending the role of the Bundeswehr. These tactics had set in place 
a dynamic of policy-orientated learning that was hard for him to control and that 
threatened to produce policy change that was politically threatening to him. Hence his 
political caution began to have effects within his leadership of the Defence Ministry. 
This was most evident in the controversy in May 1995 surrounding the development 
of a Mehrzweckschijf {m\x\\i-^ \xr^ osQ ship).^  ^ This ship was to cost DM 620 million 
and was designed for 700 soldiers with 271 tanks, transport vehicles and artillery, and 
room for 105 medics. Most importantly, it was purposefully designed for crisis 
operations, drawing on the lessons of the Cambodia and Somalia missions.^^
Rühe was unaware of the plans for the ‘multi-purpose’ ship and was only informed 
through an article published in Marineforum by Jens Detlefsen, who was the head of 
the study group in the Fiihrungsstab (Leadership Staff) of the Navy and had been 
charged with the job of developing what had been an innovative concept of Naumann 
and Stellvertreter Vizeadmiral (Deputy Vice-Admiral) Hans Frank for a 
FiihrungsschiffCljcsidmg ship’). Rühe immediately torpedoed the plan. He feared 
that the ship would create increased pressure for Germany to involve itself in 
international military interventions. More seriously, it was designed purely for crisis 
interventions and hence challenged the primacy of the concept of the Bundeswehr as 
Biindnisverteidigung.
This kind of policy thinking was anathema to Rühe, who was concerned with careful 
management of policy development so that it caused minimum political disturbance. 
The electoral-strategic context offered more threats than opportunities, as the painful 
process of base closures demonstrated. Hence there was nothing in the politics stream 
to encourage him to a policy entrepreneur role. More seriously, Rühe’s ‘salami’ 
tactics were in danger of becoming a ‘ham’ tactic, as the Defence Ministry began to 
develop its own dynamics of change as a result of policy-oriented learning. Any 
policy proposals emerging out of this learning process that challenged the core 
rationale of Biindnisverteidigung with new crisis reaction capabilities contained high
‘Schiffversenken auf der Hardthohe’, Verteidigungsniinister Rühe will ein gigantisches 
RUstungsprojekt der Marine stoppen’ SUddeutsche Zeitung, 03/03/1995 
‘SchiffVersenken auf der Hardtiiohe’, Verteidigungsminister Rühe will ein gigantisches 
Rüstungsprojekt der Marine stoppen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 03/03/1995
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political risks. The Defence ministry had developed a dynamic of policy orientated 
learning of which Rühe was losing control. Rühe had worked carefully to build a 
consensus with the SPD and Greens/Bündnis90 about Auslandseinsatze (Troop 
deployments outside Germany). Such a project would raise fears amongst the SPD 
and Greens/Bündnis90 about the development of an ‘intervention army’ and unravel 
this delicately constructed consensus.^^ Rühe was concerned about proposals from 
within the policy subsystem that raised the sensitive issues of conscription and 
Zivildienst. More seriously, they suggested further base closures.
Another issue deterred Rühe from acting as policy entrepreneur on structural reform 
of the Bundeswehr: its consequences for the social policy subsystem. The abolition of 
conscription would spell the end of Zivildienst. Without its replacement by an 
Allgemeiner Dienst for both men and women, social policy, especially care services, 
would be placed under unbearable pressure. This issue added to the impetus within 
the CDU/CSU to resist any unnecessary changes to conscription by moving the 
Bundeswehr closer to a volunteer force. Such changes threatened to unleash a process 
of policy-orientated learning that would spill over from secondary aspects to core 
aspects of policy beliefs, meaning comprehensive first-order policy change.^^ This 
social policy context helped to close windows of opportunity for policy change and 
impeded the ‘politics of punctuation’.
Michael Glos, chair of the CSU Landesgruppe in the Bundestag, stressed this issue in 
the context of debate within the FDP about conscription (and Jürgen Koppelin’s 
statement that the abolition of conscription was ‘but a matter of time’)^ ^
‘Whoever begins to put a question mark over conscription must openly admit that the 
discussion about a general service {Allgemeiner Dienst) for men and women is tied to 
this... if conscription is abolished there is no more justification for Ersatzdienst.*^^
Interview, Axel Schneider, Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheit, Berlin, 4th. 
September 2002, see also, Naumann abhors the soft-speaking of the politicians also that of his own 
minister’, in Grosser Schritt: Pazifisten, Militars und der Minister, Die Zeit, 1995, On the fears of the 
Greens about an Interventionsarmee see ‘Griine: Bundeswehr wird ‘Interventionsarmee’, gegen 
Eurofighter’, DPA 261117,26/09/1995; see also ‘Griine: Regierung haut Bundeswehr zur 
Interventionsarmee aus’, DPA 261053,26/09/1995.
Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996). ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political 
Studies, No. 44, p. 936-57.
DPA 0212209 July 96
132
The defence and security policy speaker of the CSU Landesgruppe^ Christian 
Schmidt, took up the same position in a press release on 4* June 1996. Similar 
worries about the consequences for Zivildienst were also expressed by Dr. Klaus Rose 
(CSU), chair of the Bundestag Defence Committee.*^ Michael Wonneberger, a 
member of Bundestag Defence Conunittee and chair of the CDU Brandenburg 
Landesgruppe, pointed out: ‘With the creation of a professional army the future of the 
Zivildienst and thus the effectiveness of many social institutions would be 
threatened... In the short run there is no possibility of compensating for this work.’.^ ^
Policy actors involved in social care prophesied disastrous consequences for the old, 
sick and disabled if Zivildienst were to be abolished. A voluntary social year was seen 
as an inadequate replacement for the ‘absolutely necessary’ service. According to 
Rudiger Loehle, spokesperson for the Bundesamt fur den Zivildienst: ‘If this 
disappears the state would have to finance other forms of this absolutely necessary 
se rv ice .D ie te r Hackler, the Bundesbeauftragterfur Zivildienst in the Federal 
Ministry for Family, the Elderly, Women and Youth, highlighted how, if Zivildienst 
were to be shortened to eight months, it would make it pointless as there would be 
very little time left for active service after training.*"^
In short, the interlocking subsystems of social policy and defence and security policy 
made changes to conscription particularly complicated and difficult. The issue of 
structural reform to the Bundeswehr fell into the orbit of not only the Federal Finance 
Ministry but also the Federal Ministry for Family, the Elderly, Women and Youth and 
its minister Claudia Nolte (especially division 5: Zivildienst and welfare work). Rühe 
did not wish to court political difficulties with the social policy wing of the CDU. A 
professional army of volunteers might have been cheaper in the long run. However, 
the short-term costs were far too high to encourage policy entrepreneurship by Rühe -  
in terms both of base closures and of the repercussions for Zivildienst and welfare
Presse Mitteilung, CSU Landesgruppe July 1996 
Femseh-ZHorfiinkspiegel Inland II 22.02.96 
DPA 160210 16 June 1996 
DPA 07080 5 June 1996 
^  Femseh/Horfunkspiegel 17/12/96
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work. With the Finance Ministry looking to trim the budget, Bundeswehr reform 
threatened to add to financial burdens at an inopportune time.
Thus Rühe began to restrict policy making in the Defence Ministry to a small core of 
people who lacked creativity. His Denkverbot is an excellent example of how the 
control of information and policy learning is critical for a policy veto player to 
manage and dampen change. It shows how attaining a policy stasis requires active 
policy leadership. Rühe acted to remove any ‘threat’ to the status quo. Responding to 
pressure from the Federal Chancellor’s Office, and Kohl’s worries about the political 
consequences of a wide debate about conscription and Landesverteidigung, Rühe put 
in place a Denkverbot in the Defence Ministry about further changes to the structures 
of the Bundeswehr. Vordenkers were marginalized, and any challenging papers were 
filed away, not entering into broad discussion in the Defence Ministry.
The seriousness of the ‘Denkverbot’ is demonstrated by the case of air force officer 
Jürgen Rose, a researcher at the George C. Marshall Centre. Rose was placed under a 
great deal of pressure by Rühe after questioning Rühe critically about conscription at 
a conference and publishing an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that 
stated ‘conscription must and will end.’^^  He was forced to resign his position. Above 
all, the Denkverbot was signalled by the replacement of General Naumann by the 
more conservative Hartmut Bagger in February 1996. Nauman had advocated an 
increasingly global role for the Bundeswehr, pleading in 1994 for the full 
participation of Germany in UN peacemaking operations.®  ^This put his position 
closer to that of Kinkel than that of Rühe.
Additionally, Rühe’s political position within the government had weakened, 
affecting his ability to act as a policy entrepreneur. He had poor relations with
Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheit, Berlin, 
10th. September 2002, see also DPA 151210 December 1996 
‘Druck von Oben’, Der Spiegel, 1 December 1997; ‘Zapfenstreich fur die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 3 
November 1997
‘Neue Sicherheitsrisiken bringen der Bundeswehr neue Aufgaben’, 30/05/94, DPA 300442. See also 
'During his four and a half years in office, the departing General Inspector has more than once said and 
done things that have ignited serious internal political debates...on numerous occasions he has fallen 
out with his minister, also in pubhc’ in ‘Abschied eines politischen Kopfs’, Der Tagesspiegel, 
06/02/1995. Naumann had become too much of a loose cannon for Rühe and a political Uability to his 
consensus building with the SPD and Greens. Naumann had once spoken of the 'kampfaufrrag’ in 
Yugoslavia.
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Wolfgang Schaüble, the main heir apparent of Kohl. Schaiible held the powerful 
position of chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party and had no incentive to see 
Rühe succeed at the Defence Ministry. Rühe lacked the political following 
(Hausmacht) within the CDU to build support for, and push through, a radical reform 
of the Bundeswehr. From his constituency upwards (in Hamburg, which was an SPD 
‘fortress’), his internal political support was weak so that he depended greatly on 
Kohl’s favour and hence was acutely sensitive to signals from the Chancellor’s 
Office.^* Rühe was in no position to engage in independent action, without Kohl’s 
support. This led to conceptual stagnation in the Defence Ministry, and a high level of 
apathy as the brakes were applied to any ideas of policy change that might touch on 
core beliefs about Landesverteidigung and conscription.
4.4 Policy Change Agents: Kinkel, the Foreign Ministry, the FDP and the Greens
However, there were actors in other policy subsystems and in the macro-political 
context who favoured opening up debate about not just the role but also the structure 
of the Bundeswehr. Most notably, Rühe’s Denkverbot did not extend to the Foreign 
Ministry under Klaus Kinkel. To the great irritation of both Rühe and Kohl, Kinkel 
sought out a policy entrepreneur role on Bundeswehr reform. In May 1997 a 
memorandum from the Foreign Ministry’s planning staff proposed a Bundeswehr of
250,000 men, with a reduction of conscription from ten to six months.^^ This proposal 
surfaced in the context of an increasingly strained relationship between the FDP and 
CDU/CSU over the issue of conscription.
Kinkel was a supporter of conscription. Nevertheless, his proposals placed greater 
pressure on Rühe.^^ The remodelled Bundeswehr would consist of 180,000 
professional soldiers and 70,000 conscripts. The Foreign Ministry memorandum
See SPD Biography of Volker Rühe for 1998 Federal Elections, see ‘In the party, said one Christian 
Democrat, he has no friends and is lacking the necessary regional power base’, Woche, 29.11.97, see 
also ‘...The Hamburger has no real regional power base in the Party and little support in the 
parliamentary party’. Focus, 13.10.97, both articles quoted also in the SPD Biography of Rühe for the 
1998 Federal Elections.
‘Mit Berufsarmee aufgaben nicht zu erfiillen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 May 1997, see also ‘Unter 
Verschluss: Wie viele Soldaten braucht das Land? 250000 Mann sind genug, meint Kinkel’s Aussen- 
Ministerium -  zu Rühe’s Ârger’, Der Spiegel, 05/05/1997
^  ‘Mit Berufsarmee aufgaben nicht zu erfiillen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 May 1997, see also ‘Unter 
Verschluss: Wie viele Soldaten braucht das Land? 250000 Mann sind genug, meint Kinkel’s Aussen- 
Ministerium -  zu Rühe’s Ârger’, Der Spiegel, 05/05/1997
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stressed the contradiction between the new problems and uncertainties thrown up by 
changes in the security environment and the current structure of the Bundeswehr and 
the consequent difficulties for German foreign as well as defence and security policy. 
The policy image of the Bundeswehr had negative effects for policy actors outside the 
policy subsystem. In particular, the state of the Bundeswehr, notably the need for 
greater investment in modem armaments, was of increasing concern to the Foreign 
Ministry, for whom the Bundeswehr was becoming an ever more important tool of 
foreign policy. This issue added to a series of serious conflicts of view between Rühe 
and Kinkel, notably over NATO enlargement. The NATO enlargement issue had been 
resolved in Rühe’s favour.^  ^However, it had left a legacy of strained political 
relations. Rühe resented Kinkel’s intervention on Bundeswehr reform as interference 
in his domain of ministerial autonomy and responsibility.
Rühe sought to fend off this criticism by appealing to NATO again, citing how 
Germany would lose its ‘weight’ and reputation within the Alliance through 
reductions in troop numbers. He also sought to veto policy change by linking the idea 
of a career army to a ‘world-wide intervention force’, an idea that was designed to 
strike a chord with the ‘peace’ coalition.^^ The proposals of the Foreign Ministry were 
killed off, and the few copies of the memorandum that existed were filed away. In the 
view of the Federal Chancellor’s Office, the Foreign Ministry memorandum risked 
opening up a dangerous debate before the 1998 federal elections and raised potential 
problems for the CDU/CSU in forthcoming Lander elections.
Kinkel’s exercise in policy entrepreneurship can be seen as an attempt to couple 
developments in the problem and the politics streams. On the one hand, the Foreign 
Ministry’s proposals were a pragmatic response to the reality of a Bundeswehr that 
was increasingly stretched financially by its continued over-emphasis on 
Landesverteidigung at the expense of creating effective, well-equipped and mobile 
crisis reaction forces. The Foreign Minister favoured a UN-based, more global role 
for the Bundeswehr as a crisis intervention force. But the difficulties in an effective
Tewes, H. (1998). ‘Between Deepening and Widening, Role Conflict in Germany’s Enlargement 
Policy’, West European Politics, 21
Tewes, H. ‘Germany as a Civilian Power, The Western Integration of East Central Europe’. (PhD 
Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1999)
I don’t need a professional armed force. I would only need one if a I wanted to intervne worldwide 
in places like Hati’, in ‘Zapfenstreich fur die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 03/11/1997
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policy entrepreneur role on Bundeswehr reform resided in the politics stream. Here 
developments had simultaneously encouraged and frustrated this policy leadership 
role. Kinkel’s difficulties stemmed from his lack of political weight and reputation to 
act as a policy entrepreneur on this issue. The FDP had suffered a series of ‘public 
opinion’ shocks from defeats in Lander elections, losing in 12 out of 13 elections 
between 1993 and 1995 and failing to overcome the 5 per cent hurdle in the nine 
Lander elections of 1993 and 1994. These sub-national electoral shocks led to the 
replacement of Kinkel as party chair by Wolfgang Gebhardt in 1995. Much of the 
responsibility was attributed to Kinkel’s weak leadership as party chair, and hence he 
lacked political weight within the coalition government.
At the same time Kinkel was emboldened to act by the more assertive political 
strategy of the FDP before the federal elections. Faced by the prospect of being 
eliminated from the Bundestag in 1998, the FDP sought out a more distinctive policy 
profile. Kinkel had to respond to pressures emanating from within his own party, 
which were seeking to remodel FDP defence policy, to reflect the changing security 
environment. The idea of a more professional Bundeswehr fitted in with such a 
profile. The problem was that Kinkel had very little ability to draw on the politics 
stream for support on this issue. With Kohl keen that ‘bad news’ should be kept to a 
minimum, the opportunity for Kinkel to open up a policy window on Bundeswehr 
reform was non-existent. Kinkel lacked the ability to couple a compelling policy 
problem with a supportive politics stream. The internal debate within his own party - 
whilst forcing him to act - also served to weaken his political base for engaging in 
entrepreneurship. In short, Kinkel lacked a favourable strategic context for effective 
policy entrepreneurship.
Nevertheless, policy-oriented learning continued amongst the wider political elite. 
The Bundeswehr policy monopoly and its supportive policy image of 
Landesverteidigung and conscription faced a challenge from two fronts -  ideological 
and pragmatic. Ideological criticism came from the traditional fundamentalist and 
pacifist wing of the Greens and pacifists within the Party of Democratic Socialism 
(PDS). They shared a ‘deep core’ opposition to conscription based on the belief that
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conscription serves to perpetuate the role of force in international relations/^ Pacifists 
within the Greens also stood for the abolition of Ersatzdienst. Along with pacifists in 
the PDS, they opposed conscription as part of a policy of dismantling the Bundeswehr 
and withdrawing from NATO in favour of a European peace order based on the CSCE 
as a regional organization of the But these shared policy beliefs did not lead to
the formation of a new advocacy coalition because pacifists in the Greens and in the 
PDS did not exhibit any co-ordinated action. The inhibiting factor is that such co­
ordinated behaviour would have split the Green Party.
The second, more serious challenge was from what can be termed ‘pragmatic critics’: 
actors who questioned the rationale of Landesverteidigung directly, arguing that the 
core role of the Bundeswehr was now peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. 
These actors also sought to abolish conscription, citing the need for better-trained, 
more professional forces able to engage in international crisis management and 
prevention tasks. The policy leaders here were within the ‘realist’ wing of the Greens, 
notably Joschka Fischer, and within the FDP.^  ^The FDP was initially the more 
important because it was within the Kohl government, with Kinkel as Foreign 
Minister. The FDP was split on this issue. Some younger members of the party argued 
that, in the context of the current international situation, conscription could no longer 
be justified, and that crisis management tasks required a fully professional 
Bundeswehr.^
The FDP demonstrated well the extent to which policy learning was disseminating 
through the German political system, with the party taking the lead on this issue. The 
1994 Constitutional Court ruling had broken the macro-political support for the 
Landesverteidigung policy image, allowing actors at this macropolitical level to 
question the relevance of established Bundeswehr structures, notably conscription.
The FDP’s constitution allowed the party membership to vote on key issues, but such 
a vote required a proposal by five regional party associations (Landesverbande). In
”  ‘Die PDS 1st eine pazifistische Partei’, Neues Deutschland, 14/11/1995 
^  Interview, Michael Alvarez, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Berlin, 13th. November 2001 
See Anglika Beer in ‘Wehrpflicht retten’. Die Woche, 22/08/1997. See also Femseh /Horfunkspiegel 
Inland II 13/08/1997, see also Jürgen Koppelin, Speaker of the FDP Bundestag^aktion in ‘Brennpunkt 
Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 25/07/1997
^  ‘Nur die Junge Union mochte an der Wehrpflicht festhalten: Vertreter der anderen politischen 
Jugendorganisationen dagen’, Der Tagesspiegel, 23/08/1997
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August 1997 the hurdle for a vote on conscription was cleared. The FDP was split on 
the issue. Its party chair, Wolfgang Gerhardt, Klaus Kinkel and Gunther Nolting 
backed the retention of conscription, Jürgen Koppelin, Jürgen Mollemann, the leaders 
of a number of Lander branches of the FDP and the Young Liberals favoured a 
volunteer, professional army. Following strong pressure from their coalition partner 
the CDU/CSU, and Rühe in particular, the FDP finally decided to officially campaign 
for the retention of conscription. However, the stage had been set for the FDP to 
abandon this principle once it had a younger leader and was released from the 
constraints of coalition discipline.
Within the Green Party the key entrepreneur on defence and security issues was 
Joschka Fischer. He used the events in Srebrenica in 1995 to reframe Green thinking 
about these issues, in particular two major impassioned speeches in the Bundestag 
that had a resonance and influence within the ‘peace’ coalition and the wider political 
Left in Germany. At maximum the ‘peace’ coalition and the political Left had been 
prepared to envisage a Bundeswehr committed to territorial defence. Fischer argued 
that for reasons of history Germany could not distance herself from violations of 
human rights and dignity in the rest of Europe. He considered it Germany’s historic 
and moral responsibility to ensure that Auschwitz would never again happen on 
European soil. Srebrenica required Germany to rethink its defence and security 
interests.^^
Fischer’s views had clear implications for the Bundeswehr’s future role and structure. 
It would have to be restructured as the instrument of a security policy that focused on 
crisis prevention, humanitarian intervention, civilian policing and a wider framework 
of political, economic and social reconstruction. For historical and moral reasons, 
Germany would play a lead role in multilateral and, above all, European structures 
that would undertake these tasks. Hence Fischer pushed the idea of Europeanisation 
of the Bundeswehr’s role and structures.^^ It was also clear that such highly complex 
and specialized tasks required a much more professional Bundeswehr. Nevertheless,
^  Interview, Helmut Huber, Referent, Biiro Anglika Beer MdB. Green/Bündnis 90 Bundestagsfraktion, 
Berlin, 18th July 2002, also interview with Michael Alvarez, Heinrich Boll Stilting, Berlin, 13th. 
November 2001.
^  Interview, Helmut Huber, Referent, Biiro Anglika Beer MdB. Green/Bündnis 90 
Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 18th.July 2002, also interview with Michael Alvarez, Heinrich Boll 
Stifling, Berlin, 13th. November 2001.
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despite Jürgen Trittin’s backing for Fischer’s views, at the Magdeburg party congress 
in March 1998 just before the elections, the Greens continued to see the abolition of 
conscription mainly in terms of a move toward the demilitarisation of Germany and a 
‘humanization’ (Zivilisierung) of foreign policy.^
4.5 Adapting to Rühe: The SPD and the Deferral of Bundeswehr Reform
Paradoxically, Rühe had fewer problems with the opposition SPD than with his 
coalition partner, the FDP, over conscription. A key explanation is to be found in the 
shared character of the CDU/CSU and the SPD as Volksparteien, afraid of alienating 
voters through base closures and through the damaging social effects of ending 
Zivildienst along with conscription. Such fears of electoral damage were less pressing 
for the FDP and for the Greens. On Bundeswehr reform the SPD was relatively open 
to a wide range of interests, manifesting a high degree of internal pluralism, especially 
in social policy. This electoral-strategic factor was reinforced by the SPD's interest in 
profiling itself as a 'govemment-in-waiting* and counteracting its lack of credibility on 
defence and security issues by being seen to act responsibly on issues like 
Bundeswehr reform.
The plurality of policy beliefs on defence and security was an additional factor 
impeding SPD policy change on the Bundeswehr. Internal SPD policy leadership was 
essentially about brokering agreement amongst the three advocacy coalitions that ran 
through it. Hence the SPD had a problem of presenting a united face on Bundeswehr 
reform other than around vague generalities. A crucial influence on policy brokerage 
was the past identification of two key actors - Oskar Lafontaine and Heidemarie 
Wieczorek-Zeul - with the New Left's rejection of a Bundeswehr role in out-of-area 
operations, even for peace-keeping. As Lafontaine stressed at the Mannheim party 
conference in November 1995 on his election as party chair: 'we want to remain a
^  ‘SPD lehnt Berufsarmee ab: Pladoyer fur Wehrpflicht’, Welt am Sonntag, 21 June 1996
Sloam, J. (2001) From Loosely Coupled Anarchy to Responsibility for Europe, A Study of the 
European Policy of the SPD (PhD. Thesis, Birmingham University)
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peace power... we stand back when it comes to military operations, and so it shall 
stay.'*®^
A third factor was the internal institutional context of the SPD. Its effects were 
complex. The institutional context gave a great deal of power and influence to a very 
small group of SPD parliamentarians in the Bundestag Defence Committee and the 
security policy working group. As a Fachausschuss the Defence Committee was 
strongly permeated by norms of Sachlichkeit and consensus. Here a strong role was 
played by traditionalists on conscription like Walter Kolbow (the SPD's defence 
spokesperson) who were close in policy positions to traditionalists in the CDU like his 
counterpart Paul Breuer. Rühe was particularly skilful in exploiting these working 
norms of the Bundestag Defence Committee through his technique of 'salami 
slicing'. On the other hand, the SPD was a weakly institutionalised party, 
characterized by 'loosely coupled anarchy' in which the federal, regional and local 
levels displayed a high degree of autonomy of each other.^ ®^  The result was 
considerable opportunity for personal rivalries, internal frictions and lack of party 
discipline to express themselves, especially between the party chair and powerful 
regional leaders. Regional SPD leaders were especially sensitive to the political 
implications of base closures and keen to deal directly with Kohl and Rühe on this 
issue. They were otherwise largely uninterested in defence and security policy 
questions and had little expertise in this area. In this context it was difficult for the 
SPD leadership to plot a clear direction of policy change on the Bundeswehr's role 
and structure. The key leadership resource for overcoming this 'loosely coupled 
anarchy' was appeal to the SPD's shared electoral-strategic interest in becoming a 
party of government (above all by being perceived in these terms by the electorate).
The period 1995-97 was critical in SPD thinking about defence and security policy 
and about the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. Crucially the policy context 
changed, especially as the SPD had to face up to the implications of the Constitutional 
Court ruling of 1994 and then digest the horrors of Srebrenica. How the SPD
Parteitag der SPD in Mannheim 14-17 November 1995 
Interview, Ax 
September 2002 
*°^Loscbe, P. (IS
Beispiel der SPD’ Politik und Zietgeschichte, Vol.43
el Schneider, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, lOtb. 
1993) ‘Lose verkoppelte Amacbie: zur aktuellen Situation der Volksparteien am
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responded to these exogenous events was shaped by the preoccupations of the party 
leadership with both electoral-strategic interests and ideological renewal/^ Those 
most actively concerned with the SPD's foreign, European and defence policies - 
Kolbow, Rudolf Scharping (chair of the SPD parliamentary party), Norbert 
Wieczorek (chair of the Bundestag European Affairs Committee), Wieczorek-Zeul 
(the SPD's European spokesperson) and Gunther Verheugen - were alert to the need to 
establish the SPD as competent on defence and security issues for the 1998 federal 
elections. Here the SPD had been traditionally vulnerable, and had to reappraise 
policy in the wake of the 1994 ruling and Bosnia.
This preoccupation with establishing the SPD as a govemment-in-waiting 
concentrated political attention on the importance of unity within the SPD's federal 
executive and presidium. It also involved the elite level of the federal executive and 
presidium leaving the details of defence and security policy to a small group of SPD 
parliamentarians in the key policy groups both at SPD headquarters and within the 
Bundestag as well as within the Bundestag Defence Committee. During the period of 
opposition the working groups played an important role in policy formation, with the 
same very small number of actors figuring prominently across these forums. As 
defence spokesperson, with one foot in the Bundestag Defence Committee (and its 
norms of Sachlichkeit and consensus) and the other in the SPD's internal policy 
groups, Kolbow was a pivotal actor in determining the scope and degree of policy 
change on the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. The security policy working 
group around Kolbow played an essentially reactive role to Riihe's initiatives. Fine- 
tuning the details of SPD policy and differentiating the SPD within the consensus 
about the Bundeswehr by a somewhat differently weighted ordering of priorities.
Secondly, as new party chair after his November 1995 putsch against Scharping, 
Oskar Lafontaine sought a new ideological unity as a motor for identifying the SPD 
with policy change. This motor was in a new stress on the Europeanisation of SPD
Sloam, J. (2001) From Loosely Coupled Anarchy to Responsibility for Europe, A Study of the 
European Policy of the SPD (PhD. Thesis, Birmingham University)
‘Militarischer Schütz bleibt oft genug erforderlich’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 November 1996 
‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’. Die SPD will jetzt erst die Experten 
sprechen lassen’, Berliner Zeitung, 9* June 1997
* See on European Policy, Lindner, J. (1993) ‘Europapolitik der SPD Bundestagsfraktion’ 
Perspectiven, Vol. 4, pp.293-305
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policies and their nesting in the Franco-German relationship. By reframing policy in 
this way Lafontaine aimed to provide not just a new dynamic of change but also a 
greater respectability for new policy ideas by linking them to the consensual theme of 
closer European integration. This stronger European dimension to SPD policy 
thinking was in the first instance through collaboration with the French Socialist Party 
and was coloured by the French party’s interest in European defence and security.
SPD policy thinking on defence and security was in short linked to a new external 
dynamic of Europeanisation that was essentially ’bottom-up’ (see chapter six).
Hence Lafontaine’s arrival as party chair was a catalyst for policy change. This 
strategic orientation empowered Wieczorek-Zeul as a presidium member and head of 
the Koordinierungsstelle (co-ordination point) for European policy and of the 
SchwerpunktKommission on EU affairs established by the Mannheim conference in 
November 1995 (and including Scharping and Wieczorek) to clarify European policy 
for the 1998 federal elections. It also led to the EU Affairs working group of the 
SPD parliamentary party taking a greater interest in defence and security policy issues 
and seeking to co-ordinate it through the ’cross-cutting’ group (Querschnittsgruppe) 
on European policy. Even so, defence and security played a subordinate role in this 
European policy work compared to the much more electorally salient issues of 
economic growth and employment. The result of the different electoral priorities 
between economic and defence issues was that the SPD’s defence specialists around 
Kolbow were not put under strong new pressures to adapt policy on the role and 
structures of the Bundeswehr.
By these means SPD leaders sought to organize processes of policy-oriented learning 
with a view to brokering policy change amongst the three key advocacy coalitions 
that cut across the party in defence and security policy. As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
suggest, such processes tend to be long term and result only in changes to the 
secondary aspects of policy beliefs. Hence they would not lead one to expect 
significant policy change before the 1998 elections. Nevertheless, the SPD underwent
‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’. Die SPD will jetzt erst die Experten
sprechen lassen’, Berliner Zeitung, 9* June 1997
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a deep internal debate about the foundations of its defence and security policy. This 
policy learning was aided by public debates about the role and structure of the 
Bundeswehr and the relevance of conscription organized by the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung - for instance, on 7 September 1995 between Karl Feldmeyer (FAZ), Pfr.i.R. 
Ulrich Finck (Organisation for Conscientious Objectors.), Oberst Bernhard Gertz 
(Chairman of the Bundeswehr Trade Union.), and Walter Kolbow. Similar events also 
took place in 1997 such as ‘Allgemeine Dienstpflicht: Alternative zur Berufsarmee’ 
(General Service: An Alternative to a Professional Armed Force) with the same 
participants, apart from Walter Kolbow.^This new debate within the SPD (and also 
the FDP) also provided an opportunity for researchers within universities (like 
Professor Ingo von Munch in Hamburg) and research institutes to promote 
professional armed forces. Thus Dieter S. Lutz of the Hamburg Institut fUr 
Friedenforschung (Institute for Peace Studies) suggested that estimated savings from 
the abolition of conscription could amount to between DM 4.2 and DM 13.2 
billion.^
This stress on policy leadership by brokerage and by organizing policy-oriented 
learning was accompanied by the efforts of some key actors on defence and security 
policy within the SPD to act as policy entrepreneurs on behalf of a professional 
volunteer Bundeswehr. They identified the potential for radical policy change opened 
up by the internal ‘flux’ within the SPD in 1996-1997 opened up by events in 
Srebrenica, by armed forces reforms in both France and the UK, by tightening 
financial constraints on the Bundeswehr, and by the new challenges of out-of-area 
operations. The SPD Commission on foreign and security policy under Rudolf 
Scharping offered an internal opportunity to open up debate about the role and 
structures of the Bundeswehr in time for the Hannover party conference in December 
1997. In the summer of 1996 Manfred Opel, who had been critical of conscription 
since unification, began to press for a volunteer army, with the support of Hans
‘Bonn weiterhin gegen eine Berufsarmee, Risse im Wehrpflicht-Dogma der Sozialdemokraten’, 
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 21/12/1996; ‘SPD sorgt sich um die Bundeswehr: Unter Finanzdruck wird die 
Debatte um die Wehrpflicht rasch pragmatisch’, Berliner Zeitung, 07/11/1996
‘Allgemeine Dienstpflicht: Alternative zur Berufsarmee? Conference, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
April 1996
"  Die neue Spartruppe: Experten halten eine verkleinerte Freiwilligenarmee fiir weitaus 
kostengiinstiger und mindestens ebenso kampfenstark’ Die Woche, 26 July 1996.
Interviews, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 9th November 2001- 5th, June, 2003
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Wallow, and using the media to attempt to build support. However, the SPD was 
quick to distance itself from Opel’s position. Kolbow, Scharping, Karsten Voigt and 
the Minister President of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schroder, all spoke out in favour of 
conscription.^They were supported by other members of the ‘policy monopoly’ 
notably FDP and CDU members of the Bundestag Defence Committee, led by Paul 
Breuer (the CDU’s defence spokesperson) and Gunther Nolting (FDP). Nolting 
accused Opel and Wallow of being ‘populist and wrong’; Breuer termed them ‘once 
more offside of the opinion of the SPD FraktiorC
Behind the defence of conscription by SPD and CDU members of the Bundestag 
Defence Committee lay a real concern about the disadvantages of a volunteer army.
Of paramount importance to the SPD leadership, and empowering traditionalists like 
Kolbow over policy entrepreneurs was a deep fear of the consequences of the 
abolition of conscription for Zivildienst and the effects of its abolition on the social 
system. Its abolition would open up a difficult debate about whether to create a 
Freiwilliger Allegmeiner Dienst for both men and women in Germany. For the SPD 
the issue would also be a divisive factor in any possible coalition negotiations with the 
FDP or the Greens after the 1998 elections: both the FDP and the Greens were in 
favour of the abolition of any obligatory service. But above all, as highlighted below, 
the necessary social spending that would result from the lack of Zivildienstleistende or 
Allgemeindienstleistende would cripple the social system.”  ^Thus raising the issue of 
abolition of conscription was an acutely sensitive and risky venture for the SPD in the 
run up to the 1998 federal elections, especially as it sought to differentiate itself from 
the Kohl government as the party of solidarity and modernization with social justice.
‘SPD debattiert iiber Wehrpflicht’, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 26 August 1996; ‘Vorstoss aus der SPD zur 
Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht’, Berliner Zeitung, 29 August 1996
DPA 2815336 28 August 1996.
Femseh/Horfunkspiegel, Info am Morgen 28/08/96
Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28*. August 2002, see also ‘Die Zivis sind untauglich fur die 
Wehrpflicht Debatte’, Welt am Sonntag, 07/07/1996; the article highlights how a ‘Zivi’ costs 1500 Dm 
per month and that the state would have to pay at least twice that for a professional in the same 
position. The state would have to employ an extra 700,000 men and women at a total cost of 21 Billion 
DM per year. Whilst the article stresses how this formally has no effect on the Bundeswehr debate 
(because ‘Zivis’ are not supposed to occupy jobs which could otherwise be filled by professionals (the 
principle of Arbeitsmarkt Neutralitüt) the article recognises that this would mean a professional army 
would certainly be more expensive than a conscript army and hence politically and economically very 
risky. See also Die Kostendançfer’, Die Woche, 19/06/1996
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In December 1996 the SPD’s parliamentary party chair, Rudolf Scharping, set forth 
his concept for SPD policy on the Bundeswehr. By exploiting events and 
developments in the ‘problems’ stream, he attempted to create a ‘crisis consciousness’ 
within his own party, stressing that the roles, structure and resources of the 
Bundeswehr were no longer compatible. Scharping’s timing was aided by the 
internal debate taking place within the FDP, the coalition partners of the CDU/CSU, 
about conscription. It followed a paper that surfaced in the SPD in November 1996 
from the working group on the Bundeswehr, based on close links to the armed forces. 
This paper proposed that the SPD should continue to support conscription but that the 
Bundeswehr was in need of modernisation and legitimation in a changed security 
environment and increasingly tight financial constraints. The proposals were strongly 
influenced by a letter sent from the Wehrbeauftragerin Claire Marienfeld in August 
1996, outlining the poor state of the armed forces. The SPD experts went as far as to 
warn that at current levels of expenditure the only means of sufficiently increasing the 
Bundeswehr's share of the budget would be to abolish conscription. Strikingly, the 
Arbeitskreis stressed that the abolition of conscription would have no negative 
consequences on the integration of troops into so c ie ty . In  short, in the context of the 
increasing financial constraints placed on the Bundeswehr, it was becoming harder to 
justify conscription.
Scharping sought to twin this policy ‘problem’ with a new policy by proposing a 
Bundeswehr that would be reduced to 300,000 men, with conscription cut from 10 
months to 6 months. This would free up money within the Bundeswehr’s budget in 
order to increase investment in new equipment and weapons, allowing the 
Bundeswehr to fulfil both territorial defence and crisis prevention roles equally. 
Scharping was not in favour of abolishing conscription. Indeed, he was attempting to 
bolster it by a reform that would maintain its health into the 21®* century. However, 
Scharping was also keen on stressing the importance of developing compatibility 
between European armed forces, opposing the Eurofighter project on the grounds that 
common transport and satellite capabilities were the key assets that should be
Welche Armee soil’s dann sein?’ Die Zeit, 27/12/1996, see also ‘Bonn weiterhin gegen eine 
Berufsarmee’, Neue Ziircher Zeitung’, 21/12/1996
118 'SPD-nahe Soldaten: Vier monate Wehrdienst geniigen’, Ekkehard Kohrs, General-Anzeiger, 14 
November 1996
Welche Armee soil’s dann sein?’ Die Zeit, 27/12/1996, see also ‘Bonn weiterhin gegen eine 
Berufsarmee’, Neue Ziircher Zeitung’. 21/12/1996
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developed. In short, Scharping wanted to modernise SPD thinking on defence and 
security policy, by allowing Germany to play an active role in the development of a 
European defence and security identity. This fitted in with Lafontaine's priority to 
Europeanisation of SPD policy and the policy ideas of Wieczorek-Zeul.
Meanwhile, the ‘flux’ and ambiguity about defence and security policy occasioned by 
exogenous events and developments led to alternative proposals from other policy 
entrepreneurs, most notably Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul. They also sought to 
create a ‘crisis consciousness’ and mobilse support for a broad debate that would 
question the relevance of conscription in the changed security environment, including 
the abolition of conscription in France. Verheugen was also an advocate of a possible 
Red/Green coalition after the 1998 elections.Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul 
proposed a defence and security concept to the Scharping's Commission, advocating 
an end to conscription.^^^
The internal debate within the SPD on Bundeswehr reform came to a head just before 
the "Fachkongress" on 18^ June 1997. Above all, the SPD federal executive and 
presidium was keen to avoid a debate about conscription breaking out at the Hannover 
party conference in December from which the CDU/CSU could profit electorally. The 
SPD leadership decided that the internal debate had to be resolved in the Commission 
before 18* June. The attempts at policy entrepreneurship by leading SPD figures on 
this matter made it clear to the leadership that the SPD was on the brink of a 
potentially harmful political debate. The SPD Commission led by Scharping had been 
effectively taken over by Verheugen. Thus the SPD party leadership sought to 
stamp out the debate, empowering the traditional ‘policy monopoly’ supporting 
conscription and territorial defence as the core role of the Bundeswehr within the 
SPD. The Commission ended in a victory for supporters of Walter Kolbow and 
Volker Kroning. Kroning had advocated a model that was designed to reinforce 
conscription, reducing the Bundeswehr from 340,000 to 250,000, and the percentage 
of Berufs- und Zeitsoldaten from 55 to 50 to create more places for conscripts.
Interview, Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, S*’ June 2003 
121 *gpQ ganz neue Bundeswehr’, Bild am Sonntag, 15 December 1996
Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997 
Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997
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retaining an average service length of nine months.Kroning was keen that the SPD 
remain strong supporters of conscription, ensuring that - in the event of a coalition 
with the Greens - it would not be the first.^^^
Had Verheugen and Wieczorek-2feul’s position prevailed, their policy 
entrepreneurship could well have led to the formation of an advocacy coalition uniting 
members of the Greens, the SPD and followers of Koppelin and Mollemann in the 
FDP behind a professional armed force. Scharping’s reduction of conscription to 6 
months would also have placed real pressure on the policy monopoly of territorial 
defence, by leaving little time after training for active service. Whilst Kolbow’s 
concept was not implemented, he found a means of attaining his goal of securing the 
party’s stance on conscription by proposing a WehrstrukturKommission after the 
elections. Rather than modernising the SPD’s policy to fit the changing security 
environment, the traditionalists within the SPD (the ‘experts’ led by Kolbow) were 
empowered by the SPD leadership to outline the SPD’s official position as: *Die 
Landes- und Biindnisverteidigung bleibt auch in der Zukunft die Kemaufgabe der 
Bundeswehr* (‘Territorial and Alliance Defence remains for the future the core task of 
the Bundeswehr’).*^  ^It was deemed that Germany’s security would be best protected 
through a Bundeswehr compromising of both professionals and conscripts. There 
were concerns amongst SPD traditionalists and supporters of conscription that 
professional armed forces encouraged ‘Rambos’. In contrast, conscription promoted 
transparency in the Bundeswehr, forced politicians to carefully scrutinise each troop 
deployment and provided well-qualified and educated recruits.^^^ The result was an 
acceptable compromise to all sections of the SPD, allowing debate about a sensitive 
issue to be postponed until after the federal elections. As Kolbow stated: Die Leute 
die die Wehrpflichtdebatte zu friih haben wollten haben wir gebremst’ (,We have put 
the brakes on those who started the debate on conscription too early’ Oskar
‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997 
‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997, Kroning is 
quoted as stating, ‘Die Wehrpflicht darf nicht nach der Wahl die erste Konzession der SPD an die 
Griinen sein’.
‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997 
SPD lehnt Berufsarmee ab: Pladoyer fur Wehrpflicht’ Welt am Sonntag, 21 July 1996 
‘Zapfenstreich für die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 3 November 1997, plus interviews in SPD 
Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Aussenpolitik/Verteidigung, June-September 2002 
‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 9 June 1997
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Lafontaine had succeeded in dampening down the debate that had surrounded 
Scharping’s public proposal for his concept of the Bundeswehr.
In short, whilst a significant degree of flux existed within the SPD, the problems and 
politics streams could not be effectively coupled, as the electoral-strategic interests of 
the party and internal divisions of policy belief on defence and security militated 
against a clear policy position on the abolition of conscription. Electoral-strategic 
interests closely followed opinion poll figures. Quoting Stefan Schmitz in the 
aftermath of the deployment of conscripts to deal with flooding of the river Oder in 
the summer of 1997: *Die Bundeswehr ist so popular wie selten in ihrer Geschichte. 
Uher 60% sprechen sich in UmfragenfUr die Wehrpflicht aus’ ('The Bundeswehr is 
more popular than ever before in its history. In opinion polls over 60% speak out in 
favour of conscription’.^ *^ The German public had a high level of trust in the 
Bundeswehr during the 1990s. In 1995 the Bundeswehr ranked third in a poll 
measuring the trust of Germans in their institutions, with 74% of those polled 
expressing trust in the institution, behind schools (77%) and universities (80%).*^^
Whilst other polls contradicted these findings and showed many Germans were in 
favour of a professional armed force, the Germans were more cautious about the 
abolition of Zivildienst. The conclusion drawn by party strategists was that the 
abolition of conscription would be a vote loser -  the economic repercussions would 
be severe, particularly in the short term, necessitating large-scale base closures and 
bringing Zivildienst into question, another sensitive and potentially costly issue. Over
140,000 Zivildienstleistende were active in Germany in 1997, each costing DM 1,000 
per month. If this work were to be undertaken by professionals, the cost would rise to 
DM 3,700 per post, per m o n th .S u ch  were the conclusions resulting from an 
internal discussion paper in the SPD on Zivildienst that also had an important 
influence upon the conscription debate. The paper argued that the abolition of 
Zivildienst (an inevitable consequence of a professional army) would reduce the
See ‘Rejection of Scharping’s ideas’ in ‘Bonn weiterhin gegen eine Berufsarmee’, Neue Ziircher 
Zeitung, 21/12/1996, DPA 161641,16 December 1996, also interview, Kristian Gaiser, SPD 
Partei vorstand, Berlin, 12th. November 2001.
‘Zapfenstreich fur die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 3 November 1997, also see Frage der Woche, RTL 
(Representative Forsa-Umfrage im Auftrag von RTL, 11 August. 1997)
EMNID-Umffage August 1995 
Material from SPD interview partner
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quality of service to the most vulnerable in society, in particular those with severe 
disabilities/^"^ The financial implications of ending Zivildienst would be that many 
people with disabilities would no longer be able to live independently in their own 
homes but instead would have to be placed in homes for the disabled.
Such conclusions raised alarm bells within the SPD -  the abolition of Zivildienst 
would have the effect of creating a very difficult situation for the SPD and would be 
deeply unpopular, particularly amongst core SPD support, striking deeply at SPD 
principles. The SPD was committed to defending and bolstering the rights of the 
vulnerable in society, according to the principles set out in the SPD’s basic 
programme agreed at the Berlin party conference on 20 December 1989, and modified 
at the Leipzig conference on 17 April 1998.*^  ^After the decision of the SPD to put in 
place a WehrstrukturKommission (Commission on the Structure of the Bundeswehr) 
after the 1998 elections, even Verheugen began to modify his position and become 
increasingly moderate on the question of Bundeswehr reform, actively promoting the 
idea of a commission and stressing caution.
Thus the key questions about Bundeswehr reform were delayed until after the 
elections and the SPD declared its ‘unanimous’ support for conscription, stating that 
conscription should be upheld ‘as long as possible’.P o l i c y  veto players within the 
SPD were empowered by the large number of veto points within the party and the 
wider German political system resisting change to the policy monopoly and any 
politics of policy entrepreneurship. Thus Kolbow acted as a policy veto player and 
was able to block the translation of policy orientated learning within the SPD into 
policy change. The internal SPD debate and attempts at policy entrepreneurship had 
had no effect on the policy core beliefs about conscription tied to territorial defence. 
However, they did have the effect of altering secondary aspects -  through new 
information about the state of the Bundeswehr, the seriousness with which the issue of 
its reform was taken, and a new questioning about its capability to play its roles. 
Gunther Verheugen stated: ‘Es ist kein Tabu, dariiber [the relevance o f conscription]
See ‘Verkiirzter Zivildienst erschwert die Arbeit mit Behinderten’ DPA 041716, August 1999 
‘Zivildienst Arbeitsgruppe tagte: Bergmann für erhalt des Dienstes’ DPA, 301706, May 2000 
See in particular chapter.3, ‘Durch soziale Gerechtigkeit zur solidarischen Gesellschaft’, part 1 
Reuters 161012 August 1997
137 ‘Wehrpflicht kein Tabu mehr’ Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 4* June 1997
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zu diskutieren’ (,It is no longer taboo to debate the relevance of conscriptrion’). The 
taboo of debate had not been fully broken, as Verheugen claimed, but had certainly 
been weakened.
The effects of policy orientated learning and the conscription debate within the SPD 
were evident at the Berlin regional party conference in August 1997, where Manfred 
Opel actively promoted a volunteer army whilst Wolfgang Thierse, deputy SPD party 
chair, defended conscription and backed the party line on a future 
WehrstrukturKommission. The delegates voted for keeping conscription by a tiny 
majority, 126 votes to 124, demonstrating the groundswell of support for the position 
of those such as Wieczorek-Zeul, Verheugen and Opel.^^  ^Similar policy oriented 
learning was taking place in other Lander^ with the SPD in Schleswig-Holstein 
threatening to break the party line on the issue. This brought strong opposition from 
Norbert Gansel, the MdB for Kiel in Schleswig-Holstein who sought to counteract 
such moves by the SPD Landesgruppe.^"^^
4.6 Conclusion
The hesitations of party political actors about abandoning territorial defence and 
conscription derived from the politics stream, in particular from a combination of 
electoral-strategic interests with ideological dynamics. For ‘catch-all’ parties 
(Volksparteien) like the SPD - and the CDU/CSU - there were much clearer electoral 
costs than benefits from abandoning traditional policy beliefs about the role and 
structure of the Bundeswehr. The ’catch-all’ parties -  unlike the FDP and the Greens 
-  had constituencies to defend in which Bundeswehr bases were located. Hence many 
CDU/CSU and SPD members of the Bundestag were fearful of the local political 
implications of base closures consequent on a move to a smaller professional army, 
with many more troops serving abroad than in their local areas. Whatever political 
gains there might be from such a radical shift in policy belief were more diffuse. For 
the opposition SPD to advocate radical policy change to the Bundeswehr would have 
provided electoral ammunition to the CDU/CSU that voting SPD would mean base
‘Tabubnich mit Riicksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Ralf Beste, Berliner Zeitung, 9 June 1997 
DPA 152031 August 1997
"Nord-SFD will die Freiwilligen-Armee', Lauenbiirgische Landeszeitung, 12 June 1997 
Sozialdemokratischer Informationsbrief, Kiel, 06.03.1997
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closures and unemployment. It would have opened up potential conflicts with 
powerful regional SPD leaders concerned to defend their territorial economic 
interests. The result would have been a lack of internal unity that would have 
undermined the SPD's claims to be a govemment-in-waiting.
Also, abolition of conscription raised deeply sensitive issues about the staffing and 
costs of social programmes that went to the heart of the SPD’s deep core belief in 
solidarity and social justice. It risked opening up ideological divisions within the 
party that would undermine its capacity to mobilize its voters. A further constraint on 
policy change came from the ideological commitment of the SPD leadership around 
Lafontaine, including Weiczorek-Zeul, to retain the party’s identity with peace and 
hence to stand back from out-of-area operations. This policy position on the role of 
the Bundeswehr reduced the pressure to reconsider conscription. Hence the SPD 
lacked an electoral incentive and ideological justification to reject conscription. 
Electoral-strategic constraints were less in the case of the FDP and the Greens; they 
depended for their Bundestag representation on clearing the hurdle of 5% of the vote 
and hence were more distant from local constituency issues.
Policy leadership on Bundeswehr reform within the SPD was characterized by a few 
unsuccessful attempts at policy entrepreneurship (Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul) 
but, above, all by a combination of policy brokerage (Scharping) with policy veto 
playing (Kolbow) that resulted in minimal change. Policy entrepreneurship failed 
because the ’problem’ stream could not be effectively coupled with the ‘politics’ 
stream, especially the ideological beliefs and electoral-strategic interests of the SPD. 
Crucially, the Bundeswehr policy subsystem was interrelated with those of social 
policy and of economic policy. As a result changes to policy core beliefs were too 
politically sensitive. Above all, the SPD leadership of Lafontaine, Miintefering and 
Schroder were keen to avoid a politically harmful debate on the issue. They had wider 
political ambitions for the electoral success of the party. Thus the SPD leadership 
empowered traditionalists within the party to defend the policy beliefs of territorial
Opel, Manfred (November 1996) ‘Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee: Eckdaten zur Kontrolle einer 
Freiwilligenarmee' in Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee (Zentralstelle KDV, Bremen)
143 www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1010243/programmedebatte grundsatzprogramm.pdf
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defence and conscription. In any case, the issue of the Bundeswehr's role and structure 
lacked the political salience to warrant risk-taking and also threatened to be a divisive 
factor in any future Red/Green or even SPD/FDP coalition. Whilst acknowledging the 
need for a debate, it was ‘swept under the carpet’ until after the 1998 elections.
Thus, despite the dynamics of policy learning within the SPD set in place by Riihe’s 
‘salami’ tactics and the Federal Constitutional Court ruling of 1994, the critics of the 
prevailing policy core beliefs were unable to effectively challenge territorial defence 
and conscription. Their policy positions were judged to be too politically and 
electorally risky for a 'govemment-in-waiting' that was anxious to display its unity 
and responsibility. Given the CDU/CSU's political advantage on defence and security 
policy, it seemed hazardous to promote a radical policy change beyond that of the 
federal government. In these circumstances the SPD leadership was anxious to close 
down debate about radical policy change, never mind prepared to take the action 
necessary to forge a new advocacy coalition promoting a professional Bundeswehr. It 
did not define the problem as politically serious enough.
Policy orientated learning was taking place within the institutions of government, but 
at different speeds. Within the Defence Ministry and the wider Bundeswehr policy 
subsystem policy learning was responding to the logistical problems of ‘out-of-area’ 
deployments and the implications of the 1994 Constitutional Court mling and setting 
in place a dynamic that threatened to escape political control. This dynamic of policy 
oriented learning had been created by Rube’s past ‘salami’ tactics. In the Chancellor’s 
Office the pace of change was different in the absence of political steering on behalf 
of Bundeswehr reform from Kohl. The Chancellor’s Office was concerned with 
retaining control over the Defence Ministry and limiting the potential political and 
electoral costs from Bundeswehr reform. From Kohl’s perspective, which was 
strongly influenced by electoral-strategic interests, Bundeswehr reform had 
progressed far enough. Several factors militated against further changes to the 
Bundeswehr:
• the potential political costs of further base closures and the internal strife and 
image of disunity that could be occasioned within the CDU/CSU
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• the desire to avoid internal coalition conflict with the FDP
• the macro-economic situation and EMU commitments which combined to restrict 
the defence budget and place a premium on the peace dividend
• the economic and social consequences of abolishing conscription, and the 
abolition of Zivildienst, were far too uncertain
• the deep political sensitivity to debating conscription because it touched on 
fundamental and entrenched beliefs about the German polity and citizenship.
In short, the political consequences of a broad societal debate about territorial defence 
and conscription could only be damaging for the CDU/CSU.
Thus Riihe and Kohl were cautious about further changes to the Bundeswehr. The 
policy learning that had been set in place by Riihe’s ‘salami’ tactics was stymied by 
marginalizing those attempting to act as Vordenkers, and imaginative figures like 
Naumann were replaced. Responding to signals from Kohl, Riihe had set limits on 
policy change. External perturbations, notably the worsening economic situation in 
Germany, made any investment of Riihe’s personal time and reputation in challenging 
territorial defence and conscription fruitless. Riihe’s own personal ambitions to 
succeed Kohl as CDU party chair and Chancellor served to heighten his caution.
It was more difficult for Riihe to control the policy-orientated learning taking place 
within the CDU and its coalition partner the FDP. However, he did not face the 
problem of a nascent, let alone mature advocacy coalition for a professional 
Bundeswehr. The principal opposition parties -  the SPD, Greens and PDS -  proposed 
a wide range of policies and were too inwardly focused on their ideological and 
electoral interests to engage in developing coherent advocacy coalitions and 
mobilising a wider group of societal actors behind the issue.
What emerges from this analysis of policy change during the Kohl Chancellorship in 
the 1990s is the importance of agency. Policy leadership took the form of organizing 
or blocking policy orientated learning and of managing institutional venues. In this 
way policy leaders attempted to control the flow of ideas. A key factor here was the 
Chancellor's assessment of electoral-strategic interests, along with the SPD
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leadership’s assessment of its own electoral-strategic interests as a govemment-in- 
waiting. Of particular importance was the way in which leaders in the macro-political 
system intervened to constrain the development of new ideas and potentially 
politically risky proposals from within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem. In contrast 
to what punctuated equilibrium theory suggests, the shift of a policy issue from the 
policy subsystem to the macro-political level was not the precondition for policy 
change. The pressures for change came more from within the policy subsystem, based 
on policy orientated learning, and were blocked by the macro-political level. The 
result was the inability of Riihe and of Kinkel in the coalition government - and of 
Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul in the SPD - to act as successful policy entrepreneurs 
on conscription.
Within this macro-political context of electoral-strategic interests and ideological 
factors Riihe played a key policy leadership role. He exhibited a high level of political 
skill in practising a form of salami tactics that kept SPD members of the Bundestag 
Defence Committee on board with his evolving policy on out-of-area operations. This 
skill was demonstrated in careful respect for the norm of consensus whilst using 
Europeanisation as a basis for shifting the nature of the consensus towards a redefined 
role for the Bundeswehr. In consequence, Riihe earned a great deal of respect from 
SPD defence specialists and, in the process, furthered his prospects of becoming 
Foreign Minister in a possible Grand Coalition with the SPD (without the FDP) after 
the 1998 elections. Rühe also displayed a considerable skill in tailoring his leadership 
role and style to changing assessments of the electoral-strategic interests of the 
CDU/CSU and to the overriding need in this context for internal party unity, not least 
by not annoying powerful regional leaders by savage base closures or by alienating 
the social wing of the CDU by putting Zivildienst at risk.
Strategic culture offers only a limited and partial understanding of Bundeswehr policy 
change, situating it in a context of historical memory and constitutional doctrine 
opposing any association with acts of aggression. As this chapter shows, Riihe was 
able to use German strategic culture selectively to provide himself with a political 
rationale, whether to promote policy change (as consistent with Germany’s European 
vocation) or to block change (as leading to a ’pure intervention’ Bundeswehr). Cultural 
explanation offers little insight into the dynamics of policy change over this period.
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especially the pragmatism of policy leaders in dealing with external events and 
developments and relating them to generational change, electoral-strategic interests 
and ideological renewal. Cultural explanation neglects the characteristics of the 
Bundeswehr as a policy subsystem and how it relates to the defence and security 
policy subsystem in which it is embedded. In particular, the policy orientated learning 
that followed from out-of-area operations meant that the pressures for change were 
greater from within the policy subsystem than in the wider macro-political system. 
This aspect is not captured by strategic cultural explanations. In addition, core policy 
beliefs about the Bundeswehr are bound up in a complex symbiotic relationship with 
the dynamics of electoral-strategic interests in securing party unity and governmental 
power. They are also closely interrelated to core policy beliefs in related policy 
subsystems, notably budgetary policy and social policy. As we shall see on chapter 
six, the linkage to European policy was associated with the increasingly important 
theme of Europeanisation. These interrelationships amongst policy subsystems, along 
with electoral-strategic interests, are central in shaping the potential scope for change 
and define the parameters of policy leadership.
Neither a constructivist account in terms of strategic culture or a path-dependency 
form of historical institutionalism explain the changes in Rühe’s leadership role and 
style over Bundeswehr reform. Initially in the period 1992-94 he sought change to the 
policy core of the Bundeswehr, facilitated by the presence of a key Vordenker, 
General Naumann, who encouraged policy orientated learning about its roles and 
structures. Thus the Defence Ministry began to develop its own dynamics of change 
which threatened to escape political control. In order to regain political control, and 
reduce electoral-strategic risks, Riihe replaced and marginalized key agents of change 
within the Defence Ministry. Thus more was at work than just strategic culture acting 
as a constraining variable on policy change. The flow of policy ideas was manipulated 
by leadership in order to promote and protect their own political interests. In short, 
policy leadership was important in defining the direction, scope and pace of policy 
change.
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Chapter 5: Policy Leadership on Bundeswehr Reform during the Schroder
Chancellorship (1998-2002)
The paradox of policy leadership on Bundeswehr reform during the Schroder 
Chancellorship was the combination of a new political opportunity for reform with the 
lack of a powerful sponsor for radical reform. The opportunity took the form of the 
creation of the Weizsacker Commission as a professional policy forum that produced 
radical proposals for Bundeswehr reform. The lack of a powerful sponsor derived 
from the leadership style of the Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping and the strategic 
context of his policy leadership. Essentially, Scharping attempted to play a leadership 
role as policy broker in trying to encourage debate and end Riihe's Denkverbot. 
However, he proved to be a veto player.
There were some important differences between his predecessor Riihe and Scharping 
in style and in context. A key contextual difference was that Scharping had to deal 
with the radical proposals from the Weizsacker Commission, which he had 
established and against which he was measured. The idea of an expert conunission 
had been developed in opposition as a way of covering over and diffusing internal 
party conflict about SPD policy towards the Bundeswehr. What was useful in fighting 
the federal election campaign in 1998 proved, however, a hostage to fortune in 
government. The Weizsacker Commission proved to be a powerful independent 
player, creating a problem of managing unintended consequences for the federal 
government and the SPD. Scharping's leadership role was defined by the attempt to 
manage these unintended consequences. Another important contextual difference was 
the embattled position of Scharping as a former internal party rival of Schroder. Their 
relationship was characterized by profound mutual mistrust. In contrast, Riihe had 
enjoyed the confidence of Kohl. The difference in style derived from the inability of 
Scharping to develop and sustain the cross-party and even internal party confidence 
that Rühe had achieved. Scharping differed from Rühe in not being able to establish 
his personal authority within the Bundestag Defence Conunittee or within the federal 
government. Hence whereas Rühe framed the terms in which the SPD debated 
Bundeswehr reform through 'salami-slicing' tactics, Scharping was less important than 
the Weizsacker Conunission in framing the later terms of debate.
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As we shall see in chapter 6, on entering office Scharping and the new SPD/Green 
government faced an important new window of opportunity opened by the Franco- 
British initiative at St.Malo. The Schroder government was able to use the WEU 
presidency and the EU presidency in the first half of 1999 to situate the role and 
structure of the Bundeswehr within a revived debate about European defence and 
security identity. Also, the Kosovo War gave Scharping an early opportunity to 
pursue agenda change about the Bundeswehr. However, as we shall see, he did not 
adopt a leadership role as policy entrepreneur. This unwillingness to define a policy 
entrepreneur role derived in part from problems in the 'politics stream', making it 
unattractive for him to try to couple policies for a reformed Bundeswehr with urgent 
defence and security problems. It also related to his lack of personal and political 
authority to take on such a role. Instead, Scharping resorted to defending the old 
policy monopoly, with its image of territorial defence and conscription, from the 
threat posed by the Weizsacker Commission. When seen from the perspective of 
conscription, what seemed like a policy brokerage role turns out on closer 
examination to be a veto-playing role. Scharping's political reading of the Weizsacker 
report was that it was too politically dangerous for his own ambitions. More 
accurately, the Weizsacker Commission played a brokerage role, providing a forum 
for policy-oriented learning. Scharping denied it full political support when, in 
seeking a compromise, he did so on terms that favoured and sustained the traditional 
policy monopoly and image
5.1 The Weizsacker Commission as a Professional Forum
The Schroder government saw the formation of a ‘nascent’ advocacy coalition with a 
common policy core belief in a ‘crisis prevention’ role and conscription. The 
emergence of this nascent coalition can be explained in terms of policy-oriented 
learning. It embraced both members of the German political parties, most notably in 
the Greens and the FDP, and other actors in the policy subsystem who had to grapple 
with the problems thrown up by handling an escalating number of ‘out-of-area’ 
operations. During the Schroder government this policy learning was triggered by two
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key events: the Kosovo War of 1999 and the Afghan War of 2002.^ For the FDP it 
was triggered by electoral defeat in 1998.
By 1998 policy-oriented learning had advanced considerably within the Bundeswehr 
policy subsystem, especially amongst the officers and troops^. Change was less 
advanced within the Federal Defence Ministry.^ In short, there seemed to be a clear 
link between nearness of direct exposure to problems of ‘out-of-area’ operations and a 
willingness to contemplate the kind of radical reform that could prepare the 
Bundeswehr for the next decade and more. In its work the Weizsacker Commission 
was to pick up this signal and respond to it.
What was striking was the unwillingness of Scharping and the Red/Green government 
to respond to this policy-oriented learning and to lead this nascent advocacy coalition. 
By the time of the federal elections in September 2002, only moderate change had 
occurred to the structure of the Bundeswehr, despite further extensions of its tasks. 
Such relative stagnation in the policy subsystem of the Bundeswehr cannot simply be 
understood as the consequence of a resilient strategic culture providing a strong 
institutionally embedded ideational framework that was able to deal with such 
challenges. This approach fails to capture both the way in which policy-oriented 
learning was changing this culture from the operational level upwards and the role of 
the strategic behaviour of key actors in Bundeswehr policy. The policy monopoly was 
not simply a reflection of the deep core beliefs of those within the macropolitical 
system or staunchly defended from within the Bundeswehr. It was supported by the 
macro-political level for its instrumental value, namely the diffuse and uncertain 
nature of the benefits of radical change and the much clearer economic and political 
costs of changing the policy image. In this respect there was continuity with the post- 
Karlsruhe era of the previous CDU/CSU government.
Three factors facilitated adaptive change. Firstly, once the implications of the 1994 
Constitutional Court ruling had been fully digested, marginal change to the policy
* Hyde-Price, A. .Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?’ in Webber, D. (Ed.) (2001) 
New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy Since Unification, (London, 
Frank Cass) pp.24-29
 ^Interviews Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6* August 2002 
 ^Interviews Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14*. August 2002
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image no longer brought a great deal of political controversy. The ruling had cleared 
the way for more open thinking about Bundeswehr issues, especially on the political 
Left and within the FDP. Secondly, Srebrenica and Fischer’s policy entrepreneurship 
in 1995 had had a powerful resonance within the political Left. The Left found a new 
rationale for advocating change. In this respect much of the ground for policy change 
had already been laid in opposition. The Scharping Commission had already achieved 
a good deal of adaptation in SPD thinking about defence and security. Thirdly, as 
stressed above, the problems associated with ‘out-of-area’ operations were yielding an 
increased amount of policy-oriented learning on the technical level that political 
actors could not avoid. These problems were discussed within the Bundestag Defence 
Conunittee and resonated within the main parties.
Bundeswehr policy was one of the first reform areas in which the new Schroder 
government practised its technique of using representative and expert commissions as 
instruments to build a climate of ‘professional’ consensus and to bind in affected 
interests so that its decisions were more likely to prove acceptable. The technique was 
well-suited to the macro-political context of a ‘negotiation’ democracy in which 
powerful veto players could block change. The technique was later referred to by the 
State Secretary in the Chancellor’s Office, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, as ‘the 
innovative power of consensus’.^  Thus the Governmental Commission on the 
Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr was appointed under Richard von 
Weizsacker (a highly respected former German President and a CDU politician). Its 
task was to examine the structure of the Bundeswehr in the light of the changing 
security environment and new security challenges. The Commission was designed as 
a means of ‘acceptance management’ -  bringing actors together from key institutions 
affected by Bundeswehr reform and thereby allowing the easy transmission of its 
proposals into society.^ It was to act as a professional forum that would engage in 
impartial analysis outside of the traditional constraints of the policy monopoly, and 
distancing it from the normal mechanisms of policy making within the Defence 
Ministry.
* Hogrefe, J. (2002) Gerhard Schroder: Ein Portrdt (Berlin, Siedler), p.25 
 ^Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002
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In order to distance its discussions from the ministerial hierarchy and potential veto 
by vested interests, the Commission members were appointed by the government after 
discussions between the new Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping and Schroder. Its 
membership was purposefully drawn from the various institutions that made up the 
Bundeswehr policy subsystem. The Conunission members included three 
distinguished ex-generals: Peter Heinrich Carstens, Vice-Chairman of the 
Commission (formerly SHAPE Chief of Staff); Manfred Eisele (former Assistant 
General Secretary of the UN); and Helge Hansen (former NATO Commander in 
Chief for Central Europe). It also contained eminent representatives of the key 
religious groups: Ignatz Bubis (President of the Council of German Jews), Dr. Jürgen 
Schmude (Head of the Synod of the German Evangelical Church), and Professor 
Christian Bemzen (lawyer and Vice President of the Central Conunittee of the 
German Catholic Church). The press was also present through Dr. Theo Sonuner 
(editor of Die Zeit), Dr. Amo Mahlert (Member of the Board of the publishing house 
Georg von Holzbrink). Two leading German think-tanks were represented by Dr. 
Christoph Bertram (director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) and Professor 
Harald Müller (managing director of the board of the Hessen Foundation for Peace 
and Conflict Research). Several academics also participated: Professor Helga 
Haftendom (Professor of Political Science at the Freie Universitat, Berlin), Professor 
Dr. Knut Ipsen of the Ruhr Universitat Bochum (and, most importantly, president of 
the German Red Cross, and Richard Schroder. Professor of Theology at the Humboldt 
Universitat Berlin). Other members included Dr. Eckhard Cordes (member of the 
board of DaimlerChrysler), Agnes Hürland-Büning (Parliamentary State-Secretary), 
Dr. Walter Kronun (an army doctor), Hermann Lutz (the former chairman of the 
police trade union), Lothar de Maziere (Ministerprasident), and Waltraud Schoppe 
(former member of the German Parliament).^
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith define the success of a professional fomm by the extent to 
which the forum reaches ‘consensus among previously disagreeing scientists on 
whatever technical and policy issues are placed before it’ and where the conclusions
 ^Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, May 2000
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that the forum reaches are through the involvement of all coalitions involved/ Four 
criteria are outlined for a successful ‘professional forum’: composition, funding, 
duration, and context of a mutually unacceptable policy stalemate/ The first criterion 
was fulfilled by the Weizsacker Commission: the forum was composed of a wide 
range of experts and representatives of groups affected by either a continuation of the 
status quo or radical reform of the Bundeswehr. It was also chaired by a man 
considered to be impartial, former federal president Richard von Weizsacker, an 
appointment acceptable to both the governing party and the opposition This 
appointment was designed to lend prestige and dignity to its work and to reinforce the 
impression that it would be conducted according to norms of professionalism, 
independence and neutrality.
In addition to a number impartial scientists from various German universities, the 
Commission consisted of experts from opposite sides of the German debate: on the 
one side. Professor Müller of the Hessen Foundation of Peace and Conflict Research, 
who was in favour of a professional armed force, on the other, members of the armed 
forces, representing the status quo.^ Thus coalition leaders were able to trust their 
representatives, whilst impartial members were able to give specialist advice on the 
area and help a consensus to emerge.
Though the Commission was funded by the government, an attempt was made to 
underline its independence by specifically giving it the task of reaching its own 
verdict on the future tasks and structure of the Bundeswehr. In duration, the 
Commission more than exceeded the stipulations of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith: 
namely, that a forum must meet at least six times during a year. The Commission’s 
work lasted from early 1999 until May 2000 and involved 30 plenum meetings, with 
broad and protracted debate. The Commission began with an initial debate about the 
risks, interests and role of Germany and their implications for the future needs of the 
armed forces. The work was then divided into three working groups: personnel.
 ^Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999) ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
Sabatier, P. (ed.). Theories of the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press), p. 146 
® Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework, An Assessment’, in 
Sabatier, P. (ed.). Theories of the Policy Process. (Boulder, Westview Press), p. 146 
 ^Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, July 2002. See also ‘Friedensforscher greift Scharping an’. 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 25.05.2000
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organisation, and armaments. After 8 meetings lasting a number of hours each, each 
working group reported its findings to a plenum session.
Hence the Commission had adequate time for a critical evaluation of the evidence. 
Evidence and information - an area undervalued by Jenkins and Sabatier’s criteria for 
a successful professional forum - was critical, for whilst the Commission included a 
number of experts in the area of the armed forces it also included figures with little 
knowledge of the armed forces. Evidence was of critical importance. As interviews 
testified, every member of the Commission took her/his work very seriously and 
sought to become experts in the subject area. Each representative had to be able to go 
back to the groups that they represented and stand by the verdict of the Commission. 
The Weizsacker Commission and the working groups heard evidence from a number 
of witnesses (referred to by the Commission as ‘guests’), 107 in total, ranging from 
the Finance Minister Hans Eichel and financial consultants to NATO representatives 
and a cross section of the Defence Ministry. However, rather than influencing the 
members of the Commission in favour of the dominant policy image, the witnesses 
from the German military establishment created a negative impression of vested 
interests from which the Commission sought to move away.*  ^The three ex-generals 
on the Commission played a quieter role than might have been expected, and their 
influence was most felt on secondary and technical issues. Indeed, General Hansen 
changed from being an advocate of territorial defence and conscription to being a 
proponent of crisis prevention and professional armed forces during the course of the 
Commission’s deliberations. '^*
A further factor that should be added to Jenkins and Smith’s criteria for a successful 
policy forum: a Commission must hear evidence from a wide range of sources
Interview with Professor Helga Haftendom, Berlin, 27*. May 2003 and interviews in Defence 
Ministry, Bonn, 23"*, September 2002
** Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierang, May 2000
*^  Interview in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002 
*^ Interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002
*^  Helge Hansen in Die Welt, 27.02.1996, quoted in Opel, Manfred (November 1996) ‘Auslaufinodell 
Wehrpflichtarmee - Eckdaten zur Kontrolle einer Freiwilligenarmee’ in Auslaufmodell 
Wehrpflichtarmee (Zentralstelle KDV, Bremen). In this article Hansen makes the case for Wehrpflicht. 
However in an Abweichende Voten in the report of the Weizsâcker Commission, General Hansen 
advocates a Freiwilligenarmee rather than the 30,000 Wehrpflichtige reconunended by the 
Commission’s report (Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission 
an die Bundesregierung, May 2000, Abweichende Voten, Anhang 1, p. 147).
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representing all possible points of view about the subject area, facilitating broad 
debate, a critical examination of opinion, and allowing important actors not involved 
in the Committee to express their thoughts and provide a greater depth of expert 
opinion. If the results of the work of a Commission are to be translated into policy, it 
is important that those not included in a Commission - who will be important in the 
effective implementation of a Commission’s work - feel they have been able to impart 
their perspective and knowledge of the policy subsystem.
However, the final criterion of Sabatier and Jenkins Smith - the context of a mutually 
unacceptable policy stalemate - was fulfilled only to a certain extent. As the 
Commission began its work, the political context was favourable to the development 
of a compromise, and indeed the Commission itself resulted in compromise. The 
readiness of those representing the status quo to compromise was highlighted by the 
‘Damascus’-style conversion of General Helge Hansen from advocate of territorial 
defence and conscription to supporter of a professional army. Others like Theo 
Sommer had also been staunch supporters of conscription and the continued need for 
a focus of resources on maintaining territorial defence as the core mission.
However, as we see below, the political context was changing outside the 
Commission’s deliberations and was to have the critical effect on the eventual success 
of the forum in generating internal policy change. Whilst the members of the 
Commission were prepared to compromise, the key political decision makers 
responsible for translating the Commission’s report into policy were not. The success 
of a policy forum is only seen when its reconunendations are translated into policy. 
This points to another important criterion that must be added to Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith’s criteria. A policy forum must not only include members of a policy 
subsystem but members of the macro-political policy system who are ultimately 
responsible for implementing the conclusions of a policy forum.
The Commission was greatly influenced by two key events: the Kosovo War and the 
subsequent Helsinki Headline Goals (stipulating that, by 2003, Germany should be 
able to mobilise 20,000 troops as part of a 50-60,000 force within 60 days); and the 
budget consolidation policy announced by Eichel in summer 1999 and backed
‘Zeit zum letzten 2^apfenstreich? Fiinf Argumente gegen eine Armee aus lauter Frewilligen’, Die 
Zeit, 1/03/96 - point 4 stressing how loss of Zivildienst would have severe repercusisons for social care
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strongly by Schroder as a means of restoring an image of financial competence to the 
government/^ The Commission took the Kosovo War and, in particular, the Helsinki 
Headline Goals as a confirmation that the Bundeswehr’s tasks were overwhelmingly 
those of crisis prevention and that the policy image of territorial defence -  guarded by 
the Defence Ministry - was increasingly ineffective. The critical priority was seen as 
strengthening European crisis reaction capabilities. Hence the Commission’s thinking 
became europeanised in response both to events and to ESDP developments at the EU 
level. As the members of the Commission heard the evidence given by witnesses, they 
became more and more convinced about the necessity to structure the Bundeswehr 
around crisis prevention tasks. The necessity for a change in policy image was further 
facilitated by a general impression amongst the Conunission members that vested 
interests within the Defence Ministry were the main rationale behind the policy image 
of territorial defence. Starting with the observation that Germany was surrounded by a 
‘stable peace’ and friends for the first time in its catastrophically troubled history, the 
Commission came to advocate the policy image of ‘crisis prevention’. *The 
Commission recommends that the abilities, structure and size o f the Bundeswehr be 
determined primarily from the perpesctive o f crisis deployment}^
However, the Weizsacker Conunission was not only influenced by the changing 
security environment of Germany. It was also concerned to propose a Bundeswehr 
reform that could be implemented in the context of the financial difficulties that 
Germany faced. It was particularly concerned to create a Bundeswehr that would be 
able to invest in the necessary weaponry for its new tasks. The ability of the 
Bundeswehr to invest in this way was seen by the Commission as critical for meeting 
the European ‘perspective’ and NATO requirements. One effect of the Bundeswehr 
structure that was proposed by the Conunission would be to free up of some DM 3bn 
in the medium term, explicitly for investment in new weaponry. The Conunission was 
well aware of the financial constraints and hence sought to propose several methods 
of increasing the financial efficiency of the Bundeswehr. It also reconunended that the 
defence budget should be fixed from 2001-2006, with an initial injection of extra 
funds to cover the first period of reform.
Interview with Professor Helga Haftendom 27/05/03 and interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. 
September 2002
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, May 2000 {Punkt 64).
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In the end the policy-oriented learning process within the Weizsacker Commission 
extended beyond the secondary aspects of beliefs about the Bundeswehr to embrace 
change to the policy core beliefs of the dominant policy image. It recommended that 
the central role of the Bundeswehr should be crisis management and crisis prevention 
and that its operational capabilities had to be adjusted to this role. The Bundeswehr 
was to be reduced to a peacetime strength of 240,000 troops, with 30,000 conscripts 
(a selection system) and 140,000 as the operational force component ready for 
deployment as part of the Alliance. A ‘selection system’ with 30,000 conscripts 
would, in effect, have meant the end of conscription due to the issue of 
Wehrgerechtigkeit -  the principle of justice in defence service -  the call up of all 
eligible males for military service. Before 1990 the number of men fit for and willing 
to do military service not called up was around 2%. However this rose as high as 16% 
in the post-Cold War period. A selection system would be an affront to any principle 
of equity in service and conscription: a large number of those willing and fit to do 
military service would not be allowed to.
Table 5.1 The Weizsacker Commission’s recommendations on conscription
2000 2006
Professional and 
Regular Soldiers 203,000 210,000
FDWL 23,000 5,000
GWDL 112,000 25,000
Total number of 
soldiers
338,000 240,000
FWDL: Freiwilligen zusatzlichen Wehrdienstleistende (Conscripts signed up for extra 
service)
GWDL: Grundwehrdienstleistende (Basic conscripts)
Compulsory Military Service in the 21st. Century: More Security for All (Federal Defence Ministry, 
April 2002), p.23
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(Source: Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der 
Kommission an die Bundesregierung, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, May 
2000)
The Commission wanted to retain a small number of conscripts because: ‘it allows for 
strategic, personell and societal flexibility and avoids the risks of an uncertain 
future. Above all, it was concerned with restructuring the Bundeswehr to enable it 
to engage in two simultaneous, time-unlimited crisis deployments. The army was to 
contain two brigade-size operational contingents, the air force two operational 
contingents of 90-100 combat aircraft, and the navy and the medical service also to be 
structured into two operational contingents. Other priorities included streamlined 
command structures, privatisation, greater efficiency, increased European armaments 
procurement co-operation, and increases in the defence budget. In short, the 
Commission recommended deep core change to the policy image of territorial 
defence. ‘Minor adaptations no longer serve to accommodate the extent of the 
transformation [in the security environment]: what is now needed is a fundamental 
reform’
The Weizsacker Commission is an example of the way in which a professional forum 
can be effective in promoting policy-oriented learning. A consensus was reached 
among a set of actors from within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem who had not 
started their work with agreed views on the key policy and technical issues. Its 
recommendations were also accepted by most of the main institutions involved in 
Bundeswehr policy. The reasons for this success were, in part, to be found in the 
composition of the Commission. It represented key interests and strands of opinion 
and in this way was able to establish a measure of trust within the policy subsystem. It 
also contained people whose expertise was recognized and who could reassure others 
that the work and recommendations had been based on professional norms of 
Sachlichkeit. In addition, though its secretariat was provided from within the Federal
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, May 2000, Punkt 109
^  Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, May 2000, Punkt 5
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Ministry of Defence, this secretariat distanced itself from the ministerial structures 
and interests and encouraged the process of professional consensus building within 
the Commission.^* A third factor was the way in which its meetings were conducted 
as a genuine seminar discussion on tasks and structures of the Bundeswehr in the 
context of emerging international security challenges. There was both opportunity and 
time for a critical evaluation of assumptions and evidence and for the building of 
trust. Weizsacker’s chairmanship was well-suited to this process.^^
According to sources within the Commission, von Weizsacker’s chairmanship was 
fully independent for the first six few months when he acted as a moderator.
However, when the Commission’s work was brought forward and came under greater 
time constraints, his influence was felt more strongly in attempting to get the 
Commission to develop concrete proposals. Von Weizsacker also had a strong 
influence in the Commission’s stress on crisis prevention as being the new policy 
image of the German armed forces and on the ‘European Perspective’. He was not 
responsive to proposals of members of the Commission for the inclusion of terrorist 
threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as part of the risks facing 
Germany and for the removal/alteration of the first and crucial point made by the 
report (‘For the first time in its history, Germany is surrounded by Alliance and 
Integration Partners and has no immediate external threat to its territorial integrity 
from its neighbours’). This was a critical foundation for the new policy image of crisis 
prevention.^^
But, perhaps most crucially of all, the work of the Commission was shaped by events 
(from Kosovo to the Helsinki Headline Goals) that made for a consensus that the 
status quo was no longer acceptable. Commission members, not least the three ex­
generals, proved willing to alter their perceptions of the challenges, especially their 
urgency. Above all, Weizsacker skilfully moved the européanisation issue to the 
centre of the Bundeswehr reform agenda^ "*. In this respect the radical nature of the 
policy-oriented learning that took place in the Commission cannot be divorced from
Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002, also interview with Professor Helga 
Haftendom, 27*. May 2003
“  Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002, also interview with Professor Helga 
Haftendom, 27*. May 2003 
Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002 
^  ‘Weizsacker-rede lost Verstimmung aus’ Die Welt, 20.09.2000 see also ‘Kommissionsvorsitzender 
betont Notwendigkeit europaischer Sicherheitspolitik’, Handelsblatt, 24.11.1999
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the impact of external perturbations and the way in which these events and 
developments were used by Weizsacker to manufacture a climate for policy change.
5.2 Marginalizing the Weizsacker Commission: The Politics of Base Closures
Within the Federal Defence Ministry it soon became clear that the Weizsacker 
Commission was producing a report that meant radical change for the Bundeswehr 
and that the policy monopoly would have to defend its policy image of territorial 
defence.^^ For the governing Red/Green coalition and within the Federal Chancellor’s 
Office it also became clear that the proposals of the Commission could not be 
financed, and also that the consequences for social policy and for local and regional 
economies from associated base closures were too politically sensitive.
At this point the strategic position of the Chancellor was pivotal. Schroder played a 
key role, providing staunch support for the policy image of territorial defence. Von 
Weizsacker became aware of attempts to marginalize the work of his Commission, 
notably of Scharping seeking to influence the Commission’s Report by stressing his 
utter commitment to conscription. Hence on 8* March 2000 he met with the 
Chancellor in an attempt to defend the work and proposals of his Conunission.^^
However, Schroder was happy for the radical proposals of the Conunission to be 
marginalized. Firstly, a radical reform of the Bundeswehr would entail a large number 
of base closures and raise questions about general military service that would have 
been politically difficult. Not least, his political image was that of the Chancellor who 
saved jobs, not one who presided over decisions to axe large numbers of bases. 
Schroder was especially preoccupied by the temporal dimension of the reform.
The original publication date of the Weizsacker Report in autunui 2000 meant that it 
would miss the budget negotiations for the year 2001, thus postponing the 
Bundeswehr reform. In the view of the Chancellor’s Office this delay caused by an
^  ‘Reform? Welche Reform? Der Tagesspiegel, 30.05.2000
^  Reformkampf an alien Fronten, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 06.04.2000 also see ‘Friedensforscher greift 
Scharping an’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 25.05.2000 and ‘Streit iiber die Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Die 
Welt, 23.03.2000
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accident of timing in presenting the report would open up the possibility for a broad 
societal debate about the Bundeswehr reform. The Chancellor was keen to avoid a 
wide debate that would have the effect of forcing the issue onto the macro-political 
agenda and out of the hands of the policy m onopoly.In Schroder’s view, 
Bundeswehr reform was an issue that could only cause difficulties for the SPD. A 
wide debate would lead to heightened intra-coalition tensions and conflict with the 
Greens and could result in a loss of control over the process of reform.
Worse still, postponement of the Bundeswehr reform would mean that the SPD/Green 
government would be unveiling its base closure concept, with attendant large-scale 
job losses, in the run up to the next federal elections in 2002. The Weizsacker 
proposals were unacceptable for the SPD and for Schroder. Upon hearing the 
proposals of the Weizsacker Commission, the SPD General Secretary, Franz 
Miinterfering made it very clear that he did not want any ‘softening’ of conscription 
and that it must remain the building block of the armed forces.^* It made little political 
sense for the Chancellor to jeopardise the SPD’s re-election over an issue that was 
low on the list of voters’ concerns and over a set of proposals from the Weizsacker 
Commission that were unacceptable to the SPD and the Chancellor. Not least, 
Schroder was acutely aware of the consequences that a large number of base closures 
could have for forthcoming Lander elections, notably in the SPD’s pivotal state of 
North-Rhine Westphalia in May 2000 and in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland 
Palatinate in March 2001 (the latter was SPD-led).
The second factor informing Schroder’s policy leadership on the matter was the 
necessary consequences for ziviler Ersatzdienst. With the Weizsacker Commission's 
proposal for conscription reduced to only 30,000 Zivildienst was inevitably going to 
be brought into question. The consequences of the abolition of Zivildienst were 
uncertain to say the least and, as has been highlighted, threatened core aspects of SPD 
ideology. Whilst the abolition of Zivildienst would create much-needed jobs, within 
the context of budget consolidation the removal of Zivildienst - and the cheap labour 
that it brought (130,000 young men per year) - would have severe financial 
implications and necessitate a sharp increase in social spending. The short- to
^ Inteviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23”*. September 2002 and interview in Chancellors Office, 
Berlin, T^. September 2002
^ ‘SPD Pocht weiter auf Wehrpflicht’ Frankfurter Rundschau 09.05.2000
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medium-term financial costs would be high. It was the Chancellor’s job to ensure that 
the SPD won the elections in 2002. To close almost half the bases in Germany and 
raise question marks about a ‘supporting pillar’ of the German social system would 
have created unnecessary problems for the SPD in an electoral year. The electoral- 
strategic context left little room for manoeuvre to the SPD.^^
Thirdly, in addition to these problems, Scharping, similar to Riihe, was convinced that 
public opinion would not support a radical reform of the Bundeswehr. The issue of 
out-of-area operations continued to be politically sensitive in Germany. Scharping 
perceived his leadership opportunities as tightly constrained by his strategic context - 
a conservative military establishment, traditional SPD wariness of the military and 
attachment of its security experts to conscription as a means of ensuring a strong 
control over the armed forces, and a general public still sensitive to German military 
action, especially the idea of pure crisis reaction forces. As Scharping stated: ‘It was 
important not to overstretch those who were necessary to agree -  the armed forces 
themselves, members of parliament and general public’.
Thus it was in the interests of the Chancellor and the Finance Minister to avoid 
challenges to the policy core of territorial defence and conscription and to the policy 
monopoly guarded over by the Defence Ministry. Once again, the issue of base 
closures came to the defence of the policy monopoly and dominant policy image, 
highlighting how a federal political system, with strong Lander and frequent, 
politically significant, elections can help contribute to policy inertia.
In these ways politically sensitive linkages to other policy subsystems and electoral 
considerations made for a strategic context within which changes to the policy image 
and policy monopoly were anathema to the Chancellor. Above all, it was the 
Chancellor’s job to ensure that the SPD won the federal elections in 2002. To 
effectively abolish Zivildienst and close almost half the bases in Germany would have 
caused unnecessary problems for the SPD in an electoral year. This electoral-strategic 
context left little room for manoeuvre to the SPD. Thus Schroder made it clear to 
Scharping that there would be no move away from the SPD’s support of conscription.
Ohne die Driickeberger geht as nicht’, Die Zeit, Nr. 18, 27.04.2000, Femseb/Horfiinkspiegel 
Mittagsmagazin 04.05.00 and interviews in Finance Ministry, Bonn (28th August 2002) and Berlin 
(18th August 2(X)2)
^  Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5* June 2003
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In this electoral-strategic context - and given his perception that there would be no 
money forthcoming to finance Bundeswehr reform and that he was in no political 
position to challenge Eichel on this issue - Scharping opted for the political strategy of 
doing his duty in line with budget consolidation. He placed his faith in small-scale 
base closures and, crucially, in privatisation and greater efficiency to free up the 
necessary resources for the reform. Scharping wanted to strengthen his position within 
the SPD by engaging in a reform that proposed changes to the policy core (funded 
through privatisation and efficiency measures) but without obstructing the project of 
budget consolidation. In this way he aimed to minimize internal criticism within the 
SPD.
Thus the electoral-strategic context within which Scharping was operating interacted 
with Scharping’s leadership traits to lead to the conclusion that policy 
entrepreneurship was an inappropriate strategy. However, with a reform process 
firmly underway, and given NATO and EU policy developments, Scharping had to be 
seen to be engaging in some level of reform and adaptation of the Bundeswehr to the 
new security challenges facing Germany. Not to do so would foster an image of lack 
of imagination and innovation.
The most appealing strategy for Scharping was that of policy broker between the 
Weizsacker Commission, the electoral-strategic context of the SPD, and the 
bureaucratic interests within the Federal Defence Ministry and the Bundeswehr.^^ 
However, in attempting to play a broker role Scharping actually played the role of a 
policy veto player, blocking any challenge to the policy monopoly. The first step in 
Scharping’s strategy was to marginalize the findings of the Weizsacker Commission. 
He did so by changing the timing and tempo of the reform process, in short by the 
management of its temporal aspect. The proposed publication date of its findings was 
brought forward from autumn 2000 to 23”* May 2000 to allow the Bundeswehr reform 
to be passed through cabinet before the budget negotiations began in August 2000. 
This would allow the base closure concept to be agreed in late 2000/early 2001, 
thereby decreasing its potential negative effects on the September 2002 federal 
elections. This political manipulation of the timetable of Bundeswehr reform was
‘Er Geifel sich in der Rolle des Geheimnisvollen Dritten im Reigen zwischen Kirchbach und 
Weizsacker’, ‘Die Einsamkeit der Auster’, Die Zeit 13.06.2000 
Der Minister will keine Berufsarmee, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 08.05.2000
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justified publicly by the need to establish clarity for the Bundeswehr and increase its 
Alliance capability (Biindnisfahigkeit). Thus Scharping stated that without this action: 
‘Then the German Defence Minitser must send a letter to the NATO Generalsecretary 
and cancel the participation of the Bundeswehr’
Whilst the Weizsacker Conunission had been allowed to conduct most of its work 
without political steering from the SPD/Greens, it was not free from attempts at 
outside influence. In a final and rather desperate attempt to dissuade the Conunission 
from instigating a ’positive feedback process’, members of the Commission began to 
receive telephone calls from the Defence Ministry in its last weeks of their debate.^^ 
Their callers sought to persuade them to adopt a more moderate stance on issues such 
as conscription and the stress on crisis prevention as the core policy image of German 
defence and security policy. The Commission and the Defence Ministry were closely 
linked, and the deliberations of the Conunission were known within the ministry. 
According to one source, on a visit toward the end of the Conunission’s deliberations 
Scharping made it clear to the Conunission that the report would not be implemented 
as he could not enforce the Conunission’s reconunendation of the closure of half of 
all barracks and sale of half of Bundeswehr real estate.^ "* Scharping had also become 
increasingly frustrated with the Conunission, stating that ’some of its members seem 
to have mistaken a request for advice as a request to give orders’.
Within the Federal Defence Ministry von Kirchbach acted on Scharping’s request and 
developed a concept, released in April 2002, for Bundeswehr reform under the 
heading of ‘Cornerstones for the Further Conceptual Development and Planning of 
the Armed Forces’. It was a ‘mini-reform’, making small policy core changes to the 
Bundeswehr, and reflected his roots in the era of Riihe’s Denkverbot. Kirchbach’s 
proposals envisaged a reduction from 323,000 soldiers to 290,000, increasing the 
number of professional soldiers from 189,000 to 202,300 and reducing the conscript 
numbers from 134,000 to 84,500.^^ The paper was drawn up with key generals in the
Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung 19.04.1999
Interview with Professor Helga Haftendom, Belrin, 27“* June 2003 
^  Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, May 2000, pt.225; Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 30th August 2002.
Interview, Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th. June 2003 
^  ‘Griine attackieren Bundeswehr-Konzept, Die Welt. 20.04,2000
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planning staff and in the army, navy and airforce. It drew sharp criticism for its lack 
of ambition and neglect of the problem of Wthrgerechtigkeit, as one in every three of 
those judged capable and willing would miss military service.^^
Table 5.2 Basic Positions of German Political Parties on Bundeswehr Reform
Bundeswehr
2000
General
Inspector
Weizsacker
Commission
SPD
(Model
of
Kroning)
CDU
(Model
of
Breuer)
Bundnis
90/Grünen
FDP
Size of 
Armed 
Forces
338,000 280,000-
290,000
240,000 250,000 300,000 200,000 260,000
Length of 
Conscription
10 Months 
with option 
of extension 
to 23 
months
9
Months
10 Months 9
Months
9 Months 
with
option of 
extension 
to 23 
months
0 5
Months
Number of 
Conscripts
135,000 84,500 30,000 105,000 100,000 0 65,000
Kirchbach’s proposals were much more conservative than those of the Weizsacker 
Commission and, if followed by Scharping, would have created the impression of an 
unimaginative minister -  in effect, identifying Scharping as a policy veto player. The 
negative reactions to Kirchbach’s proposals showed Scharping that a reform that did 
not make significant adaptations to the policy image and was too close to the status 
quo would not do. The Defence Ministry was well aware of the challenge to its policy 
monopoly from the far-reaching proposals of the Weizsacker Commission and some 
concession to its proposals had to be made. Scharping continued to harbour ambitions 
of occupying the Chancellor’s Office and wanted to be seen as a reformer and man of 
action. At the same time he wanted to be seen as responsible and not as opposing the 
project of budget consolidation. Thus Scharping had to be seen as a policy broker
37 ‘Ein Sprengsatz fiir den Kanzler’ Die Welt 28.04.2000
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whilst in reality defending the core of the policy monopoly of 
Landes/Biindnisverteidigung and conscription.
The SPD budgetary policy spokesperson in the Bundestag, Volker Kroning, had 
already made clear his position about the concept that the SPD members of the 
Budget Committee were prepared to fund in May 1999. His concept involved 270,000 
troops, of whom 105,000 would be conscripts, with personnel costs sinking from 50 
to 44 per cent of the defence budget and the investment share of the budget rising to 
30 per cent.^^ Kroning's concept noted how a professional army would necessitate 
many base c losures . In  close co-operation with the head of the planning staff, 
Harald Kujat, Scharping developed a ‘middle way’ between the recommendations of 
the Weizsacker Commission and von Kirchbach’s internal ministry proposal. It 
represented adaptation to the policy core, whilst leaving the policy monopoly firmly 
in place. In short, Scharping acted as a policy broker, seeking to reconcile these two 
sets of recommendations with each other and with the budget consolidation 
programme. Central to Scharping’s concept was the claim that it could be financed 
through a relatively small number of base closures and from the economic gains from 
privatisation and increased economic efficiency within the Bundeswehr. Hence 
Scharping founded the Gesellschaft fur Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb 
(GEBB) to carry out this task. Scharping’s concept envisaged a Bundeswehr of 
277,000 (with 22,000 in further education and training), of whom 77,000 were to be 
conscripts. In addition, the economic efficiency of 166 small bases was to be tested.'*  ^
The concept was agreed in cabinet on 14^ June 2000."^  ^With the maintenance of such 
a large number of conscripts, Scharping failed to focus the armed forces on crisis 
prevention, ensuring that the scarce resources of the Bundeswehr would continue to 
be over-stretched.
‘Ein gangbarer Weg in die Zukunft der Bundeswehr’, Handelsblatt 03.05.2000; ‘Reformkampf an 
alien Fronten’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 06.04.2000 
‘Bin gangbarer Weg in die Zukunft der Bundeswehr’, Handelsblatt 03.05.2000 
^  Die Bundeswehr sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert, Eckpfeiler fiir eine Emeuerung von Grund auf, 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 14.06.00 
‘Kabinettbeschluss mit Protestnote’, Berliner Morgenpost, 14.06.2000 
‘Bundeswehr vor ihrem grossten Umbau’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 15.06.2000
Table 5.3 Rudolf Scharping’s Reform Concept
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Personnel
Category
Army Air Force Navy Armed Forces
Regs/TCY’s 112,000 47,000 19,000 178,000
Short Service 
Volunteers
21,000 3,200 2,800 27,000
W9 Conscripts 
W6WÜ
17,700 6,300 1,000 25,000
Conscripts 21,300 3,500 200 25,000
SSVs/Conscripts 60,000 13,000 4,000 77,000
Standing Forces 172,000 60,000 23,000 255,000
(Source: Die Bundeswehr: Sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert, Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, June 2000)
However, Scharping’s strategy for Bundeswehr reform was to backfire, for three 
reasons. Firstly, he was confronted by the institutionalised interests and bureaucratic 
politics at the heart of the policy monopoly. His privatisation strategy was slow to 
take off. Despite successes in the vehicle fleet and clothing areas, Scharping’s 
proposals encountered the same bureaucratic obstacles that General Huber’s had met 
eight years earlier. Privatisation involved the close co-ordination between a number of 
different institutions and actors who had an interest in the process. The proposals had 
to pass through the Defence Ministry. As they passed from one office to another, each 
official raised critical points with the result that the proposals had to be passed back
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along the chain for further amendment/^ Privatisation proposals also had to be 
approved by the Finance Ministry and the Bundesrechnungshof Auditing
Office), where more objections about the feasibility of proposals were raised, not least 
the constitutionality of the reforms. The net result was to stall the privatisation 
project. Scharping had set unrealistic targets for privatisation. Whilst there were some 
successes, most notable within the clothing and vehicle fleet, Scharping was unable to 
meet the high level of expectation that he had generated.
Figure 5.4: Gesellschaft fu r Entwicjclungy Beschaffung und Betrieb (GEBB), 
Pilotprojekte Bundeswehr (Council for Development, Procurement and Enterprise: 
Pilot-project Bundeswehr)
Gesellschaft fur Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb (GEBB): 
Pilotprojekte Bundeswehr (Auszug)
Aufqabe: Ziel;
B«wirUchaften de* Materials in den 
Bundeseigenen Lagem und Sonderverwehrlagem
Schaffen eine* Verkehrs- und 
Transportverfounde* Bundeswehr
Betrieb von administrativen Rechenzentren 
der Bundeswehr
FISchendeckendes und leistungsstarkes 
Kommunikations- und Datennetz
Einrichten von Kompetenzzentren 
Informationstechnologie
Betrieb des Oefechtsübungszentrum 
Heer
Einrichten eine* Fiottenmanagement# 
fOr PKW, LKW, Busse sowie 
Aust)ikfaingsfahrzeuge der Panzertruppenschuie
Betrieb von Ausbiidungseinrichtungen der 
Luftwaffe fOr EF 2000 und Hul»chraut>er NH90
Logistische VoilunterstOtzung der Radargerite 
APAR und SMART-L fOr die Fregatte Kiasse 124
Liegenschaftsmanagement in den 
Wehrtwreichsverwaitungen
Effiziente Bewirtschaftung 
bundeseigenen Materials
Optknieren des Verkehrs und 
Transportwesens der Bundeswehr
WirtschafUicher Betrieb
Moderne und kompatibie 
Kommunikationstechnoiogie
quaiifiziertes IT-Personai fOr 
Bundeswehr und Industrie
WirtschafUicher Betrieb
WirtschafUicher Fahrtietrieb
Kostensenkung durch 
gemeinsamen Ausbildungs- 
betrieb mit der Industrie
Angabe von unimtûtzunaslaietur 
lie privatwirtschafUich gOnstiger 
ertwacht warden kOnnen
Betrieb unter Nutzurtg ziviler 
eistungen oder in gentein- 
samer Nutzung mit gewerbi. Pa
Quelle: BMVg, 2001
Interviews in Defence Ministry in Bonn (23rd. September 2002) and Berlin (6th August 2002); 
Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arheitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 
Berlin, 10th September 2002.
177
The central problem was that those charged with the implementation of privatisation 
and efficiency measures within the Defence Ministry were those who would be most 
adversely affected: the civilian personnel. This was the key reason why proposals 
were passed backwards and forwards between ministerial sections (Referate) and 
were stalled in the hope that the CDU/CSU would win the 2002 federal elections and 
reverse the reform process.^^ In short, institutionalised interests, bureaucratic politics 
and inadequate planning acted to apply the brakes to Scharping’s initiative. Whilst 
consulting groups were called in to review financial practice and help increase 
efficiency, they found deeply entrenched institutionalised interests hard to overcome. 
One source recalled the statement of a high-ranking official in the Hardthohe: ‘The 
flies [consulting groups] may come and the flies will leave, but the s*** [referring to 
himself] always stays’.^  Faced with these constraints, the privatisation and efficiency 
initiative failed to release the necessary financial resources for Scharping’s other 
reform proposals. The second reason related to Scharping’s own political self- 
interests. He had banked on a number of base closures, in particular of small bases, to 
help raise resources for the reform. With a 16 per cent drop in troop numbers, base 
closures were a necessary part of Scharping’s reform.
Scharping’s base closure plan took place in three phases: main planning from June 
until September 2000, fine planning from September to December 2000, and the final 
decision in early 2001. During the main planning stage Scharping made it clear that 
the 166 small bases with less than 50 soldiers would mostly be closed unless they 
were needed for special purposes such as radar surveillance. The more sensitive issue 
of closure of the 439 larger bases was left open. Such bases were often the lifeblood 
of a local economy. A garrison of 10,000 troops would, for example, consume over 
two million bread rolls, 1,250 pigs, 130 cows, and DM 500,000 of fruit and 
vegetables in a year. The average annual expenditure of an employee of the
Interview, Herr Axel Schneider, Referent, SPD Artbeitsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik, SPD 
Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 4th. September 2002 
^  Interview, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002
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Bundeswehr in the local economy was DM 60,000.'^  ^For this reason Scharping made 
it clear that the majority of closures would take place in the more prosperous regions 
of the western Lander rather than the new Lander which had already suffered large 
closures under Stoltenberg and Riihe and were no longer in a position to sustain 
further cuts. Electoral-strategic interest also played a role in this judgement. The SPD 
saw the East as pivotal for its success in the forthcoming 2002 federal elections. The 
sensitivity of base closure was such that members of the Green party, who previously 
protested against the military, opposed the closure of bases in their own Lander and 
constituencies."^
The SPD was also concerned that the base closure programme could have a negative 
impact on the two key Lander elections due on 25* March 2001 in Baden- 
Württemberg and Rhineland Palatinate, especially on the prospects for Kurt Beck, 
Ministerprasident in Rhineland Palatinate. Scharping was bound to be sensitive to this 
latter argument because he was a former Ministerprasident of Rhineland Palatinate, 
which remained his home state. Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland Palatinate saw a 
drop of 4 per cent and 15 per cent in troops numbers respectively. Indeed, Scharping’s 
meetings with Kurt Beck were particularly intensive and took place before Scharping 
met with other Ministerprasidenten.^^ In particular, the SPD parliamentary party put 
pressure on Scharping to push through the concept as fast as possible."^* It was also 
critical to troop morale that their future be clarified as soon as possible. Scharping 
acted quickly to put to rest fears stoked by the CSU that Bayern was to suffer 
disproportionately. Scharping ‘took the wind from the CSU’s sails’ by securing the 
future of bases such as Freyung in Bayem."^  ^In this way it was hoped to uncouple the 
timing of a base closure programme not just from the federal elections of 2002 but 
also from sensitive Lander elections in 2001.
The closure of larger bases was to be determined through testing by a number of 
publicly articulated criteria: the social and economic importance of the base to the 
region, the relationship between the local population and the base, the amount of new
'Jobs fur Wachhunde', Alexander Szandar, Der Spiegel 09.10,2000 
^  ‘Alle lieben die Bundeswehr’, Rheinische Post, 18.08.2000 
DPA 141542 December 2000
‘Fraktion mahnt Scharping zur Eile’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung 02.12.01 ‘Scharpings Konzept 1st 
ausgewogen’
‘Nur kleine Bundeswehr Standorte werden geschlossen’. Die Welt 18.08.00
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recruits that a base produced, and the concentration of bases in the region (the army 
had to remain ‘in der Flache prasent’, allowing soldiers to remain near their homes). 
Two very important but less articulated criteria were the prices to be fetched by the 
real estate left vacant and, secondly, the political sensitivity to the SPD of the closure 
of the base.^°
Scharping was very careful during the large-scale and fine-planning stages to keep all 
details about base closures within the Fiihrungsstab of the Defence Ministry. 
Scharping wanted to push his concept through quickly as a ‘short, sharp, shock’ in 
early 2001 and avoid mass protest and negative media coverage. Crucially, Scharping 
wanted the support of his SPD colleagues in his attempts to secure a higher budget for 
the Bundeswehr. Scharping also had one eye upon his political future, and his 
political ambition of the Chancellorship and had to be careful to avoid alienating 
fellow colleagues through an insensitive programme of base closures.
However, on 14^**. December 2000, Scharping’s plans were leaked to Die Welt.^  ^
Scharping had planned to speak with the Ministerprasidenten in early 2000 about 
their concerns. The leak meant that opposition had more time to mobilise. Scharping’s 
strategy and personal popularity within his own party was dealt a severe blow, as the 
leak placed a number of his colleagues in a very difficult position, causing them to 
feel betrayed by Scharping.^^ The leak forced the ‘fine planning’ stage of Scharping’s 
strategy to be completed sooner than anticipated.
Scharping encountered a high level of opposition from the chair of the 
Bundeswehrverband, Bernhard Gertz, who had publicly warned about threats to up to 
80 bases.^^ Heavy-weight opposition came from a number of 
Landerministerprasidenten and other Lander politicians. Examples included Lower 
Saxony, notably Siegmar Gabriel (SPD Ministerprasident) and Heiner Aller (SPD 
Finance Minister).^"  ^Lower Saxony was Schroder's home state). In Schleswig- 
Holstein Ministerprasident Heide Simonis continued to support Scharping’s reform 
publicly, but her Interior Minister Klaus Buss was sharply critical (he had been
^  ‘Alle lieben die Bundeswehr’, Rheinische Post 18.08.00 
‘79 Bundeswehr Standorte im Viser der Reformer', Die Welt, 14.12.2000 
‘79 Bundeswehr Standorte im Viser der Reformer', Die Welt, 14.12.2000 
‘Bundeswehr reform bedroht bis zu 80 Standorte’, Tagesspeigel 10.01.01 
^  DPA 101612Jan01 ‘Widerstand gegen Bundeswehrreform aus den Lândem’
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promised by Scharping that he would be consulted before any decision was made).^^ 
Criticism of the base closure programme also came from the CSU and Bavaria, most 
notably Edmund Stoiber, Peter Ramsauer (Geschàftsführer der CSU Landesgruppe), 
Erwin Huber (head of the Bavarian Staatskanzlei), and Thomas Goppel (CSU General 
Secretary). Meanwhile, Kurt Beck, SPD Ministerprasident in Rhineland Palatinate 
had been lobbying Scharping for months for ‘gentle treatment’
Most importantly, the implementation of Scharping’s base closure programme 
highlights the difficulties that he would have faced in implementing the 
recommendations of the Weizsacker Commission. The potential damage both to the 
SPD and to his own personal popularity within the SPD and in the eyes of the public 
would have been high.^  ^ As the Handelsblatt noted: ‘A large-scale closure of bases 
would have meant mass protests, also internal to the party. No minister could 
withstand that’.^ *
Scharping's programme of base closures planned on bringing in DM 1 billion to help 
finance Bundeswehr reform, in comparison with the recommendation of the 
Weizsacker Commission for an initial financing of DM 1 billion per year from this 
source.^^ The Weizsacker Commission had recommended the closure of roughly half 
of all bases and sale of half of the real estate of the armed forces. Scharping’s 
concerns in designing the programme were two-fold: to attain as much money for the 
Bundeswehr as possible, whilst simultaneously retaining as much support within his 
own party as possible.^^ It was later revealed that much of the information in the leak 
was inaccurate. However, the damage had already been done and the leak to Die Welt
'Die Bündeslânder kampfen urn den Erhalt von Kasemen und Standorten', Berliner Morgenpost, 
18.12.00
56 'Opposition und Lander kritisieren Scharping’s Streichliste', Die Welt 15.12.2000
Poll in Der Spiegel 19.03.2001 demonstrates the unpopulatiry of barrack closure. ‘Bundeswehr 
Sparen -  aber wie’? ‘The armed forces need around 2 Billion DM. How should this hole in the finances 
be filled? The Bundeswehr should pull its troops out of the Balkans -  27%; the number of troops 
should be reduced by 25,000 -  22%; close 50-60 further bases -  11%; take the missing money from 
another budget -  21%. (Emnid-Umfrage fiir den Spiegel vom 13 und 14 Marz 2001; rund 1000 
Befragte; Angaben in Prozent)
‘Scharping’s Konzept ist ausgewogen’, Handelsblatt 30.01.2001 
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, May 2000, pt. 249
^  Interview with Herr van den Busche, Refernt, Biiro Volker Kroning, SPD Bundestagsfraktion,
Berlin, 15th August 2002
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ensured that Scharping’s concept was brought into the public before his first round of 
talks with Lander politicians, scuppering Scharping’s own damage limitation project 
planned for January.^^
Scharping went public with his ‘fine planning’ and final decision concept on the 29* 
January 2001, after a first round of consultation with Lander politicians. Following an 
examination of 439 large bases, his initial plan foresaw the closure of 39 with a 
further 53 large bases facing reductions of up to 50 per cent. This was to be 
accompanied by the closure of 20 smaller bases, with a further 72 smaller bases also 
facing reductions of up to 50 per cent in numbers.^^
Scharping’s concept was agreed in cabinet on 31®* January 2001. However, Scharping 
continued to encounter protest from within his own party as well as the CSU. Indeed 
in the week of 13* February, Scharping had 15 meetings with Lander politicians and 
members of the opposition.^^ Lander politicians began to argue for a compensation 
package for base closures. However, the Defence Ministry, having received the 
backing of the Chancellor's Office and the cabinet for the ‘final concept’, was 
insensitive to such pleas. There were also a number of marches and public protests 
against base closures across the Lander. Nevertheless whilst politicians protested 
against the reforms, there was little unrest about the base closure concept amongst the 
troops, the Wehrbeauftragter, Willfned Fenner, stating: ‘my mailbox is hardly 
spilling over’.
On 16* February 2001 Scharping presented his final concept, after a second round of 
talks with Lander politicians, embodying one major correction: the garrison of 1000 
soldiers in Schneeberg, Saxony, was to remain. This was the result of a joint 
campaign by all the parliamentary parties on the Landtag of Saxony against the 
closure of the base. In total, the second concept cut the number of posts lost by 
2,500“
'Die Bündeslânder kampfen um den Erhalt von Kasemen und Standorten', Berliner Morgenpost, 
18/12/00
“  Kleinere Armee, weniger Standorte, Frankfurter Rundschau, 30.01.2001 
DPA 021535 February 2001 
^  ‘Scharping andert Konzept fiir die Bundeswehr-Standorte’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung 17.02.2001
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Scharping’s own leadership traits, crucially, follower need satisfaction and political 
ambition were clearly of importance in his humdrum leadership style on the issue of 
Bundeswehr reform. His base closure concept was a compromise between purely 
military reasons for closures and their political, economic and social consequences. 
Scharping’s concept necessitated a reduction in troops from 340,000 to 282,000, a 
reduction of 16 per cent. The base closure programme was sensitive to forthcoming 
Lander elections with Rhineland-Palatinate losing 15 per cent of its troops (from 
39,512 to 33,600) and Baden-Württemberg losing 4 per cent (from 34,293 to 32,800). 
The CSU-led Land of Bavaria was a big loser from closures, with a drop of 19 per 
cent (from 71,696 to 57,900). However, SPD-led Lander were also far from immune 
to large-scale troop reductions, most notably North-Rhine Westphalia losing 17 per 
cent of its troops (from 59,371 to 49,000). The scale of the opposition to base closures 
and sensitivity to the reduction of troops by 16 per cent demonstrates the political, 
economic and social difficulties that Scharping and the SPD would have incurred had 
they followed the recommendations of the Weizsacker Commission and reduced the 
number of troops by a further 42,000 to 240,000.^^ Such a concept would have made 
many more political enemies for Scharping and caused the SPD electoral damage. As 
one interview partner stated: ‘Better to have a small-scale reform than a large-scale 
reform which would bring such negative consequences that it would be reversed 
before it could begin by the victory of the CDU/CSU in the 2002 federal elections’.
Within sections of the Federal Defence Ministry and from Green members of the 
Bundestag Finance Committee there was a great deal of disappointment about 
Scharping’s lack of courage over base closures. Scharping himself stated that from a 
purely military and rational point of view he should have closed a further 60 bases.^  ^
Scharping had been unable to close the large number of smaller bases that he had 
wished to, only closing 20 of the 166 small bases that had come under threat in his 
earlier proposals in the summer and autunrn of 2000. The result was that Scharping
‘Scharping’s Konzept ist Ausgewogen’, Handelsblatt, 30.01.2001; ‘Weniger Soldaten, weniger 
Standorte: Scharping wehrt sich gegen alarmistische Kritik’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30.10,2001 
^  Interview, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23”*. September 2002 
‘Scharping andert Konzept fiir die Bundeswehr-Standorte’, Süddeutsche Zeitung 17/02/01
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had not been able to free up the necessary funds by base closures to finance the 
reform of the Bundeswehr.^^
Thus by early 2001 Scharping realised that he would be unable to secure the 
necessary funds to carry out the reform of the Bundeswehr. Along with the General 
Inspector of the Bundeswehr he began a campaign to secure more funds for the 
Bundeswehr in the 2002 budget.^^ By having saved the government from a difficult 
debate about the future of Zivildienst and large-scale base closures he hoped that he 
would be seen as having ‘done his duty’ with the Bundeswehr reform and 
appropriately rewarded with funds that would alleviate some of the financial 
constraints of the Bundeswehr.^^
In his Material und AusrUstungskonzept Harald Kujat outlined the need for DM 220 
billion to be spent on new equipment by 2015. Armed with these figures, as well as 
the implications of the base closures, Scharping met with Schroder and Eichel in 
March 2001 to highlight how there was a hole of DM 2 billion in the defence budget. 
This hole had to be filled if he was to push through his Bundeswehr reform. One of 
the reasons for this situation was that, behind the scenes, budget negotiations between 
the State Secretary in the Finance Ministry, Manfred Overhaus, and the State 
Secretary in the Defence Ministry, Klaus-Guenther Biederbeck had already broken 
down.^  ^By the end of May 2001 Scharping, Eichel and Schroder had met three times. 
However, the Finance Minister, with the full support of the Chancellor, ruled out any 
increases in the defence budget. The budget had been frozen at DM 47.7 billion and 
was to remain so until 2006. For Eichel to give way to Scharping at such an early 
point in the process of the budget negotiations would have set a bad example to other 
ministries that were seeking extra funds. Those responsible for the defence budget 
within the Finance Ministry were immune to the tactics of the Defence Ministry for
‘Die Wehr ist nicht mobil, ohne Geld ist Rudolf Scharping zur Untatigkeit verdammt’ Rheinische 
Merkur, 01.06.2001; ‘Der Minister steht unter Druck, um seine Plane umzusetzen, fehlt Scharping das 
Geld, und die Truppe murrt’, Kolner Stadt-Anzeiger, 02.06.2001; ‘Scharping allein zu Haus’, Der 
Spiegel, 11.06.2001’, ‘Nachschuss Notig: Der Verteidigungsminister Braucht mehr Geld’, Die Zeit,
08.03.2001
‘Schweres geschiitz: Finanzkrise der Bundeswehr: Scharping’s vehemenz im Wehretat-Streit zwingt 
den Bundeskanzler zum eingreifen’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 08.03.2001
Interview with Herr van den Busche, Refernt, Biiro Volker Kroning, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 
Belrin, 15th August 2002.
‘Schweres geschiitz: Finanzkrise der Bundeswehr, Scharping’s vehemenz im Wehretat-Streit zwingt 
den Bundeskanzler zum eingreifen’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 08.03.2001
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gaining more m o n ey A n y  reports about the poor state of the Bundeswehr were 
perceived by them as ‘pure propaganda’ and not taken seriously
Scharping was thus in a very difficult position. The financial difficulties of the 
Bundeswehr were such that figures in the FUhurungsstab began to lobby the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary party, notably Paul Breuer and Volker Riihe. They 
attempted to encourage the opposition to place greater pressure on the Schroder 
government by highlighting the financial plight of the Bundeswehr. '^* Scharping had 
promised to push through his reform without endangering the budget consolidation 
programme. It was now clear that this was not possible, and that he faced major 
policy and political risks. He was in danger of being attacked for endangering the 
ability of Germany to fulfil its international commitments to NATO and the EU and 
of growing criticism of his reform concept from within his own party. His critics 
argued that the Weizsacker Commission’s report would have been a cheaper option 
and also more suitable to Germany’s international commitments. In late 2001, in the 
context of the deployment of troops in Afghanistan, there was increasing frustration 
within the SPD about the continued reliance of the Bundeswehr on conscription and 
about the dichotomy between territorial defence and crisis prevention and 
management. Hans-Ulrich Klose (chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Bundestag) stated that Scharping’s reform had to be scrutinised and that the model 
proposed by the Weizsacker Commission had been the ‘best’.^ ^
However, these dangers were counterbalanced by the necessity for the SPD 
parliamentary party to ‘carry through’ Scharping’s reform until the federal elections 
in 2002. They were condemned to live together because of the shadow of the 
elections. The SPD parliamentary party and Schroder were keen to avoid Scharping’s 
resignation for two reasons. Firstly, the government could be damaged by the loss of 
another key figure. Scharping’s resignation would be the eighth ministerial 
resignation since the election of the Red/Green government. Secondly, Scharping’s
Interview with Herr van den Busche, Referent, Biiro Volker Kroning, June 2002; Interview in 
Finance Ministry, 15th August 2002; see also ‘SPD und Griine weisen Forderungen Scharpings nach 
mehr Geld zuriick’, Handelsblatt, 27.03.2001 
Interview in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28* August 2002.
Interview, Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe 
Verteidigung), Berlin, 16th. August 2002 
Der Spiegel Nr. 51,17/12/2001 pp.22-24
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presence in the Defence Ministry neutralised a key potential challenger to Schroder’s 
position as Chancellor. He had already been involved in plotting one failed coup 
d’état during the legislative peiiod.^^ Schroder was keen to keep him isolated in the 
Defence Ministry, where he was seen to be doing a good job of destroying his own 
popularity. This leads to the final reason for the inability of Scharping to implement 
his reform proposals.
The third reason was termed by one source - ‘the Scharping phenomenon’, his ability 
to walk from one political embarrassment to another.^^ A series of political mistakes 
and scandals saw him lose the support and respect of many within his own party and 
within the Defence Ministry. Scharping’s leadership style also demonstrated poor 
mobilising and conciliatory skills. Scharping began his time in the defence ministry 
using former defence ministers Leber and Schmidt as models.^^ This led him to 
attempt to accommodate as many points of view as possible, encouraging open 
discussion about the state and future of the Bundeswehr. He consulted figures from 
the ‘grass roots’ upwards in a Bestandsaufhahme (stocktaking). However Scharping’s 
accommodative, consensual leadership style was short lived. As it became clear that 
the Bundeswehr was to gain no new resources, Scharping closed down access to 
decision making in the Defence Ministry, granting influence to a small circle of 
advisors within the Planning Staff.^  ^The Leber model led Scharping to conclude that 
he should not change the personnel within the Defence Ministry but instead work with 
those already in office.*^ This proved to be a mistake, as he found himself surrounded 
by Riihe’s appointees, figures interested in maintaining the status quo and lacking 
imagination. Riihe’s appointees were also active in leaking information to the 
CDU/CSU.®^
Scharping alienated - and made unnecessary enemies of - members of the Bundestag 
Budgetary Conunittee and many within his own ministry by failing to supply basic 
information about his financial plans. He gained a reputation as arrogant and
Interview, Chancellor’s Office, 2"**. September 2002 
Interview, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, August 2002 
‘Der stille Star’, Rheinische Post’, 01.04.1999
‘Der General und sein Minister’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 08.02.2001; Interviews, Defence Ministry, 
Berlin, 18th August 2002.
Interview, Rudolf Scharping, 5*. June 2003
** Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin,
16th. August 2002
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unnecessarily coercive in his dealings with his coalition partners and colleagues 
within the SPD.^  ^This exacerbated his problem of raising more funds for the 
Bundeswehr. He also failed to consult and ‘bring along’ key figures within the 
Defence Ministry whose support was crucial for an effective implementation of the 
reform.Scharping’s ineptitude was eventually to lead to his dismissal from office by 
the Chancellor in the sununer of 2002 and replacement by Peter Struck, the SPD’s 
parliamentary party leader. The final nail in Scharping’s coffin was a scandal about 
payments for an autobiography and his close ties to a lobbyist. This scandal came at 
the end of a number of damaging revelations, many of which could have been avoided 
by Scharping, demonstrating poor judgement. These included inappropriate timing of 
holidays in Majorca during the deployment of German troops in Macedonia, the use 
of military aircraft for personal appointments, and the poor handling of a scandal 
involving radioactive munitions. Scharping became something of a joke figure within 
his own party and amongst the general public. "^^  Scharping’s position was now so 
weak that he had become a liability to the government as it faced a very difficult 
federal election. He was no longer in a position to challenge Schroder’s leadership.
Hence the Red/Green government found itself locked into a policy concept for the 
Bundeswehr that was manifestly failing. As the budgetary situation deteriorated in 
2001-2, and the federal government was threatened with a ‘warning letter’ {Blauer 
Brief) from the European Conunission over its budget deficit, it was clear that there 
would be no further available funds for the Bundeswehr. The emerging SPD position
‘Er (Scharping) 1st eine Harte der es an jeder Eleganz mangelt’ in ‘Reform, Welche Reform?’ Der 
Tagesspeigel, 30.05.2(XX); ‘Eine stille Art des Terrors’, the description of one division head in the 
Defence Ministry of Scharping’s Leadership Style in ‘Die Einsamkeit der Auster’, Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, 13.06.2000; SPD und Griine weis ein Forderung Scharping’s nach mehr Geld zuriick’, 
Handelsblatt, 27.03.2001 ; Interview with Herr van den Busche, Referent for Volker Kroning MdB., 
SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 15th August 2002 
Interview in Defence Ministry, 6* August 2002. Scharping’s leadership style had changed from 
collegial and accommodative to coercive and authoritarian. One source recalled how in a meeting 
shortly after his concept was passed in cabinet Rudolf Scharping’s was thoroughly dismissive of the 
reservations held by a number of key figures within the ministry who would be responsible for 
implementation of the reform, causing a great deal of resentment. See also Das Vertrauensverhaltnis 
Scharpings zu seinen obersten Fuhrungsstaben hat einen Knacks bekommen’ (After the sacking of 
General-Inspekteur Hans-Peter von Kirchbach and his replacement with Harald Kujat (Former Head of 
the Plannig Staff) -  this significantly soured the atmosphere in the Defence Ministry) in ‘Aus dem 
Reichstag’, Die Welt, 30.05.2(X)0; see also ,’Even the closest Generals to him said in Berlin at the 
weeked in a private and frank conversation ,The Minister has broken the bond of trust to the Generals 
with his recent behaviour in Hannover’ ‘in ‘Viele Generals haben vertrauen zu Scharping verloren’, 
DPA 140938, April 2002, ‘Bundeswehrangehorige protestieren gegen Reformplane von Minister 
Scharping’, Die Welt, 08.06.2002 
^  ‘Rudolf retten -  bis zu Wahl’, Die 2kit, 31.05.01
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was that the Bundeswehr reform was to be ‘carried through’ to the elections of 2002, 
after which a ‘reform of the reform’ would take place.®^
In this context, later external developments and shocks - the deployment of German 
troops to support peacekeeping in Macedonia as part of ‘Operation Fox’, September 
11* and the subsequent deployment to Afghanistan - had little effect on the shape or 
implementation of the Bundeswehr reform. September 11* was the catalyst for the 
anti-terror package, which relied on increased insurance and tobacco taxes to generate 
an additional DM 1.5 million for the Bundeswehr. However, this money was to be 
used only for the purpose of anti-terror measures. It was also placed within the 
Einzelplan 60, necessitating the Defence Ministry to apply to the Finance Ministry for 
access to the fund.^  ^In reality, then, there were no extra funds available to support the 
Bundeswehr reform. Even long-term weapons projects such as the A-400-M transport 
aircraft, a lynchpin of European defence and security co-operation, and the NATO 
DCI came under threat. The percentage of the defence budget allocated to investment 
in armaments continued to lie well beneath the necessary 30 per cent, at 23 per cent.®^  
Only after long and arduous negotiations between the Defence Ministry, the Finance 
Ministry, the Bundestag defence and budgetary committees, and the Federal 
Chancellor’s Office was a reduced number of aircraft (73) ordered.®*
The Bundeswehr was faced with tasks of equipping itself not only for crisis 
prevention capabilities but also for territorial defence. The continuing commitment to 
territorial defence was apparent in its purchase of some of the heaviest immobile 
artillery in Europe, infuriating Germany’s partners, especially the British.®  ^With 
77,000 conscripts, the territorial defence/crisis-prevention dichotomy of the 
Bundeswehr continued, preventing the movement of the Bundeswehr towards the 
goals set by NATO and the EU.
Interview, Jürgen Schnappertz, Referent, Büro Peter Struck MbB., Bundestagsfaktion, Berlin, 5th 
August 2002 
“  See Table 4.2
^  ‘Bundeswehr wehrt sich gegen Sparkurs’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02.05.2002 
** ‘Bundeswehr wehrt sich gegen Sparkurs’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02.05.2002 
Interviews with Mr. Paul Williams (Political Military Affairs) and Col. Jack Sheldon (Defence) 
British Embassy, Berlin, 9“* September 2002; ‘Verteidigung braucht Zukunft’, Die Zeit, 06.06.2002, 
Christoph Bertram
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As far as Bundeswehr reform was concerned, the key external perturbations came not 
from the international security environment but from the budget policy subsystem. 
Budget consolidation was a much higher priority of the SPD-led government than 
defence policy, in part because it was so closely bound up with the German EU 
priority to EMU, and in part because financial competence mattered far more to 
German voters than Bundeswehr and wider defence and security policy issues. Hence 
Bundeswehr reform, low on the list of voters’ concerns, was to be ‘fudged through’ 
until after the 2002 elections. Meanwhile, no challenges to the policy monopoly 
would be permitted. Scharping had altered the policy image to the furthest extent he 
saw possible within the budgetary and political constraints. There had been no politics 
of punctuation and no change to the ‘deep core’ of the policy image supporting the 
Bundeswehr.
The budgetary implications of Bundeswehr reform became contested. Proponents of a 
professional army, like the Green parliamentary party’s budget spokesman, Oswald 
Metzger argued that the maintenance of conscription was financially crippling the 
Bundeswehr.^^ Others, like Riihe, stressed the potentially higher costs of a 
professional army. The most influential position was that of the Finance Ministry: that 
budgetary consolidation meant priority to efficiency measures and privatisation.^^
Less contested were the politics of radical Bundeswehr reform which was ruled out on 
electoral-strategic grounds. It was seen as endangering the electoral chances of the 
SPD and thus weakening the position of the Chancellor who wished to be associated 
with measures that increased rather than reduced employment and that did not 
threaten the delivery of social care. The macro-political system thus would allow no 
change or dissent to the policy image.
Despite this political line from the top, opposition to conscription grew within the 
SPD parliamentary party, and criticism of Scharping’s reform concept increased 
within the press and public debate.^^ The events of 11*'^  September 2001 and their
^  Interview with Herr Voringer, Referent for Oswald Metzger, Green Budgetary Spokesperson and 
Obmann in Finanzauschuss, Berlin, IS* August 2002.
Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn, 23"*. September 2002
‘Wie Scharping wieder Tritt fassen kann; Er muss jetzt die Vorscblage der Weizsacker-Kommission 
zur Bundeswehrreform übemehmen’, Siiddeutsche Zeitiung, 03.01.2002., ‘Scharpings schwache 
Truppe’, Die Woche, 11.01.2002; ‘Wehrpflicht darf kein Tabu bleiben: General Willmann iiber Notige 
Anderungen bei der Bundeswehr’, Frankfurter Allgemenine Sonntagszeitung, 03.02.2002; ‘Die arme 
Armee’, Die Welt, 01.03.2002. See also criticism of Wehrpflicht from Ute Vogt, Landesvorsitzenden,
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aftermath set in place a ‘positive feedback’ process in which it became increasingly 
clear that a Bundeswehr committed to territorial defence was in no position to respond 
flexibly to the new security challenges. Indeed, within the Defence Ministry itself, the 
lessons from the deployment in Afghanistan played an important role in policy- 
orientated learning. An internal paper, written by a group of generals surfaced within 
the Defence Ministry in February 2002, spurred by the new security challenges facing 
Germany. It argued that to meet humanitarian and crisis reaction commitments and to 
increase Wehrgerechtigkeit the Bundeswehr required to be a professional armed force 
of 200,000 to 250,000 men.”
The paper was particularly concerned by the bad impression created by the late arrival 
of German forces in Kabul due to the time taken to gather troops from the whole of 
Germany. The generals stressed that the German armed forces were simply not 
structured for such deployments and that greater flexibility and responsiveness was 
needed in the new security environment. Change was inevitable in order to avoid 
always being the ‘taillight’. It was becoming clear to many inside the military that the 
German armed forces were in no position to meet the challenges faced by the new 
security environment. Policy orientated learning was taking place, kick-started by the 
consequences of September 11^, and deployment with the British and Americans. A 
process that had started under Riihe continued as figures within the Defence Ministry 
underwent changes to the policy core of their belief in territorial defence and 
conscription as a result of the practical experiences of engaging in multinational 
combat missions. However, the SPD leadership was determined to stick resolutely to 
the traditional policy image, at least until after the 2002 elections.^"^
5.3 Rudolf Scharping as Policy Leader: The Strategic Context of Bundeswehr 
Reform
The radical policy change proposed by the Weizsacker Commission contrasted with 
the hesitant and cautious response of the Federal Defence Minister, Scharping. Its
Baden Wurtemberg, Heiko Maas (Saarland), Christoph Matschie (Thuringen) and former defence 
minister Hans Apel. The SPD Prasidium was determined to maintain the policy monopoly of 
LandesverteidigungAVehrpflict.
Interviews, Defence Ministry, Berlin 14* August 2(X)2 
^  ‘Politik und Kommandeure halten an Wehrpflicht fest’: Kanzler, Verteidigungsminister und 
Generalinspekteur versuchen Debatte iiber Berufsarmee im Keim zu ersticken’. Financial Times 
Deutschland, 09,04.2002
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work was in effect marginalized by Scharping in favour of the existing ‘policy 
monopoly*. Thus whilst the majority of Commission members themselves were 
convinced of the need for a change in the status quo, the strategic context and actions 
of key political decision makers inhibited the transmission of the Commission’s 
proposals into policy.
A range of factors inhibited policy change.
• The unwillingness of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to put his full political 
weight behind the Weizsacker Report, particularly given the continuing 
sensitivities within the Green Party about ‘out-of-area* deployments. Fischer 
was inhibited by the relatively weak position of the Green Party in the federal 
coalition, its consequent difficulties in profiling distinctive positions, and the 
demands of coalition discipline from the SPD.^  ^Fischer did not pursue the 
agenda-setting role on Bundeswehr reform of his predecessor Kinkel.
• The unwillingness of the CDU/CSU opposition (unlike the FDP) to embrace 
and mobilize around the new policy image of a professional, crisis-prevention 
Bundeswehr. It feared drawing attention to the Kohl government’s record of 
deep financial cuts in defence policy and was still strongly influenced by the 
role of Riihe as a deputy chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party in 
defending his legacy.^^
• Scharping’s conception of the difficulties of managing policy change within 
the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems. He believed 
that their internal complexity made a heroic leadership style counterproductive 
and stressed building confidence and trust through dialogue, especially with 
ordinary soldiers. This led him to embrace a policy leadership role of 
brokerage, in which he sought to earn the respect of service personnel by 
showing that he listened to their concerns: ‘management by co-operation after 
management by terror* However, his problems in playing this role derived
Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 
Berlin, 4th September 2002
^  Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 
4th. September 2002.
Interviews in Defence Ministry in Bonn (23"*. September 2002) and Berlin (6* August 2002) and 
with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5*. June 2003. See also ‘Scharping -  find ich gut’, Berliner
191
from the fact that he was not neutral on the issue of conscription. In 
consequence, advocates of a professional, crisis-management Bundeswehr saw 
him as in reality a veto player.
• The lack of political power and influence of Scharping, not least vis-à-vis 
Schroder. Schroder distrusted Scharping’s political motives and ambitions. In 
consequence, despite his best efforts to profile the requirements of the Defence 
Ministry at the centre, Scharping was never an insider at the Federal 
Chancellor’s Office.^® This relative political isolation of Scharping had 
implications for his authority and standing within the SPD and the Bundestag, 
and not least within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem.
• The primacy that Schroder gave to backing Eichel’s budget consolidation 
programme, with consequent strict financial constraints on the Bundeswehr. 
The budget division of the Finance Ministry justified these constraints as a 
means of extracting greater efficiency from the Bundeswehr and thereby 
releasing resources for modernization. The Federal Chancellor’s Office argued 
that stress should be placed on Germany’s disproportionately high 
contribution to non-defence security rather than to higher spending on the 
Bundeswehr. Scharping was critical of what he saw as the conservative and 
bureaucratic outlook of the Finance Ministry under Eichel, especially of its 
powerful budget division.
• The deep political sensitivities within the social care policy subsystem about 
the vital role of ziviler Ersatzdienst as a central pillar of social policy and fear 
that the end of conscription would lead to the collapse of this pillar, with large 
transitional and short to medium term financial and human costs.^^ These 
sensitivities were felt acutely within the SPD, whose political identity was 
bound up with social solidarity.
With a selective Wehrdienst of 30,000, Zivildienst was inevitably going to be 
brought into question. The consequences of the abolition of Zivildienst were 
uncertain, to say the least, and threatened core aspects of SPD ideology.
Morgenpost, 12.02.1999. See also ‘Scharping bevorzugt auf der Hardthohe die sanfte Tour’, Stuttgarter 
Nachrichten, 09.01.1999 
Interview in Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2nd. September 2002 and with Herr Axel Schneider, 
Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 10th September 2002 
^  Interviews in Finance Ministry, Bonn (28* August 2(K)2)and Berlin (18* August 2002)
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Whilst the abolition of Zivildienst would create much needed jobs, within the 
context of budget consolidation the removal of Zivildienst - and the cheap 
labour that it brought (130,000 young men per year) - would have severe 
financial implications and necessitate a sharp increase in social spending. The 
short- to medium-term financial costs would be high.^^ Some within the 
Defence Ministry, notably the Bundeswehr University in Munich, had 
attempted to influence the reform process by a study undertaken under the 
leadership of ex-Deputy General Inspector Jürgen Schnell. This study 
concluded that a force with 280,000 professional soldiers would lead to 
significant savings. However as Scharping stated: "If those doing Zivildienst 
and Wehrdienst were to be replaced by professionals, the costs would rise 
dramatically. As one high-ranking official in the Finance Ministry stated: 
"The abolition of Zivildienst plays a big role in the issue of Bundeswehr 
reform -  it would be very expensive at least in the short to medium term -  no 
government is prepared to open up this debate".
In order to avoid this issue there was a preference for keeping conscription off 
the political agenda. This factor points to a 'mobilization of bias' within 
German public policy, with interests within social policy having the power to 
prevent the question of conscription from being openly discussed.
The electoral strategic constraints that faced the SPD/Green government, with 
a number of sensitive mid-term Lander elections. The SPD federal executive 
and the Federal Chancellor's Office hesitated in dealing with the political ‘fall 
out’ from large-scale base closures. It was agreed amongst the SPD party 
leadership that, in the short to medium term, a professional army would
See Interview with Heiner Bartling, SPD Inenminister, Niedersachsen in ‘Ein Pflichtjahr ware fur 
alle ein Gewinn’, Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung, 06.04.2002, who states. It is a big illusion that 
the holes [left by the possible abolition of Zivildienst] could be filled by professionals. No one could 
pay for it.. '
A study at the Bundeswehr University in München found that 7 Billion DM could be saved with 
Streitkràfte of 280,000 Ze/f- und Berufssoldaten n 'Teuere Wehrpflicht’, Der Spiegel 21.02.2000
(DPA 0485) 201754 Feb 00
Interview in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28* August, 2002
See classically, 'non-decision-making' as the second face of power, Bacharach, P and Baratz, M. 
‘Two Faces of Power’, American Political Science Review’, Vol.56, No.3, pp.947-952
Interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23”*. September, 2002.
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involve high political costs as well as be financially more expensive. Hence 
Schroder was keen to prevent any debate about conscription.^^
The vested interests within the Federal Defence Ministry, notably within the 
Fiihrungsstab, which consisted of many Riihe appointees who continued to 
oppose the reductions in personnel that a large-scale Bundeswehr reform 
would bring. The Fiihrungsstab had been less involved in policy-oriented 
learning than the Weizsacker Commission and those closest to the operational 
problems of the Bundeswehr. As one source stated: ‘The armed forces always 
prefer the status quo’.^ ^^  Bundeswehr reform was bound up in bureaucratic 
politics within the core executive.
In the language of ‘multiple streams’ literature, key building blocks for a policy 
entrepreneurship role were in place. There was a compelling policy problem that was 
widely recognized after the Kosovo War (1999) and a coherent set of policy solutions 
in the Weizsacker Report (2000). Moreover, the Weizasacker proposals stood 
alongside a proliferation of NATO, WEU and EU initiatives designed to develop 
military capabilities for a crisis management role:
• NATO's updated Strategic Concept and Defence Capabilities Initiative (April 
1999)
• The Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers (May 1999)
• The European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European 
Policy on Security and Defence (June 1999 at Cologne)
• The Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki on Common European 
Security and Defence (December 1999).
Scharping played a key role in this hectic round of diplomatic activity, not least 
because of the German Presidency and the pressure to respond to the Anglo-French 
St. Malo Declaration. Thus in the context of the Kosovo crisis he chaired the informal 
meeting of EU and European NATO defence ministers in Bremen that called for an
‘Die Zeit ist Reif, Der Spiegel, 15,08.04,02, ‘Kanzler Schroder will eine Debatte vermeiden’ 
Interview in Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14* August 2002
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enhanced European crisis management capability in the framework of the Petersburg 
tasks.
However, consistent with what multiple streams literature suggests, Scharping did not 
offer heroic leadership on Bundeswehr reform because he did not see the politics 
stream as offering a window of opportunity for domestic policy entrepreneurship on 
strengthening military capabilities for making the conduct of Petersburg operations 
more effective. The humdrum rather than heroic leadership style of Scharping had a 
number of causes that were identified above and are analysed in this section. An 
important role was played by his beliefs about the constraints posed by the nature of 
the defence and security policy subsystem and what these constraints implied for 
policy leadership.
From the perspective of the ‘advocacy coalition’ framework and perspective two, 
Scharping and Schroder were unwilling to throw their weight behind a nascent 
coalition for a professional, crisis-management Bundeswehr. Without their policy 
leadership it had little short-term prospect of forming, let alone becoming a mature 
advocacy coalition. According to ‘punctuated equilibrium* theory and perspective 
five, the politics of punctuation of the policy image of territorial defence and 
conscription was frustrated by a macro-political environment that was unreceptive to 
policy change and institutional access for those proposing a professional armed force. 
As under Riihe and Kohl, the policy image of territorial defence and conscription was 
sustained not so much by strategic culture as by political calculation of key policy 
leaders in the macro-political system that policy and deep core changes were not in 
their interests.
This kind of strategic political calculation was apparent in the CDU/CSU. The 
inadequacies of the Bundeswehr in carrying out crisis management missions did not 
receive the attention that they deserved because of the unwillingness of the CDU/CSU 
to act as an effective opposition on this issue. In consequence, those advocating the 
crisis-management policy image within the policy subsystem lacked the
Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD 
Bundestagsfraktion, 10th September 2002, Interview, Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU 
Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin, 16th. August 2002
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encouragement to press effectively for and gain full implementation of the 
Weizsacker Report and a bigger share of the federal budget. This unwillingness of the 
CDU/CSU to prioritise Bundeswehr reform stenuned from a political fear of 
highlighting their own failures during their years in office, notably the effects of the 
massive defence cuts with the end of the Cold War. Hence the CDU/CSU was not 
very receptive to radical Bundeswehr policy change. This attitude worked to the 
benefit of the status quo and the policy image of territorial defence and conscription. 
As a deputy chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party Riihe was able to sustain the 
Denkverbot in opposition.
The CDU/CSU’s opposition to the SPD on the issue of the Bundeswehr was 
hampered by their own record on the issue during the mid- to late-1990s. There was a 
broad consensus amongst military experts in Germany (see interview notes) that the 
Bundeswehr was in a poor state for international engagement after the budget cuts 
under Volker R iihe .H ence, for the CDU/CSU to highlight the desolate state of the 
Bundeswehr would be to draw attention to their failures while in office.
The CDU/CSU opposition acted to support the traditional policy image of territorial 
defence, stressing the importance of conscription. In this way it facilitated and 
supported Scharping’s role as a ‘policy broker’ rather than outlining an alternative 
agenda-setting role on the Bundeswehr. The main roles of the CDU/CSU opposition 
during the Schroder/Fischer government were to press for a higher budget for the 
Bundeswehr and to oppose base closures. Volker Riihe, who had decided upon 
leaving the Defence Ministry after the 1998 elections to distance himself from the 
Bundeswehr, was inundated with requests from figures within the Defence Ministry to 
become active on the issue and push the Red/Green government for more 
resources.**^
Despite this widespread support for territorial defence and conscription within the 
CDU/CSU, there was a growing feeling that CDU/CSU policy on conscription was
Interview with Herr Markus Lackamp, CDU/CSU Bündesgeschâftstelle, Berlin, 6th. August 2002. 
Interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn and Berlin, August and September 2002 
“ ‘ Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin,
16th. August 2002
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outdated and was in need of ‘modernisation’ Younger members of the CDU/CSU 
started to question whether conscription was the correct basis for an armed force 
involved in international missions. A senior party figure, Wolfgang Schaiible (former 
chair of the parliamentary party and for a brief period in opposition of the CDU), took 
up the cause of reform against Riihe and Breuer. Before the 2002 federal elections 
Edmund Stoiber, the CDU/CSU Chancellor candidate put together an election team 
called ‘40 plus’. Wolfgang Schaiible was given responsibility for European, foreign 
and security policy and was charged with producing a paper on future security 
concepts for the CDU/CSU. In April 2002, Schaiible - along with Rupert Scholz and 
Karl Lamers (the foreign policy spokesperson of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party) - 
delivered this paper to Angela Merkel (the CDU chair) and to Stoiber and his team 
‘40 Plus’. Schaiible’s concept was strongly influenced by the events of September 
11* It called for a shortening of the length of conscription to five/six months and a 
separation of the Bundeswehr into two groups: HeimatschutzJcrafte (national guard, 
consisting of mostly conscripts), and Einsatzkrafte (crisis reaction troops, consisting 
of career soldiers)^Stoiber was convinced that the events of September 11^. 
necessitated a stronger level of domestic security and that international missions were 
better carried out by professional troops. Schaiible also proposed that the government 
should be given the power to deploy the Bundeswehr without the consultation of 
Parliament.
In contrast, ex-defence minister Volker Riihe developed an alternative concept on 
CDU/CSU Bundeswehr policy, entitled: "The Future of the Bundeswehr: 10 
Theses’ Riihe and Breuer strongly rejected any shortening of conscription, 
recommending a Bundeswehr of 300,000 troops, including 100,000 conscripts. Riihe 
warned that splitting the Bundeswehr into Heimatschutz and Einsatzkrafte would have 
the effect of creating a ‘two-class army’, with de-motivated and under-funded troops 
at home and well-equipped troops on international duty. Most importantly, Riihe 
warned against Schaiible’s concept as the ‘beginning of the end’ for conscription, 
which he saw as the ‘jewel in the crown of the Bundeswehr’. He also highlighted how 
Schaiible’s concept would necessitate base closures and would meet with ‘revolt’ 
amongst CDU/CSU supporters and be a certain vote loser. Riihe also pointed to the
Interview with Herr Markus Lackamp, CDU/CSU Bündesgeschâftstelle, Berlin, 6th August 2002 
‘Union entscharft intemen Streit um die Bundeswehr’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06.04.2002 
‘Schlappe fur Schaüble’, Die Welt, 06.04.2002
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consequences of a shortening of conscription for Zivildienst. Zivildienst would have to 
be shortened and would be rendered impractical/^^
The CDU/CSU leadership was aware that conscription needed rethinking. Indeed, 
advised by a security policy group including Naumann, Edmund Stoiber was a strong 
supporter of Schaiible’s ideas about the Bundeswehr. However, once again, the 
ramifications of base closures - especially sensitive in Bavarian local politics - 
extinguished opportunities for action on the issue. When Stoiber was informed of the 
mood within the CDU/CSU parliamentary party about Schaiible’s concept, and about 
the implications for base closures, his support for Schaiible’s concept disappeared 
quickly.
After a number of hours of discussion it was decided unanimously to retain 
conscription at 9 months. Schaiible’s idea of splitting the Bundeswehr into two 
sections was sceptically received. From this point on Paul Breuer, a staunch defender 
of conscription was put in charge of developing CDU/CSU policy on the 
Bundeswehr. Merkel's and Stoiber’s policy leadership in favour of stasis and the 
traditional policy monopoly was critical. They realised that Schaiible’s paper had 
touched on a sensitive issue within the CDU/CSU, and acted fast to stop any policy- 
orientated learning by putting a policy veto player in charge of the issue for the 
election. Nevertheless, whilst Schaiible’s paper was vetoed, it helped to promote a 
process of policy-orientated learning within the CDU/CSU. It served to act as an aid 
to the small group of reformers within the CDU/CSU that sought to alter the 
secondary aspects of the belief system of supporters of conscription in the CDU/CSU. 
There was a growing consensus amongst younger members of the CDU/CSU (like 
Bruno Zierer and others in the CDU/CSU Parteivorstand) that Riihe and Breuer were 
outdated in their thinking on the Bundeswehr and that conscription was in need of 
adaptation to the post-September 1 security environment.**^
Thus Schaiible, with the support of Lamers and Scholz, sought to carve out a policy 
entrepreneur role on Bundeswehr reform within the CDU/CSU. However, his ability 
to engage in the ‘coupling’ of the three streams of problems, policies and politics was
‘Schlappe fur Schaiible’, Die Welt, 06.04.2002
‘Union will bei Wehrpflicht von neun Monaten bleiben’. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
06.04.2002
Interview with Herr Markus Lackamp, CDU/CSU Bündesgeschâftstelle, Berlin, 6th August 2002
198
circumscribed by the pressing requirements of electoral-strategic interest, especially 
as the 2002 federal elections neared. In addition, Schaiible was not considered an 
expert on issues of defence and security. He was, however, very active in lobbying to 
promote agenda change, using the press to help get his message across** .^ The 
problem was that, by the time of the presentation of his paper, Schaiible was still not 
prepared enough to push through such a concept, depending heavily on the support of 
Scholtz and Lamers. The CDU/CSU parliamentary party continued to stand firmly 
behind conscription, despite the presence of a nascent coalition forming against the 
current model of conscription.
Schaiible’s failure as a policy entrepreneur cannot be explained by inadequacies in his 
personal leadership traits. He was operating within an unfavourable electoral strategic 
context, where his proposals threatened more political electoral losses than gains for 
the CDU/CSU. He was unable to create any kind of ‘crisis consciousness’ within the 
CDU/CSU because it retained a greater credibility on defence and security issues with 
the public than the SPD or the Greens. It might be argued that Schaiible’s timing was 
poor. However it must be remembered that it was Stoiber and Merkel, not Schaiible 
who requested that Schaiible present a paper on the issue. Riihe and Breuer were able 
to act as policy veto players by appealing to the ramifications for wider macro­
political objectives, and the campaign team was highly sensitive to electoral 
arguments. The issue of base closures remained the defining element of CDU/CSU 
policy on the Bundeswehr.
The net result of CDU/CSU opposition during the Red/Green government was more 
help than hindrance to Scharping’s policy broker role, by reinforcing the dominant 
policy image and policy monopoly. CDU/CSU opposition was most damaging to the 
SPD in highlighting Scharping’s lack of political judgement and political scandals. 
The CDU/CSU was also very active in pushing for an increase in the Bundeswehr’s 
budget, and was able to protest more against the implications of budget consolidation
See interviews with Wolfgang Schaiible, ‘Wir werden weiter diskutieren’. Die Welt, 08.04.2002;
,Wehrpflicht wird im Wahllkampf bedeutung haben’, Sachsische Zeitung, 11.04.2002, ‘Schaiible strebt 
hohre Verteidigungsausgaben an’. Financial Times Deutschland, 25.07.2002
Interview with Herr Markus Lackamp, CDU/CSU Bündesgeschâftstelle, 6th. August 2002; see 
also’RUhe had warned the party leadership before that base closures were a consequence of a shorter 
period of duty for conscripts. The argument that such a closure would lead to an unprising from the 
regional partty organisations and electoral districts and could then cost the CDU votes in the coming 
election acted to convince Stoiber [against Schaüble’s concept]’. ,Schlappe fiir Schaüble’, Die Welt,
06.04.2002
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for defence than Scharping, who had to toe the government line. The CDU/CSU was 
also supportive of the idea of privatisation within the Bundeswehr. Paul Breuer, 
Thomas Kossendy and Dietrich Austermann reserved their criticism for Scharping’s 
implementation of the in itia tive .T he  CDU/CSU was also in favour of maintaining 
conscription, and like Scharping stood against the radical recommendations of the 
Weizsacker Conunission.
Thus, whilst there were figures within the CDU/CSU who were seeking to instigate 
policy core change to party thinking on the Bundeswehr, they were hindered by the 
electoral strategic context within which they were operating. The CDU/CSU 
opposition was more aid than hindrance to Scharping, urging him to be as 
conservative and humdrum as possible on the key issues of territorial defence and 
conscription.
Nevertheless, the Kosovo War had an effect on the policy monopoly and its 
supportive policy image of territorial defence by uniting the opposition to this policy 
image and by giving momentum to a nascent advocacy coalition for a professional, 
crisis-management Bundeswehr. The Greens, who provided the most important strand 
of the ‘ideological’ opposition to territorial defence, now joined the PDF in their 
practical opposition to the policy image. The Kosovo War presented an opportunity 
for Fischer to act as policy entrepreneur within his own party to marginalize the 
‘fundamentalist’ pacifists and empower the ‘realists’. It demonstrated in practical and 
vivid terms Fischer’s contention of 1995 (against the background of the Srebrenica 
massacre) that military force sometimes had to be used to defend human rights and 
the moral values that underpinned Green thought. With the triumph of Fischer’s 
policy entrepreneurship within the party, the Greens’ opposition to conscription was 
transformed into a practical critique of the ineffectiveness of this policy image in the 
new and emerging international security environment. Instead of pushing for abolition 
of conscription as a step toward disarmament, it was seen as an opportunity to 
structure the armed forces around crisis p revention .In  another sense Green 
opposition shared a common basis with that of the FDP in its libertarian rejection of 
the requirement that a citizen had such deep obligations to society.
Interview, Herr Bemd Weber, in CDU/CSU Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, 26th September 2002. 
Angelika Beer, ‘SPD Pocht weiter auf Wehrpflicht’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 09.05.2000 and 
interview with Herr Helmut Hiiber, Office of Angelika Beer MdB, Berlin, 18th July 2002
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This transformation within the Green Party was potentially an important event. It 
meant that a nascent advocacy coalition was emerging to oppose territorial defence. It 
also demonstrates the importance of leadership in the formation of advocacy 
coalitions. However, crucially this opportunity was thwarted by the Red/Green 
coalition agreement of 1998. Under pressure from the SPD, notably from its chair 
Lafontaine who played the lead role and was closely aligned with the peace coalition, 
the Greens had committed themselves not to make a coalition issue of their opposition 
to conscription. Nevertheless, this development demonstrates the importance of policy 
leadership by animators of change for the formation of 'nascent' advocacy coalitions. 
The transformation of a 'nascent' coalition into a 'mature' coalition capable of gaining 
power over policy was, however, frustrated by the lack of a powerful ministerial 
sponsor within the SPD.
The unwillingness of Scharping to play a leadership role as policy entrepreneur in 
agenda-setting on Bundeswehr reform was closely linked to his belief that the policy 
subsystem was too complex and porous to accommodate an heroic policy style. The 
Bundeswehr policy subsystem had a reputation as a graveyard of political ambitions. 
As an ambitious politician, Scharping's central interest - like that of Riihe earlier - was 
in avoiding becoming another victim of the Defence Ministry. Interests that were 
adversely affected by policy proposals were prepared to brief against a minister and 
undermine his reputation. In order to try to cope with these difficulties Scharping 
opted for a dual approach, modelled on two previous, successful SPD defence 
ministers in the previous SPD/FDP governments: Helmut Schmidt and Georg 
Leber. Schmidt's reputation stemmed from a detailed policy knowledge that derived 
from a close working relationship with officials, with whom he sought to cultivate a 
relationship of trust.
The lesson that Scharping drew was the importance of building confidence by opting 
for continuity in senior official positions in the Defence Ministry. Despite criticism 
from within the SPD, he retained the same State Secretary as under Riihe: though 
making it clear that any sign of disloyalty would lead to instant dismissal. Because 
these senior officials were the legacy of Riihe's Denkverbot, this continuity was not
‘Der stille Star’, Rheinische Post’, 01.04.1999, ‘Noch kein Georg Leber, aber immerhin’. General 
Anzeiger, 15.01.1999, Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD 
Bundestagsfraktion, 10th. September 2002
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associated with an interest in policy innovation. Instead, bureaucratic vested interests 
tended to prevail. The model of Leber was reflected in Scharping's efforts to go 
outside the formal hierarchy to make contacts with ordinary soldiers and gain their 
respect and admiration. He wanted to be seen as a responsive minister who had the 
interests of soldiers at heart rather than as a remote, top-down policy maker (which is 
how he saw Riihe).Scharping initiated a series of meetings with soldiers that were 
designed to illustrate a desire on his part to learn from them. He sought a more 
bottom-up approach to policy leadership.
Scharping's opinion was that Riihe’s style of leadership, which he termed the 
‘leadership of control’, was not conducive to effective leadership of a large institution 
such as the Defence M inistry.Instead of attempting to stop ‘leaks’ by strict control, 
which could have had the consequences of undermining confidence and engagement, 
Scharping made a conscious effort to cultivate confidence and motivate his staff. This 
was one reason why Scharping did not replace a large number of Riihe’s appointees 
on taking up his post within the Defence Ministry; it would have been a confidence- 
destroying rather than confidence-boosting measure. Instead, Scharping was prepared 
to trust the loyalty and qualifications of the personnel appointed by Riihe and release 
them later if they failed to meet his expectations.
Scharping’s leadership style was also strongly influenced by his conception of the 
nature of the flow of information within the Defence Ministry. At the top of the 
ministry Scharping would have to wait until the information came to him by the 
Dienstweg (service path), rising upwards through the ranks, so that hierarchy could 
shape the intelligence that he received. The Dienstweg was slow and filtered out 
information, with successive spins placed on it by the time it reached the minister. As 
Scharping stated, he wanted: ‘To create a situation were the quality of thought rather 
than rank counts’.S c h a rp in g  was keen to obtain his information by hearing the 
soldiers’ ideas and concerns from direct meetings with the soldiers themselves (over
Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5* June 2003
Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14* August 2002, Interview with Rudolf Scharping, BerUn, 5* 
June 2003
Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5* June 2003, see also Willensky, H I. (1967) 
Organizational Intelligence, Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York, London, 
Basic Books)
‘Ein sanfter Mann furs Militar’, Die Zeit, 25.03.1999
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200 meetings and conferences during his time in office). The result was an 
openness to policy-orientated learning. At the same time this approach made 
Scharping critical of the Weizsacker Commission, whose approach he saw as too 
intellectual and remote from the concerns of ordinary soldiers.
Scharping entered office with the advantage that he had been involved in SPD foreign 
and security policy and a long time advocate of modernising the image of the SPD in 
this policy area. In substantive terms he emphasised the importance of the trans­
atlantic relationship and NATO as the key to German defence and security policy, 
whilst advocating a European defence and security policy that fitted into this wider 
framework. Hence his views represented a fundamental continuity with, rather than 
radical change to, the basic foundations of German foreign policy. In fact, Scharping's 
views were closer to those of Riihe than to those of Lafontaine who stressed the 
Franco-German relationship and was more critical of NATO and the US role. This 
pointed to an internal strategic problem for Scharping within the SPD, the product of 
the way in which different advocacy coalitions within defence and security policy ran 
through the party. Scharping’s political ambition of attaining leadership of the SPD 
and the Chancellorship acted as a break upon his willingness to take political risks on 
behalf of Bundeswehr reform.
Scharping's leadership problems had their origin less within the policy subsystem than 
in his own personal attributes and in the domestic strategic context of relations within 
the SPD and within the federal government. Over the period 1995-98 he had acquired 
a grasp of the key issues because of his chairmanship of the SPD's policy review of 
foreign and security policy (see chapter 4). During the 1998 federal elections he had 
been the SPD's 'shadow' foreign minister. However, the coalition negotiations of 1998 
had been a setback for Scharping. Lafontaine wished to remove him from the 
potentially powerful position of chair of the SPD parliamentary party, which could 
become a potential rival power base. The result was that Scharping was offered the 
post of Defence Minister. This put him in the second rank within the new federal
Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berhn, 5th June 2003 and with Axel Schneider Referent, 
Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 10th September 2002
128 'Als Schatten-Aussenminister in den USA', Berliner Morgenpost, 25 May 1998
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government - behind Schroder, Lafontaine (as Finance Minister) and Fischer (as 
Foreign Minister).
For Scharping it was another bitter blow after his shock displacement as party chair 
by Lafontaine at the Mannheim conference in 1995.^^  ^In three years he had moved 
from top position through the first rank to the second. This development was good 
neither for his political self-confidence nor for the confidence of other actors in the 
policy subsystem that he could provide policy leadership. Both his personal attributes 
as a SPD figure in political decline and the domestic strategic context in which he 
operated conspired to rule out a heroic policy style and an entrepreneurial policy 
leadership role. Scharping's lack of internal SPD support was exemplified at the party 
conference in Nuremberg in November 2001 : he got only 58.8 per cent in the 
elections to deputy party chair, compared to 68.9 per cent for Wolfgang Clement and 
80.8 per cent for Franz Muntefeiing.^^^
Central to the domestic strategic context was a difficult political relationship to 
Schroder. Scharping had defeated Schroder in the internal SPD ballot of party 
members for party chair in 1993. More seriously for their relationship, Scharping had 
later sacked Schroder as the SPD's economic policy spokesperson. He regarded 
Schroder as a political maverick who could not be trusted. In turn, after the 
resignation of Lafontaine from all his political posts in 1999, Schroder viewed 
Scharping as his most dangerous potential rival. He was convinced that Scharping 
was conspiring to unseat him in summer-autumn 1999, especially following electoral 
defeats in the Lander elections of Hesse, the Saarland and Thuringia, the image of 
chaos in the first year of the government and poor opinion poll figures. The Federal 
Chancellor’s Office identified in Scharping a political threat as an alternative 
candidate for those dissatisfied with Schroder. Hence Scharping was a distrusted 
politician who lacked the confidence of Schroder. This was not a macro-political 
context in which Bundeswehr reform was likely to thrive. In this strategic context
‘Jawoll Herr Schroder’, Hamburger Morgenpost, 13.10,98, ‘Schroder und Lafontaine’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 13.10,98
‘An Niederlagen gereifter Parteisoldat’, Leipziger Volkszeitung, 01.12.98 
‘Streicheleinheit nach dem Nasenstiiber’, Badische Zeitung, 23.11.2001 
‘Wahlt Anstandig’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21.11.2001
Scharping -  der Mann mit dem langeren Atem versagt sich Hâme, Rheinische Post, 15.03.1999 
Interview, Chancellors Office, September, 2002
Interview, Chancellors Office, Berlin, 2™". September, 2002
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Scharping was hardly likely to be an effective policy entrepreneur on Bundeswehr 
reform.
Scharping's leadership problems were aggravated by the low priority that Schroder 
attached to defence and security - and especially the Bundeswehr - in his priorities as 
a Chancellor of modernization. Above all, Schroder knew that the Bundeswehr was of 
minor interest to voters compared to such issues as growth, jobs and financial 
responsibility. A relaunch of the government after the chaos of the first months and 
Lafontaine's dramatic resignation had to address these issues and not defence. Hence 
the central policy axis was not to Scharping but to Hans Eichel, Lafontaine's 
successor as Federal Finance Minister. Eichel owed the salvation of his political 
career after his defeat as Hessen's Ministerprasident to Schroder. The result was a 
relationship of close confidence that Scharping did not enjoy. In turn, Schroder gave 
central priority to Eichel's budget consolidation programme (Agenda 2000). This 
programme was designed to bring down the heavy and mounting debt servicing 
charges of the federal government, thereby releasing funding for the social policy 
programmes that the SPD favoured and giving the government more room for 
political manoeuvre. Schroder was able to regain the moral high ground in the SPD by 
aligning himself with the principle of intergenerational equity through reducing the 
debt burden on future generations. In contrast, Bundeswehr reform was seen as less 
relevant to the core political theme of 'modernization with social justice'.
No less importantly, the new Schroder government coincided with the launch of the 
final stage of EMU on 1 January 1999. EMU was Germany’s project par excellence, 
and a euro that worked -  in the sense of being stable -  was in Germany’s basic 
interests, especially given the strength of the value of economic stability within 
German public opinion. The Schroder government would not be able to escape 
responsibility for an economic failure of the euro and would pay a heavy political 
price. Hence it was in German interests to be a ‘model pupil’ (Musterknabe) in fiscal 
policy by staying within the boundaries of the Stability and Growth Pact. This Pact 
had been initiated by German negotiators with the aim of strengthening the euro 
through EU rules to promote fiscal discipline. For the Schroder government to be seen
‘Der ungerechte Staat’ Die Welt, 28.11.2002
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to break these rules would be an acute political embarrassment. For these reasons the 
Schroder government identified budget consolidation as the top priority.
In this context of tough pressures from the budgetary policy subsystem Scharping had 
no real prospects for delivering the larger defence budget that he needed for 
Bundeswehr reform. He found himself the impotent spectator of a budget 
consolidation programme that undercut his ability to carry through Bundeswehr 
reform and that further diminished his political reputation and credibility. Scharping 
was very active in advocating higher defence spending, being a ‘permanent visitor 
within the Federal Chancellor’s Office’ and lobbying extensively in the Finance 
Ministry. However, Scharping’s assertiveness and activism could not counteract the 
problem of his weak political position. The deployment of the Bundeswehr in Kosovo 
and Macedonia brought an increase in defence spending. The defence budget grew 
from Euro 23.962 billion in 1998 to Euro 24.320 billion in 2000, with an additional 
Euro 1.02 billion in the Epl. 60 (overall budget) allocated for Bundeswehr 
deployments.
Nevertheless, in the context of the economic problems besetting Germany, Scharping 
was unable to convince Schroder and Eichel about the need to free up substantial 
extra funds for the Bundeswehr outside of those for these deployments. The Finance 
Minister made his position clear: ‘Wer den Wehretat erhoht, der muss sagen, an 
welcher anderen Stelle er Ausgaben streichen will’^^ .^ Schroder stated at a 
Bundeswehr conference in November 1999 that the Bundeswehr would have to find 
any extra money from privatisation and efficiency measures. Indeed, by July 1999 
Scharping had already accepted a reduction of DM 3,4637 million in his budget. 
Scharping could count on figures such as US Defence Secretary William Cohen, 
George Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, the British government and pressure 
from the opposition parties advocating higher defence spending in Germany.
However, the Red/Green government was set on its paramount political goal of
Interviews in Finance Ministry, Bonn (IS*** August 2002) and Berlin (18* August 2002)
See Table 4.2
Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.4,1999
See ‘Von Schrumpfhaushalt zum Rumpfhaushalt’, Verteidigung, 29.07.1999 
‘Kritik aus den USA am Etat der Bundeswehr’, Handelsblatt, 02.12.1999 and ‘Streit um die 
Bundeswehr’, Berliner Zeitung, 02.12.1999 for Cohen; on Robertson see ‘Deutschland gibt ein 
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budget consolidation. Scharping’s own weak political position and his difficulties in 
raising funds for the Bundeswehr were compounded by the SPD’s Green coalition 
partner, which was by ideological nature unfriendly to increases in defence 
spending.
The lack of financial resources forced Scharping to look elsewhere for money to 
finance the Bundeswehr and provided the context for his project of privatisation and 
financial efficiency within the Bundeswehr. This project represented a policy change 
to secondary aspects of the policy belief system that was attributable to the new 
consolidation policy within the budget policy subsystem in which defence and 
security policy was nested. Crucially, the lack of funding led Scharping to the 
conclusion that a large-scale Bundeswehr reform to the policy core was out of the 
question. It also contained a number of potentially serious political risks and costs, 
adversely affecting a large number of actors across the German political system.
• Base closures threatened Lander interests and the SPD’s political success at 
this level and its power within the Bundesrat
• Related cuts in ziviler Ersatzdienst from abolition of conscription threatened a 
range of groups concerned with providing care and social services and would 
necessitate large and costly changes to the provision of social services. 
Bckhard Fuhr succinctly summed up the position of the SPD: ‘To abolish 
conscription in the end is all to do with social policy. Without conscription 
there is no community service. The conscientious objectors are the greatest 
supporters of what they object to’.*"^^
Interview in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August 2002, see also ‘Ministerium setzt Arbeitsgruppe 
zum Zivildienst ein’. Berliner Zeiting, 20.03.2000, see also ‘Ohne die Driickeberger geht es nicht’. Die 
Zeit, Nr. 18, 27.04.2000, describing the ‘Sv is’ as a ‘The main pillar of the German social system’, see 
also DPA 041623, May 2000 for Wohlfahrtsverbande. See also ‘Stirbt der Zivildienst mit der 
Wehrpflicht?’, Berliner Morgenpost, 14.05.2000, ‘the German Hospital Federation can see a 
catastrophy looming....there will be less help for the old and disabled.’die Deutsche 
Krankenhausgesellschaft sieht eine ‘mittelere Katastrophe’ kommen.. .es werde weniger hilfe fur Alte 
und Behinderte geben’. See also Interview with Heiner Bartling, SPD Inenminister, Niedersachsen in 
‘Ein Pflichtjahr ware fur alle ein Gewinn’, Interview with’ Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung, 
06.04.2002, who states, ‘It is a big illusion that these holes [left by the abolition of Zivildienst] could be 
filled by professionals. No one could pay for it’.
‘Fragen zur Wehrpflicht’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25.03.2000
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At the same time Scharping found himself in an international strategic context, 
especially after the St. Malo Declaration, and then the Kosovo War, that was linked to 
intensifying external pressures on German defence and security policy to meet greater 
commitments. This pressure came from NATO -  notably from the US Administration 
- and from the EU with the development of the Helsinki Headline Goals, which were 
adopted by the European Council in December 1999 and set targets for a European 
Rapid Reaction Force. The Headline Goals were especially important for those 
involved in defence policy in the SPD. Setting defence policy within the context of 
the EU and the Petersburg tasks (enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997) made 
the justification of defence spending easier for the SPD as well as for the Greens. 
These developments went hand in hand with the NATO Defence Capabilities 
Initiative of 1999, which set aims for the Alliance members to improve their 
capabilities in the areas of deployment and mobility, sustainability and logistics, 
operational effectiveness, survivability, and conunand and control. Such international 
commitments acted as an important external pressure for reform of the German armed 
forces. They were complemented by direct pressure from the US Defence Secretary 
and the US Secretary of State for enhanced German defence capabilities and 
willingness to commit to an international role.^ "^ ^
For NATO conscription was not an issue as long as Germany was in a position to 
fulfil its crisis-management commitments as set by the force structure proposals. 
However, as the legislative period progressed, doubts increased within NATO about 
the ability of a conscription army to fulfil these commitments. Areas such as logistical 
support, which was traditionally manned by conscripts, demonstrated the weaknesses 
of conscription to many Germans working within NATO. The logistical units had to 
manned by those willing to be away from home for sustained periods of time, a task 
to which conscripts were not suited. Indeed, one source within the German 
representation to NATO hints at the disposition of Germans working in NATO by 
stating: ‘Within NATO the Weizsacker Commission was seen as the best set of 
proposals for Bundeswehr reform there has been’.^ "^^
‘Kritik aus den USA am Etat der Bundeswehr’, Handelsblatt, 02.12.1999 and ‘Streit um die 
Bundeswehr’, Berliner Zeitung, 02.12.1999
Interview at NATO HQ, Brussels, 16th and 17th September 2002 , see also ‘Ein Sprengsatz fur den 
Kanzler’, Die Welt, 28.04.2000
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Contacts on the international level notably in NATO, and also increasingly in the EU, 
were an important source of policy-orientated learning. The Defence Capabilities
Initiative and the Helsinki Headline Goals worked to place greater pressure on the 
German government to increase defence spending, in particular to help finance 
investment in weapons, machinery and equipment and thereby increase the capability 
to engage in crisis management operations. This increased external pressure on the 
policy image of territorial defence highlighted the financial constraints on a 
Bundeswehr that was attempting to equip itself for both territorial defence and crisis 
management. At the same time there was also a sense of a German ‘model’ of 
conscription to be defended from states such as the Britain and the United States and 
of their failure to understand the German reasons for retaining conscription. These 
reasons were bound up with shared deep core beliefs about the post-war political 
order.
Through the intergovernmental imperatives set by Helsinki Headline Goals and the 
Defence Capabilities Initiative, the EU and NATO wielded influence within the 
German political system and placed ever-greater adaptive pressure on Germany to 
move away from the doctrine of territorial defence. However, this influence was 
diluted on entering the German political system through its contact with vested 
interests within the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems. 
During the Red/Green government there were increased contacts between the EU and 
NATO levels and the domestic level of policy making. However, despite regular 
contacts with the domestic level, German representatives in NATO and the EU lacked 
the ability to disseminate new ideas about the key issue of conscription within the 
Federal Defence Ministry. This inability was linked to bureaucratic politics within the 
Defence Ministry.
Crucially, the Defence Ministry was still dominated by Riihe’s appointments and was 
not very receptive to policy learning. Under Generalinspekteur Hartmut Bagger and 
Riihe Denkverbot appointees, it was in the grip of staunch advocates of territorial 
defence and conscription. Any recommendations from NATO and EU representatives
Interviews at NATO HQ, Brussels, 16* and 17* September 2002
Interviews at NATO HQ, Brussels, 16* and 17* Sepetember 2002, Interviews within Defence 
Ministry, Bonn, 23”*. September 2002,
*'*® Interviews in the Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23”*. September 2002
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had to pass through this cognitive filter and generals who were strongly in favour of 
conscription and the policy image of territorial defence. Discussion of radical change 
remained taboo -  of policy core as well as of secondary aspects. Important 
bureaucratic interests were at stake. A professional, crisis management Bundeswehr 
would have meant a smaller force, the closure of a large number of bases, and a large 
reduction in personnel. As one source within the Federal Defence Ministry, highly 
involved with the implementation of the reform stated: ‘you cannot expect the frogs to 
drain their own pond’.^ "^  ^The role of bureaucratic veto players defending vested 
interests is suggested by the number of ex-generals who -  once liberated from the 
constraints of office - immediately changed their policy positions from advocating 
conscription to staunch support for a professional army.^ "^ ^
Despite this bureaucratic politics, NATO and particularly the EU with its Helsinki 
Headline Goals played an important role during this period. They began to empower 
those within the German political system and the defence and security policy 
subsystem to challenge the policy image of the territorial defence policy monopoly. 
The Kosovo War did not immediately set in place the ‘politics of punctuation’ on the 
issue of the tasks and structure of the Bundeswehr. In the short run the existence of 
the Weizsacker Commission allowed the federal government to postpone decisions 
pending its report. Moreover, the CDU/CSU and FDP opposition was characterised 
by too much ambiguity and too great a weight of responsibility for the current 
situation in the Bundeswehr to effectively mobilize and challenge the policy image of 
territorial defence. The critical effect of the Kosovo War was that it shifted decision-
Interview in the Defence Ministry, Berlin, 30* August 2002. There was also a Wamstreik by 
civilian workers at the Defence Ministry, ‘Heisse Zeiten fur die Bundeswehr’, General-Anzeiger,
15.05.2001
See Chritian Krause, Brigadiergeneral a.D. und Mitgleid des Internationalen Instituts fur 
Strategische Studien in einem Beitrag fiir die ‘Neue Ruhr Zeitung’ 05.03.1996 in Opel, Manfred 
(November 1996) ‘Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee - Eckdaten zur Kontrolle einer Freiwilligenarmee’ 
in Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee (Zentralstelle KDV, Bremen).
Helge Hansen in Die Welt, 27.02.1996, quoted in Opel, Manfred (November 1996) ‘Auslaufmodell 
Wehrpflichtarmee - Eckdaten zur Kontrolle einer Freiwilligenarmee’ in Auslaufmodell 
Wehrpflichtarmee (Zentralstelle KDV, Bremen). In this article Hansen makes the case for Wehrpflicht. 
However in an Abweichende Voten in the report of the Weizsacker Commission, General Hansen 
makes the case for a Freiwilligenarmee rather than the 30,000 Wehrpflichtige reconunended by the 
Commission’s report (Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Konunission 
an die Bundesregierung, May 2000, Abweichende Voten, Anhang 1, p. 147).
See also General Helmut Willmann (Inspector of the Army 1996-2(101, Founder of the Bundeswehr’s 
Special Forces) in ‘Wehrpflicht darf kein Tabu bleiben: General Willmann iiber Notige Anderungen 
bei der Bundeswehr’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 03.02.2002.
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making about crisis-management capability not to the domestic macro-political level 
but to the international level.
5.4 Conclusion
The legislative period encompassing the Schroder/Fischer period is illustrative 
primarily of the importance of the policy leader, in particular the role of the ‘policy 
veto player’. However, whilst leadership plays an important role, the strategic context 
within which Scharping was operating made policy entrepreneurship impossible. 
Several factors hindered policy change and the transmission of the recommendations 
of the Weizsacker Commission into policy.
• The unwillingness of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to put his weight 
behind the Weizsacker Report. Fischer was inhibited by the relatively weak 
position of the Greens in the coalition, its difficulties in profiling distinctive 
positions, and the SPD’s demands for coalition discipline.
• The unwillingness of the CDU/CSU to mobilize around the new policy image 
of a professional, crisis-prevention Bundeswehr. It feared drawing attention to 
the Kohl government's deep financial cuts in defence policy and was still 
strongly influenced by Volker Riihe.
• Scharping's conception of the difficulties of managing policy change within 
the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems. He believed 
that their complexity made a heroic leadership counterproductive and stressed 
confidence-building and trust through dialogue. This led him to embrace a 
leadership role of brokerage, seeking to earn the respect of service personnel 
by showing that he listened to their concerns: ‘management by co-operation 
after management by terror’.H o w e v e r, his problems in playing this role 
derived from his lack of neutrality on the issue of conscription. Hence
Interview, Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 
Berlin, 4th/10th September 2002
Interview, Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 
Berlin, 4/lOthSeptember 2002, CDU/CSU Arbeitsgruppe Verteigigung,
Interviews in Defence Ministry in Bonn (23*^ . September 2002) and Berlin (14* August 2002) and 
Rudolf Scharping, Berlin,5*. June 2003. See also ‘Scharping -  find ich gut’, Berliner Morgenpost,
12.02.1999 and ‘Scharping bevorzugt auf der Hardthohe die sanfte Tour’, Stuttgarter Nachrichten,
09.01.1999
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advocates of a professional, crisis-management Bundeswehr saw him as a veto 
player.
The lack of political power and influence of Scharping. Schroder distrusted 
Scharping’s motives and ambitions. Despite his best efforts, Scharping was 
never an insider at the Federal Chancellor’s Offlce.^^  ^Scharping’s political 
isolation had implications for his authority.
Schroder’s backing of Eichel’s budget consolidation, with strict financial 
constraints on the Bundeswehr. The budget division of the Finance Ministry 
justified these constraints as a means of extracting efficiency from the 
Bundeswehr.The Chancellor’s Office argued for a stress on non-defence 
security rather than increased spending on the Bundeswehr and Scharping was 
critical of what he saw as the conservative and bureaucratic outlook of the 
Finance Ministry.
The political sensitivities within the social care policy subsystem about the 
role of ziviler Ersatzdienst as a pillar of social policy and fear that the end of 
conscription would necessitate large transitional and short to medium term 
financial and human costs. These sensitivities were felt acutely within the 
SPD, whose identity was intertwined with social solidarity.
The Commission’s proposals meant that Zivildienst would inevitably be 
questioned. Whilst this would create jobs, within the context of budget 
consolidation abolishing Zivildienst - (130,000 young men per year) - would 
necessitate a sharp increase in social spending. As one high-ranking official 
in the Finance Ministry stated: ’’The abolition of Zivildienst plays a big role in
Interview, Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2nd. September 2002 and with Herr Axel Schneider, 
Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfi'agen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 4th/10th.September 2002 
Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28* August 2002 
Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14* August 2002
Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn (28* August 2002) and Berlin (18* August 2002)
Ex-Deputy General Inspector Jürgen Schnell at the Bundeswehr University, Munich, produced a 
study concluding that a force of 280,000 professional soldiers would save 7 Billion DM (DPA 0485) 
201754 Feb 00. However as Scharping stated: "Wenn sie die Zivildienstleistenden durch Arbeitnehmer 
und die Wehrpflichtigen durch Artbeitnehmer ersetzen, enstehen erhebliche Mehrkosten’ ,Teuere 
Wehrpflicht’ Der Spiegel 21.02.2000
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the issue of Bundeswehr reform -  it would be very expensive at least in the 
short to medium term -  no government is prepared to open up this debate"
Hence conscription was kept off the agenda, highlighting a 'mobilization of 
bias' within German public policy, with interests within social policy having 
the power to prevent conscription from being openly discussed.
• The electoral-strategic constraints facing the SPD/Green government, with 
several mid-term Lander elections. The SPD federal executive and 
Chancellor's Office hesitated in dealing with the political ‘fall-out’ from large- 
scale base closures. Hence Schroder was keen to prevent debate about 
conscription.*^
• The vested interests within the Defence Ministry, particularly the 
FUhrungsstab, consisting of many Riihe appointees who opposed the 
personnel reductions. As one source stated: ‘The armed forces always prefer 
the status quo’.*^ * Bundeswehr reform was bound up in bureaucratic politics 
within the core executive.
The domestic politics stream could not be coupled with the problems and policies 
streams. The international context of the Helsinki Headline Goals also circumscribed 
a ‘policy veto’ role. Hence the strategic context constrained Scharping into attempting 
a role as policy broker, making humdrum leadership on the issue an optimal strategy 
for Scharping and the SPD. However, Scharping ended up playing the role of policy 
veto player. As we have seen, the period 1998-2002 did see the development of a 
‘nascent’ advocacy coalition advocating from common deep core beliefs. However, a 
clear ‘policy monopoly’ supportive of the policy image of territorial defence was 
evident. It was in the interests of Schroder and Scharping to ensure that no ‘politics of 
punctuation’ would occur and that the ‘policy monopoly’ continued. Thus whilst 
Scharping wanted to be seen as a policy broker, he was a veto player.
157 Interview, Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28* August 2002.
See 'non-decision-making' as the second face of power, Bacharach, P and Baratz, M. ‘Two Faces of 
Power’, American Political Science Review*, Vol.56, No.3, pp.947-952
Interviews, Defence Ministry in Bonn, 23*^ . September 2002
‘Kanzler Schroder will eine Debatte vermeiden’. Die Zeit ist R eif, Der Spiegel, 15,08.04.02,
161 Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14* August 2002
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This chapter has also shown the importance of perspective three: policy-orientated 
learning, notably through the work of the Weizsacker Commission. However, again, 
the importance of the policy leader in acting on policy-orientated learning has been 
vital. Policy-orientated learning can only induce policy core change if key macro­
political figures are prepared to act to facilitate and support it. It is vital for the 
success of a policy forum to contain members of the macro-political system 
responsible for the implementation of the reform. The Schroder/Fischer legislative 
period demonstrates how this willingness is determined by the strategic context of 
policy leaders and their own particular leadership traits. Scharping was not willing to 
attempt to create a crisis consciousness and attempt to couple the streams of 
‘problems, politics and policies’ in such an unfavourable political climate.
However, the policy monopoly was not immune to the effects of policy-orientated 
learning. Whilst the results of the Weizsacker Conunission had been largely 
marginalized, the Conunission had begun its work in the context of a mutually 
unacceptable stalemate. It was clear to all interests that the Bundeswehr had to be 
changed to meet new challenges like Kosovo and CESDP. This pressure to structure 
the Bundeswehr to its new tasks forced Scharping to move the German armed forces a 
small step closer to ‘crisis-prevention forces’ by reducing the number of troops to 
280,000 and the number of conscripts to 77,000. Scharping began also to use the 
discourse of crisis prevention more, signifying changes to the secondary aspects of the 
policy monopoly. The policy monopoly was, in short, undergoing changes to the 
secondary and indeed core policy aspects of its policy image of territorial defence.
The role of crisis prevention was being taken seriously, and the armed forces were 
being designed with the Helsinki Headline Goals in mind. However, the deep core of 
territorial defence remained in the form of 77,000 conscripts, hamstringing the 
Bundeswehr, draining its finances and impeding it in meeting its growing tasks in 
crisis management.
External linkages both to the consolidation programme of the budget policy 
subsystem and to the social policy subsystem - as well as the impact of electoral- 
strategic interests of the SPD on the temporal dimension of political management of 
the Bundeswehr reform - worked in favour of the policy monopoly. The policy 
learning of the Weizsacker Conunission was marginalized. Its results were judged to
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be too dangerous for the SPD. The government had the more compelling problems of 
budget consolidation and unemployment reduction to face. It was not prepared to 
allow its coalition partner, the Greens, or international pressure to abolish 
conscription and, by proxy, ziviler Ersatzdienst, which would in the short term cause 
unemployment and raise public expenditure. Action as a policy entrepreneur within 
such a strategic context would have led to failure and also to alienation within his own 
political party. Scharping could see no way of coupling the politics stream with the 
problem and policy streams.
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Chapter 6: Bundeswehr Reform and Strengthening the Common European 
Security and Defence Policy: Between Atlanticisation And Europeanisation
This chapter situates the reform of the Bundeswehr's roles and structure in the context 
of Germany's role in the development of a European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI) within the NATO alliance (as its European pillar) and - after the Cologne and 
Helsinki European Councils in 1999 - of a Common European Security and Defence 
Policy (CESDP) as a component of the EU. Bundeswehr reform has been caught up in 
these two complex and interrelated dynamics of 'uploading' and 'downloading' 
associated with the emerging security and defence component of European 
integration, and represented respectively by Atlanticisation and Europeanisation. 
Successive German governments sought to reconcile these twin dynamics in the 
traditional 'bridge' concept (Brücken-Konzept). According to this concept, the 
strengthening of a European security and defence policy was not to be understood as 
emancipation from the United States, but as the European pillar (europaischer Pfeiler) 
in the transatlantic alliance.^ It fitted into the notion of German interests as bound up 
in a dual integration strategy of European and transatlantic Einbindung that went back 
to the beginnings of the post-war Bonn Republic. This concept was put under 
increasing strain as - by the Helsinki European Council - the EU's goal had become 
'an autonomous military capacity... to launch and conduct EU-led military 
operations.' The formulation of the need for an autonomous EU military capacity, 
which was led by the Foreign Ministry, challenged the Defence Ministry's traditional 
position - that the military dimension was a matter for NATO under the ESDI/CJTF 
arrangements.
The key question is the extent to which, and the ways in which, the dynamics of 
Atlanticisation and Europeanisation affected Bundeswehr reform, shaping the scope 
and pace of domestic policy change. In addressing this question the chapter seeks to 
show how public policy theory can offer new insights into the processes of 
Atlanticisation and Europeanisation, especially by highlighting the role of domestic
 ^See Schmalz, U. ‘Die europaisierte Macht -  Deutschland in der Aussen und Sicherheitspolitik’, in 
Schneider, H. Jopp, M. and Schmalz, U. (eds.) (2002) neue Deutsche Europapolitik? 
Rahmenbedingungen - Problemfelder -  Optionen' (Europa Union Verlag, Bonn) p.563
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policy leadership. It draws on the rapidly expanding literature of Europeanisation 
studies, and suggests the value of public policy analysis in shifting attention from its 
dominant institutionalist perspective. In contrast to the emphasis on 'misfit' between 
domestic and European institutional requirements as the trigger for domestic change, 
the chapter highlights the role of domestic policy leadership in determining the extent 
to which, and the manner in which, German defence and security policy is 
Atlanticised and Europeanised.
The central argument of this chapter is that policy leaders have played a central role in 
the bottom-up and top-down processes of Europeanisation in German defence and 
security policy, whether as entrepreneur, broker or veto player. CESDP has been an 
increasingly important part of the strategic context within which these roles are 
played.
6.1 The Defence Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and CESDP
Europeanisation - and to a lesser extent Atlanticisation - of German defence and 
security policy are conceived as, first and foremost, 'bottom-up' processes in which 
dorhestic policy leaders contest how European requirements should be defined and 
use these requirements to set and control the scope and pace of domestic Bundeswehr 
policy change. Crucially, successive German Defence Ministers have defined 
European requirements within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance (as its European 
pillar) and sought to control its development so that the Foreign Ministry is kept on 
the margins. In the Defence Ministry view, the Foreign Ministry's proper 
responsibility is institutional issues about where and how security policy decisions are 
best taken at the European level rather than military capability issues. Both Riihe and 
Scharping were keen to route policy development through the Western European 
Union (WEU) and NATO and away from the European Council -at which Foreign 
Ministers had a privileged role - and the General Affairs Council. 'Atlanticisation' has 
deeply influenced how the Defence Ministry and the Bundeswehr have framed 
Europeanisation and the way in which successive defence ministers have used it. 
ESDI/CJTF and CESDP were, above all, seen in the Defence Ministry as a clear 
demonstration of 'burden-sharing' in defence that would help to strengthen the
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transatlantic alliance. From the perspective of the Defence Ministry Bundeswehr 
reform has interacted with CESDP but both have been nested within NATO and 
Atlanticisation.
In contrast, the Foreign Ministry sought to define CESDP as an issue of backing the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by credible operational capabilities, 
thereby keeping it in the framework of the General Affairs Council of the EU and the 
European Council. The stress was on CESDP as an integral part of CFSP, as drawing 
on civilian as well as on military assets, as having a strong crisis-prevention 
dimension, and consequently as needing Foreign Minister co-ordination at EU and 
domestic levels. The centrality of the new Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
within the new CESDP was seen as an important victory for the Foreign Ministry, 
cementing the notion of political control over the military. Hence policy leadership 
was very much about a bureaucratic politics of designing and managing institutional 
venues in order to retain control of process, ideas and outcomes. CESDP was the story 
of the Defence Ministry’s difficulties in moving beyond an observer role with respect 
to EU defence policy. Before Cologne, it engaged in reactive damage-limitation by 
ensuring that the PSC was served by a structure of military advice through the EU 
Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). After the Cologne 
European Council, its damage-limitation was directed at maximising the autonomy of 
the new Military Committee and the Military Staff within the Council structures - 
keeping them at a distance from COREPER and the German Permanent 
Representation in Brussels. It sought - belatedly - a more central and proactive role 
for the new Council of Defence Ministers in developing the EU 'Force Catalogue’ and 
the Review Mechanism put in place with the Nice Presidency Report.
Secondly, domestic policy leadership on Bundeswehr reform has been only 
imperfectly Atlanticised, let alone Europeanised, reflecting what Goetz describes as a 
bifurcation within the federal executive.^ At official working levels the Defence 
Ministry has a very high level of contact with, and immersion in, NATO business so 
that it is possible to speak of a strong NATO and transatlantic identity. Hence the
 ^Goetz, KH. ‘The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation’ in Dyson, 
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) Germany, Europe and the Politics o f Constraint (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) pp.57-72
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Defence Ministry devoted far more attention, time and energy to the North Atlantic 
Council meeting in Washington DC in April 1999 and to the Bremen Declaration of 
the WEU Council of Ministers in May 1999 than to the European Council meeting in 
Cologne in June 1999. Inherited departmental philosophy suggested that an evolving 
European dimension to European integration should be embedded within the Atlantic 
Alliance. No less importantly, Atlanticisation offered a rationale for seeking 
additional roles and resources for the Bundeswehr, and Europeanisation was 
associated with similar 'bureau-shaping' behaviour. This behaviour suggests a strong 
'bottom-up' dimension to Atlanticisation and Europeanisation within the Defence 
Ministry as officials seek to use NATO and the EU to increase domestic political 
leverage, for instance vis-à-vis the Finance and Foreign ministries.
However, Atlanticisation and Europeanisation are constrained in two main ways. 
Firstly, to a greater extent that Goetz allows, at the administrative level Atlanticisation 
is imperfect because the Defence Ministry has a range of supporters of the traditional 
Bundeswehr identity as a conscript army devoted to territorial defence.^ Bundeswehr 
identity and Atlantic identity are in tension within the ministry. In essence, the 
Federal Defence Ministry is the key reference point of the Bundeswehr policy 
subsystem and the point at which it connects to, and interacts with, the NATO policy 
subsystem. The consequence is that 'bottom-up' pressures within the ministry for the 
Atlanticisation/Europeanisation of policy leadership on the Bundeswehr are muted. 
Secondly, at the political level. Federal Defence Ministers have a different range of 
preoccupations with respect to Bundeswehr reform, situating it within the external 
domestic framework of party, parliamentary and coalition management and of federal 
and electoral politics. Crucially, this larger political framework is only very limitedly 
Atlanticised or Europeanised. Hence defence ministers have little incentive to frame 
and justify Bundeswehr reform in terms of either of these processes. This 
characteristic of domestic institutional structures means that successive defence 
ministers have no real incentive to derive Bundeswehr reform from the 'top-down'
 ^Goetz, KH. ‘The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation’ in Dyson, 
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) Germany, Europe and the Politics o f Constraint (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) pp.57-72
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requirements of the Atlantic Alliance or of the EU / Hence, despite Atlanticisation of 
the Federal Defence Ministry's working official level, Bundeswehr reform ultimately 
owes more to domestic political factors as ministers give priority to cultivating their 
political standing and building their political credit in the domestic arenas of party, 
parliamentary and coalition politics. Moreover, Rühe's centralization of policy making 
within the Federal Defence Ministry can be seen as an attempt to better control the 
internal processes of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation so that they were compatible 
with domestic political requirements. This analysis of Atlanticisation/Europeanisation 
in Bundeswehr reform suggests that the bifurcation between bureaucratic and 
governmental dimensions is not as pronounced in the Defence Ministry as Goetz 
suggests.^
The chapter argues that public policy theory and Europeanisation studies can usefully 
enrich each other. Public policy theory provides useful insights into processes of 
Atlanticisation/Europeanisation, especially by highlighting the role of policy leaders, 
for instance in managing institutional venues and organizing policy learning. Equally, 
Atlanticisation and Europeanisation are essential to understanding processes of policy 
change. First, it is necessary to examine current studies of Europeanisation and their 
weaknesses when applied to the policy subsystems of German defence and security 
policy and of the Bundeswehr. Above all, it is important to set how one understands 
Europeanisation in the context of the nature of CESDP as a policy field.
The central characteristic of CESDP is that it avoids the traditional 'hard' Community 
method of European integration with its clear prescriptive institutional model that is 
enforced by a supranational institution like the European Commission. CESDP 
represents 'soft' integration in a voluntarist rather than coercive manner, strictly 
intergovemmentalist in approach (with governments retaining the national veto), and 
eschewing the ambition to create a common European army. In particular, the 
characteristics of CESDP as an integration process shaped how it affected 
Bundeswehr reform.
 ^Goetz, KH. ‘The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation’ in Dyson, 
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press)
 ^Goetz, KH. ‘The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation’ in Dyson, 
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford University Press) 
pp.57-72
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CESDP lacked a clear, shared vision of the EU's strategic interests, especially 
between Europe's two major military powers, Britain and France. The initial 
momentum to establish an autonomous and credible European defence capability 
from the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 was soon lost in 
disagreement about the EU's strategic interests. The EU lacked a co-ordinated 
view on its implications for the future of NATO.^ Would CESDP undermine or 
strengthen NATO? There was also a lack of unity on how to respond to the three 
US conditions for supporting CESDP: no decoupling, no duplication and no 
discrimination.^ The rudiments of a shared vision of the EU's strategic interests 
did not really begin to emerge till after the Iraq war in 2003 and the associated 
crisis in transatlantic relations, and then only in a vague form. Even limited soft 
forms of integration were frustrated by continuing differences of national security 
cultures, which framed and constrained policy leadership, notably on the issue of 
autonomy of the EU as a security and defence actor. Neither the High 
Representative for CFSP - Javier Solana - nor PSC had much ability to influence 
essentially domestically driven defence policies that showed only limited signs of 
convergence.
CESDP lacked a prescriptive institutional model for force structures that would 
give the EU the military capability to pursue its strategic interests in a credible 
manner. The Helsinki Headline Goal was mainly about earmarking existing 
capabilities for the overall EU 'Force Catalogue'. In this respect it did not go much 
beyond the CJTF arrangement, which was seen as a key NATO achievement in 
ESDI: the rapid deployment of the most appropriate forces from different states to 
match the specific requirements of individual missions. CJTF was not based on a 
proactive approach to altering the military capabilities of contributing states. The 
maximalist solution, which was floated on occasion by Joschka Fischer, for 
instance in January 1999, was a common European army (as envisaged in the 
European Defence Community proposal in the 1950s). However, this idea was off 
the agenda. The German Defence Ministry identified the more urgent and
 ^Howorth, J. (2000) Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative, Survival, vol.42, no.2, 
pp.33-55
Howorth, J. (2000) ‘European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?' EU-ISS, Chaillot 
Papers (43) (WEU, ISS, Paris)
 ^Schake, K. (2002) Constructive Duplication, Reducing EU Reliance on US Military Assets (London, 
Centre for European Reform)
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practical issue as how to make progress in achieving readiness, deployability and 
sustainability and in giving coherent and operational form to 'collective capability 
goals' like C3, intelligence and transport. They were seen as the critical tasks for 
the new EUMC, the EUMS and the Council of Defence Ministers.
CESDP lacked clear priorities for budgetary spending to support this force 
structure. There were no clear convergence criteria on defence/GDP spending (on 
the Maastricht EMU model) or targets for research and development investment.® 
The new Council of Defence Ministers lacked the authority of ECOFIN in 
operating processes of monitoring by peer review (like, for instance, 'naming and 
shaming' weak contributors), let alone a common EU defence budget. The 
proposal in the Draft Constitution of the European Convention in 2003 for a 
European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency was an attempt 
to move in this direction. Fischer pushed this issue within the Convention. 
However, there was a failure to match the commitment to CESDP with increased 
public expenditure on defence, notably in reforming the Bundeswehr.
CESDP lacked a clear strategy for strengthening and rationalising the European 
defence industry around areas where the EU has a significant technological base 
and where harmonised procurement projects would enable European forces to 
operate autonomously. There were some signs of merger activity, notably the 
Franco-German EADS (Aérospatiale/Matra-DASA). There were also high-profile 
collaborative projects, like the Meteor air-to-air missile and the A-400M military 
transport aircraft. However, they were fraught with difficulties, not least on the 
German side over meeting commitments to purchase the A-400M. These 
difficulties were in part budgetary. The German government was deeply reluctant 
to pay the price for creating an autonomous European defence capability. They 
were also the product of America's huge lead in military technologies and the 
consequent perception - notably within the British government - that merger and 
joint projects with US defence companies would yield higher value-added for 
European forces. Hence CESDP was not backed by a strong armaments policy.
Lindley-French, J, (2002) In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing International 
Affairs, 78, 4, pp.789-790
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Against this background Europeanisation was more a bottom-up than a top-down 
process. This combination of voluntarism in European integration with bottom-up 
Europeanisation was consistent with the interests of successive German Defence 
Ministers who sought to avoid a significant 'misfit' with European requirements. Their 
interest was in avoiding a 'misfit' that would force transformation of the Bundeswehr 
away from the conscription model for territorial defence and generate serious 
domestic political costs for their careers and their governments. Hence German 
Defence Ministers shied away from a CESDP that was based on clear strategic goals 
and proven military capabilities and preferred pursuing ESDI in the framework of 
NATO.
This points to a key contrast with Atlanticisation. The post-Cold War period was 
associated with new uncertainties and hesitations about NATO's role. Nevertheless, as 
early as the Rome Declaration of November 1991, the North Atlantic Council was 
attempting to define a new Strategic Concept; by December 1992 NATO was 
endorsing 'out-of-area' operations; and in January 1994 it agreed on the idea of 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The CJTF concept served to tether the WEU 
firmly in the NATO orbit, thereby ensuring that Europeanisation of European defence 
and security was embedded within Atlanticisation. Also, by deciding on accelerated 
enlargement of NATO to east and central European states like Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, the NATO-orientation of these EU applicant states was secured. 
Their Atlanticisation through NATO membership preceded their Europeanisation 
through EU membership. In this way the building blocks were put in place for a long­
term framing of European defence within NATO, enhancing the prospect that CESDP 
under the auspices of the EU would prove to be the de facto 'NATO-isation' of the 
EU. Moreover, Atlanticisation was more of a top-down process than Europeanisation 
through CESDP. The resulting risks of a 'misfit' between Atlantic requirements and 
German policies encouraged a great deal of activism by Riihe. He played a key role in 
uploading German policy preferences into the WEU (the Petersburg tasks) and in 
defining the terms on which 'out-of-area' operations were decided (under the authority 
of the UN Security Council and on a case-by-case basis, as agreed at the Brussels 
North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1992).
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6.2 Europeanisation: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches
Over the last decade there has been an explosion of academic interest in the 
Europeanisation of public policy, though with a lag in examining institutional and 
political aspects.^ More recently, the concept of Europeanisation has been applied to 
Germany in a systematic way, including foreign and defence policies.There is a 
broad consensus that Europeanisation is concerned with the domestic political and 
policy effects of European integration. However, Dyson and Goetz have argued that 
there is much less agreement about how these effects are best understood.In a 
somewhat stylised way, developing on Dyson and Goetz, it is possible to identify 
three different approaches to Europeanisation. From the perspective of this thesis, 
each approach can be seen as having different implications for how policy 
leadership is conceived.
The first two approaches can be seen as different variants of the top-down perspective 
on Europeanisation. This perspective was outlined by Robert Ladrech: ‘An 
incremental process re-orientating the direction and shape of politics to the degree that 
EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of 
national politics and policy-making.’^^  These two approaches are the 'fusion' thesis 
and the 'misfit' thesis. Wessels and Rometsch argue that the growth of the EU as a 
political system has led to a fusion of institutional arrangements across several levels
 ^BuUer, J, and Gamble, A. (2002) ‘Conceptualising Europeanisation’, Public Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 17, pp.4-24
Featherstone, K. and Radaelh, C. (2003) The Politics of Europeanisation (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press)
Cowles, M. Caporaso, J and Risse, T, (2001) Transforming Europe, Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change (Ithaca, NY, Cornell) pp. 1-21
Hix, S and Goetz, KH ‘Introduction, European Integration and National Pohtical Systems’, in Hix, S 
and Goetz, K.H. (2001) Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems 
(London, Frank Cass) pp. 1-26 
Goetz, K.H., Dyson, K. ‘Europeanisation Compared, The Shrinking Core and the Decline of Soft 
Power’, in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press) pp.349-376
Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. ‘The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy. On the 
Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation ’ in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) 
Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, Oxford Uuniversity Press) pp.325-345 
Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. ‘The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy. On 
the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’ in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) 
Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 13-20 
Ladrech, R. (1994) ‘The Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions, The Case of France’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No.l pp.69-88
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of government and administration in Germany with those of the Domestic 
policy makers look to Brussels to attempt to maintain a high degree of influence on 
policies that will affect the domestic level. In consequence, the EU has experienced a 
'bureaucratisation' with the 'intensive propensity of national politicians and civil 
servants toward comprehensive participation in preparing, making and implementing 
and controlling EU decisions that can affect them directly'. As Wessels states: 
'Without being pressed into one uniform model, the involvement in the EU has led in 
nearly all member states to a Europeanisation of daily activities and to a functional 
and sectoral decentralisation and a political de-parliamentarisation.’ Europeanisation 
is associated with 'comprehensive mobilization and a co-existence of decentralization 
and co-ordination.'.^"  ^According to the 'fusion' thesis domestic institutional and policy 
traditions are losing their distinctiveness. This suggests that the Federal Defence 
Ministry would devote many more resources to EU business, that the Bundeswehr 
would converge with its EU counterparts through CESDP, and that the characteristics 
that it had developed in the 1950s would be become increasingly attenuated. The 
'fusion' thesis generates the perspective that Europeanisation will be associated with 
institutional and policy convergence.
In practice, Europeanisation effects from CESDP are shaped by the very distinctive 
nature of defence policy in Germany both as an exclusive function of the federal level 
(and hence not bound up in domestic 'co-operative' federalism) and as deeply 
embedded into NATO and Atlanticisation. To the extent that the culture of the 
Bundeswehr is open, flexible and collegial in its dealings with EU partners, this 
culture owes less to the mores of domestic 'co-operative' federalism and its 
congruence and easy fusion with EU institutional arrangements and ways of doing 
business than Wessels and Rometsch suggest. The familiarity of Federal Defence 
Ministry officials with multi-level governance is rooted in NATO and Atlanticisation, 
and CESDP can be seen as an additional layer in this complex multi-level Atlanticist 
game rather than in the games of 'co-operative' federalism. What makes the game 
difficult for Federal Defence Ministry officials is the difference of institutional 
cultures between NATO and the EU. Hence given the historical priority of
Wessels, W. and Rometsch (Eds.) (1996) The EU and its Member States, Toward Institutional 
Fusion? (Manchester, University Press)
Wessels, W. ‘An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macro-Political View on Integration Processes, 
Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol.35, No.2,1997 p.26
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Atlanticisation over Europeanisation - of NATO over CESDP - CESDP has proved a 
challenge for the Defence Ministry and the Bundeswehr (though not an entirely new 
situation). The Federal Defence Ministry has shown less sign than any other federal 
ministry of developing specialized EU units at division or section levels.^  ^ In contrast 
to the Finance Ministry (with EMU) or even the Interior Ministry (with Interior and 
Justice) the Defence Ministry has been a striking laggard in matching structural 
changes to CESDP.
As we saw above, within the Defence Ministry the 'fusion' thesis only applies in a 
qualified way. At the administrative level, both Europeanisation and Atlanticisation 
are complementary with the role of the ministry as the epicentre of the Bundeswehr 
policy subsystem and of its strongly developed sense of a distinctive policy identity as 
an indispensable core component of the post-war political order and identity of 
Germany. This militates against a comprehensive mobilisation of the ministerial 
administration behind Atlanticisation or Europeanisation. At the political level, 
federal defence ministers are bound up in a configuration of party, parliamentary, 
governmental and electoral factors that offer little incentive to seek to Atlanticise or 
Europeanise Bundeswehr reform. The domestic political opportunity structure does 
not support active use of Europeanisation or Atlanticisation as top-down requirements 
for reform because these key institutional and political arenas are not bound up in an 
effective multi-level system reaching up to NATO and the EU.^  ^Hence the 'fusion' 
thesis has limited explanatory power as a means of understanding the Europeanisation 
of German defence and security policy. It is by no means obvious that it is generating 
a convergence of military policy outcomes.
The other approach to Europeanisation as a top-down process focuses not on fusion 
but on 'fit'/'misfit', the consequent way in which European requirements impose 
adaptational pressures on the domestic level, and the very different manners in which 
domestic institutions shape the outcomes which vary from accommodation, through
Sturm, R. Pehle, H. (2001) Das neue deutsche Regierungssystem (Leske and Budrich, UTB, 
Opladen) p.45
Goetz, KH. ‘The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation’ in Dyson, 
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics o f Constraint (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) pp.57-72
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transformation, to inertia and retrenchment/^ The perspective that Europeanisation 
will lead to convergence is rejected in favour of the differential impact of Europe. The 
Helsinki Headline Goal of CESDP can be seen as a trigger for Bundeswehr reform. 
The question was whether the Bundeswehr could accommodate these requirements, 
would be forced to transform, or would display inertia or resistance. The independent 
variable is 'fit' or 'misfit' between the two levels: fit means no adaptational pressure 
and accommodation; a high degree of 'misfit' increases the prospect of inertia and 
resistance to change; whilst a low or medium degree of 'misfit' triggers 
transformation. Domestic variables - like capacity for political leadership, nature of 
institutional veto points, and extent of public support for the European idea in 
conceptions of identity- are treated as intervening variables in shaping outcomes. This 
approach emphasises Europeanisation as a vertical and hierarchical process of 
institutional requirements and constraints that come from above, with 'misfit' as the 
trigger for change. Implicit is a rather narrow conceptualisation of policy leadership 
as a process of managing the implications of 'misfit' by negotiating change through a 
particular structure of domestic institutional veto points, subject to the constraints of 
wider public attitudes towards European unification.
Despite this focus on 'misfits'. Risse gives a great deal of emphasis to the intervening 
variables in shaping the impacts of Europeanisation. Firstly, domestic political and 
governmental structures enable or block adaptational change. A key question is 
whether they provide multiple veto points, which make the achievement of consensus 
harder. Despite its status as a federal institution the Bundeswehr has not been able to 
avoid the ‘joint decision trap’ of the German federal structure (notably over base 
closures, see chapters 4 and 5).^  ^The second intervening variable is formal 
institutions, which frame the reaction to pressures for change from the EU and the 
strategies of actors responding to adaptational pressures within these 
institutions. Institutions can provide actors with the resources and information to 
initiate policy change and can ameliorate the effects of multiple veto points. The third 
variable is political and organisational cultures. These cultures define the setting
Borzel, T (2000) When Europeanisation Hits Home, Europeanisation and Domestic Change, EUI 
Working Paper No. 2000/56
Cowles, M, Caporaso, J and Risse, T, (2001) Transforming Europe, Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change (Ithaca, NY, Cornell) pp.1-21 
Scharpf, F, (1985) The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalismand European 
Integration (Berlin: WZB)
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within which actors respond to Europeanisation and determine the strength of the 
logic of appropriateness that is challenged, or perhaps reinforced, by Europeanisation.
The entrenchment of organisational culture is often a product of a much deeper factor: 
national state identity and the extent to which it is in symbiosis with ideas of 
European order and progressive European integration. In the case of the Bundeswehr 
the traditional model of a conscript army for territorial defence is deeply rooted in 
deep core political beliefs about post-war national identity. This model competes with 
the idea of European unification at this deep core level of political culture.
These three intervening variables have been applied in past studies of the Bundeswehr 
and of CESDP.’’
Less attention has been given to Risse's fourth intervening variable - agency.
Risse identifies the role of agency in Europeanisation in two main ways. Firstly, 
European integration leads to a differential empowerment of actors, reshaping the 
power structure at the domestic level. It produces winners and losers. Thus CESDP 
can be seen as empowering those advocating deep-seated Bundeswehr reform - like 
the Weizsacker Commission. Secondly, Europeanisation is associated with learning, 
which induces changes in the interests and identities of actors. Risse distinguishes 
between ‘single loop’ and ‘double loop’ learning; ‘Single loop learning’ refers to 
situations where actors simply adjust their strategies to achieve their goals and 
preferences. This is ’simple’ learning about how to cope with Europeanisation.
’Double loop’ learning involves paradigmatic change to the goals and preferences of 
actors and is reflected in a discontinuity in institutional development with a 
transformation of rules and norms.^^ Europeanisation as differential empowerment
Longhurst, K, (2000) Strategic Culture, The Key to Understanding German Security Policy? 
(Birmingham University, PhD. Thesis)
Longhurst, K. (2000) ‘The Reform of the German Armed Forces, Coming of Age?’, European 
Security, Vol.9, No.4, Winter 2000
Longhurst, K. (2000) German Strategic Culture, A Key to Understanding the Maintenance of 
Conscription, University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies Discussion Papers,
Longhurst K, (2003) Why Aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the 
Persistence of Conscription, German Politics, Vol. 12, No.2 pp.147-165
Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. ‘The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy. On the 
Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’ in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) 
Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, Oxford University Press) pp.325-345 
Cowles, M. Caporaso, J and Risse, T. (2001) Transforming Europe, Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change (Ithaca, NY, Cornell) pp.1-21
See also Laird, F. (1999) ‘Rethinking Learning’ Policy Currents, No.9, Vol3, pp.3-7
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and as simple learning to cope underlines how it is a resource available to policy 
leaders and is consistent with an actor-centred account. 'Double loop' learning and 
institutional development focus on Europeanisation as a cognitive structure that 
shapes the preferences and practices of policy actors.
Despite its top-down basis in a 'fit'/'misfit' account, Risse develops a sophisticated 
analysis of the domestic variables affecting Europeanisation which leaves space for 
considering how domestic actors use European integration. In this respect, this 
account and the bottom-up approach have a substantial area of overlap. Also, though 
Risse's account was developed from a different academic context, it closely parallels 
some of the analytical perspectives about policy change developed in this thesis from 
public policy theory. His 'misfit' thesis is close to the perspective about external 
perturbations and policy change. His stress on differential empowerment has affinities 
with the perspective about advocacy coalitions and policy change. His emphasis on 
learning overlaps with the perspective about policy-oriented learning. The key point is 
that public policy theory has much to contribute to strengthening this type of account 
of Europeanisation, not least by specifying under what conditions policy learning 
occurs (including the role of professional forums), by highlighting the role of 
institutional venue management, and by identifying different policy leadership roles. 
Not least, and again consistent with public policy theory. Risse attempts to identify 
the complex relations between structure and agency in his account of Europeanisation. 
The weakness is that his account of structure is better developed than his account of 
agency.
The second approach to Europeanisation is represented by studies that focus on how 
domestic actors frame and use Europe to pursue particular policy beliefs and to gain 
power over policy in the context of domestic political opportunity structures and the 
incentives that actors face. In this view of Europeanisation as a bottom-up process the 
focus is on how domestic actors create 'misfits' and use the EU to strengthen their 
domestic political power, to pursue institutional interests (for instance in more 
competences and resources), and to legitimate policy reforms and develop new policy
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solutions.^  ^'Misfits’ are seen not as givens but as manufactured and managed for 
domestic political purposes. Europeanisation is a resource in the hands of policy 
leaders. An example is the Weizsacker Commission's definition of a problem of 
adaptation to an emerging CESDP and the learning processes that it triggered, both 
within the Commission and externally (see chapter 5).
Conversely, Rühe and later Scharping were keen to minimize adaptational 
requirements on the Bundeswehr's structure by negotiating a close fit between an 
emerging CESDP and the traditional role conceptions of the Bundeswehr. For the 
Federal Defence Ministry it was important to define a strategic vision for CESDP that 
would not require major force restructuring away from a conscript Bundeswehr. In 
this approach the central question is how domestic actors use European integration in 
the debate about Bundeswehr reform and how they seek to upload domestic 
institutional models and policy preferences to the European level. In this way they can 
either increase or reduce adaptational pressures on the Bundeswehr. The bottom-up 
approach allows for a more expansive conception of policy leadership in which 
Europe is a resource that is used to expand or contract the scope for domestic policy 
reforms.
Christoph Knill has argued that this bottom-up approach is more useful than the 
'misfit' thesis (or the 'fusion' thesis) for understanding how Europeanisation works in 
policy areas where there are no clear prescriptive EU institutional models to 
download.^^ For this reason the bottom-up approach seems more appropriate for 
understanding CESDP. As the Iraq crisis revealed, CESDP did not rapidly evolve as a 
clear vision of the EU's security interests, a model of an appropriate force structure to 
ensure that the necessary military capability was in place, a clear statement of 
priorities, and a clear strategy for rationalising the European defence industry. The 
Helsinki Headline Goals were essentially limited, and there was a hesitation to press 
the model of convergence criteria and mutual surveillance and peer pressure - let
Goetz, K.H. ‘European Integration and National Executives, A Cause in Search of an Effect’ in Hix, 
S and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2001) Europeanised Politics and National Political Systems (London, Frank 
Cass), pp.211-231
Knill, C. (1998) ‘European Politics, The Impact of National Administrative Traditions’, Journal of 
Public Policy, Vol. 18 (1) pp. 1-28 
Knill, C. (1998) ‘European Politics, The Impact of National Administrative Traditions’, Jouma/ of 
Public Policy, Vol. 18 (1) pp. 1-28
230
alone ’hard' sanctions that had been used to develop EMU. The stress was on 
voluntarism in a policy field that was seen as touching on the very core of state 
sovereignty. Defence was if anything even more politically sensitive than fiscal and 
tax policies and revealed the great diversity of conceptions of strategic culture within 
Europe. Hence the main mechanisms of Europeanisation were 'soft' rather than 
coercive: the trans-national exchange of ideas and practices amongst military 
professionals and mimetic behaviour through benchmarking best practice.^^
However, CESDP served less to import new ideas, for instance about force structures, 
and more to legitimate particular domestic policy arguments about how to modernise 
the Bundeswehr and its nature as a force. In this respect CESDP fits well with a 
bottom-up approach to Europeanisation. 'Soft' mechanisms of Europeanisation offered 
more scope either to protect the traditional Bundeswehr model or to limit and control 
the scope and pace of policy change in the Bundeswehr. Notably neither Rühe nor 
Scharping - despite their endorsement of CESDP - pressed the case for 'hard' 
mechanisms of Europeanisation. They recognized that such mechanisms could 
accentuate a 'misfit' between the Bundeswehr and CESDP that would heighten top- 
down adaptational pressure.
Following and broadening the consensus-seeking definition of Europeanisation by 
Dyson and Goetz, Atlanticisation and Europeanisation are best seen as complex sets 
of interactive top-down and bottom-up processes through which domestic politics is 
affected by NATO and by European integration around the EU respectively.^^ This 
definition suggests a range of opportunities for policy leadership in shaping and 
managing these processes, which can be seen as enabling constraints.^^ The account in 
this section points to the risks in a rather stylised juxtaposition of the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches. In practice, there is a large area of overlap and common 
ground between these approaches. Though he comes from a more top-down position
Lodge, M. (2002) ‘Varieties of Europeanisation and the National Regulatory State’ Public Policy 
and Administration, Vol. 17, No.2, pp.43-67
^  Goetz, K.H., Dyson, K. ‘Europeanisation Compared, The Shrinking Core and the Decline of Soft 
Power’, in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics o f Constraint 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press), p.20
^  Goetz, KH. ‘The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation’ in Dyson, 
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, Oxford 
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that reflects his intellectual origins in international relations, Risse has a sophisticated 
view of how 'misfit' operates that opens up substantial space to consider the domestic 
aspects of Europeanisation. However, the advantage of the bottom-up approach is that 
it focuses attention on how domestic policy leaders - in this case Federal Defence 
Ministers - manage 'fit' so that adaptational pressures are minimized. It has a 
particular value in the context of studying Atlanticisation and Europeanisation in a 
policy field like defence and security where - especially in Europeanisation - there are 
not the clear prescriptive institutional models that trigger top-down change through 
'misfits'.
6.3 Europeanisation of German Defence and Security Policy
Studies of the Europeanisation of German defence and security policy have reflected 
the greater knowledge about the Foreign Ministry than the Defence Ministry. There 
has been a tendency to analyse from the European perspective of the Foreign Ministry 
as the senior co-ordinating ministry pursuing the agenda of European integration. In 
substantial part because of problems of access to an intensely secretive area, the 
Defence Ministry has been neglected. Another reason is that till recently the Defence 
Ministry has been an observer rather than active participant in EU integration. At the 
same time, little has been written on the Atlanticisation of German policy, with the 
major exception of Hanrieder's influential 'penetration' thesis which suggests deep 
fusion in the Atlantic Alliance and its structures.^^ The Defence Ministry seems to 
support Wessels's portrait of the 'opening of the state' better than any other ministry.^^ 
This chapter seeks to create a more balanced picture by focusing on the Federal 
Defence Ministry and the case of Bundeswehr reform. What emerges is a picture of a 
ministry that is only imperfectly Atlanticised, and even less perfectly Europeanised, 
but rather locked into domestic political structures that give little incentive to 
Atlanticise or Europeanise the Bundeswehr. More striking is the active leadership role 
of Rühe and Scharping in seeking to shape and use Atlanticisation and 
Europeanisation in the interests of their own essentially domestic political interests 
and agendas.
^  Hanrieder, W.F. (1970) The Stable Crisis: Two Decades of German Foreign Policy (Boulder, New 
York)
Wessels, W. (2000) Die Offiiung des Staates: Modelle und Wirklichkeit Grenziiberschreitender 
Verwaltungspraxis 1960-1995 (Opladen, Leske and Budrich)
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Studies of Europeanisation have had much to say about the nature and problems of 
European policy co-ordination in Germany. ESDI and CESDP raise interesting 
questions about how this machinery functions in relation to defence and security. 
More importantly, questions arise about how policy leadership at ministerial level 
interacts with this co-ordinating machinery, affecting how German policy on defence 
and security has been projected at the European level. Accounts of European policy 
co-ordination converge in identifying it as horizontal and negative rather than vertical 
and positive, ex post rather than ex ante. It is seen as the product of pronounced 
sectoral fragmentation and the lack of an authoritative 'ringmaster', and as resulting in 
German negotiating positions emerging at a late stage.^  ^In practice, the EU policy 
competence of the Federal Chancellor's Office remained weak, at least till the second 
Schroder government, with powerful constraints set by ministerial autonomy and 
coalition politics.
The key co-ordinating mechanisms were the monthly meetings of the Committee of 
European State Secretaries, chaired by the Foreign Ministry; the bi-weekly meetings 
of the European division heads; and the weekly meetings of the heads of European 
units dealing with EU issues. The Defence Ministry has traditionally stood aloof from 
this structure as spectator rather than active player. Riihe's strategy was to define 
ESDI as a NATO-based issue, thus falling outside the European co-ordinating 
structure. To the extent that WEU had been drawn towards the EU orbit with the 
Maastricht Treaty, the strategy of Defence Ministers was to work at the highest 
political level through the Chancellor to prevent the Foreign Ministry being drawn 
into Franco-German initiatives that excluded the Defence Ministry (as before 
Maastricht) and threatened to damage the Atlantic Alliance and the partnership with 
the US. This twin-track strategy diminished the opportunities for the European policy 
co-ordinating machinery to address defence-related issues. These issues were seen as 
sensitive matters of high politics.
^  Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. (2000) Germany’s European Diplomacy (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press) p. 132
Derlien, H.U. ‘Germany’ in Kassim, H, Peters, B. and Wright, V. (eds) (2000) The National Co- 
orination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.54-78
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However, as we shall see later, between the Cologne and Nice European Councils, the 
design of the institutional architecture for the CESDP led to new turf battles between 
the Defence and Foreign Ministries. How this was resolved at the EU level - notably 
the extent to which CESDP was subordinated to the General Affairs Council and the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) - had implications for the relations between 
the Defence Ministry and the traditional co-ordinating machinery in Berlin.^^ The 
trade off for the Defence Ministry was greater enmeshment in domestic EU co­
ordination (though it could still seek protection behind the traditional principle of 
ministerial autonomy) in return for a stronger role for the new Council of Defence 
Ministers and an upgrading of the importance of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) 
and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) as sources of military advice.
The Defence Ministry has sought to carve out a high degree of sectoral specialization 
in CESDP in a manner consistent with traditional German arrangements for managing 
EU business. By seeking to manage the institutional venues in this way the strategy is 
to retain as much control as possible over the agenda of CESDP and to prevent the 
Foreign Ministry - which is less attached to the conscription, territorial defence model 
- from using CESDP to create a problem of misfit that places serious adaptational 
pressures on the Bundeswehr. This suggests that more than bureaucratic fusion is at 
work in CESDP.^^ Critically, ministerial policy leadership seeks to shape CESDP so 
that the Bundeswehr does not become a domestic political problem.
The most sophisticated account of the Europeanisation of German foreign, defence 
and security policy is by Miskimmon and Paterson.^^ They provide a multi-variable 
explanation of uploading and downloading processes within CFSP and CESDP that 
stresses their interconnections. Miskimmon and Paterson utilise Michael Smith’s 
framework of domestic adaptation to European foreign policy. This framework 
identifies four factors that act as a yardstick by which to assess how far ‘EC political
Jopp, M. (2000) ‘Gemeinsame europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik’ in Wiedenfield, 
W. and Wessels, W. (eds.) (2000) Jahrbuch der Europaische Integration, p.233-42 
Wessels, W. and Rometsch, D. ‘Conclusions: EU and National Institutions’ in Wessels, W. and 
Rometsch, D. (Eds.) (1996) The EU and its Member States, Toward Institutional Fusion?
(Manchester, Manchester University Press) pp.328-265 
Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. ‘The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy. On 
the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’ in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) 
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dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy 
making’ - the extent of elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional 
change, and increase in public support for European integration.^^ Checkel’s concept 
of ‘persuasion’ is used as an additional tool to help explain the extent to which 
Germany has influenced the shape of both CFSP and CESDP. Miskimmon and 
Paterson conclude that Germany has been both an agent (‘uploader’) for 
Europeanisation and an object (‘downloader’) of the process. Its role as object was 
evident in elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, constitutional change and 
support of public opinion for CFSP and CESDP as an aspect of European political 
unification.^^
Germany’s role as an agent is shown in five key ways:
• ideational export in Germany’s promotion of the Petersburg tasks as the basis for 
CESDP
• example setting in providing the greatest number of troops for the European Rapid 
Reaction Force
• practical steps to strengthen co-operation through the Franco-German Corps and 
Eurocorps
• cognitive leadership and discursive influence by attempting to promote public 
debate about CESDP
• promotion of multilateralism through a strong role in institution building 
(European Rapid Reaction Force - ERRF, the EU Stability Pact for south-eastern 
Europe, the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the 
EU Military Staff).
Miskimmon and Paterson conclude that Germany played a strong role in uploading its 
policy preferences to the EU level. This role was facilitated by strong public and elite 
support, the lack of sectoral interests opposing CSFP, and the important role of the 
strongly Europeanised Foreign Ministry and Fischer’s policy entrepreneurship on 
behalf of CFSP. Factors limiting the uploading process include the reliance of the
Ladrech, R. (1994) ‘The Europeanisation of Domestic Pohtics and Institutions, The Case of France’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No.l pp.69-88
Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W, ‘The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy. On 
the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’ in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H, (Eds.) (2003) 
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235
Foreign Ministry on strong ministerial leadership, the role of the Chancellor in 
providing strategic direction (in Schroder’s case his role as a ‘normaliser’), and the 
Defence Ministry’s ‘Atlanticist’ orientation predisposing it to look to NATO as the 
key institution of German defence policy. According to Miskimmon and Paterson 
internal and external factors limit the process of Europeanisation in Germany. 
Internally, the lack of co-ordination between ministries, which represent ‘little 
empires’, leads to a mixed policy discourse and resistance to the communitarisation of 
CSFP within the Foreign Ministry. The lack of a sectoral interest pushing for CSFP 
also serves to temper German activism in this policy area. Two external factors act to 
limit top-down Europeanisation: the lack of an authoritative EU body to force 
increased co-operation on CFSP, and the braking effect of the process of renegotiation 
of EU treaties.
This chapter concurs with the thesis of Miskimmon and Paterson that, although 
Germany plays a strong role as an ‘agent’ in uploading its policy preferences to the 
EU level, it is to only a very limited extent an object of Europeanisation in defence 
and security policy. Despite the rhetoric from the Foreign Ministry, the Federal 
Chancellor’s Office and the Defence Ministry about Germany’s commitment to 
developing a functioning CESDP, German defence policy remains emphatically 
NATO-oriented. Atlanticisation frames and qualifies how Europeanisation shapes 
German defence and security policies. The Defence Ministry has been the institutional 
guarantor that a balancing of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation would be sustained 
in domestic bureaucratic politics within the federal core executive.
However, this chapter differs in two respects from Miskimmon and Paterson. Firstly, 
it questions just how far Atlanticisation affects defence and security policy by 
stressing the context of the domestic political opportunity structure and incentives.^"  ^
Secondly, it provides a different explanation for limited Europeanisation that is rooted 
in public policy theory. It stresses the distinctiveness of policy subsystems like the 
Bundeswehr, the resilience of core policy beliefs to change, the long-term nature of 
policy-oriented learning, and the role of design and management of institutional
^  Goetz, KH. ‘The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation’ in Dyson, 
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) pp.57-72
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venues. It also draws out the role of policy leaders in shaping, managing and using 
‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ processes, whether as policy entrepreneurs, brokers or 
veto players. Knill and Risse stress the importance of institutional and strategic 
cultures as mediating factors in the extent to which a state engages in ‘downloading’ 
from the EU level.^  ^The chapter argues that an interactionist account of leadership 
offers a more subtle insight into the complex dynamics of structure and agency in 
Europeanisation.
The advocacy coalition framework asks questions about the role of policy-orientated 
learning in informing the bottom-up and top-down processes of Europeanisation. To 
what extent does policy learning in committees and daily interaction on the 
international level affect policy making on the domestic level? Of interest here is the 
role played by the Weizsacker Commission as a professional forum in defining and 
translating adaptational pressures from the EU level into policy change on the 
domestic level. Punctuated equilibrium theory also provides an interesting 
contribution to understanding the bottom-up process of Europeanisation by alerting us 
to the role played by policy leaders in seeking to use and influence Europeanisation. 
This role can take the form of setting in place a process of ‘positive feedback’ or 
conversely protecting the dominance of a policy monopoly and policy image by 
seeking to control institutional venues through the control of information and policy- 
orientated learning. Policy leaders can use institutional venues to block or to facilitate 
adaptational change.
6.4 The EU and German Defence and Security Policy under the Kohl 
Chancellorship
The attempt to develop a common European security and defence policy is not simply 
a phenomenon associated with the post-Cold War environment. From the early stages 
of the European integration process the ambition to create a political identity through 
common defence - and not just closer economic integration - was evident. This
Knill, C. (1998) ‘European Politics, The Impact of National Administrative Traditions’, Journal of 
Public Policy, Vol. 18 (1) pp. 1-28
Cowles, M. Caporaso, J and Risse, T. (2001) Transforming Europe, Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change (Ithaca, NY, Cornell) pp.1-21
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ambition surfaced in the European Defence Community proposal (which perished in 
the French Assembly in 1954), in De Gaulle's vision of Franco-German leadership 
(which caused serious domestic political difficulties for Chancellor Adenauer), and in 
the abortive Fouchet Plan on European political union of 1961.^  ^It surfaced again in 
the Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1981; an early draft proposed a council of defence 
ministers. The French Fouchet Plan sought to incorporate defence into the EEC on an 
intergovernmental basis. A central problem, especially once De Gaulle became 
French President in 1958, was the association of French-inspired plans for common 
European defence with challenge both to US hegemony (represented by NATO) and 
to the idea of a supranational Europe. In particular, they threatened to wreck what was 
conceived as the central German national interests in a privileged relationship to the 
US in defence (through the NATO framework) and in supranational integration.
Hence, though the Elysée Treaty on Franco-German Co-operation of 1963 committed 
France and Germany to bilateral defence co-operation, the Bundestag insisted on 
inserting - in the face of Adenauer's opposition - an Atlanticist preamble stressing 
collective defence within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle's 
withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated structure in 1966 further 
reduced the credibility of French proposals on common defence to German policy 
makers who remained wedded to NATO and made the Elysée Treaty provisions 
redundant.^^ Out of the failures of these years emerged one structure that represented 
a supranational approach to defence and security - the Western European Union 
(WEU). Its relative success was the result of the fact that it emerged out of US 
demands for the Federal Republic to join NATO and rearm. WEU was a potential 
building block for later initiatives, notably the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the 
Petersburg Declaration of 1992, and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. It was one on 
which German negotiators seized in the Maastricht negotiations and after.
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The early abortive efforts were followed by a slowly evolving framework of foreign 
policy co-operation that created a diplomatic context in which defence co-operation 
could be seen as more credible. From the outset Germany played a key role as 
initiator and supporter of efforts at foreign policy co-ordination, aligning itself with a 
supranational approach that aimed at effectiveness and speed through qualified 
majority voting. However, this larger framework evolved with great difficulty, 
leaving a gap between German ambitions for the EU and what practically could be 
negotiated. It proved difficult to gain agreement on Europe's strategic interests or an 
institutional structure that avoided national vetoes. Where such agreement was 
forthcoming - as eventually over Bosnia and then over Kosovo - it lacked credibility 
without military capability. Above all, in relation to defence and security, Germany 
had to reconcile its Atlanticist and its European interests.
The Harmel Report of 1967 on the future tasks of the Alliance gave initial impetus to 
this larger diplomatic framework. By drawing attention to the importance of the 
political context of security it contributed to instilling the idea of the value of 
European foreign policy co-operation. The first practical step was European Political 
Co-operation (EPC), which was strongly backed by Chancellor Willy Brandt, agreed 
at the Hague Summit of 1969, and came into force in 1970.^  ^EPC was conceived as a 
structure within which foreign policy stances could be co-ordinated. It put in place a 
mechanism through which European foreign ministers, officials and diplomats were 
able to meet on a regular basis for this purpose. However, EPC was not tied to the 
institutions and agenda of the EC and was completely intergovernmental, only playing 
an outside role in European foreign policy during the 1980s.' °^ It was marginally 
successful in formulating a common European position on such areas as Middle East 
policy and policy to Asia and South America. The most important role of the EPC 
was in elite socialisation and as a forum within which policy learning could take 
place."^  ^It helped to facilitate a deeper knowledge and mutual understanding between 
EC states, putting in place the habits and structures of mutual consultation that could
Hendriks and Morgan (2001) The Franco-German Axis in European Integration (Cheltenham, Elgar)
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later be strengthened in the context of later external shocks and crises. These shocks 
and crises - like Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq - clarified the need for deeper European 
foreign policy co-ordination and for the credibility that comes from an autonomous 
military capability. German governments consistently supported the development of 
EPC away from intergovernmentalism towards the Community method.
President Francois Mitterrand was important in trying to give a new impetus to 
Franco-German defence collaboration as the motor for a wider European defence co­
operation. Beginning in 1983, he sought to encourage Franco-German discussion of 
defence matters of mutual concem."^  ^Mitterrand's defence initiatives were made much 
more credible to the German government by his explicit and strong support for the 
Kohl government's decision to implement the NATO dual-track decision on stationing 
Cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany."^  ^This support was delivered in a speech to 
the Bundestag, despite strong domestic opposition in Germany not least from the 
Social Democratic Party (with which Mitterrand's Socialist Party was linked).
Another factor was Franco-German agreement that Gorbachov represented a new 
opportunity to bring peace and stability to Europe. A third factor was German Foreign 
Ministry thinking that bilateral initiatives on European security policy could 
compensate for the poor progress with EPC.
Hence in 1986-87 Mitterrand and Kohl developed a series of initiatives. They sought 
to revive the WEU as a key component of European political unification with its new 
Platform on European Security Interests in October 1987. This spoke of 'a more 
cohesive European defence identity'. The 25^  ^anniversary celebrations of the Elysée 
Treaty in 1988 were used to launch a Franco-German Defence Council. This initiative 
derived from the Federal Chancellor's Office as a device for binding France more 
strongly to the territorial defence of Germany.' '^  ^The new protocol to the 1963 Treaty 
spoke of the conviction of the need 'to develop a European identity in the field of 
defence and security', in conformity with the WEU declaration at The Hague in 
October 1987. The new Franco-German Brigade - created in October 1990 - was
Cole, A (2001) Franco-German Relations (Pearson, Longman), pp. 109-110 
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meant to symbolise this new positive view of bilateral defence collaboration as the 
'core of European corps'/^
However, these Franco-German initiatives on defence co-operation under Mitterrand 
and Kohl were stronger on symbolism and declaration than on substance. They were 
without deep effects on the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr's operational tasks were 
bound up with NATO, from which France remained distant. Moreover, these 
initiatives were not linked to the mobilising effect of shock or crisis. Hence they 
lacked a sense of urgency. This situation was transformed in 1989-90 by the shock of 
German unification and Mitterrand's conviction that the effects of this shock were 
best contained by deepening European political as well as economic and monetary 
integration. Defence was seen as a key component of stronger European political 
union to ensure that a stronger Germany was bound more tightly into European 
structures."^^
The Maastricht Treaty, which was negotiated in the two intergovernmental 
conferences of 1991, was for German negotiators an historic opportunity in the wake 
of Germany's rapid unification to underline her commitment to accelerating European 
unification and making it irreversible. A common European defence policy caused 
particular problems for the Kohl government. It raised difficult issues about how to 
reconcile paying off the political debts owed to both the Americans and the French 
with respect to their support for German unification. The difficulty stemmed from the 
importance that Mitterrand attached to this aspect of the Maastricht Treaty. Kohl was 
caught between the desire to respond positively to Mitterrand on a common defence 
policy as a logical next step in making European unification irreversible and the 
desire to accommodate American concerns by continuing to promote the traditional 
German 'bridge' concept.^^ Defence was negotiated in and around the IGC on political 
union, with foreign ministry officials in the driving seat. The key question centred on 
the role of the WEU, which German negotiators identified as the decisive institutional 
venue for gradually giving the EU a role in defence and security.
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The German negotiating position was to strengthen the WEU's role, but to confine 
this role to crisis-management operations. Collective defence was to remain the 
function of NATO. Hence WEU/EU and NATO would have complementary 
functions. In this way German negotiators carved out a balancing role between two 
views. According to the British and the Dutch, the WEU should be a bridge linking 
the EU and NATO, but with the WEU remaining as the European pillar of NATO. In 
the French view, the WEU should be an instrument for the gradual transfer of various 
functions - including collective defence - from NATO to the EU, acquiring an 
autonomous operational capability and the right to operate outside and within 
NATO."^  ^The Kohl government offered ambivalent support to the French position. 
The German Foreign Ministry worked with its French counterpart (leaving aside the 
German Defence Ministry) to table a joint Frarico-German proposal on defence. It 
proposed an 'organic' link between the WEU and the EU and the transformation of the 
Franco-German Brigade (created in 1990) into the Eurocorps as the basis for an 
integrated European military structure."^  ^Nevertheless, Kohl stressed the importance 
of getting NATO on side and attached key importance to the Rome summit of NATO. 
Here the new NATO 'Strategic Concept' endorsed the development of European 
multilateral forces whilst reaffirming the primacy of NATO as the forum for defence 
co-operation.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created by the Maastricht 
Treaty as a separate intergovernmental pillar of the EU, whilst the role of the WEU 
was cast in ambivalent language. There was reference to 'the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy' as one of the goals of the EU in Article B. However, Article 
J.4(l) offered an opportunity to slow down the development of this policy when it 
spoke of 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defence.' This Treaty provision underlined the absence of a political will 
behind a European defence policy, especially on the part of staunch Atlanticists like 
the British and the Dutch. Some progress was made in putting in place an institutional 
structure to provide a military capability for the EU. The WEU was elevated as 'an 
integral part of the development of the EU' (Article J.4.2), and its secretariat
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reinforced and moved from London and Paris to Brussels. It was to 'elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions' of the EU that have defence implications. The 
problem was that the WEU had no forces of its own, relying on its member states to 
contribute troops and materials. Also, this limited integration of defence and military 
policy into the EU was not accompanied by a clear binding link between the EU and 
the WEU.
During the Maastricht negotiations defence ministries, including the German, had 
been marginalized in favour of foreign ministers and their officials who occupied the 
key role in the IGC on political union. The German defence ministry looked to the 
NATO Rome summit of November 1990 and its new 'Strategic Concept' to protect its 
interests, in this way effectively neutralising the hastily prepared Franco-German 
proposal on defence that had bypassed them. The foreign ministry's idea of a closer 
'organic link between the WEU and the EU was kept off the agenda. Another factor in 
limiting progress towards a common European defence was the intransigence of 
Atlanticist states, which led to major friction between the French government and the 
Dutch over whether the Dutch had been using their EU presidency to pursue their own 
agenda on defence and institutional issues. Irritated by British and Dutch obstruction, 
Mitterrand had convened a separate EU summit in Paris on defence outside the 
framework of the IGC and hence away from Dutch chairing.^® The outcome at 
Maastricht was unsatisfactory to the French, but helpful to Kohl in not opening up a 
domestic split between Atlanticists and Europeanists. Kohl was acutely conscious that 
it was equally important for the German government to pay off political debts over 
German unification to the US as well as to the French.^^
During the period after unification Germany was keen to show itself a reliable 
international partner that would not return to a German ‘Sonderweg’ both to the 
French (as partners in developing the EU) and to the US (as partners in NATO). The 
problem was how to reconcile and balance the twin priorities to Europeanisation and 
Atlanticisation. This problem had reverberations within the federal core executive. 
Within the context of a general policy commitment to balancing these two priorities -
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guarded over by the Chancellor - the Defence Ministry had an institutional bias 
towards Atlanticisation, the Foreign Ministry to Europeanisation/^ This phenomenon 
had exhibited itself during the IGC negotiations on defence. For the Defence Ministry 
the key was to keep the Chancellor focused on NATO summits, as in Rome in 
November 1991, and on the value of substantial operational policy statements (like 
the new NATO 'Strategic Concept') over declaratory Franco-German statements that 
could jeopardise transatlantic relations. The key theme was the development of 'a new 
European security architecture' through NATO in the form of an ESDI, notably at the 
NATO Brussels meeting in January 1994, which linked ESDI to Combined Joint Task 
Forces (CJTF).
The pressure of events in eastern and south-eastern Europe combined with the 
opportunities that were offered by the Maastricht Treaty to open a window of 
opportunity for Rühe to play an activist policy leadership role in ESDI. In the face of 
new security challenges Rühe could argue that faith in German promotion of 'soft' 
security through support for economic development was not enough. He developed 
the argument for a stronger defence component within German foreign policy, 
working both through NATO and the WEU. This position challenged the Foreign 
Ministry. Rühe sought to carve out a key role through the negotiations leading to the 
WEU ministerial meeting in Bonn in June 1992 at which the Petersburg Declaration 
was agreed. This agreement outlined a distinctive interventionist role for the WEU in 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian operations, giving a strongly German 
emphasis to its tasks. Not least, Rühe, like many within the CDU, realized that 
Germany was going to have to take a more active role in the international community 
under pressure from its international partners, especially the United States, to take a 
greater share of the security ‘burden’.T h e  Karlsriihe ruling of 1994 on ‘out-of-area' 
operations offered a further opportunity for Rühe to act as a policy entrepreneur to 
promote a stronger defence and security dimension for the EU. He was aware that 
defence and security co-operation was going to be a key issue in the future of the EU
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and was confident of Kohl's support in actively promoting this dimension of European 
integration/"^
Riihe’s activism on ESDI was partly motivated by his interest in making sure that the 
process of Europeanisation was not controlled by the Foreign Ministry/^ Foreign 
Ministry control threatened to create a problem of 'misfit' that would lead to difficult 
problems of adaptation, not least for the Bundeswehr. Hence he was keen to ensure 
that he had a strong voice in determining the substance of any initiatives on ESDI that 
would have top-down effects on the Defence Ministry. Also, whilst Rühe was a strong 
advocate of ESDI, he was wary of challenging the primacy of NATO as the key 
framework for German policy. Rühe was very careful to place ESDI within the 
context of the relationship with the US. He stressed that it was in the interests of both 
the US and the EU that the EU should begin to take more responsibility for security 
issues: ‘Nur ein geeintes Europa ist für die USA ein gleichrangiger P a r t n e r Rühe 
emphasised that, in the context of a broader spectrum of risks, the key to future 
European security was going to be an increased emphasis on crisis management.
In Rühe’s eyes, Bosnia and the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 were key events that 
demonstrated the need to put in place European structures that would ensure that such 
an event could not happen again. His goal was to create an EU that could deal with 
crises such as those in the former Yugoslavia, without recourse to the United States -  
but only in situations where the US was happy to let Europe ‘go it alone’ (‘Hier wird 
wirklich europaisch gedacht’.^  ^ Rühe was also keen to promote the necessary military
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capabilities for such structures, stressing priority to greater co-operation in armament 
production and procurement in Europe/^
As chapter 5 showed, Riihe's activist policy leadership in promoting the development 
of crisis reaction capabilities at NATO, EU and German levels was constrained.
Above all, he was wary of challenging the idea of territorial and alliance defence as 
the core principle on which the Bundeswehr was structured. The development of an 
ESDI threatened to lead to new EU institutional models that could create adaptational 
pressures through 'misfit' and initiate a process of ‘positive feedback’ within the 
policy subsystem of German defence and security policy by highlighting the failure of 
a policy based on territorial defence and conscription. The strategic political context 
made Rühe unwilling and unable to act as a policy entrepreneur for ESDI outside the 
context of NATO. Part of his caution in acting as policy entrepreneur on behalf of a 
crisis management role for the Bundeswehr stemmed from perceptions of Rühe within 
the CDU/CSU as the ‘crown prince’ and likely successor to Kohl.^  ^His political 
ambitions meant that he was unwilling to take unnecessary risks as Defence Minister. 
Also, and paradoxically, Rühe lacked a strong level of support within his own party 
(coming from Hamburg, which was predominantly SPD), Hence Rühe was heavily 
dependent on the support of the Chancellor, which constrained his decisional 
assertiveness.
Nevertheless, Rühe was active on ESDI when and where he saw an opportunity that 
was consistent with this strategic context. Rühe was aware that: ‘It must be clear to 
the Europeans: there will be no more automatic American engagement in Europe. In 
the future there will be conflicts where the Europeans have to act a l o n e W i t h in  
strategic constraints, in particular the lack of support within his own party for a 
change to the policy monopoly, Rühe demonstrated a high level of activism. He 
played the role of policy broker on behalf of ESDI, seeking to enhance Germany’s 
ability to engage in crisis reaction capabilities within this framework, whilst ensuring 
the continued dominance of the policy monopoly by stressing the primacy of 
territorial and alliance defence as the core task of the German armed forces. Within
‘Rühe für ange Rüstungskooperation in Europa -  gegen US Konkurrenz', DPA 261137 April 1995 
‘Kronprinz in Feldgrau’ in Die Woche, 06/10/1995, see also ‘Aufdem Weg zum Gipfel’, Die Woche, 
14/08/1998
^  ‘Hier wird wirklich Europaisch gedacht’, Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt, 29th December 1995
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the context of a weak Foreign Ministry under Klaus Kinkel, he was able to mobilize 
the support of Chancellor Kohl behind his efforts to control the uploading of Germany 
preferences into ESDI and thereby the top-down effects on his Defence Ministry.^^
Central to Riihe's activism was his call for a new transatlantic partnership, based on 
three pillars: political, economic and security. A stronger Europe within the security 
partnership was the solution to the failure of the UN evident in the Bosnian crisis. The 
future role of Germany in this new security environment was going to be ‘from net 
importer to contributor’ to the WEU, NATO and UN.^  ^Rühe was active in advocating 
this position not only within Germany but also in the US, notably on a visit to 
Washington in March 1995. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine recognized: Rühe had 
‘access to the most important Americans’, allowing an active role not only in defence 
but also in foreign policy on his visit to the US.^  ^He was notably effective in using 
US support to strengthen his domestic position vis-à-vis Kinkel, especially over an 
acceleration of NATO enlargement. '^*
Rühe was aware of the sensitivity of the issue of giving a military dimension to CFSP. 
Within the context of the multiple veto points in the German political system, his 
salami tactics had been carefully deployed to bring on board key members of the 
opposition and of his coalition partner, the FDP, especially over monitoring the UN 
embargo on Serbia and Montenegro in 1993-96 and over Bosnia. The development of 
a common European defence policy had to be carefully managed within Germany. 
Rühe acted as a policy broker within his own party and the subsystem of defence and 
security policy. Rather than engaging in entrepreneurship on behalf of a common 
European defence policy, he was convinced that it could only be realised by salami 
tactics and a gradual move towards this goal.^^
‘Die konzeptionellen Defizite von Bundesaussenminister Klaus Kinkel’, in ‘neue Transatiantische 
Partnerschaft’, Handelsblatt, 2^^ . March 1995; see also ‘Gerangel zwischen richtigen und Mochtegem- 
Aussenminister, Rühe stiehlt Kinkel die Schau’, Der Tagesspiegel, 30/07/1996 
Rühe, V. ‘ Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Die Rolle der Bundeswehr’, Internationale Politik 4/1995,
p.28
“  Frankfurter Allgemeine article quoted in ‘Behutsam in den Krieg’, Der Spiegel, 12 June 1995 
^  Tewes, H. (1998) ‘Between Deepening and Widening, Role Conflict in Germany’s Enlargement 
Policy’, West European Politics, 21,
‘Immer waren seine Schritte dem Konsensus ein kleines Stück voraus’, in ‘Herr der Tmppe ohne 
Tmppe’, Die Zeit 18/10/1996, see also ‘Meister der Salamitaktik’ in ‘Verteidigung ist der Beste 
Angriff’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17/10/1996
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As a first step Rühe was keen to transform the Franco-German Brigade into 
Eurocorps (made operational in November 1995) and to strengthen Eurocorps as a 
multinational force of 50,000, joined by the Belgians and the Spanish. It was a first 
step towards the development of a European army that would give substance to CFSP 
and provide an insurance against US withdrawal of its forces from Europe. He also 
supported the strengthening of the German-Netherlands Corps in Münster.^^ 
Furthermore, Rühe backed strongly the assignment of the Eurocorps to the WEU, for 
whose future use it was 'made available'.However, above all he was keen to secure 
these moves to strengthen WEU as part of an emerging ESDI within the trans-Atlantic 
partnership. Hence Rühe did not follow the French in pressing for a rapid merger of 
the WEU into the EU. This approach helped to protect him against potential attack 
from Atlanticist members of his own party. It also ensured that this incremental 
development of a common European defence policy as a crisis-management 
capability under WEU auspices could be reconciled with the retention of territorial 
defence as the core policy image through NATO. In NATO and the WEU the Defence 
Ministry had greater potential to control policy outcomes than in the EU framework 
where foreign ministers were likely to be far more influential. A development of 
common European defence policy through WEU/NATO offered a better guarantee 
that the principle of a conscript Bundeswehr could be defended.
Rühe's policy initiative was also designed to take the initiative from the French in 
developing a common European defence policy and thereby ensure that moves in this 
direction were consistent with German strategic interests. By leaving the initiative to 
the French government the prospects of painful embarrassments and difficult choices 
for the German government would be increased. The French conception of a common 
European defence policy was much more about moving away from the reliance on the 
US and NATO as a security provider. Rühe and Kohl did not see NATO, the US and 
a common European defence policy as mutually exclusive.^^ Having at first ‘sounded
^  ‘Hochste Zeit fiir eine grundlegende Reform’, Das Parlament, 1-8 September 1995 
Forster, A. ‘The EU and the WEU’ in Moens, A and Anstis, C. (eds.) (1994) Disconcerted Europe, 
The Search for a New Security Architecture’ (Oxford, Westview) pp.48-75 
Hendriks and Morgan (2001) The Franco-German Axis in European Integration, p .ll2 . See also 
Interview with Volker Rühe in ‘Hier wird wirklich Europaisch gedacht’, Rheinischer Merkur/Christ 
und Welt, 29/12/1995, Interviewer, ‘The Europeans alone?’ Rühe, ‘Yes, also alone. Therefore 1 am for 
a strengthening of European capabilities, a strenghthening that does not go against the US but also 
complements US capabihties’.
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out’ and reassured the Americans by visiting the US, Rühe called for the 
strengthening of European capabilities to respond to crises within Europe, to ensure 
that ‘a situation such as Yugoslavia would not be allowed to develop in the first 
p l a c e H e  was conscious that the period leading up to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
would set the context for any agreement on how Europe was going to move toward a 
common defence policy7° Consequently, in Rühe’s eyes, how the Bosnia crisis was 
handled and the lessons that were learnt from the wars of succession in the former 
Yugoslavia were of great importance to the future development of the EU.
Rühe began to use the rhetoric of Kohl before the Maastricht summit, and stressed 
how the EU was a ‘matter of war and peaceAccording to this logic, Rühe argued 
that the next step for the great ‘ Friedensmaschine ’ of the EU was to give up 
sovereignty in the area of the armed forces.^^ Rühe and Kohl hoped that the WEU 
would provide a framework within which the tensions between Atlanticists and 
Europeanists could be reconciled, with the WEU acting as a bridge between the 
NATO and the EU. Hence Rühe supported the Combined Joint Task Forces proposal 
in 1994 because it opened up the possibility for NATO command and control 
structures to be placed under WEU operational command in the conduct of missions 
supporting the Petersburg tasks.^^
1995-96 was a critical juncture for ESDI. Jacques Chirac's election as French 
President in May 1995 was associated with a characteristically Gaullist attempt to 
make defence the key axis of French EU policy. This had a number of advantages. It 
resonated with hostile views against US hegemony in defence across the political 
spectrum. Also, it built European integration around a defence pillar where France 
was seen as having a comparative advantage, not least over Germany. It was, 
however, clear from past experience that any French initiative on European defence 
that was built on hostility to the US would fail. In December 1995 President Chirac 
closed the gap between French and German thinking by accepting that CESDP must
‘Hier wird wirkhch Europaisch gedacht’, Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt 29*. December 1995 
'Deutsche Kontingent bis 2000 Maim -  Einsatz im Juh', Welt am Sonntag 11* June 1995 
‘Hier wird wirkhch Europaisch gedacht’, Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt 29*. December 1995 
‘Hier wird wirkhch Europaisch gedacht’, Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt 29*. December 1995 
‘Neue transatiantische Partnerschaft: Volker Rühe zimmert an einem aussenpohtishen Konzept’, 
Handelsblatt, 01/03/1995
249
be built from within NATO through Europeanising NATO^^. This redefinition of the 
French position suited the CDU/CSU very well as it allowed the development of a 
crisis reaction capability, whilst retaining the dominant policy monopoly and image of 
territorial defence and conscription. At the July 1996 NATO council in Berlin the US 
accepted this agenda and stipulated that the WEU could be asked to carry out a 
military role in purely European conflicts.
This French move facilitated the Franco-German ‘common strategic concept’ of 
December 1996. For the first time they jointly defined the objectives of a common 
defence policy. Crucially, the French government conceded the principle of ‘parity’ 
between French and Germany and discussion of the role of nuclear deterrence within 
ESDI. The signal was that Franco-German defence co-operation could be pursued in 
multilateral structures and that France rejected a special leadership role. Germany was 
happy to embrace NATO reform, bringing it closer to OSCE and thereby allay 
Russian fears. The basis for a joint Franco-German concept of ESDI was laid, 
reducing dependence on, but not seeking independence from the US.^^
These external changes were critical in shifting the debate in Germany. By these 
interlinked French and NATO moves Rühe was emboldened to become a policy 
broker and seek a revision of German positions on CESDP. He redefined CESDP as a 
means of increasing German weight and influence vis-à-vis the United States in the 
post-Cold War world, without disrupting this strategic partnership. Similarly, through 
ESDI he saw a means of strengthening the Federal Defence Ministry's domestic 
weight and influence within the federal core executive, in particular by upgrading the 
importance of defence as a component of a more active German diplomacy on the 
international stage.^  ^Underpinning this political strategy for ESDI was an attempt to 
project an image of Rühe as an active, world-rank politician who was the number one 
foreign policy expert of the CDU and a candidate for the highest office once Kohl 
retired.^^
Cole, A (2001) Franco-German Relations (Pearson, Longman), p,118 
Cole, A (2001) Franco-German Relations (Pearson, Longman), p. 104-118 
‘Gerangel zwischen richtigen und mochtegem-Aussenminister’, Der Tagesspiegel, 30/08/1996 
‘Kronprinz in Feldgrau’ in Die Woche, 06/10/1995, see also ‘Auf dem Weg zum GipfeP, Die 
Woche, 14/08/1998
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Whilst Rühe was keen to act as policy entrepreneur on behalf of ESDI, he was much 
more cautious about how it should be given substance. He used the Bosnia crisis - and 
especially events in Srebrenica - to argue that the time had come for Germany to 
actively stand against genocide in Europe and that such a strategy for Germany 
required being part of a European military structure that was capable of acting in a 
crisis prevention role.^* However, in developing his ideas on ESDI in a more practical 
form, Rühe was very much the policy broker who was keen to ensure that an ESDI 
did not challenge the dominant domestic policy monopoly of territorial and alliance 
defence. He proved a very skilful policy leader in the strategic context that faced him, 
heroic in vision, but humdrum on detail. This leadership mix was reconciled in his 
consistent salami tactics in developing a crisis prevention role for the Bundeswehr, 
whilst not challenging a domestic political context that was deeply wedded to 
territorial defence and conscription.
Crucial to the way in which Rühe conceived ESDI was his shared view with Kohl that 
Germany was historically deeply indebted to the United States, and that the 
unqualified support of the Bush Administration for rapid German unification in 1989- 
90 had increased this indebtedness.^^ Hence Kohl was not prepared to be used by the 
French government to develop an ESDI in opposition to the United States. Rather, 
first and foremost, ESDI must emerge from the process of Europeanisation of NATO, 
with US support at every stage. For Rühe NATO and the WEU were the prime 
institutional venues in which ESDI would develop. He instrumentalised the WEU to 
give operational expression to European policy and project the role of the Defence 
Ministry. This position suited the bureaucratic interests and reflected the established 
institutional culture and identity of the Federal Defence Ministry. It was the condition 
under which Rühe could sponsor and support ESDI without conceding political 
weight and influence to the Foreign Ministry. Above all, Rühe ensured an optimal 
‘uploading’ of German policy preferences and practices in the WEU's Petersburg 
tasks. This conception supported role change in the Bundeswehr without challenging 
the continuance of territorial defence and conscription as the primary rationale and
Rühe, V, 'Bilanz und Perspektiven, Eine Bewertung des Bundesministers der Verteidigung’, Soldat 
und Technik 1/1996, p. 11-12 
Interviews, Herr Thomas Schiller (CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter, Office of Karl 
Lamers MdB, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Aussenpolitik) Berlin, November 15th. 
2001 and 14th. Febuary 2002.
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basis of the German armed forces. In the context of a public that was sensitive to the 
issue of intervention and a constraining domestic political context, the use of NATO - 
and WEU as a bridge to the EU - as the institution in which the first steps toward a 
stronger ESDI was to be taken enabled Rühe to reconcile new and traditional roles. In 
this way the creation of an ESDI would not threaten the dominant policy monopoly 
within Germany.
This policy leadership role depended on Rühe's skills in routing ESDI through the 
institutional venues of NATO and WEU. In this way he could keep ESDI business 
away from the regular meetings of the European State Secretaries, which were chaired 
by the Foreign Ministry. Once CESDP business got into the European State 
Secretaries Committee, it was much more likely to escape out of the defence and 
security policy subsystem into the macro-political context. A change of institutional 
venue increased the prospects of a more radical approach to ESDI with a consequent 
threatening 'misfit' between EU requirements and the Bundeswehr's operational 
capabilities.
The control of information and promotion of policy-orientated learning was crucial to 
Rühe's policy broker role. Within the Defence Ministry and NATO these processes 
were facilitated by figures such as Naumann and Manfred Womer.^^ As secretary- 
general of NATO, with very close contacts to Naumann, Worner was important in 
working with the WEU to secure the definition of the Petersburg tasks. Naumann and 
Womer were also important in ensuring that policy learning about the need for a 
stronger crisis prevention role did not lead to a 'politics of punctuation', affecting core 
policy beliefs, but instead altered only ‘secondary aspects’ of the domestic policy 
monopoly and image. As shown in chapter 4, Rühe was also active in seeking to 
promote policy-orientated learning within the coalition parties and also the opposition 
parties. Rühe’s leadership traits and style were an important part of his broker role. 
Despite his reputation as a 'yob’, Rühe demonstrated important conciliatory and 
mobilizing skills, combining the cultivation of agreement around clear policy goals 
with decisional assertiveness.
so Interviews, NATO, Brussels, 16“’ and 17*. September 2002
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In conclusion, Rühe's policy leadership skills were vital to the way in which 
Europeanisation affected the Bundeswehr. He played an active role in seeking to 
‘uploading’ German policy preferences and practices in such a way that 'misfit' and 
major adaptational pressure to the core policy beliefs about the Bundeswehr were 
avoided. CESDP was carefully managed by keeping it within the institutional venues 
of NATO and the WEU where the Defence Ministry was the primary player and the 
Committee of European State Secretaries could be kept on the margins. This 
institutional venue management ensured that Rühe retained privileged access to Kohl, 
especially in preparing key NATO Council meetings where the role of the WEU was 
discussed (notably in Brussels in January 1994, Berlin in June 1996, and Madrid in 
July 1997). The Berlin meeting was especially important in gaining approval for 
Rühe's concept of building a ESDI within NATO through the Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) structure, including its reference to 'the use of separable but not separate 
military capabilities in operations led by the WEU'. Rühe's view of the prime need to 
embed ESDI in the Atlantic framework of NATO was upheld in that the United States 
would still have an effective veto on any WEU-led operations through the need for 
North Atlantic Council approval for the use of NATO assets.
Rühe was determined that the Defence Ministry should not be as marginalized in the 
definition of German positions during 1996 for the IGC preparing the Amsterdam 
Treaty as it had during the Maastricht negotiations. Kohl was determined to make 
progress towards a 'Communitarisation' of CFSP as a key to closer European political 
union, notably through the extension of qualified majority voting. Crucially, 
strengthening CFSP commanded wide domestic political consensus across party 
boundaries and high public support.^  ^Kohl also saw an opportunity to put the 
opposition SPD and Greens under pressure at a time when they lacked internal 
consensus about developing a common European defence policy, with many key 
figures rejecting a 'militarisation' of the EU. The Defence Ministry's influence in the 
development of German negotiating positions was apparent in the emphasis on 
constructing European capabilities in defence and security policy within the European 
pillar of NATO. The Foreign Ministry's contribution was seen in the longer-term
Schmalz, U. ‘Die europaisierte Macht -  Deutschland in der Aussen und Sicherheitspolitik’, in 
Schneider, H. Jopp, M. and Schmalz, U. (eds.) (2002) Eine neue Deutsche Europapolitik?, 
Rahmenbedingungen -  Problem/elder -  Optionen (Bonn, Europa Union Verlag) p. 551
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perspective of a common defence through incorporation of the Petersburg tasks in the 
EU Treaty, the step-by-step integration of the WEU into the EU, and the introduction 
of a solidarity clause. However, crucially, the idea of a phased fusion of the WEU into 
the EU collapsed because of British resistance.
6.5 Fischer, Scharping and the Europeanisation of Defence and Security Policy: 
The Legacy of Opposition
Crucial to the relationship over ESDP between Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister, 
and Rudolf Scharping, the Defence Minister, in the Schroder government was the 
different directions in which they had led their parties in foreign and security policy in 
the opposition period. Before the 1998 federal elections both had sought to position 
the Greens and the SPD respectively as govemments-in-waiting. Scharping's key 
objective was to Atlanticise the SDP by promoting ESDI within the NATO 
framework. In this process his relationship with Solana, the NATO general 
secretary, was important.^^ Above all for electoral strategic reasons, Scharping sought 
respectability for the SPD as a party to be trusted to handle defence and security 
within government. This was to be achieved by the aligning the SPD with the theme 
of Europeanising NATO. For Fischer the central issue was a European defence and 
security policy within the framework of the EU's CFSP. This framework offered a 
better opportunity to pursue the Green's agenda of a strong civilian and crisis- 
prevention dimension to defence and security through multilateral agreement and 
action. Fischer's commitment was evident in his first speech to the European 
Parliament on 12 January 1999 when he referred to ESDP as the next important stage 
in the deepening of the EU after the Single Market programme and Economic and 
Monetary Union.^ "^  Accordingly, neither Fischer nor Scharping challenged
See ‘Solana, NATO-Einsatze ohne mandat der UN sind moglich’ 20/01/1998 and see also ‘Die 
NATO als Dreh- und Angelpunkt: Das Transatlantische Verhaltnis war Thema einer Konferenz der 
SPD-Bundestagsfraktion im Berliner Willy-Brandt-Haus’, Neues Deutschland, 21/01/1998. For the 
role of Karsten Voigt and Rudolf Scharping in fashioning Atlanticist consensus in SPD see also ‘In 
Germany, a formal Burial for Anti-NATO Past’, International Herald Tribune, 21.01.1998. See also 
‘Aussenpolitischer Kongress: Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts’, 18/06/1997 for internal debate 
within SPD.
Interview, Jürgen Schnappertz, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Referent, Office of Peter Struck, Berlin, 5th 
August 2002, see also NATO Generalsekretar bei Scharping’, SPD Pressemitteilung, 01/02/1996 
'^'‘Fischer: Meine Partei kann sich nicht beschweren: Mit Schroder einig in der Europapolitik’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.01.1999
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departmental thinking. Scharping was not a minister who was ever likely to challenge 
the Defence Ministry to become more Europeanised by reorientating its strategic 
thinking and force structures around the EU. Conversely, Fischer's thinking was 
consistent with thinking within the planning staff of the Foreign Ministry where 
officials were pressing for a stronger element of EU strategic thinking in defence and 
security policy and wishing to move away from conscription.^^
However, Fischer's policy leadership role was constrained by three factors. Firstly, the 
Green party emerged from the 1998 federal elections as very much the junior 
coalition partner, having underperformed in relation to the electoral potential 
exhibited before the pre-election party conference. Fischer was successful in getting 
top priority to CFSP in the coalition agreement, but an end to conscription was ruled 
out. Secondly, Schroder had no background or interest in defence and security policy 
and was content to place a politician in whom he had little confidence and trust in the 
Defence Ministry.^^ Thirdly, Scharping had little, if any political credit and support on 
which to draw in coalition and party negotiations. He brought no extra political 
leverage to the Defence Ministry. Fischer had greater leverage as both the leading 
figure in the Green party and deputy Chancellor and consistently the most popular 
figure in the federal government.®  ^Even so, it was difficult to translate these 
advantages into policy entrepreneurship over defence and security policy where 
Scharping guarded the competence of the Defence Ministry. For Scharping and his 
ministry the Foreign Ministry could legitimately focus on the institutional questions 
thrown up by designing ESDP. However, capability questions were a matter for the 
Defence Ministry. This division of competence was seen as essential if territorial 
defence and conscription were to be retained as the essential pillars of the 
Bundeswehr.
‘Die Geschichte hat die Entscheidung zur EU-Erweiterung gefallt. Wir miissen sie jetzt vollziehen’, 
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 16.01.99
See also ‘Fischer: Nach Euro muss Europa Verteidigungsidentitat aufbauen’, DPA, 171340, November 
1998
^  See ‘On Wednesday the Staatsminister in the Foreign Ministry, Ludger Volmer (Green) registered 
the claims of his Ministry to influence on the reform. Volmer stated: ,The Foreign Ministry has overall 
control over security policy, and in the discussions about the consequences of the reform for security 
policy we have one or two words to say’.in ‘Auswartiges Amt pocht auf Mitsprache bei 
Bundeswehrreform’ Berliner Zeitung, 25.05.2000 
^  Interview, Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2°“* September 2002 
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and he has now made it it the east. 62% of all those asked see the Foreign Minister as the most 
trustworthy politician in the country’, Der Tagesspiegel, 25.03.2003
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An active German role in developing ESDP in 1999 - led by Fischer - was surprising 
given these constraints, a past German reluctance to lead on military issues, and a 
Red/Green coalition containing a pronounced pacifist tradition. A key factor was the 
transition of the SPD and the Greens from opposition parties to government. This 
shift of macro-political realities altered the framework in which defence and security 
policy was considered. There were top-down pressures from within NATO and the 
EU to which the new government had to respond. A second factor was the steepness 
of the learning curve because on 1 January 1999 the new Schroder government had to 
assume the EU Presidency. In doing so they were confronted by the new opportunity 
that was opened by the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration to give a central role to 
ESDP in the EU Presidency.*^ Crucially, the learning curve was made even steeper by 
the Kosovo crisis and war, which forced urgent and very difficult decisions about 
whether and how to engage the Bundeswehr. Clear positions could not be evaded. 
Like earlier events in Bosnia -  especially the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 -  the 
Kosovo War was vital in altering the debate on ESDP within the SPD and the Green 
party. It provided a window of opportunity for advocates of a more active German 
policy in developing a European crisis reaction capability to create a 'crisis 
consciousness'. This policy could be more readily legitimated within the political Left 
by situating it within the context of the development of an ESDP that was the next 
stage in European political unification. Kosovo was a critical event in enabling the 
SPD and Green leaderships to carve out a defence and security policy within a 
European framework.^^ Though there were considerable difficulties with pacifist
See ‘Less than eight months from national elections the Social Democrats believe they can win, the 
intent could not be clearer. The party took aim at a domestic audience and tried to say again, with a few 
nuances, that it has undergone a conversion, definitively endorsing the mainstream of the Atlantic 
Alliance viewpoints’, in ‘In Germany, a formal Burial for Anti-NATO Past’, International Herald 
Tribune, 21.01,1998.
See speech by Chancellor Schroder to the 35"'. Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 
February, 1999.
^  Interview, Herr Helmut Huber, Referent, Büro Angelika Beer, Griinen/Biindnis 90 
Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 18th. July 2002, ‘Die Kosovo-Krise wirkt wie ein Katalysator’ Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 24.03.2000
Interview, Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th. June 2003; Dirk Sawitzky, Referent, Büro Gemot Erler, 
Berlin, 17th. July, 2002; Herr Helmut Huber, Referent, Büro Angelika Beer, Grünen/Bündnis 90; June 
2002, Kristian Gaiser, Leiter, Referat Westeuropa/EU, SPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, 12th.November 
2001; Dr. Wolfgang Biermann, Leiter, Referat Internationale Politik, SPD Parteivorstand,, Berlin, 3rd. 
September 2002. See also Der Kosovo-Krieg und seine Lehren’, Bericht von der Kommission 
Internationale Politik, beim SPD Parteivorstand, November 2001’. See also ‘The Future of the CFSP’ 
Social Democratic Views on the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: A Stock- 
Taking of the SPD Group in the Bundestag’, November 2000.
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views, notably in the Greens, the result was a new domestic consensus, which was 
ratified at the SPD’s Berlin party conference in December 1999. This emerging 
consensus formed the basis for a newly active German role over ESDP at the Cologne 
and Helsinki European Councils in 1999. Indeed, the Helsinki European Council 
marked the symbolic turning point from ESDI to CESDP, to agreement on developing 
a common European security and defence policy within the framework of the EU.^^
Even without the Kosovo war, the new Schroder government coincided with the 
implications of agenda-setting on European defence in the Franco-British St. Malo 
Declaration of 4 December 1998. On the one hand, this event caused some political 
embarrassment for Schroder who had indicated in the federal election campaign that 
he would be giving greater stress to Anglo-German relations within the EU. Here, in a 
key issue area, France and Britain were setting the agenda for the new German EU 
Presidency. The St. Malo Declaration was a challenge to flesh out how the European 
Council should assume the responsibility to decide on the progressive framing of a 
common defence policy within the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty's provisions 
on CFSP. On the other hand, the St. Malo Declaration represented a window of 
opportunity to pursue traditional German policy interests in strengthening CFSP by 
giving it a military component.^^
Hence the Schroder government was confronted with three pressing challenges: the 
EU Presidency, the St. Malo Declaration, and the Kosovo crisis and war. Its response 
was framed within the emphasis laid on continuity in the government's policy 
statements on foreign and European policies. ESDP continued to be seen as a 
necessary and desirable aspect of the European political union that was Germany's top 
priority. However, it was also bound up with differences of view within the new 
government about the Franco-German relationship. For Fischer the Franco-German 
relationship remained the essential motor for European unification, and ESDP was the 
next main project in this process.^ "^  For some in the Chancellor's Office - notably
Howorth, J. Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative, Survival, vol.42, no.2. Summer 
2000, pp.33-55
Howorth, J. Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative, Survival, vol.42, no.2. Summer 
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Interview, Michael Alvarez, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Berlin, 13' .^ November 2001; see also 
Teunissen, P. (1999) Strengthening the Defence Dimension of the EU, An Evaluation of Concepts, 
Recent Initiatives and Developments’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.4, p.340
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around Hombach, its new head - other relationships - especially with the British - 
offered an opportunity for a more influential German role.^  ^The key problem for 
Fischer was the difference between French and German strategic cultures. The 
civilian-based German concept of security (reinforced by the Greens) contrasted with 
the more realist and military-based French approach.^^ Also, the German 'bridge' 
concept of ESDP was difficult to reconcile with French distance from NATO and 
identification of ESDP with independence from the US. German caution stemmed 
from fear that France might tempt Germany into a European initiative that 
undermined NATO and the German security partnership with the US. The earlier 
Franco-German initiatives of the Kohl-Mitterrand period -  the Franco-German 
Defence Council, the Franco-German brigade and the Eurocorps -  had been accepted 
on condition that they did not threaten NATO.
The past policy leadership of Chancellor Kohl on ESDI was crucial in setting the 
terms in which the new Red/Green government debated ESDP in the framework of 
the Kosovo war and of the St. Malo Declaration. For Kohl ESDI had to be part of a 
Europeanisation of NATO. Rühe’s policy brokerage and ‘salami tactics’ on behalf of 
a stronger ESDI and the Franco-German recognition that an ESDI had be achieved 
through the WEU and the Europeanisation of NATO offered Kohl an opportunity to 
put pressure on the SPD and Greens as ‘unreliable’ in European policy.^^ Rühe and 
Kohl acted to shift the consensus. In turn, this combination of external changes with 
the use made of this issue by the Kohl government made it possible for Scharping and 
Fischer to act as policy leaders on ESDI within their parties. By March 1996 Oskar 
Lafontaine as new SPD chair had convened a joint study group on security with the 
French Socialist Party. This study group advocated a concentration on strengthening 
and rationalizing the European armament industry as a precondition for ESDI.
Lafontaine's attempt to push for greater Franco-German co-operation in generating 
new policy ideas brought out the profound ambivalence in SPD attitudes to defence 
and security. On the one hand, Lafontaine was ideologically committed to European 
political union around the Franco-German motor and wanted to give it a new centre-
Interview, Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2“^ . September 2002 
^  ‘Andreani, G, (2000) ‘Why Institutions Matter’, Survival, Vol.42, No.2, p.94 
Interview, Michael Alvarez, Henrich Boll Stiftung, Berlin, 13th. November 2001, Interview, Bemd 
Weber, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th. August 2002
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left dimension. He also saw electoral strategic advantage in the domestic legitimation 
of new policy thinking by stressing its European dimension. On the other hand, 
Lafontaine was uncomfortable with French strategic culture. On matters of defence 
and security he - like Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul - was closer to Swedish and 
Finnish ideas about the importance of the civilian dimension. In consequence, 
Lafontaine hesitated to pursue the Franco-German motor in defence and security 
policy, preferring to align the SPD with Swedish and Finnish proposals in the 
negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty.^^
More pressingly, events in Bosnia offered Kohl and Rühe an opportunity to label the 
SPD and the Greens as unreliable. As chapter 4 showed, the main turning point was 
the Bundestag debates of 13 and 30 June 1995. Fischer, as the Green's parliamentary 
speaker, spelt out the limitations of a pacifist policy, referring to Germany's historic 
and moral responsibility to confront ethnic cleansing in Europe. Even so, despite 
Fischer's policy entrepreneurship, the Green's official position had been an essentially 
civilian approach based on the OSCE and WEU, rather than NATO. As late as the 
European Parliamentary election of 1999 the Green's manifesto stressed that the EU 
does not require a military arm. However, deteriorating opinion poll figures before the 
1998 federal elections encouraged Fischer to be more forceful in its rejection of a ‘go- 
it-alone’ pacifist policy. The exigencies of staging a recovery before the federal 
elections and ensuring that the Greens were koalitionsfahig with the SPD 
strengthened his hand on Green security policy.^^ Hence in the coalition agreement of 
October 1998 there was no problem of signing the Greens up to creating an ESDI, 
including the further development of the WEU, within the framework of a 
strengthened, 'more Communaritised' CFSP. The fact that CFSP was the only EU 
policy area that was the subject of an individual chapter in the Red/Green coalition 
agreement indicated that the new government was likely to prioritise an active role in 
this area. However, Kosovo was to test the unity of the Greens/Bündnis 90 to its limit, 
with Fischer forced to plead his case before a special party conference. For Fischer 
ESDP was a response to a policy problem - genocide in Europe - and part of the 
politics of sustaining coalition with the SPD.
Interview, Axel Scxhneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheit, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 
4th. September 2002
^  Interview, Michael Alvarez, Henrich Boll Stiftung, Berlin, 13th. November 2001; Herr Helmut 
Huber, Referent, Büro Angelika Beer, Grünen/Bündnis 90, Berlin, 18th. July 2002
259
In government, as foreign minister, Fischer again played the role of policy leader on 
behalf of CESDP. Fischer used the Kosovo crisis to bring home to Germans that the 
issue was not one of whether Germany joins in an ESDI dedicated to working for 
peace and preventing humanitarian disasters. It was about Germany playing a leading 
role in this process because of its special historical responsibility.Fischer’s role as 
entrepreneur was facilitated by his position as leader of the smaller coalition partner 
in government and by his ongoing identification with this issue, over which he had 
scored a resounding victory over the pacifist wing within his own party.
Above all, the St. Malo Declaration and the Kosovo war provided him with the 
opportunity as new Foreign Minister to make ESDP a central agenda item for the 
informal meeting of EU foreign ministers on 13-14 March in Reinhartshausen, the 
Franco-German summit in Toulouse on 29 May, and the Cologne European Council 
in June 1999. At the March meeting he gained agreement for an EU Military 
Committee and for the future Political and Security Committee, as well as pressed for 
the integration of the WEU into the EU. The symbiosis between Fischer’s policy 
ambitions and the Europeanist bias of the Foreign Ministry created a facilitative 
environment to act as a policy entrepreneur on this issue.^^  ^Fischer was constrained 
by the coalition agreement, which stipulated that the Greens would not make the 
abolition of conscription a coalition issue. At the same time neither he nor his party 
had a stake in the retention of the policy monopoly of territorial defence and 
conscription. Thus Fischer’s strategic political context meant that he was in a position 
to advocate a stronger emphasis upon EU crisis prevention forces, without having to 
face the consequences of the resulting ‘top-down’ pressures from the EU. These 
pressures would fall instead upon the Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, and 
Finance Minister, Hans Eichel. The SPD was more vulnerable to the implications of 
pursuing ESDP.
Scharping had played a different kind of leadership role in opposition - as policy 
broker rather than entrepreneur. This matched his less heroic leadership style than
Interview, Michael Alvarez, Henrich Boll Stiftung, Berlin, 13th. November 2001; Herr Helmut 
Huber, Referent, Büro Angelika Beer, Grünen/Bündnis 90, Berlin, 18th July 2002.
Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. (2000) Germany’s European Diplomacy (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press), p,25
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Fischer's. As chapter 4 showed, the debate in the SPD about the use of force had been 
triggered by the Gulf War. Lafontaine aligned himself with the pacifist left; Scharping 
spoke to the centrist majority in limiting any German involvement to UN 
peacekeeping operations; whilst a sizeable minority was prepared to envisage a 
German military involvement under a UN Security Council resolution. Scharping 
backed the SPD’s appeal of the issue of ‘out-of-area’ intervention to the Federal 
Constitutional Court in 1994 as a means of breaking the intra-party deadlock. This 
ruling - and Bosnia - played a catalytic role in helping a grouping around Scharping, 
Verheugen and Voigt to create a new consensus within the SPD.^ ®^  The lack of a 
consensus was clear in the Bundestag vote on Bosnia in June 1995. 55 SPD deputies 
voted against German participation in IFOR .
The SPD's federal executive established the ZukunftsKommission under Scharping 
with two functions: to establish a new consensus in the SPD on European security, 
and to ensure consensus with the Kohl government so that the SPD did not expose a 
weak flank that the CDU/CSU could attack in the 1998 federal elections.^^  ^The crisis 
in Bosnia had led to a polarization between the old left, who opposed German military 
involvement unless it was under a UN mandate, and reformers such as Scharping and 
Voigt who argued that Germany had a special moral responsibility to act to stop 
genocide. The Commission was a tool with which to help forge a consensus within 
the SPD to avoid a similar situation to the SPD party conference in 1995 where 
foreign policy issues polarized the party between Lafontaine and Scharping. By the 
May 1997 SPD European conference Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, deputy party chair, 
was using the joint Swedish/Finnish initiative on European security to seek out a 
consensus on bringing the WEU into the EU. Hence she advocated the inclusion of 
the Petersburg tasks in the forthcoming Amsterdam Treaty and stressed the 
importance of developing the civilian capabilities of the EU in crisis prevention and
Interview, Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5‘ June 2003
‘Die SPD schafft sich ein Guetesiegel: Der neue aussenpolitische Ansatz soli der Partei Profil 
geben’, Saarbriicker Zeitung, 19/06/1997; ‘Sozialdemokraten setzen auf eine berechenbare 
Aussenpolitik,’ Handelsblatt, 19/06/1997; ‘SPD sucht neues aussenpofitisches Profil’, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 19/06/1997
‘Parteitag der SPD in Mannheim, 14-17 November 1995,’ Beschlusse
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conflict resolution. By appealing in this way to two ‘neutrals’ as models, she situated 
the SPD in a framework more acceptable to the pacifist wing of the party.
The work of the Scharping Commission was supplemented by a number of 
conferences and by visits from prominent figures to provide it with information and 
analysis. In particular, as mentioned above, Aussenpolitischer Kongress: 
Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts (Foreign Policy Congress: The Challenges 
of the 21^. Century) in 1997 was an important event, showing a new public face to 
SPD foreign and security policy. These events continued into 1998 with a public 
symposium on the trans-Atlantic relationship in January 1998, including John 
Kornblum, the US Ambassador. An important visitor at this symposium was NATO 
General Secretary Javier Solana, who had previously visited Scharping and the SPD 
Bundestag parliamentary party in February 1996. The symposium was important for 
Scharping and Voigt as a means by which to place increasing pressure on 
traditionalists within the SPD who did not fully endorse mainstream Atlantic alliance 
viewpoints. Scharping and Voigt were keen to ensure that the party publicly sustained 
its image as competent on issues of foreign and security policy by narrowing 
differences with Kohl. According to others within the SPD, Solana (a former 
Socialist foreign minister in Spain and earlier an opponent of Spanish entry into 
NATO) proved to be.a very influential figure within the SPD. He brought home the 
necessity for the SPD to consider acting outside of a UN mandate, thereby helping to 
put in place the building blocks for the SPD’s involvement in Kosovo.^^^
At the November 1997 SPD conference the Scharping Commission’s report was 
adopted. It recommended that the WEU should be built up as the European pillar of 
NATO, allowing a greater role for Europe if the US should lose the will to intervene 
in European crises. On this basis ESDI was included in the Red/Green coalition 
agreement, especially strengthening of the WEU within the EU framework, reforming
Interview, Axel Schneider, Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 
10th. September 2002
‘Die SPD befiirwortet die erweiterung von NATO und EU’, Frankfurter AUegmeine, 19/07/1997 
and SPD auf neuem aussepolitischem Kurs: Scharping fiir grossere Beteiligung der Bundeswehr bei 
Auslandseinsatzen -  Kongress in Bonn’, Die Welt, 19/06/1997
Interview with Jürgen Schnappertz, Referent, Büro Peter Struck, Berlin, 5th August 2002; also 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 'Solana, NATO-Einsatze ohne Mandat der UN sind moglich’, 20 
January 1998
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NATO so that its aims were more consistent with the OSCE and the UN Charter, and 
reforming the Bundeswehr on the basis of a broader concept of security.
Whilst the SPD was forced to modernise its defence and security policy as a result of 
Rühe’s salami tactics and of changes in the security environment, it remained wary of 
‘positive feedback’ that might undermine the dominant policy monopoly of territorial 
defence. The potential costs to the SPD were too uncertain. Thus, despite the 
reservations of Verheugen and Heidemarie Wiezoreck-Zeul about conscription, this 
question and the critical issue of Bundeswehr reform were postponed until after the 
1998 elections (see chapter 4). As within the Defence Ministry under Rühe, it was 
safer for the party leadership to empower traditionalists who defended the policy 
monopoly. Scharping's role as policy broker rather than entrepreneur was shown in 
the way in which he adopted a more conservative position on conscription than he had 
originally advocated. Nevertheless, as chapter 4 showed, the effect of the debate 
within the SPD before the 1998 federal elections was to stimulate policy-orientated 
learning. This learning did not affect ‘deep core’ policy beliefs, and thereby cause a 
‘politics of punctuation’, but it did extend to secondary aspects and to the policy core 
of the belief systems within the SPD.
Thus, during the period of presenting the SPD as a govemment-in-waiting, Scharping 
and Voigt played an important role in modernizing its defence and security policy. An 
important part of this role was the promotion of policy-orientated learning within the 
SPD. After the Bosnia crisis and Srebrenica massacre the SPD was more receptive to 
learning. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Scharping and Voigt promoted 
policy-orientated learning through conferences and visits of high-level international 
politicians and representatives of international institutions, notably Solana. However, 
Scharping had been keen to ensure that the SPD did not move towards the French 
conception of CESDP -  as a challenge to the primacy of NATO. Scharping's central 
objective was to get the party to accept the Atlanticist position and recognize NATO 
as the core institution of German defence and security policy. In so far as 
Scharping can be labelled a policy entrepreneur, his entrepreneurship was about
Interview, Herr Kristian Gaiser (Head of European Policy, SPD Parteivorstand), Berlin, 12' 
November 2001
109 Interview, Rudolf Scharping, S'** June 2003.
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promoting NATO as a security organization and ESDI as part of the WEU and the 
‘European pillar' of NATO, able to act if the US lost interest in Europe/^^
The legacy of opposition was a Red/Green government in which Fischer and 
Scharping represented different strands of thought about European defence and 
security policy. The new Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, had been out of the internal 
SPD circuit reviewing defence and security. His contribution was to frame the new 
importance of ESDP, consequent on the St. Malo Declaration and Kosovo, within a 
policy discourse that emphasised a more self-confident German role in Europe. 
Schroder saw in ESDP an instrument to give a new international profile to Germany 
by working together with the two major European military powers, Britain and 
France, in designing this new initiative. The combined German Presidencies of the 
EU and of the WEU in early 1999 offered a window of opportunity to achieve this 
profile through prioritising ESDP. Germany could play a special role as bridge 
between the European and the transatlantic dimensions of ESDP. Also, it was 
essential for Germany to be an active player in any core or leadership group that 
might be emerging in a fast-changing Europe. Such a group might well have a 
military dimension. However, Schroder was not prepared to make a linkage between 
ESDP and radical reform of the role and structures of the Bundeswehr away from a 
conscription force because of the potential domestic political costs. Both were 
secondary to the budget consolidation programme of the Finance Minister. The result 
was that by 2000 any notion of Germany as a leading player in developing ESDP had 
evaporated.
6.6 The Effects of CESDP on the Bundeswehr: The Weizsacker Commission as 
Agent of Europeanisation
Before the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 the influence of the EU on 
the Bundeswehr had been limited. CFSP had had little substantive effect on its roles 
and structures. The most concrete developments were the creation of the Franco- 
German Brigade and then Eurocorps in 1995. However as we have seen, Kosovo and
‘Integration statt isolation’, Vorwarts, Febuary, 1998; see also Rudolf Scharping in ‘Eine 
notwendige Partnerschaft fiir das 21. Jahrhundert, Nur eine nach aussen handlungs- und fiihrungsfahige 
EU bei der Bewaltigung der globalen Herausforderung ein starker Partner Amerikas sein kann’, 
19/01/1998
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the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia opened up the opportunity for those 
within the SPD and Greens pushing for a stronger defence dimension in the EU. The 
St. Malo Declaration of Britain and France in December 1998 and the Kosovo War of 
1999 acted to give momentum to the development of a European Rapid Reaction 
Force, so that Europe would be able to respond effectively to crises in the future.
Thus at Helsinki European Council in 1999 it was agreed that governments would 
commit themselves to Headline Goals and Capabilities Goals. The Headline Goals 
involved the development of a 'militarily self-sustaining' force - by 2003 - consisting 
of 50,000-60,0000 troops (15 brigades), deployable within 60 days, and able to 
remain in the field for up to 12 months. Its 'rapid response' elements were to be 
available and deployable far more quickly. Under the Capabilities Goals the 
governments pledged to increase and develop the capabilities of the troops involved in 
common operations, in areas such as the enhancement of European airlift resources, 
air transport command and naval support.
The Helsinki meeting of the European Council also set up new civil and military 
committees on the European level to co-ordinate the CESDP. The Political Committee 
for the CFSP became the Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of 
national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level and meeting on a regular basis. 
Advice to the PSC was to be provided by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), made 
up of the domestic chiefs of defence and their military delegates. The EU Military 
Staff (EUMS) in the Council worked to the EUMC.. The role of the EUMS was to 
give ‘early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersburg tasks 
including identification of European and multinational forces’. The institutions were 
voluntary and not attached formally to the Commission, but instead to the Council of 
Ministers.
The practical effects of Germany’s commitment to the Helsinki Headline Goals and 
the Capabilities Goals (goals that were mirrored in NATO’s Defence Capabilities 
Initiative) were to force a rethink about the roles and structures of the German armed 
forces. The Helsinki Headline Goals in effect codified the lessons of the Kosovo War, 
namely that the German armed forces were not in a situation to be able to carry out 
crisis-management tasks effectively. The conflict in Kosovo also served as a reminder 
to the Germans that common capabilities were critical to any potential European
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defence and security policy. The job of determining the future roles and structure of 
the Bundeswehr and interpreting the implications of the Kosovo War was given to the 
Commission 'Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr' under former 
federal president Richard von Weizsacker. This Commission acted as the key agency 
of Europeanisation of the Bundeswehr.
The implications of the CESDP for the Bundeswehr were recognized in the 
Weizsacker Commission's findings, which stressed the need for the Bundeswehr to 
orientate itself to the crisis-management tasks set out in the Helsinki Headline Goals. 
The ‘European perspective’ was of great importance to the Commission members, 
and hence its proposals were designed to enable the Bundeswehr to be increasingly 
used in operations under the auspices of the EU. This objective was embodied in 
chapter two of the report, entitled the ‘European Imperative’, which recognized that 
the future international credibility of the EU would depend on its ability to respond 
effectively to crisis situations.^^  ^The Kosovo War demonstrated the extent to which 
Germany and its European partners had fallen behind the US in areas such as high- 
technology weapons, leadership structure and communications systems, making joint 
operations with the US difficult.
In the Weizsacker Commission's view, the development of CESDP created two 
crucial challenges for German defence policy: co-operation and convergence in the 
procurement of weapons systems and force structures. Hence it recommended that the 
German government should launch a European political initiative, similar to the 
Maastricht convergence criteria for EMU, to harmonise European armed force 
reforms and reach joint European agreements on procurement of weapons systems.
In this way the Commission signalled that the participation of German armed forces 
within a European Rapid Reaction Force was on an equal footing to their 
commitments within the NATO alliance. However, the Commission did not see the 
commitments to NATO and the EU as mutually exclusive: the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative of NATO - affirmed at its summit in Washington DC in April 1999 - called
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, II ‘Der europaische 
Imperative
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, II ‘Der europaische 
Imperative
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for similar procurement to the Capabilities Goals of the EU. The Helsinki 
commitments were fully compatible with NATO requirements.
For the Weizsacker Commission, it was not only the commitments entered into at the 
European level that necessitated a ‘fundamental renewal’ of the German armed forces. 
This requirement was a consequence of the reality of increased involvement of the 
Bundeswehr in crisis -management tasks since the Karlsruhe ruling of 1994. The 
Helsinki Headline Goals acted to provide a European framework within which the 
Commission could legitimately recommend that German armed forces needed to be 
restructured -  not only as part of NATO and UN requirements but also as a crucial 
element of the next step in European unification.
As a result of these combined pressures -  from NATO, the EU and the practical 
experiences of crisis-management operations in the 1990s - the Commission 
determined that the armed forces should be re-structured to engage in crisis- 
management tasks. They were to comprise an operational forces component of 140,00 
troops, a peacetime strength of 240,000 troops, with 30,000 conscripts and build-up 
potential of 3000,000 troops, with a manpower reserve of 100,000. The Commission 
recommended that civilian posts be reduced to around 80,000 in order to free-up 
funds, which were to be used to increase investment in equipment for the Bundeswehr 
-  it was estimated that DM2-3 billion a year would be necessary for its adequate 
equipment.
Command structures were also to be made more efficient in order to increase the 
effectiveness of operational control. This took the form of an enhancement of the 
responsibility of the Chief of Staff for planning, command and control, and 
acquisition, and the centralisation of all ministerial functions in Berlin. In line with 
the Helsinki Headline Goals, multinationalisation of operational forces was to 
promoted by seeking integration alone the lines of the NATO Airborne Early Warning 
Forces and the pooling of European lift, reconnaissance and air defence resources. 
Equipment was also recognized as in need for modernization for the new crisis- 
management tasks, however only in co-operation with European partners. In line with 
the EU’s Capabilities Goals and NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative the 
Commission recommended that, in future, all equipment should be procured in
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agreement with EU partners and that large-scale equipment be procured and used 
mutually. The Commission also recommended that - in order to achieve savings for 
investment in the Bundeswehr - services in co-operation, maintenance, development, 
acquisition, logistics and training should be privatised.^^^
For the Weizsacker Commission the Helsinki Headlines Goals and the EU had a 
decisive influence as the imperative driving the reform. This demonstrates the 
important role that can be played by policy forums in the process of 
‘Europeanisation’. The Weizsacker Commission played a dual role in this process. 
Firstly, it acted as a conduit through which the EU was exerting top-down influence; 
the EU's goals were brought to bear on the reform debate. Secondly, the Commission 
(led here by Weizsacker) used European requirements as a means with which to place 
pressure upon the dominant policy image of territorial de f ence . I t  did so by 
providing not only a new policy image (crisis reaction) but also a new institution 
within which this new policy image could find a home (the EU). It was, in short, an 
agent of bottom-up Europeanisation. However, as chapter five illustrates, its influence 
as a policy forum for Europeanisation was limited because it did not include members 
of the macro-political system who carried responsibility for implementing its 
conclusions. The rapid internal learning process that Europeanised the work of the 
Commission (where Weizsacker's role was critical) was not matched within the wider 
political system which was only very limitedly Europeanised.
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung
Interview, Professor Helga Haftendom, Otto Suhr Institute, FU, Berlin (Mitglied Komission 
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr), Berlin, 27th. May 2003 
Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23^ ‘*. September 20(02. For von Weizsacker’s views (remarkably 
similiar to the conclusion of the Commission) see interveiw with Richard von Weizsacker in ‘Europa 
muss erwachsen werden’ Die Zeit 21.10.1999, where he states, ‘In ten years we must be in the situation 
to take care of stability in our own continent. Of course there will still be national armed forces. 
However, in the areas of early warning, logistics and air transport -  in the areas necessary for a Rapid 
Reaction Force -  we can finally begin. We can no longer afford to be so completely dependent [on the 
USA]. Certainly not when we have to reckon with such a unilateralism from the USA’.
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6.7 CESDP and the Problem of Institutional Credibility: Europeanisation versus 
Atlanticisation in the Defence Ministry
Whilst the Helsinki Headline Goals had an important, ilf not critical effect upon the 
report of the Weizsacker Commission, the same cannot be said of the reform proposed 
by Defence Minister Scharping. The Helsinki Headline; Goals were not an 
‘imperative’ in Scharping’s reform concept. The Wiezsiâcker Commission stressed 
how Germany faced ‘no threat to its territiory from its meighbours’ and recommended 
that the ‘yardstick for the Bundeswehr should be the capability to participate in two 
crisis-response operations’.H o w ev er, Scharping’s reiform concept continued to 
stress territorial defence as the ’core task of the Germam armed forces’, a task that 
could only be fulfilled through the continuance of conscription. According to 
Scharping’s reform concept: ‘Territorial defence allows us to fulfill our obligations to 
the NATO alliance . It also provides the capabilities necessary for peace-making and 
peace-keeping operations’.
As we have seen in chapter five, a number of factors combined to marginalise the 
Weizsacker Commission’s recommendations. In turn, tthey help to explain why 
Europeanisation - as both a top-down and a bottom-up process - had little impact on 
Bundeswehr reform. The Helsinki Headline Goals had Ibeen agreed by foreign 
ministers in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU llevel. The ‘bottom-up’ process 
of Europeanisation -  Germany as an agent of Europeaniisation - was a product of the 
main domestic players in intergovernmental negotiatioms, most importantly the 
Foreign Minister and his supportive institutional apparaitus, the Foreign Office, under 
the strategic guidance of the Chancellor’s Office and thie Chancellor. This interaction 
between structure and agency is crucial in determining tthe model of CESDP promoted 
by Germany on the EU level. It is well know that the Foreign Ministry embodies a 
political and organizational culture that is ‘Europeanist”, perceiving the EU as the key 
institutional framework for German foreign policy.
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium dler Verteiidigung, Points 1 and 7
‘Die Bundeswehr, Sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert, Eckpfeilier fiir einie Emeuerung von Grund auf’ 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, point 4, passed by cabinet om 14,06.2000
Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. (2000) Germany'sEurtopean Diplomacy (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press), p.25
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However organizational culture cannot be seen as the sole determinant of policy -  it 
does not stand alone and is reproduced and altered by the actions of actors. As has 
been highlighted above, the Foreign Ministry’s Europeanist outlook is a result of the 
symbiosis between the enabling strategic context of a foreign minister as leader of a 
smaller coalition partner and the ministry’s European bias, with both acting to 
reinforce the other. The position of Fischer and earlier Genscher as important leaders 
of their respective parties allowed for greater risk-taking and entrepreneurship within 
the Foreign Ministry in EU policy. Successive foreign ministers - Genscher, Kinkel 
(to a more limited extent) and Fischer - have been keen to press for increased co­
operation in the field of foreign and security policy and the extension of this co­
operation into defence.
Whilst Joschka Fischer and the Foreign Ministry were central in driving the agenda of 
CESDP and shaping its institutional structures, the implementation of the Helsinki 
Headline Goals fell on the Defence Ministry. In the context of Germany as an ‘object’ 
of Europeanisation, the Defence Ministry was the crucial institution; the key actor 
was Rudolf Scharping. However, in order to understand the process fully, the net must 
be cast wider for a number of domestic political factors also served to influence the 
extent to which German defence and security policy was influenced by the creation of 
new institutions on the EU level.
The Defence Ministry’s strong Atlanticist orientation meant that NATO rather than 
the EU was viewed as the most robust and crucial pillar of German defence and 
security policy. However, organizational and political culture does not provide as 
complete an explanation as constructivists posit.^^  ^Again, we must turn to the role 
played by agency and the theme of policy leadership. After the discursive stagnation 
of the Denkverbot under the last two years of Volker Rühe’s stewardship.
Longhurst, K. (2000) Strategic Culture, The Key to Understanding German Security Policy? 
Birmingham University, PhD Thesis.
Longhurst, K. (2000) German Strategic Culture, A Key to Understanding the Maintenance o f 
Conscription, University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies Discussion Papers,
Longhurst K. (2003) Why Aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the 
Persistence of Conscription, German Politics, Vol. 12, No.2 pp.147-165
Maull, H. (1990/91). ‘Germany and Japan, The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 69, 5, pp. 91- 
106.
Maull. H. (Ed.) (1995) ‘Deutschland's Neue Aussenpolitik’ (München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag)
Maull, H. (2000). ‘German Foreign Policy Post-Kosovo, Still a Civilian Power’. Paper to the Annual 
Conference of the Association for the Study of German Pohtics, London, 27-28 April.
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conservative figures within the Defence Ministry were dominant. They opposed a 
shift away from conscription that would have freed up the resources and provided the 
professional soldiers able to spend a number of months abroad, thereby restructuring 
the German armed forces to fully take part in crisis-management tasks.
Key figures within the Defence Ministry (notably Kujat, Schneiderhan, Langer, von 
Kirchbach) were prone to mistrust the new institutions on the EU level.^^  ^Rather than 
being seen as complimentary to NATO, the PSC and other new EU structures in the 
Council were perceived as lacking the necessary credibility to inform the restructuring 
of the German armed forces. Without close co-ordination between the institutions of 
the EU and NATO, particularly in the area of force planning negotiations, figures 
within the Defence Ministry were sceptical of the value of the new EU structures.
There were regular meetings between German NATO and EU officials in Berlin, with 
the aim of promoting an exchange of ideas and developing common concepts. 
However, the essential problem for the EU in defence and security policy was that it 
was seen as a threat to NATO within the Fiihrungsstab of the Defence Ministry. 
Arguably, no other area of EU policy faces such institutional competition as CESDP. 
Added to this, the Helsinki Headline Goals are not enforceable by the European Court 
of Justice, and no other policy area is more jealously guarded by nation states than 
defence and security. As Miskimmon and Paterson highlight, the lack of an external 
body to enforce co-ordination and of a sectoral interest providing extra impetus to 
CESDP serves to limits the scope of Europeanisation of the policy area.^^^
In this context the issue of institutional credibility is important in understanding why 
the Defence Ministry was unreceptive to the EU as a forum for the development of 
German defence and security policy. The greater institutional credibility of NATO
119 Interviews, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6 August 2000 and Bonn, 23'‘*.September 2002.
In one interview with a high ranking General in the Planning Staff on 6‘ . August 2002 when asked 
the question: ‘What level of ‘top down’ pressure is felt in the Defence Ministry from the EU to adapt to 
the Helsinki Headline Goals and develop a more EU-orientated security policy’, the answer given was 
simply: ‘None’. Whilst this may be an exception it demonstrates the intractability of some leading 
figures to contemplate any challenge to the leading role of NATO. These finding were also supported 
by interviews in NATO, September 2002. Also, during a number of informal conversations with high- 
ranking officials in the EU the summer of 2002, a high degree of pessimism and disappointment was 
expressed about the difficulties encountered by the EU in altering the NATO-orientated mindset of 
some within the Defence Ministry.
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within the Defence Ministry is more than just a product of elite socialization and 
‘strategic culture’. The institutional credibility of NATO stems from policy 
leadership, namely the unwillingness of both Rühe and Scharping to appoint or 
promote pro-Europeanist 'Vordenkers' within the Defence M in is try .T h is  is not to 
imply that the EU had no influence upon German defence policy. Within the Defence 
Ministry, compliance with the Helsinki Headline Goals and Capabilities Goals was 
seen as being complimentary to NATO requirements. Under NATO force proposals, 
the German armed forces were committed to be capable of participating in three 
operations: interoperability, flexibility and speedy deployment were the catchwords. 
Also, the Capabilities Goals outlined by the EU were in close accordance with those 
outlined by NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative. It was not the Helsinki Headline 
Goals that was perceived as a threat to NATO but the longer-term consequences of a 
stronger European defence dimension, consequences that were spelt out by the 
Weizsacker Commission. Hence, whilst Germany adapted its armed forces to be able 
to participate in a European reaction force of 50-60,000 troops available at 60 days 
notice, this commitment and deployment did not represent a ‘Europeanisation’ of the 
Defence Ministry.
Whilst Miskimmon and Paterson highlight the importance of Smith’s processes of 
‘elite socialisation’ and ‘bureaucratic reorganisation’, policy leadership must take 
centre stage. The new Military Committee and the Military Staff set up on the EU 
level has led to a process of limited elite socialization. However, the quality of elite 
socialization taking place within the NATO context is much higher and crucially a 
long-standing pillar of the organizational and institutional culture of the Defence 
Ministry.Furthermore, this pillar had been strengthened during the 1990s. 
However, organizational culture and elite socialization are not ‘stand-alone’ concepts; 
they are supported, adapted or challenged by policy leaders. During the 1990s Volker 
Rühe exploited the Atlanticist orientation of the Defence Ministry as a framework 
within which to practise his ‘salami t a c t i c s H e  was skilled in manipulating the
Interviews, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14th, August 2002, also. Interviews with Axel Schneider, SPD 
Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, 4th. September 2002.
Interviews, NATO, Brussels, lb**' and 17‘*' September 2002; Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6*. August 
2002
Interview, Herr Bemd Weber (Referent, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgmppe
Verteidigung), Berlin, 26th. August 2002
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organizational culture of the Defence Ministry to stall forces for change during the 
Denkverbot, by placing conservative figures in key positions and thereby hindering 
the process of policy-orientated learning. The presence of former Defence Minister 
Manfred Worner at NATO and of Klaus Naumann as General Inspector of the 
Bundeswehr, along with a supportive domestic political context, meant that NATO 
could provide adaptation to the new post-Cold War security environment by 
developing the ability to engage in crisis management.
Concomitantly, when domestic political factors unfavourable to further reforms of the 
German armed forces narrowed Rühe’s strategic political context, he used the 
Atlanticist organizational culture to stress the importance of territorial defence and 
collective defence, empowering traditionalist figures within the ministry and 
discouraging 'Vordenkers’}^^ The ‘mediating factors’ of institutional culture and the 
role of individuals are thus intertwined. Actors play a key role in promoting new 
policy images or policy stasis within institutions, drawing analysis back to the role of 
individual policy leadership as a key variable in the process of Europeanisation.
When Scharping was appointed Defence Minister, he perpetuated the discursive 
stagnation by working with rather than replacing key figures appointed by Volker 
Rühe.^^  ^Rather than instigating wide debate within the Defence Ministry about the 
institutional frameworks of German defence policy, reform was dominated by 
conservative voices. An example was von Kirchbach’s conservative internal reform 
concept, which led to his dismissal by Scharping. The Atlanticist orientation of such 
figures and their conservative worldview meant that the EU crisis-reaction capabilities 
were seen as a threat to the deeply embedded, traditional policy image of territorial 
defence, conscription and the even spatial distribution of the armed forces. By 
challenging the policy image of territorial defence, the EU also threatened large-scale 
base closures and troop reductions.
Buchholtz, D. ‘Soldat in bewegter Zeit: General Naumann pragte die Bundeswehr im Umbruch’, 
IFDT, 1/1996; see also Naumann, K, ‘Bundeswehr vor neue Herausvorderungen’ in Soldat und 
Technik, 1/1995; see also ‘Abscheid eines politischen Kopfs’, Der Tagesspiegel, 06/02/1996
Interviews, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6th. 2002, Bonn, 23rd. September 2002 also. Interview, Axel 
Schneider, SPD BundestagsfraÜion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, 10th. September 2002 
Interviews, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, August/September 2002
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On the other hand, NATO was a far less threatening institution to the Defence 
Ministry. Whilst NATO pressurised Germany to restructure its forces to enable it to 
engage in crisis-reaction capabilities, it presented no threat to territorial and collective 
defence as the core task of the German armed forces. NATO was an institution within 
which the increasing pressure for crisis-reaction capabilities could be reconciled with 
the domestic pressures upon Rühe and Scharping to prevent significant ‘positive 
feedback’ and a ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Figures such as Manfred Womer and Klaus 
Naumann focused on spearheading the adaptation of NATO to crisis reaction 
capabilities. However, unlike the concept of a European Rapid Reaction Force,
NATO did not threaten the main raison d’etre of the German armed forces as 
territorial defence. In contrast, there was considerable resistance to the ‘top-down’ 
pressures of Europeanisation within the Defence Ministry.
NATO was endowed with a high degree of credibility by history. Not only had it been 
the framework within which Germany had weathered the Cold War, but it had also 
been championed successfully by Volker Rühe during the 1990s as the framework 
within which Germany was to engage in its first international military engagements 
since the Second World War. It was an institution within which Germany had been 
engaging in force planning for over 50 years and a tmsted fomm of elite socialization. 
The proposals of the Weizsacker Commission were simply ‘too European’ for the 
Defence Ministry.
Domestic political factors served to weaken the ‘European imperative’ in the 
Weizsacker Report, providing no real incentive for the Defence Minister to justify 
Bundeswehr reform in these terms. As has been highlighted, Scharping had a much 
broader and more complex follower need satisfaction than Joschka Fischer. Fischer 
was secure as leader of the Green party and in a position to engage in policy 
entrepreneurship on CESDP. In contrast, Scharping’s political ambitions, most 
notably of being Chancellor, meant that he had to take into account the effects of his 
policy upon his personal standing within the SPD. As far as he was concerned, a 
radical reshaping of the Bundeswehr that would free up funds for long-term 
investment was out of the question because it meant high short- to medium-term costs
128 Interview, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23^**. September 2002
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for broader SPD goals (notably budget consolidation and a strong welfare state). Base
closures would create many political enemies within his own party.129
Scharping was unable to escape the constraints of the budget consolidation, resulting 
from Germany’s commitment to staying within the 3% fiscal deficit limit in the EU's 
Stability and Growth Pact. The Weizsacker Commission and the EU’s focus upon 
crisis-reaction capabilities suggested increased government spending. A full 
implementation of the Weizsacker Commission would have placed a question mark 
over the system of Ersatzdienst. The short- to medium-term costs to the social system 
from an end to Zivildienst would have undermined any attempt at budget 
consolidation and threatened basic pillars of the SPD’s party programme (as outlined 
in chapter 5). It is also important to note how the Europeanisation of one policy area: - 
monetary policy and fiscal rules - has a negative effect upon a state's willingness and 
ability to adapt in other areas of European policy.
Whilst Scharping’s reform concept was championed as an 'Erneuerung vom Grund 
auf (Fundamental Renewal) it was in effect a compromise. On the one hand, it sought 
to take account of the pressures emanating from the EU, stressing the necessity for the 
adaptation of structures to crisis-reaction tasks, and crucially an end to conscription 
(in order to free up resources in the long term for investment in equipment needed for 
such tasks). On the other, it accommodated to the pressures for a continuance with 
territorial defence as the dominant policy image shaping the structure of the German 
armed forces. Whilst the reform concept presented by Scharping allowed Germany to 
contribute to the limited proposals of the Helsinki Headline Goals, it did not free 
resources for investment in new equipment.
The ‘top-down’ Europeanisation of the German armed forces was hindered by the 
unwillingness of Scharping to take political risks on behalf of crisis-reaction 
capabilities. Political leadership plays a key role in the Europeanisation process. 
Whilst Fischer’s strategic context allowed him to act as a policy entrepreneur in 
CESDP, Scharping faced a much more constraining strategic context which confined 
him to the role of policy broker - and, seen from the Weizsacker Commission's
Interview, Herr van den Busche, Referent, Biiro Volker Kroning, Berlin, 15th, August 2002
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perspective, of ‘veto player’ on relating Bundeswehr reform to CESDP, Scharping 
had welcomed the Helsinki Headline Goals as compatible with NATO requirements 
and had hoped that they might herald a greater share of the budget. However, he 
hesitated when faced with the implications of further European integration in the area 
of CESDP as spelt out by the Weizsacker Commission - a change to the policy 
monopoly. Scharping’s policy brokerage role on behalf of a common European 
defence policy had taken shape during the SPD’s period in opposition, and, akin to 
Rühe, involved the development of a European crisis-reaction capability as part of a 
European pillar of NATO. This position did not change as a result of the Kosovo 
conflict.
6.8 Conclusion
Successive German Defence Ministers were successful in ensuring only a very limited 
Europeanisation of Bundeswehr policy. Their policy leadership was directed at 
managing both Atlanticisation and Europeanisation so as to minimise 'misfit', 
potential top-down adaptational pressures and a revision of the assumptions on which 
Bundeswehr policy had been based. EU effects on the structures of the Defence 
Ministry were even more negligible. In structural terms it remained the least European 
of German ministries.M oreover, there was only a very limited increase in the 
Europeanness of values and in the willingness to exploit EU institutional venues. The 
Defence Ministry was, in short, reactive in dealing with CESDP. This strongly 
reactive role, and limited Europeanisation, had its roots in a traditional deep 
commitment to NATO as the prime multilateral institution for collective defence.
Even then, Atlanticisation was carefully managed so that it did not challenge 
traditional policy assumptions about the Bundeswehr.
German policy towards CESDP was characterised by a weak 'co-ordinative' discourse 
at elite levels about its aims and objectives, with the Foreign Ministry being far bolder 
than the Defence Ministry. The tensions between Atlanticisation and Europeanisation 
and the problems of reconciling the notion of an autonomous European defence
Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. ‘The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy, On 
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capability with the traditional ’bridge' concept made it difficult to forge and sustain a 
'common language and framework through which key policy makers can come to 
agreement in the construction of a policy programme'.^^^ Fischer saw CESDP as 
essentially a European project that depended on working closely with the French. It 
was part of the integrationist logic of the Foreign Ministry. Scharping saw CESDP as 
a limited venue that had nothing to do with the main Defence Ministry business of 
collective defence. For him CESDP raised sensitive and critical issues of force 
readiness, deployability and sustainability and, not least, of designing appropriate 
structures and procedures for consultation with NATO, especially on military capacity 
and the transfer of assets. Crucially, the Foreign and Defence Ministries differed in 
the way in which they defined the point at which CESDP might compromise the 
relationship with the US. The Defence Ministry - reflecting its NATO orientation - 
was much more cautious. Hence German policy towards CESDP lacked the unified 
’co-ordinative’ discourse of French policy makers or British policy makers. It was 
more difficult for other EU partners to interpret. The Foreign Ministry was closer to 
French positions, the Defence Ministry to British positions.
This disjointed ’co-ordinative’ discourse made for difficulties for policy leaders in 
engaging in ’communicative’ discourse on CESDP: that is, in seeking to persuade the 
German public ’(through discussion and deliberation) that the policies developed at 
the co-ordinative phase are necessary (cognitive function) and appropriate (normative 
function)’.^ ^^  CESDP did not achieve a high-profile role in policy leadership under the 
Kohl and first Schroder governments because there was not sufficient consensus on its 
necessity (in terms of the problems in NATO) and on its appropriateness (given the 
risks to Germany’s traditional bridge role between the Atlantic Alliance and Europe). 
Hence policy leaders were reluctant to justify radical Bundeswehr reform as necessary 
or appropriate to the future requirements of CESDP. The Weizsacker Commission 
developed a communicative discourse about Bundeswehr reform that stressed 
CESDP, but this approach lacked wider political resonance.
Schmidt, V. (2001) ‘The Politics of Economic Adjustment in France and Britain, When Does 
Discourse Matter?’ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.8, pp.247-264
Schmidt, V. (2001) ‘The Politics of Economic Adjustment in France and Britain, When Does 
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The process of Europeanisation was mediated and delayed by a Defence Ministry that 
was deeply committed to the primacy of NATO for collective defence and that saw in 
NATO a more secure shield for retaining traditional assumptions about the role and 
structure of the Bundeswehr. However, the Defence Ministry did not have a single 
coherent identity that shaped how its policy leaders behaved. Atlanticisation vied with 
the notion of the Bundeswehr as a citizens' army of conscripts that was committed to 
territorial defence. Policy leaders manoeuvred within, as well as were shaped by, this 
complex identity context. Atlanticisation was not primarily a top-down process. 
Defence Ministry policy leaders instrumentalised it for the purpose of protecting 
inherited notions about the Bundeswehr. The reform of the Bundeswehr does not, 
consequently, reveal a 'penetrated' German polity - whether by NATO or the EU - but 
a polity with a complex set of post-war identities that provide the context for policy 
leadership.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 The Main Findings
This thesis has applied public policy theory to explain how German defence and 
security policy has changed in the period 1990-2002, within the ‘policy subsystem’ of 
the Bundeswehr. It focuses on the roles, styles and strategies of leadership in policy 
change in the context of examining five analytical perspectives about policy change 
that are derived from public policy theory:
Perspective 1. The context and opportunity for major policy change is provided by 
significant perturbations external to the policy subsystem, notably the effects o f 
international crises, governmental changes, 'public opinion' shocks for instance as 
manifested in Lander elections, changes emanating from other policy subsystems 
including international institutions like NATO and the EU (NATO-isation and 
Europeanisation), and court rulings on Bundeswehr reform.
Perspective 1.1: Significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, 
but not sufficient, cause o f change in the policy core attributes
Perspective 2. Policy change requires a shift within the policy subsystem in the 
coalition in power so that new beliefs are brought to bear on policy.
Perspective 3. Policy change is a long-term process, requiring policy-oriented 
learning by means o f technical information and analysis o f the nature and magnitude 
o f problems, their causes, and the probable impacts o f different policy solutions.
Perspective 4. Policy change requires skilful policy entrepreneurs, capable o f 
manipulating short-term 'windows o f opportunity' to bring new ideas to bear. These 
windows are opened by 'compelling problems' or by events in the 'politics' stream.
279
Perspective 5. Policy change requires a shift o f institutional venue, bringing in new 
actors and ideas and changing the decisional bias.
In particular, attention is paid to the three leadership roles of policy entrepreneur, 
policy broker and policy veto player with reference to the governments of Helmut 
Kohl and Gerhard Schroder and the Federal Defence Ministers Volker Rühe (1992- 
98) and Rudolf Scharping (1998-2002), in contrast to the ‘contextualist’ consensus 
that dominates the literature on German defence and security policy crediting 
structure, culture and inheritance from the past with explanatory power, the thesis has 
demonstrated how ‘political culture’ is also a product of agency. The thesis has 
utilised an interactionist approach to policy leadership that draws out the complex 
relationship between leadership skills and strategic political context.
The thesis has broken new ground in German defence and security studies by testing 
the value of explanations drawn from public policy theory and in particular by 
examining whether they allow a clearer understanding of the causal mechanisms at 
work in determining policy change. Policy theory is concerned with understanding the 
role played by ideas in policy change, the precise mechanisms through which some 
ideas are successful and others not, and crucially the role of agency in this process. 
Hence the thesis has provided a clearer understanding of the relationship between 
structure and agency. Public policy theory is well adapted to this task because it is 
concerned with the transmission of ideas and argument, in short with the cognitive 
basis of policy.
Thus the initial chapter set out the methodological and theoretical approach of the 
thesis, examining the concept of policy leadership. The chapter set out a set of 
analytical perspectives based upon public policy theory and developed the 
‘interactionist’ approach to leadership. It argued that in order to understand policy 
change we must look deeper into the relationship between structure and agency -  that 
to the extent that policy change in German defence and security policy is culturally 
conditioned, culture is an accomplishment of actors who are not simply a product of 
their institutional environments. The conceptual approach outlined in Chapter 1 
therefore unites the insights of pubhc policy theories: advocacy coalition theory, 
multiple streams theory and punctuated equilibrium theory and illustrates the
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important role of policy leadership, either as policy entrepreneurs, adopting often 
radical policy solutions and changing the policy image, policy broker, negotiating a 
consensus between competing policy beliefs or policy veto-player, minimising the 
political costs of pressures for policy change emanating from the policy subsystem. 
Leaders are demonstrated as being vital to policy-making, through the use of policy 
orientated learning by using information to reframe issues or appointing particular 
figures in key positions to act as ‘gatekeepers’ of policy orientated learning, selecting 
policy forums or changing institutional venues. It is argued that this approach gives a 
clearer account of the causal mechanisms involved in the process of policy change.
Chapter 2 set the context for the case study of Bundeswehr reform from 1990-2002 by 
focusing on the characteristics of the policy subsystem and how the institutional 
organization of the armed forces, defence and security policy, foreign policy and 
budgetary policy, and not least the relationship to NATO and to the European Union, 
determines the scope for, and nature of, policy leadership in Bundeswehr reform. The 
chapter argues that the institutional context of the policy subsystem influences the 
types of leadership styles employed by policy leaders, favouring policy brokerage and 
veto-playing over policy entrepreneurship, circumscribing the room for and potential 
gains of policy entrepreneurship.
Chapter three applies the theoretical approach to the Bundeswehr during the Cold War 
and sets the scene for the case study of the period 1990-2002 by explaining the post- 
Cold War context of Bundeswehr reform. The chapter uses the advocacy coalition and 
punctuated equilibrium theory approaches to conceptualise the Bundeswehr policy 
subsystem, identifying three contending coalitions: the freedom coalition, peace 
coalition and the ‘outsider’ pacifist coalition. The freedom coalition was centred 
around the CDU/CSU and right of the SPD with a shared policy core belief in the 
Western way of life and Atlanticist in approach. The peace coalition was rooted in the 
‘realist’ wing of the Green Party and centre left of the SPD. Its deep core beliefs were 
a commitment to peace, internationally negotiated disarmament and arms control. The 
third coalition, the pacifist coalition was characterised by a deep core belief in its 
fundamental opposition to war, advocating unilateral disarmament and neutrality and 
found its home within the fundamentalist wing of the Green Party.
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The chapter argues that the dominant coalition was the freedom coalition. However, 
despite the overall adversarial contest about defence and security policy, the chapter 
argues that Bundeswehr policy subsystem during this period can be understood in 
terms of punctuated equilibrium theory. It was dominated by a policy monopoly with 
a supportive and deeply entrenched policy image of Landes- and 
BUndnisverteidigung, of conscription and of ‘citizens in uniform*. The policy 
monopoly was spread widely across the Federal Defence Ministry, the Chancellor’s 
Office, the Foreign Ministry, the two main ‘catch-alT parties (Volksparteien) of the 
CDU/CSU the SPD, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Lander governments and a 
range of social institutions like the churches and the trade unions and was supported 
by the international institutions in which Germany was embedded. Thus the Chapter 
argues that the policy monopoly was not only supported by the policy subsystem but 
also the wider political system, the external constraints of the international treaty 
system, the Federal Constitutional Court, Lander interest in maintaining military 
bases and several other constraints. The chapter also demonstrates the importance of 
Adenauer’s choice of policy brokerage as a leadership role, founding the Bundeswehr 
upon careful cross-party management and consensus ensuring a policy monopoly on 
the Bundeswehr.
Therefore chapter three argues that policy change during the Cold War period was 
‘third order change’, focusing on the adaptation of existing policy instrument such as 
the length of conscription rather than the creation of new policy instruments.
The chapter also points to limitations with the ACF: the difficulty of fitting all actors 
and institutions into particular coalitions; the lack of co-ordinated behaviour over a 
long period of time despite conunon policy beliefs, highlighted by the way in which 
the FDP and Green parties both came to support a professional Bundeswehr without 
much co-ordinated action. Finally, and most importantly, the chapter demonstrates 
that it is individual actors who seek out leadership roles in policy-making, not 
advocacy coalitions.
The fourth chapter illustrated the post-Cold War period of the Kohl Chancellorship 
(1990-1998) and the change of the Bundeswehr to an issue of ‘second order change’, 
though changes in the security environment and the responses of key policy leaders.
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The chapter tests the analytical perspectives of policy change against original 
empirical material, shining light in particular upon the role of policy entrepreneurs, 
shifts of institutional venue, and policy-oriented learning as variables in explaining 
change. The chapter is an examination of policy leadership, especially the traits, styles 
and strategic context, highlighting how policy leaders negotiated the complex 
domestic institutional context and international security environment. The chapter 
also highlights the importance of the cross-fertilisation approach of the thesis and the 
importance of allowing the analytical perspectives of public policy theory to 
complement each other. However, above all, the chapter is demonstrative of the role 
of the policy leader and agency in the policy making process.
The chapter found that policy leadership under the Kohl Chancellorship took the form 
of organising or blocking policy orientated learning and managing institutional 
venues, with policy leaders seeking to control the flow of ideas. Leaders from the 
wider political system, the CDU/CSU and SPD party leadership played important 
roles in intervening to halt new ideas developing with the Bundeswehr policy 
subsystem which would have negative consequences for the electoral fortunes of the 
CDU/CSU and SPD. Thus pressures for change which emanated form the policy 
subsystem as a consequence of policy-orientated learning was blocked by the macro­
political level, meaning Rühe, Kinkel, Verheugen and Wiezorek-Zeul were unable to 
act as successful policy entrepreneurs on conscription.
The chapter finds that the CDU/CSU were reluctant to open up a debate about 
Landes- and Bundesverteidgung for several reasons:
• the potential political costs of further base closures and the internal strife and 
image of disunity that could be occasioned within the CDU/CSU
• the desire to avoid internal coalition conflict with the FDP
• the macro-economic situation and EMU commitments which combined to restrict 
the defence budget and place a premium on the peace dividend
• the economic and social consequences of abolishing conscription, and the 
abolition of Zivildienst, were far too uncertain
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• the deep political sensitivity to debating conscription because it touched on 
fundamental and entrenched beliefs about the German polity and citizenship.
Hence Ruhe’s reform of 1994 outlined a Bundeswehr of 340,000, containing 140,000 
conscripts and 53,600 crisis reaction troops deployable at short notice, with a military 
service of 10 months, allowing the Bundeswehr a limited crisis reaction role without 
threatening the policy monopoly of Landesverteidigung and conscription. The chapter 
illustrates how Riihe’s policy leadership was the crucial factor within a macro­
political context of electoral-strategic interests and ideological factors. Rühe 
demonstrated much skill in practising a form of salami tactics that brought SPD 
members of the Bundestag Defence Committee on board with his evolving policy on 
out-of-area operations. Rühe’s skill was evident in the way in which he carefully kept 
a consensus whilst using Europeanisation as a basis for moving the consensus towards 
a redefined role for the Bundeswehr. Rühe also demonstrated skill in adapting his 
leadership role and style to changing assessments of the electoral-strategic interests of 
the CDU/CSU and to the necessity for internal party unity. In particular, Rühe was at 
pains not to anger regional leaders through severe base closures or court problems 
with the social wing of the CDU by putting Zivildienst in question.
Hence chapter 4 highlights how strategic culture can provide only a partial 
understanding of Bundeswehr policy change. The chapter demonstrates that Rühe was 
able to use German strategic culture selectively to provide himself with a political 
rationale, either to promote policy change (as consistent with Germany's European 
vocation) or to block change (as leading to a 'pure intervention' Bundeswehr).
Strategic culture cannot illustrate the pragmatism of policy leaders in dealing with 
external events and developments and relating them to generational change, electoral- 
strategic interests and ideological renewal. The chapter clearly demonstrates that 
cultural approaches neglect the characteristics of the Bundeswehr as a policy 
subsystem and how it relates to the defence and security policy subsystem in which it 
is embedded. In particular, the policy-orientated learning that followed from out-of­
area operations meant that the pressures for change were greater from within the 
policy subsystem than in the wider political system. The chapter also shows how core 
policy beliefs about the Bundeswehr are intertwined in a complicated symbiotic
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relationship with the dynamics of electoral-strategic interests in securing party unity 
and governmental power and are also closely bound to core policy beliefs in related 
policy subsystems, especially budgetary policy and social policy. The linkage to 
European policy was associated with the increasingly important theme of 
Europeanisation. The chapter illustrates how such connections between policy 
subsystems, combined with electoral-strategic interests, are key to shaping the 
potential scope for change and define the boundaries of policy leadership.
Rational choice institutionalism, a part dependency form of historical institutionalism 
or a constructivist account in terms of strategic culture cannot explain the changes in 
Rühe’s leadership role and style over Bundeswehr reform. Initially in the period 
1992-94 he sought change to the policy core of the Bundeswehr, facilitated by the 
presence of a key Vordenker^ General Naumann, who encouraged policy orientated 
learning about its roles and structures. Thus the Defence Ministry began to develop its 
own dynamics of change which threatened to escape political control. In order to 
regain political control, and reduce electoral-strategic risks, Rühe replaced and 
marginalized key agents of change within the Defence Ministry. Hence more was at 
work than just strategic culture acting as a constraining variable on policy change.
The flow of policy ideas was manipulated by the leadership in order to promote and 
protect their own political interests. In short, policy leadership was important in 
defining the direction, scope and pace of policy change.
The fifth chapter applied the theoretical approach in the context of the Red/Green 
government and discovered that the legislative period encompassing the 
Schroder/Fischer administration was illustrative primarily of the importance of the 
policy leader, in particular the role of the ‘policy broker’. Whilst leadership played an 
important role, the strategic context within which Scharping was operating made 
policy entrepreneurship impossible. The domestic politics stream could not be 
coupled with the problems and policies streams. The international context of the 
Helsinki Headline Goals militated against a ‘policy veto’ role thus the strategic 
context constrained Scharping into his role as policy broker, making humdrum 
leadership the optimum strategy for Scharping and the SPD.
285
Whilst policy brokerage would normally be associated with the context of competing 
coalitions and advocacy coalition theory, the Schroder/Fischer period saw policy 
brokerage acting within a context best explained by perspective five: punctuated 
equilibrium theory. The period 1998-2002 did see the development of a ‘nascent’ 
advocacy coalition advocating from common deep core beliefs. However, there was a 
clear ‘policy monopoly’ supportive of the policy image of territorial defence. It was in 
the interests of Schroder and Scharping to ensure that the ‘politics of punctuation’ did 
not take place and to maintain the ‘policy monopoly’.
A number of factors militated in favour of a continuation of the policy monopoly:
• The unwillingness of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to put his full political 
weight behind the Weizsacker Report, particularly given the continuing 
sensitivities within the Green Party about ‘out-of-area’ deployments.
• The unwillingness of the CDU/CSU opposition (unlike the FDP) to embrace 
and mobilize around the new policy image of a professional, crisis-prevention 
Bundeswehr.
• Scharping's conception of the difficulties of managing policy change within 
the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems.
• The lack of political power and influence of Scharping, not least vis-à-vis 
Schroder.
• The primacy that Schroder gave to backing Eichel’s budget consolidation 
programme, with consequent strict financial constraints on the Bundeswehr.
• The deep political sensitivities within the social care policy subsystem about 
the vital role of ziviler Ersatzdienst as a central pillar of social policy and fear 
that the end of conscription would lead to the collapse of this pillar, with large 
transitional and short to medium term financial and human costs
• The electoral strategic constraints that faced the SPD/Green government, with 
a number of sensitive mid-term Lander elections. The SPD federal executive 
and the Federal Chancellor’s Office hesitated in dealing with the political ‘fall 
out’ from large-scale base closures
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• The vested interests within the Federal Defence Ministry, notably within the 
FUhrungsstab, which consisted of many Rühe appointees who continued to 
oppose the reductions in personnel that a large-scale Bundeswehr reform 
would bring.
Scharping was unwilling to act as a sponsor for radical reform and differed from his 
predecessor, Volker Rühe, in two key ways: his leadership style and context. There 
were two key contextual differences: Scharping had to contend with the radical 
proposals of the Weizsacker Commission. The concept of an expert commission had 
been developed during the period of opposition as a way of covering over and 
delaying internal party conflict about SPD Bundeswehr policy before the election 
campaign of However, the Commission created a problem of managing unintended 
consequences for the federal government and the SPD. Scharping's leadership role 
was defined by the attempt to manage these unintended consequences. The second 
critical contextual difference was the Scharping’s position as a former party rival of 
Schroder. Whereas Volker Rühe had enjoyed Kohl’s support, there was a high level 
of mistrust between Scharping and Schroder.
Scharping also contrasted in style to Rühe, as he was unable to develop and sustain 
the cross-party and even internal party confidence that Rühe had achieved. Scharping 
was not able to establish his authority within the Bundestag Defence Committee or 
within the federal government, demonstrating a combative and aggressive leadership 
style. Rühe framed the terms in which the SPD debated Bundeswehr reform through 
'salami-slicing' tactics, Scharping was less important than the Weizsacker 
Commission in framing the later terms of debate.
Scharping and the new SPD/Green government faced an important new window of 
opportunity opened by the Franco-British initiative at St.Malo. The Schroder 
government was able to use the WEU presidency and the EU presidency in the first 
half of 1999 to situate the role and structure of the Bundeswehr within a revived 
debate about European defence and security identity. Also, the Kosovo war gave 
Scharping an early opportunity to pursue agenda change about the Bundeswehr. 
However, he did not adopt a leadership role as policy entrepreneur despite the 
windows of opportunity opened by the Franco-British German initiative of St. Malo, 
the WEU and EU presidency of 1999. Scharping’s unwillingness to act heroically on
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behalf of a radical Bundeswehr reform stemmed in part from problems in the ’politics 
stream', making it unattractive for him to try to couple policies for a reformed 
Bundeswehr with urgent defence and security problems. It was also due to his lack of 
personal and political authority to take on such a role. Thus Scharping defended the 
policy monopoly, with its image of territorial defence and conscription, from the 
negative feedback of the Weizsacker Commission which recommended that the 
Bundeswehr be reduced to 240,000 with 30,000 conscripts with a 10 month term of 
service.
When seen from the perspective of conscription, what seemed like a policy brokerage 
role turns out on closer examination to be a veto-playing role. Scharping's perceived 
the Weizsacker Commission’s recommendations as too politically dangerous for his 
own ambitions. Hence the Weizsacker Commission played a brokerage role by 
providing a forum for policy-oriented learning. This forum was starved of political 
support by seeking a compromise that was based upon and sustained the traditional 
policy monopoly and image
Hence chapter five also illustrates the importance of perspective three: policy- 
orientated learning, in particular through the work of the Weizsacker Commission. 
However, again, the importance of the policy leader in acting on policy-orientated 
learning was shown to be crucial. Policy-orientated learning can only spark policy 
core change if key macro-political figures are prepared to act on its behalf. The 
success of a policy forum is dependent upon it containing members of the macro­
political system responsible for the implementation of the reform. The chapter 
demonstrates how this willingness is determined by the strategic context of policy 
leaders and their own particular leadership traits. Scharping was unwilling to create a 
crisis consciousness and to couple the streams of ‘problems, politics and policies’ in 
an unfavourable political climate.
Nevertheless, the policy monopoly did not completely escape the effects of policy- 
orientated learning. Whilst the results of the Weizsacker Commission had to a great 
extent been marginalized, the Commission started its work in the context of a 
mutually unacceptable stalemate. It was evident to all interests that the Bundeswehr 
needed a fundamental renewal to meet new challenges such as Kosovo and CESDP. 
Scharping was forced to move the German armed forces a small step closer to ‘crisis-
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prevention forces’ by reducing the number of troops to 280,000 and the number of 
conscripts to 77,000. Scharping started to use the discourse of crisis prevention, 
signifying changes to the secondary aspects of the policy monopoly. The policy 
monopoly was experiencing changes to the secondary and core policy aspects of its 
policy image of territorial defence. The need for crisis prevention forces was being 
taken seriously, and the armed forces were being designed to some extent with the 
Helsinki Headline Goals in mind. However, the deep core of territorial defence 
remained in the form of 77,000 conscripts, tying the hands of the Bundeswehr, 
stretching its finances further and constraining it in meeting its growing tasks in crisis 
management.
The dominant constructivist account of German defence and security policy argues 
that institutions embody specific norms and practises; that ‘strategic culture’ is the 
key determinant of German defence and security policy. However chapter five acts to 
demonstrate that agency and policy leadership plays a much more important role in 
German defence and security policy than constructivist approaches argue. Actors and 
institutions interact in a symbiotic relationship. Leadership, however, is the key 
variable determining the norms and practises that pervade a ministry. Within the 
Defence Ministry, Scharping’s approach to leadership and retention of many of 
Rühe’s appointees was important in maintaining the policy monopoly and ‘negative 
feedback’. Chapter 5 demonstrates the usefulness of the analytical tools of public 
policy theory and the concept of policy leadership in opening up the ‘black box’ of 
policy making, providing a much more satisfying and nuanced account of the policy 
process than the concept of strategic culture alone.
Chapter Six tackled the question of the extent to which, and the ways in which, the 
dynamics of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation affected Bundeswehr reform, 
shaping the scope and pace of domestic policy change. The chapter shows how public 
policy theory can offer new insights into the processes of Atlanticisation and 
Europeanisation, especially by highlighting the role of domestic policy leadership and 
suggests the value of public policy analysis in shifting attention from its dominant 
institutionalist perspective. In contrast to the emphasis on ’misfit’ between domestic 
and European institutional requirements as the trigger for domestic change, the 
chapter illustrated the role of domestic policy leadership in determining the extent to
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which, and the manner in which, German defence and security policy is Atlanticised 
and Europeanised.
The chapter illustrates the extent to which German defence ministers acted 
successfully to ensure only a partial Europeanisation of Bundeswehr policy and how 
policy leadership played an important role in managing Europeanisation and 
Atlanticisation to minimise top down pressure for adaptation. The Defence Ministry is 
found to have been reactive in dealing with the CESDP and to the extent that it was 
strongly Atlanticist in outlook with a commitment to NATO as the pre-eminent 
multilateral institution, this Atlanticisation was carefully managed so as not to 
threaten the policy monopoly. Indeed the Foreign Ministry with its strong Europeanist 
conunitment and integrationist logic was more proactive on the issue of CESDP and 
was viewed by Fischer as a European project necessitating strong cooperation with 
the French. Scharping, on the other hand, viewed CESDP as a threat, raising sensitive 
issue of force structures, deployability and structures for consultation with NATO. 
Most importantly, the Defence ministry was cautious about CESDP due to the 
ramifications for Germany’s relationship with the US. Thus rather than a strong ‘co- 
ordinative’ discourse between the Foreign and Defence Ministries as in France, 
CESDP in Germany was met by weak, disjointed co-ordinative discourse, with the 
Foreign Ministry closer to French positions, the Defence Ministry closer to the 
British.
As a consequence of this disjointed discourse, it was difficult for policy leaders to 
engage in communicative discourse with the German public. Under the Kohl and 
Schroder Chancellorships CESDP was not allocated high priority and profile due to a 
lack of agreement upon its necessity and appropriateness and it was not therefore 
subject to policy leadership. Bundeswehr reform would not be justified as necessary 
or appropriate to the future requirements of CESDP. Whilst the Weizsacker developed 
a conununicative discourse about CESDP, the process of Europeanisation was 
mediated and delayed by the Defence Ministry, which was conunitted to NATO as the 
key institution of German defence and security policy and reluctant to open itself up 
to the process of negative feedback which CESDP entailed.
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However, the Defence Ministry did not have a single consistent identity that shaped 
the behaviour of its policy leaders. Atlanticisation competed with the concept of the 
Bundeswehr as a citizens' army of conscripts conunitted to territorial defence. Policy 
leaders worked within, as well as were shaped by, this complex identity context. 
Atlanticisation was not primarily a top-down process. Defence Ministry policy leaders 
used it in order to protect inherited ideas about the Bundeswehr. The chapter 
demonstrates that the reform of the Bundeswehr does not, therefore, highlight a 
'penetrated' German polity - whether by NATO or the EU - but a polity with a 
complex set of post-war identities providing the context for policy leadership.
7.2 The Value of this Research
This thesis has engaged in two key tasks: to uncover new empirical material and 
improve theory on German defence and security policy. In doing so, the thesis has 
also developed new insights into the study of public policy theory and policy 
leadership.
The empirical content has added to an increasingly important field as the reform of 
the Bundeswehr, and its readiness to engage in crisis prevention tasks and European- 
wide pooling of military resources and capabilities is a key barometer of the German 
willingness to address the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ that continues to beset the 
European Union. Thus the research makes a small but significant contribution to this 
question.
The thesis makes a valuable contribution to the theories of German defence and 
security policy. Over the past decade the constructivist approach to German defence 
policy has become dominant, arguing that strategic culture, social constructivism and 
sociological institutionalism provides the best means of understanding change, or 
policy stasis in German defence and security policy and Bundeswehr reform. This 
thesis has questioned this school of thought and has developed a deeper understanding 
of the relationship between structure and agency by using insights from public policy 
with a ‘cross-fertilisation’ approach and arguing for the importance of the policy 
leader in the process of policy change, as policy entrepreneur, veto player or broker.
In doing so the thesis fills a gap in leadership studies in Germany. Whereas previous
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work has focussed upon the role of the Chancellor, and the Kanzleramt, the thesis 
focuses upon the role played by ministers and high ranking officials, using the 
analytical tools offered by public policy theory to open up the ‘black box’ of policy 
making in Germany in a more nuanced fashion than previous accounts/
Thus, in applying a new theoretical approach the thesis has not only uncovered the 
weaknesses of strategic culture in conceptualising German defence and security 
policy but also improve upon current work on public policy theory by using 
Bundeswehr reform as a means with such to test the strengths and weaknesses of 
public policy theory and the concept of policy leadership. This has ramifications not 
only for the study of German defence and security policy but for the entire study of 
public policy theories. In particular, the cross-fertilisation approach to public policy 
theory in the context of an interactionist approach to policy leadership represents an 
interesting way of developing public policy and overcoming some of its weaknesses. 
It is to the implications of this thesis for public policy theory and policy leadership 
that I will now turn.
7.3 The Implications for Public Policy Theory, the Study of Policy Leadership 
and Europeanisation
The conceptual framework has ramifications, not only for the study of German 
defence and security policy but also for the application of public policy theory to 
other areas of study. In testing the analytical perspectives of policy change derived 
from public policy theory it has become evident that the three main public policy 
theories: the ACF, multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theory are best 
viewed not as distinct and separate theories but applied in a cross-fertilisation 
approach. This provides an excellent basis from which to employ the ‘interactionist’ 
approach to leadership, which stresses the interaction between a leader’s skills and 
his/her strategic and institutional context. Such a framework is able to provide a clear 
understanding of the relationship between stmcture and agency by providing a 
comprehensive set of analytical tools with which to understand the means through 
which policy change takes place.
‘ See for example, Padgett, S. (ed.) (1994) Adenauer to Kohl: The Development o f the German 
Chancellorship (London, Hurst)
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The cross-fertilisation uncovers a number of weaknesses with public policy theory. 
Most importantly, it is clear that an individual theory cannot satisfactorily explain 
policy change in the policy subsystem of Bundeswehr reform. Whilst certain aspects 
such as external crises, perturbations, professional forums, institutional venues, venue 
shopping and policy entrepreneurs/brokers are conunon to the three main public 
policy theories, public policy theory is in disagreement about the time scale of policy 
change, the causal mechanisms of policy change and the relationship between 
structure and agency. In particular PPT does not share a conunon understanding of 
leadership.
However, the cross-fertilisation approach is nevertheless not without its own 
weaknesses. The thesis could be accused however of arbitrariness in ‘picking’ 
theories to suit the empirical material. However not to do so could also lead to 
accusations of dogmatism and of attempting to find empirical material to suit the 
theoretical approach. The core principal of the theoretical approach is that previous 
accounts of German defence and security policy have been too structure-heavy. In 
attempting to uncover the complex relationship between actors and institutions it is 
best to employ a theoretical approach that allows flexibility. Thus the thesis is closest 
to ‘historical institutionalism’ where policy change is seen as ‘as the consequence... 
of strategic action...filtered through perceptions of an institutional context that 
favours certain strategies, actors and perceptions over others’. Instead of seeking to 
apply one theory to German defence policy the thesis has worked upon the premise 
that the policy making process is too complicated to apply one single approach. In the 
same way that the application of sociological and rational choice institutionalism 
privilege structure and agency respectively and would be too rigid to help open up the 
black box of policy making, the application of one single public policy approach 
would have similarly constraining effects.
Rather than develop an ‘agency-centred’ approach to policy change the interactionist 
approach’ to policy leadership based within the cross-fertilisation of public policy 
theories helps map out the relationship between structure and agency. Whereas 
strategic culture and constructivist accounts are vague when understanding the precise 
mechanisms through which policy change comes about, the application of the
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interactionist approach to policy leadership set within the context of a cross­
fertilisation of public policy theories provides the necessary conceptual tools with 
which to unpack the complexity of the policy process. To attempt this with one theory 
alone or a narrow sociological/rational choice institutional framework would be akin 
to doctor undertaking an examination of a patient without all the necessary 
instruments: it could well lead to a misdiagnosis.
The consequences for public policy theory as a field are potentially quite significant. 
The advocacy coalition framework, multiple streams theory and punctuated 
equilibrium theory are all inadequate as stand-alone explanations of policy change. 
The concept of coalitions spanning government and society united by shared deep 
core, policy core and secondary aspects is fraught with problems. There are no doubt 
cases where coalitions are clear-cut such as during the ‘peace’, ‘freedom’ and 
‘pacifist’ coalitions during the Cold War. However, the ACF was found wanting in 
the post-Cold War period. It was impossible to identify competing coalitions in the 
post-Cold War world. However, one important aspect of the ACF was of continued 
relevance throughout the thesis: policy orientated learning.
In understanding the relationship between structure and agency, policy orientated 
learning was found to be critical. The control of learning through key figures within a 
ministry is an important mechanism through which ministers (notably Rühe and 
Scharping) induce policy change or encourage policy stasis. This is of great benefit to 
the multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium approaches which although are more 
agent-centred policy-orientated learning is a concept which helps fill key gaps in 
explaining how an entrepreneur goes about coupling the three streams of politics, 
policies and problems and sheds more light upon positive or negative feedback 
processes occur in punctuated equilibrium theory.
Weaknesses and potential improvements were also found within the concept of policy 
orientated learning itself as outlined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, who outline four 
criteria necessary for a successful policy forum: composition, funding, duration and 
the context of a mutually unacceptable policy stalemate. However, in studying the 
Weizsacker Commission as a policy forum a fifth criterion was discovered: a policy 
forum must not only include members of a policy subsystem but members of the
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macro-political policy system who are ultimately responsible for implementing the 
conclusions of a policy fomm.
The research has also made an important contribution to the study of policy 
leadership. Studies of policy leadership in Germany have mainly focused on the role 
of the Chancellor and neglected the role of ministers and key ministerial figures. The 
thesis has analysed leadership at the level of the policy subsystem and has much to 
say about the determinants of policy change.
Drawing on public policy theory, the thesis has provided case studies of policy leaders 
as entrepreneurs, veto players and brokers. The use of aspects of public policy theory 
has proved to be helpful in understanding the role policy leaders play in policy 
change, demonstrating that to the extent that strategic culture is a determinant of 
German defence and security policy, it is reproduced or adapted by policy leaders.
The interaction between an actor’s personal leadership traits and skills and strategic 
context act to determine the leadership role pursued. In particular, electoral 
constraints and repercussions for the political ambitions of the policy leaders studied 
have proved to be key leadership traits.
To the extent that a single case study can lead to generalisable conclusions, the 
research has found that certain leadership traits and skills are critical to the success of 
policy entrepreneurship, brokerage and veto playing. Multiple streams theory 
describes how the ability of an entrepreneur to coupling the streams of politics, 
problems and policy is crucial but is thin on the detail of the precise mechanisms: the 
traits and skills needed in the execution of this task. A more detailed examination of 
the policy leader as animateur and entrepreneur is provided by enquiring into these 
aspects. In particular, the study of Volker Rühe illustrates the importance of policy- 
orientated learning in ‘coupling’. Rühe’s salami tactic was achieved through the 
control of policy orientated learning, using well-honed mobilisatory and conciliatory 
skills and the appointment of key figures within institutions to set in place a process 
of policy orientated learning that caused policy-core change. Without cross­
fertilisation the thesis would be bereft of the ACF’s conceptualisation of policy 
orientated learning which is of great use in distinguishing between change to 
secondary aspects, policy core and the deep core of actors beliefs system.
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Simultaneously, punctuated equilibrium theory helps provide a broader 
conceptualisation of the broader context within which entrepreneurship and policy 
learning takes place. Hence in this instance, change is couched in terms of policy 
entrepreneurship acting to instigate a process of positive feedback to the policy image 
supporting a policy monopoly of Landes/Biindnisverteidigung and Wehrpflicht, the 
extent of which is determined by the level of policy orientated learning initiated 
through the leadership traits and skills of the policy leader as entrepreneur.
However, when the interaction between a policy leader’s policy leadership traits and 
strategic context change the form of policy leadership alters dramatically. This leads 
to another important aspect of the thesis: the notion of the policy leader as veto player, 
providing an immobiliste form of policy leadership, impeding policy change. This 
concept, which most closely approximates to punctuated equilibrium theory again 
becomes more illuminating of the precise mechanisms involved in policy stasis when 
cross-fertilisation is used. Once more policy orientated-leaming is crucial. Volker 
Rühe’s salami-tactic was halted when his control of the process of policy orientated 
learning threatened to spiral out of control and effect his own political ambitions and 
the electoral success of the CDU/CSU due to the repercussions for sensitive issues 
such as base closures and social policy and the necessity to stay within the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. The replacement of General Naumann with the more 
conservative General Hartmut Bagger was the first step to act to encourage a process 
of negative feedback to the policy image, ensuring that whilst change to the policy 
monopoly had occurred on the level of secondary aspects and policy-core beliefs, the 
deep core beliefs ie. policy monopoly of Wehrpflicht and supportive policy image of 
Landes und BUndnis-Verteidigung were not threatened and that no further ‘positive 
feedback’ occurred. Rühe’s Denkverbot was about stalling the process of policy- 
orientated learning. Strategic culture, rather than informing the policy choices of Rühe 
as policy leader was used as a tool with which to control the policy process and his 
institutional contexts.
The study also gives greater depth to the concept of the leader as policy broker and 
the role played by professional forums in the policy making process, notably the 
necessity for a policy forum to contain members of the wider political system 
responsible for translating the recommendations of the policy forum into policy or
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sponsors to exist in the political system with the power and willingness to act 
successfully on behalf of the proposals of a commission. Scharping’s role as a policy 
broker on Bundeswehr reform and veto role in conscription was a result of the 
interaction between Scharping’s leadership traits and skills and his strategic political 
context. Again, policy orientated learning proved to be critical in the policy process.
The research has provided an account of three forms of policy leadership and in doing 
so has explored how policy leadership can be improved as a concept and illustrates 
the benefits of situating the study of policy leadership within a context that allows for 
a thorough exploration of the relationship between actors and institutions ie. historical 
institutionalism. Public policy theory provides a range of tools which when applied in 
a cross-fertilisation approach in support of an interactionist approach to policy 
leadership gives a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between actors 
and institutions. Concepts such as policy orientated learning and the control of 
institutional venues all help to further elucidate the role of the policy leader in the 
policy process. In examining the policy leadership traits and skills of an actor and 
how they interact with the strategic political context of the actor in question, the 
interactionist approach helps develop a better understanding of the motives and 
precise mechanisms involved in the policy making process.
The thesis has also demonstrated that the growing literature on Europeanisation can 
benefit from the application of public policy theory by highlighting the role of policy 
leaders in managing institutional venues and controlling policy orientated learning.
An interactionist approach to leadership can help provide a more nuanced and subtle 
understanding of the interaction between structure and agency in the process of 
Europeanisation. Policy leaders played a key role in the Europeanisation process as 
entrepreneurs, brokers or veto players.
This represents a new avenue of investigation for studies of Europeanisation and 
merits greater investigation. The theoretical approach could be well applied to the 
process of armed forces reform in France for example and this has already been 
recognised to some extent by Irondelle.^ France experienced ‘heroic’ leadership on 
the issue of armed forces reform by President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister
 ^Irondelle, B (2003) ‘Europeanisation without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991 
96’ Journal o f European Public Policy Vol. 10 No.2, pp.208-227
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Alain Juppe who acted as policy entrepreneurs on behalf of an emerging advocacy 
coalition in favour of a professional armed force generating a sense of crisis 
consciousness and putting in place a process of positive feedback and policy 
orientated learning, challenging the dominant policy monopoly of ‘national 
sanctuary’. This advocacy coalition was formed as a result of policy learning kick- 
started by experiences of the 1991 Gulf War and the difficulties of employing a 
conscript-based army in an age of high-technology, rapid-response warfare, policy 
learning that was promoted by key policy leaders acting as policy entrepreneurs.^ In 
contrast to Germany, France lacked a strong civil service supporting the welfare state. 
Some argued an end to conscription would swell the ranks of youth unemployed. 
However, as Irondelle concludes: ‘The reform of the armed forces in 1995-1996 
directly originated in defence budget cuts.. .the European argument was the 
sledgehammer argument. They were confronted with the ‘principe de realite’ of the 
convergence criteria’.'*
In France the top down, indirect pressures emanating from the European Union were 
used as a means of inducing policy change by actors on the domestic level, initiating a 
process of ‘positive feedback’ challenging the old policy image of territorial defence 
and conscription.^ Whereas EU pressures in Germany threatened to topple Zivildienst, 
a pillar of the welfare state, creating problems for the political standing of the defence 
minister, finance minister and chancellor they provided an opportunity for heroic 
leadership on the issue of armed forces reform. Irondelle describes a Europeanisation 
of French defence and security policy without the European Union where the idea of a 
‘European security Community’ and the pressures of adhering to the Maastricht 
Criteria were used by key actors (Chirac and Juppe) to generate a sense of ‘crisis 
consciousness’.
The strong incentives for reform on the domestic level strengthened the reform 
coalition, marginalising the ‘national sanctuary’ coalition and empowering advocates 
of radical reform to utilse the ‘indirect pressures’ from the EU to promote a
 ^McKenna, J. Justin (1997) Towards the Army of the Future, Domestic Politics and the End of 
Conscription in France, West European Politics, Vol.20, No.4, pp. 125-145 
 ^Irondelle, B (2003) ‘Europeanisation without the European Union? French Mihtary Reforms 1991- 
96’ Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 10 No.2, p.219
 ^Irondelle, B (2003) ‘Europeanisation without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991- 
96’ Journal o f European Public Policy Vol. 10 No.2, p.219
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professional armed force. Whereas in Germany Volker Rühe placed conservative 
figures in key positions in the defence ministry and implemented a 'Denkverbof to 
discourage a process of ‘positive feedback’, by 1995 in France the reform coalition 
occupied the key strategic positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Ministry. Many of those in key positions were from the advisory staff of the 
foreign minister between 1993-1995, Alain Juppe, who became Prime Minister in 
May 1995 and along with Chirac, acted as a policy entrepreneur for radical reform 
and actively encouraged policy learning and change to the policy and deep core 
beliefs about conscription and territorial defence. This also points to the nature of the 
French political system with the dominance of the President in defence and security 
policy and consequent lack of potential ‘veto players’ making policy entrepreneurship 
a more desirable strategy.
Thus the interactionist approach to policy leadership not only improves upon current 
theories of German defence and security policy but also has the potential to be applied 
to other states and to deepen our understanding of the domestic policy process and the 
phenomena of Europeanisation and Atlanticisation. The further testing of the 
conceptual approach through examinations of other military reforms and a wider 
variety of policy areas would illustrate more of the weaknesses of an interactionist 
approach to policy leadership. This would no doubt suggest improvements and 
provide a more consistent and coherent theory of policy change which seeks to unify 
the divergent approaches within the field of public policy theory and create a theory 
which recognises the necessity of allowing for the interplay between structure and 
agency and the importance of basing policy studies within the school of historical 
institutionalism, providing greater depth to the concept and role of policy orientated 
learning and use of institutional venues.
299
Appendix: Principal Interviewees
The thesis involved a number of confidential interviews, including 10 interviews in 
the Leadership Staff and Planning Staff of the Defence Ministry in Bonn (23^. 
September 2002) and Berlin (6^ , 14* and 30* August 2002) 6 interviews in the 
Finance Ministry in Bonn (28* August 2002) and Berlin (18* August 2002) and 2 
interviews in the Chancellor’s Office (14*. November 2001 and 2"**. September 
2002) I also undertook 5 confidential interviews at NATO (16* and 17* September 
2002) including the German Representation and Germans amongst the NATO staff.
My research also benefited from a number of informal conversations with figures in 
the EU military staff, with a number of academics from the Free University,
Humboldt University and Potsdam University and researchers in the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fUr Auswartige Politik and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
The fieldwork research benefited greatly from a period spent in the SPD 
parliamentary party’s working group on foreign policy (October-December 2001)
This gave me the opportunity to attend several specialist conferences and workshops 
on defence and security policy, notably in the wake of September 11, 2001. In this 
way I was able to listen to senior politicians and policy experts expound their views 
off the record and directly experience the content, style and quality of debates. I was 
also fortunate to be invited to similar conferences and workshops organized by the 
CDU and by the Greens. In consequence, I gained ready access to a range of 
politicians and officials.
Frau Margit Hellwig-Botte (Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Aussen 
und Sicherheitspolitik) Berlin, 9th. November 2001
Herr Kristian Gaiser (Head of European Policy, SPD Parteivorstand) Berlin, 12*. 
November 2001
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Herr Stephan Bôkenfôrde (Research Assistant, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) 
Forschungsgruppe V, Riistung und Rüstungskontrolle) Berlin, 20th. November 2001
Dr. Alrun Deutschmann (Research Assistant, SWF, Forschungsgruppe IV, 
Sicherheitspolitik) Berlin, 20th. November 2001
Dr. Peter Schmidt, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Head of Forschungsgruppe 1, 
Europaische Integration) Berlin, 20th. November 2001
Herr Michael Alvarez (Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Presse und Offentlichkeitsarbeit) 
Berlin, 13th. November 2001
Herr Olav Gobs (Head of European Policy, CDU Bundesgeschaftsstelle) Berlin, 21st. 
November 2001
Herr Thomas Schiller (CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter, Office of Karl 
Lamers MdB, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Aussenpolitik) (Two 
interviews) Berlin, November 15th. 2001 and 14th. Febuary 2002
Herr Dirk Sawitzky (SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter, Office of Gemot Erler 
MdB.) Berlin, 17th. July 2002
Herr Helmut Huber (Green/Bündnis90 Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter, Office of 
Anglika Beer MdB) Berlin, 18th. July 2002
Herr Jürgen Schnappertz (Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Office of Peter Struck 
MdB.) Berlin, 5th. August 2002
Herr Marcus Lackamp (CDU Bundesgeschaftsstelle, Bereich Politische Programmen 
und Analysen) Berlin, 6th. August 2002
Herr Van der Busche (SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Haushalt, Referent, 
Office of Volker Kroning MdB. Arbeitsgmppe Haushalt) Berlin, 15th. August 2002
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Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe 
Verteidigung) Berlin, 16th. August 2002
Herr Voringer (Mitarbeiter, Büro Oswald Metzger, MdB.) Berlin, 18th August, 2002
Herr Bemd Weber (Referent, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe 
Verteidigung) Berlin, 26th. August 2002
Herr Rudiger Huth (CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter Volker Riihe MdB.) 
Berlin, 26th. August 2002
Dr. Wolfgang Biermann (Head of International Policy, SPD Parteivorstand) Berlin, 
3^ .^ September 2002
Mr. Paul Williams, British Embassy, Berlin (Political-Military Affairs Division) 
Berlin, 9^. September 2002
Col. Jack Sheldon, British Embassy, Berlin (Defence and Security Policy Division) 
Berlin, 9^. September 2002
Herr Axel Schneider (Referent, SPD Artbeitsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik Offices of 
Peter Zumkly, Heidmarie Wiezoreck-Zeul, MdBs.) (Two Interviews) Berlin, 4* and 
10^. September 2002
Professor Helga Haftendom, Otto Suhr Institute, FU, Berlin (Mitglied Komission 
Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunfr der Bundeswehr) Berlin, 27th. May 2003
Herr Rudolf Scharping (Former German Defence Minister and MdB, 1998-2002) 
Berlin, 5*. June 2003
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